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ABSTRACT 
The Labour Party, having lost the General Election in 1979 after the Winter of 
Discontent, descended into internal turmoil, as the Left-dominated National Executive 
Committee (NEC) and conference sought revenge on the centre-right Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) for its alleged failures in government. In 1981, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) split from Labour, leaving the Labour Party facing possible 
electoral extinction. However, the trade unions - founders of the Labour Party - came 
to its rescue, led by a small group of dedicated general secretaries and staff, who set out 
to regain the NEC for the moderates, and to return the Labour Party to what they termed 
"sanity" and electability, by expelling Militant, safeguarding the position of Deputy 
Leader Denis Healey MP when challenged by Tony Benn MP, and delivering for Neil 
Kinnock MP (the Leader they helped install after the 1983 election) an NEC committed 
to supporting him in changing the party. 
The thesis documents the organisation of the Right within the PLP before 1981 (the 
Manifesto Group and Labour First). It then covers the internal party groupings which 
organised the Fightback of the party's traditional right (the St Ermins Group of trade 
union leaders, Labour Solidarity Campaign and Forward Labour). It details their role in 
the leadership and deputy leadership elections, in changing the NEC's political 
composition and its workings, in the expulsion of Militant, in campaigning for One 
Member One Vote, and in helping keep Moderate members within the party. 
Contrary to some academic writings, this thesis shows how this was initially undertaken 
without the support of the Leader, and it details the amount of organisational work 
needed to achieve change and assist in Labour's re-emergence as an electable party. The research draws on extensive private papers and archives, together with over 70 interviews with key players. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
As late as 1993, Mrs Thatcher was able to write that "on 28 March 1979, James 
Callaghan's Labour Government, the last Labour Government andperhaps the last 
ever, fell from office" (emphasis added)'. Whilst such a premature obituary from this 
source could have been penned more in hope than anticipation, it nevertheless might 
have looked prescient in 1980 or 198 1. At that time the Labour Party, reeling from its 
1979 defeat, faced disillusion from unions and party activists, infiltration from the 
Trotskyist Militant Tendency, a dysfunctional party apparatus, policy divides 
(especially over Europe) and a campaign to rewrite the party's constitution to transfer 
power from the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) to the conference and constituencies. 
Meanwhile the left-controlled National Executive Committee (NEC) appeared at war 
with the record of the last Labour Government, vindictive towards MPs, tolerant over 
Militant and unable to turn the party's infantry or big guns on their opponents in the 
House of Commons. 
In 1978, the lesson one reviewer drew from a study 2 of the Left's take-over of the party 
was that "that those opposed to the left must organise and be as assiduous as the left', 3 . 
This thesis relates how this advice was heeded and how Labour's traditional Right, 
weakened and tested by defections to the new Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 198 1, 
nevertheless set about their objective of reclaiming the Labour Party to make it 
electable. It is an untold story: "The campaign.. to restore a moderate NEC and put the 
Labour Party back on the rails deserves a full study to itself. It came before red roses 
and mattered more"4 . 
In embarking on this campaign in the aftermath of the 25 January 1981 Limehouse 
Declaration (which led to the SDP), Labour's "traditional Right" exhibited very 
different characteristics from those of its predecessor elements. The Labour Party, 
founded by unions and financially dependent on them, reflected both in its structure and 
its mores a division of roles between the party's constituent parts, the deference then 
common in society and a deeply loyalist tradition. Tbus the unions would (until the late 
sixties) rarely criticise a Labour government in public and, in their policy-making role 
I Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins, 1993, p. 3/4. 2 Michael Hatfield, The House the Left Built, Victor Gollancz, 1978. 
3 George Jones, "A Left House Built on Sand", Socialist Commentary, November 1978. 4 Edward Pearce, Denis Healey. A Life in Our Times, Little, Brown, 2002, p. 557. 
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in conference (where they wielded some 90% of the votes), worked to persuade rather 
than mandate the elected representatives. Similarly, local party members, having 
selected (with union input) their parliamentary candidates, largely respected MPs' 
decisions, concentrating on campaigning and supporting them within the constituency. 
The 1960s saw the break in this "settlement' 'which had until then left MPs fairly 
independent both of the unions and of the membership. Conference voted for 
unilateralism against its Leader's wishes, and so the Gaitskell-supported Campaign for 
Democratic Socialism (CDS), the first organised right-wing caucus, was formed to 
overturn this, which was achieved in short order. Hitherto, it had been the Left which 
organised (in the Tribune Group) against the PLP's right-wing majority. The other 
change in the 1960s and 1970s was the passing away of right-wing leadership in many 
trade unions, which was to impact on the Labour Party for over a decade. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, as Europe became a divisive issue, the Right again organised 
around a policy issue although its proponents were also increasingly working together 
against the Left who, in addition to winning seats year by year on the party's governing 
National Executive Committee (NEC), were increasingly vocal in their criticism of 
Labour governments. Their demands for control over MPs, the Manifesto and the 
choice of Leader were aimed at weakening the hold of the right-wing parliamentary 
leadership over the party, and to redistribute power to the rank-and-file, with MPs 
individually and collectively accountable to local activists and conference delegates5. 
Chapter Two summarises the pre- 19 81 position. 
After the SDP split, the "traditional" Right's response changed. Solidarity (bringing 
together MPs and party activists) never engaged in policy, whether on incomes policy, 
Europe or defence. And the St Ermins Group of trade unionists set itself a more limited 
and focused task - to regain control over the NEC, by disciplined use of their voting 
strength. Only this, they reasoned, could provide an NEC supportive of the 
parliamentary Leadership and one willing to create an electable Labour Party - by 
returning it, in their words, to "sanity". The St Ermins Group members largely came 
from strong, loyalist, even deferential, working-class backgrounds. Some had served as 
Labour Party agents or councillors, all were committed to the party as the route to 
improving the lives of those they represented. Their experience of the inner sanctums 
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of the party, however, and their fear of the electoral oblivion threatened by the SDp6, 
led them to put policy differences aside and to work together to produce change within 
the party. Others who shared many of their political standpoints (such as David Basnett 
of the GMWU) favoured a different, less interventionist, approach whereby policy 
differences would be held at bay by keeping them out of the public eye and making 
some common cause with the Left, so as to win an agreement to live with their 
differences, and to park further changes to the party's structure. 
The Right described in this thesis wanted no such compromise with the Left, partly 
drawing on the lessons of a previous generation 7, but mostly because polling evidence 
showed the electorate's rejection of the Left's policies and behaviour. There was an 
urgency to their task, as the SDP notched up by-election victories, and they foresaw the 
possibility of being eclipsed by them in the general election. They were thus driven by 
electoral, rather than sectarian, considerations. In Kinnock's words, speaking of the 
trade unionists, "the fact of the matter is, and this took me quite a time - perhaps as 
much as a year - to recognise, that these people were not organising for classic Right 
wing hegemony in the Labour Party. But they were organising in favour of the Labour 
Party. .. [They were] immensely irritated by the nutters, .. frustrated by the extended 
weakness of the Party"8. 
The trade unionists also had doubts about the parliamentarians' reliability. It was, after 
all, MPs (not the Electoral College) who had chosen Michael Foot as Leader (under 
whom the SDP defected and who was proving an electoral liability). The unions had 
witnessed a lack of courage in MPs in standing up both to Benn and to their local 
activists9. The hard men of the unions thus took the lead in changing the NEC 
composition, whilst encouraging Solidarity to campaign against Militant and working 
with them to preserve Healey's Deputy Leadership position. 
Meanwhile, MPs in Solidarity found themselves in an unusual position. Coming from a 
loyalist tradition, they were tom between that instinct and their doubts about the ability 
of the Leader for whom few had voted. How that affected their success is detailed in 
5 Jim Claven, The Centre is Mine, Pluto Press (Australia), 2000, p. 3 1. 6 The SDP and Liberal's joint opinion poll rating, for example, in November 1981 was on 43%, to Labour's 28% and the Conservatives' 25.5% (Jim Claven, op cit, p. 38). 7 See p. 89. 8 Neil Kinnock, interview, 7 June 2004. 
9 The Manifesto Group was unwilling to denounce Benn (Roy Hattersley, interview, 5 May 2004). 
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the Solidarity chapter. Here we might note some of the characteristics of the Right as it 
faced the post-Limehouse future, bereft of some of its leading lights. 
Firstly, this traditional Right was effectively leaderless throughout the 1980s. Solidarity 
was headed by Roy Hattersley and Peter Shore, whilst the organisation campaigned for 
Healey as Deputy Leader. The St Ennins Group of trade unionists were unknown to the 
public or even to the great majority of party members. Given the evidence in this thesis 
about the success of these groups, this absence of a strong leader is surprising in the 
light of the academic literature on change within political parties. Frank L Wilson, for 
example, states that: "Despite pressures from socio-economic change, institutional 
reforms and altered terms of party competition, political parties do not respond with 
changes unless their leaders order them to do so"10. The current thesis shows that, far 
from being the project of the Leader, the work of the St Ermins Group took place 
without Foot's knowledge. After Kinnock became Leader, he became aware and later 
supportive of the Group". However, under neither Leader were the changes the result 
of initiatives launched from the top. 
Secondly, despite the importance of policies to the party, both the St Ennins Group (and 
its smaller cousin, Forward Labour) and Labour Solidarity were effectively policy-free 
zones. They had strong views on internal party matters (particularly Militant and 
OMOV12 ) but took no positions on the big policy issues - in contrast to CLV vS13 earlier 
effective pro-European stance. Whilst this enabled the Groupings to encompass a wide 
spectrum of opinion, it reflected the absence of an articulated philosophy -a role filled 
in earlier times by Evan Durbin, Tony Crosland or other Fabians. 
Thirdly, in contrast to CDS, Solidarity had neither patronage nor encouragement from 
Foot, the party Leader. CDS was an overtly loyalist organisation, motivating those who 
favoured unity behind the elected Leader 14 . Solidarity supporters had largely supported 
Healey over Foot, yet grouped traditional loyalists whose instincts remained "pro- 
10 Frank L. Wilson, "The Sources of Party Change: The Social Democratic Parties of Britain, France, Germany and Spain", in Kay Lawson, The Sources ofParty Change: The Social Democratic Parties 
ofBritain, France, Germany andSpain, Praeger, 1994, p. 275. 
Roger Godsiff interview, 9 April 2002; Neil Kinnock interview. 
12 One Member One Vote. 
13 Campaign for Labour Victory. 
14 Brian L. Brivati, "The Campaign for Democratic Socialism 1960-196411,1992 PhD Thesis, Queen 
Mary and Westfield, University of London. 
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Leader". Initially, many senior MPs held back from organising within the party, in 
deference to a plea from Foot that there should be "no Groupings" 15. 
Fourthly, these right-wing groupings had to fight a war on two fronts (quite apart from 
the Conservatives): against the Left in the Labour Party and against their former 
colleagues now in the SDP. The SDP split weakened internal opposition to the party's 
move to the Left16 , and 
for some time there remained suspicion that Solidarity members 
would defect. Hattersley felt that any pro-European sentiment could be taken as the 
first step to defection 17 . 
Fifthly, for virtually the whole period of the union-led "fightback", there was probably 
no majority for this within activist membership of the party. Right-wing MPs mostly 
believed the battle could be fought solely in the PLP and failed to comprehend the 
penetration of the Left's arguments within the party. It would be for a later generation, 
especially Kinnock and subsequently Blair, to re-establish a Moderate majority amongst 
activists. Nevertheless, the Moderate Groups always believed that they spoke for 
Labour voters and for the wider Labour membership - and took succour from the 
evidence of OMOV ballots. 
Finally, the difficulty in terminology even for this thesis reflects an unease within a left- 
wing party for anyone to be labelled "Right". For all party members, the Conservatives 
were the true "Right". Within the party before 198 1, the pro-Europeans, particularly 
around Roy Jenkins, were fairly commonly identified as Labour's Right, and the 
Manifesto Group could be labelled that way. It is more difficult after the SDP split, 
when many of Labour's Right departed, to continue with that term for the remaining 
non-Left. The key players themselves used different terms. John Golding called his 
group "The Loyalist Group" or "the Mods" (Moderates). Trade unionists referred to 
each other as "Friends" or "Mainstream" colleagues. To Kinnock, they were "not right- 
wingers but certainly die-hard anti-ultras"18. Furthermore, as he now acknowledges, 
these very categorisation of Left and Right were a part of the problem. "Big mistake 
that a lot of us made .. including me, even though possibly I got over it a bit earlier than 
one or two others, was to draw up a category of Left and Right. Which had as major 
Is Patrick Cheney, interview, 21 March 2002. 
16 Frank L. Wilson, op cit, p. 272. 17 Roger Broad, Labour's European Dilemmas: from Bevin to Blair, Palgravc, 200 1, p. 145. is Neil Kinnock interview. 
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definitive considerations - not sole, but major - where you stood on the European 
Community, and where you stood on the Bomb. And some people were very left-wing 
and very pro-European. Others were on the Right and very CND. And so many in both 
cases as to make the line a bloody zig zag. And we all were massively mis-led by these 
definitions"19 
I have labelled the post-1981 anti-Left groups "Traditional Right", which reflects a 
union-based, loyalist tradition, mostly in the centre on policies (though with notable 
anti-Common Marketeers and some unilateralists, policies seen as "Left"), deeply 
wedded to parliamentary democracy and loyalty to the leadership. It is not wholly 
satisfactory, particularly as, over the years, some on the "soft-left" joined its ranks. 
Even from 198 1, it is hard to define Peter Shore as "Righf ' in any sense that he would 
have accepted, yet he is key to this "Traditional Right". For convenience, therefore, the 
term "Moderate" is used as an abbreviation for "Traditional Right" post-1981 (and 
Centre-Right to encompass both the post-split Moderates and the pre-split Right). 
Hopefully the story, despite shortcomings in labelling, will explain the anti-far-Left 
cohesion of this otherwise disparate collection, whose motivation in many ways speaks 
for itself. 
The story - despite Thatcher's premature obituary for the Labour Party and despite, 
initially, a Leadership unwilling to challenge the Left in the party - is of Moderate trade 
unionists and parliamentarians winning control of the NEC and gradually implementing 
reforms which helped make the party electable. For the whole of his period as Leader, 
Kinnock had a majority on the NEC (sometimes wafer-thin) which was provided by 
continuous and intense union organising and bargaining behind the scenes. The thesis 
describes this manoeuvring and assesses its success and failures. Apart from John 
Golding's recently published memoir", virtually none of this organisational story has 
been documented. Although some of the Manifesto Group papers are available, no 
history of it has been written, which is also the case for those Groups whose archives 
are not available at all. The St Ermins Group archives are now in the care of this 
author; Solidarity's are in a closed archive at the University of Hull, but have been 
made available by the kind permission of Rt Hon Lord Hattersley, to whom I am 
indebted. Other personal papers are listed in the bibliography. In addition to drawing 
19 Neil Kinnock interview. 
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heavily on archives, the thesis relies on extensive interviews with virtually all the key 
players from the Ccntre-right of the party. Because it is an untold story, it is those 
players who have been interviewed rather than the Left, most of whom knew little of 
what was going on amongst the Right, and the most useful of whom (Benn) has 
committed so much to paper, in his published diaries, that these have been used where 
needed. A few activists from the Left have been interviewed, partly to test the accuracy 
of the picture that emerges. However, the research draws on participants themselves. 
The interviews have been transcribed and, where quoted, are verbatim, even where the 
language sometimes appears telegraphese - it is how the words were spoken. 
20 John Golding, Hammer ofthe Left, Politico's, 2003. 
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Chapter 2 The Scene the Right Faced 
The 1979 Labour Party Conference sapped the strength of its Leader, James Callaghani, 
who indicated to Neil Kinnock that he was at the point of resigning 2. Votes for 
mandatory reselection of MPs, calls for control of the manifesto to pass to the NEC, 
distrust of the parliamentary party, and moves to widen the franchise for the election of 
the Leader, had the Right feeling defensive, depressed and insecure. Meanwhile, on the 
Left, a strong band of organised supporters, receiving succour from unions and party 
activists, campaigned to change the constitution and the leadership itsel?. 
The May 1980 Special Conference, with its attacks on David Owen and fellow right- 
wingers, 4, heralded a likely split in the party whilst the 1980 Annual Conference in 
Blackpool witnessed a major assault on the record of the Labour Government - by one 
of its own members. Benn's attack on his erstwhile Cabinet colleaguess and the PLP, as 
well as his "impossibilist" programme for a government, simultaneously epitomised 
and sharpened the fissure between the party in the Commons and the party in the 
country. 
The response of the Right was muted. Within parliament, the Manifesto Group secured 
majorities in internal elections but had little dialogue with the NEC. It had no 
cheerleader and no shared view on Europe, defence or economic policy - the rallying 
cries within the wider party. The right-wing activists' Campaign for Labour Victory 
(CLV) was outgunned. Unbeknown at the time, it also had within it a small group 
preparing to split from the party and launch a new political movement7 . Superficially, 
the impending battle looked like the 1960s'. Indeed, most of the CDS surviving 
members, both inside and outside parliament, were active in the Manifesto Group or in 
I His speech to Conference followed an attempt by a delegate to move "a vote of no confidence in Mr. 
2 
Callaghan" (Report ofthe 1979 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 225). 
Neil Kinnock in The Battlefor Labour, BBC 4,30 October 2002. 
3 CPLD and Briefing literature; Jon Lansman and Jeremy Corbyn in Neil Kinnock, The Battlefor 
Labour; Patrick Seyd, The Rise and Fall ofthe Labour Left, Macmillan Education, 1987; David 
Kogan and Maurice Kogan, The Battlefor the Labour Party, Fontana. 1982; Martin Westlake, 
Kinnock Little, Brown & Co, 2001. 
4 Report of 1980 Labour Party Special Conference oftheLabour Party, pp. 249 and 25 1. 
3 Report ofthe 1980 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, pp. 146-148. 
6 ibi4 p 30; Giles Radice, interview, 25 July 2002. 
7 Jim Daly, interview, 3 May 2002, and Jim Daly papers. 
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CLV8. Some therefore expected that a similarly managed, targeted effort could achieve 
its required ends9. However, the 1980s were different for Labour's Right. 
Firstly, they were Leaderless. In comparison to Gaitskell's towering impact on the CDS 
members'o, the 1979-80 Leader of the opposition (Callaghan) offered little attraction to 
younger members. Denis Healey did not run a "courV" 
1 and there was no intellectual 
lead 12 . Shirley Williams was outside the 
House, as was Roy Jenkins (in Brussels). 
Neither Owen nor Rodgers fitted the bill and Crosland was already dead. Shore's anti- 
Europeanism ruled him out. Hattersley failed to attract personal loyalty either within 
the PLP or outside 13 and was not yet an heir-apparent. 
Secondly, there was a range of policy positions within the Right. They were united 
more against the Left's agenda (especially on constitutional reform and PLP/ party 
relations) than on any one policy. Neither Europe nor defence united all the anti-hard- 
14 left, unlike earlier battles in the party 
Thirdly, the charges of "betrayal" levelled against the 1974-1979 Governments, which 
were part of the cause cjMbre of the Left, came not after a long period in Opposition 
with its attendant frustration at repeated election defeats (the CDS experience), but close 
on the heels of a period of government and when there appeared a prospect of returning 
to power 15 . 
Fourthly, the Right's opponents had an agenda of democratic constitutional reform, 
making the status quo harder to defend. An age and class split made the 
"accountability/ radical/ change" agenda attractive to newer, younger members whilst 
the older, working-class members had difficulty defining their opposition to apparently 
reasonable demands. Early calls for OMOV initially found little favour amongst unions 
and it was only on the agenda long after it could be a rallying cry for the Right. 
8 Bill Rodgers, Fourth Among Equals, Politicols, 2000, John Gyford, interview, 25 April 2002; Jim 
9 
Cattermole, interview, 16 May 2002, Brivati, op cit, and Manifesto Group Archives (MGA). 
Bill Rodgers, op cit. 
10 ibid; Brian L. Brivati, op cit. 
II Giles Radice, interview, 24 June 2002. 
12 Brian Lapping comment, quoted by George Cunningham, interview, 24 May 2002; Giles Radice 
interview. 
13 Clive Wilkinson, interview, 17 April 2002; John Gyford interview; Jim Cattermole interview. 
14 Roger Broad, op cit; Bill Rodgers, op cit. is Labour nearly won the Southend East by-election in March 1980 and, in her first year in office, 
Thatcher's standing in the polls suggested that she could be beaten. 
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The Right's major problem was its distance from the party's activists. It is therefore 
important to understand its roots. Labour's vote was concentrated in urban areas where 
many councils were Labour-dominated. The MPs, councillors, Ps, school governors 
were all party and union stalwarts, in touch with their community but unable to respond 
to social change. Such change came quickly to the industrial cities, with the closure of 
engineering, wholesaling, manufacturing, textile and printing companies. Manual work 
declined and professional residents moved in. The 1950-60s migration of working class 
families to the new towns, followed by local government reorganisation (which 
increased council size, making it less likely that councillors or employees lived check 
byjowl with those they served), saw a severing of party-community links16. Many 
blue-collar trade unionists, the bedrock of local parties, found the new breed of 
university-educated party members difficult to manage and felt themselves frozen out of 
the activists' agenda. The former were predominantly white, male and over-40, largely 
unmoved by Vietnam demonstrations, abortion debates, feminism or the public sector 
unions' disillusion with the Callaghan Government. Small local parties sufficed when 
the co-operatives, unions, Catholic Church, Labour Clubs or the pubs offered a constant 
dialogue between party activists and their locality. They were a major problem when 
the membership no longer reflected their community. 
The major discord between activists and the PLP was over the interpretation of the 
record of the 1974-79 Governments. This was not the first time that a Labour 
government had been found wanting. Evaluation of earlier governments had 
documented insufficient moves towards equality17. Seminars had debated how 
ministers became distant from the party' 8. The emergence of state-funded political 
advisors was just one attempt to retain party/government dialogue19. However, the 
conflicting appraisals of 1974-79 lay at the heart of the subsequent hostilities and help 
explain the delay in the usual solution of the-unions-riding-to-the-aid-of-the-party. 
16 Sue Goss, Local Labour and Local Government, Edinburgh University Pres 
, 
S, 1988; John Gyford, 
The Politics ofLocal Socialism, George Allen & Unwin, 1985; John Silkin, Changing Battlefields: 
The Challenge to the Labour Party, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1987, p. 26-28, Peter Tatchell, The Battle 
17 
for Bermondsey, Heretic Books, 1983, Jim Daly interview, Matt Tee, interview, 16 April 2002. 




Such as at a Fabian seminar at Plaw Hatch, November 1974 (witnessed by the author). 
For other exmples, see Andrew Blick, People who live in the Dark Politico's Publishing, 2004. 
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In the public mind, the unions hampered the government. Yet, despite Callaghan's 
view during the Winter of Discontent that "this great trade union movement in this great 
crisis .. has nothing to say. It is completely leaderleSS,, 
20 
, the unions refused to accept 
any blame for the disasterý'. Success in overturning In Place ofStrife 22 , had led both 
Callaghan (the leading dissident) and union leaders to assume a goveniment-TUC 
dialogue would carry the unions with it. Butjust as the 1960s generation in the 
constituencies were challenging assumptions of local parties, so the new shop-steward 
movement meant that union leaders could no longer carry their members. The 
Cabinet's failure to heed the general secretaries' warnings that they could not continue 
with the pay policy led to the 1978/79 industrial disputes. 
After the 1979 election, differing conclusions were drawn. Union members, along with 
constituency activists, blamed the Leaders for not listening to the led. An ekisting 
mood for constitutional change and greater accountability turned into the belief that it 
was no longer enoughjust to win policy resolutions in conference. Until elected leaders 
were accountable, they would continue to betray the movement and fail to deliver party 
policy. The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was set up to work for 
constitutional changes to overcome these problems, through the introduction of 
mandatory reselection, NEC control over the manifesto, and the election of the Party 
Leader by an Electoral College (or conference). These demands became central to party 
debate. In 1979 to 1982: "the issue of democracy and power in the party became 
dominant almost to the point of making substantive issues secondary. .. The forms of 
the revolt - an attempt to seek major changes in the constitution of the Party so as to 
bring the Parliamentary Party under the control of the Labour Party outside the House - 
was unique in its force and effectiveness , 23 . 
The mood within the PLP turned to despair. Individually under threat because of 
impending reselection, and abandoned by the NEC24' MpS saw local activists favour the 
solutions advocated by Benn. The party turned in on itself, just as the Conservative 
Government's policies were adversely affecting many traditional Labour voters, who 
20 Bernard Donoughue, The Heat ofthe Kitchen, Politico's, 2003, p. 266. 21 Roy Grantham, interview, 2 July 2002. 
22 The January 1969 White Paper which sought to regulate industrial relations, particularly unofficial 
23 strikes 
(Cmnd 4327, HMSO). It was defeated by union, NEC and parliamentary pressure. Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, Edinburgh 
24 
University Press, 199 1, p. 192. 
Joe Haines, The Politics ofPower, Coronet Books, 1977, p. 14. 
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later voiced their frustration that the party appeared more interested in its internal rows 
then in their situation25. The 269-strong PLP was unable to defend the previous 
Government's record with confidence. The attacks hurt long-serving MPs who had 
trooped through the lobbies late at night to sustain a Labour Government - especially as 
they had seen left-wing MPs miss votes "to salvage their consciences" whilst the 
"loyalists" did their duty 26 . These feelings were described in CLV's "Roll of Honour" 
of the 17 MPs who died "whilst keeping our government in power. .. Those strains are 
still showing in prematurely shortened retirements .. We should honour not abuse those 
who night after night fought the good fight"27 . The toughest attacks on the Callaghan 
Government came from his own party and particularly the NEC28. 
Labour MPs were not popular with the party after 1979. The Manifesto Group was 
unable to attract one new member from the 1979 intake of new MpS29. Although still 
commanding a controlling vote in the PLP, it lost the debates on reselection, election of 
the Leadership (which removed the PLP's only seats on the NEC), and control over the 
manifesto. It was out-gunned in the newspaper and TV debates about the future of the 
party. As the traditional leader of the Right, the PLP failed to offer any leadership 
against the Left. Right-wing activists were frustrated at the absence of personalities 
willing to battle for them. CLV complained that few Shadow ministers would grace 
their platforms 30 and a deputation to Healey had him "patronisingly" reassure them "to 
leave it to hiM,, 3 1. Right-wing MPs continued to believe the battle would be fought 
solely in the PLP and underestimated the penetration of the Left's arguments within the 
party. Even the soft-left misunderstood the trends. For example, when John Silkin later 
stood for Deputy Leader, he was amazed and disconcerted to discover that the new 
Electoral College required him to put himself around CLPs and unions rather than 
simply his fellow parliamentarians". 
25 Neil Kinnock, The Battlefor Labour. 
26 Jim Wellbeloved, interview, 3 April 2002. 
27 Labour Victory, October 1980. 
28 Margaret Thatcher, op cit, John Golding, op cit, Tom McNally, interview, 27 November 2002. 29 Brian L. Brivati, op cit. 30 McGivan letter to Rogers, 13 November 1979; internal document, November 1979: "MPs .. have for the most part not been forthcoming.. Anyone mildly associated with Jim Callaghan has steered 
31 clear while our prominent spokesmen 
have had only occasional.. links with the Campaign". 
32 
Jim Daly interview. 
John Silkin, op cit, p. 49/50. 
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Both the Manifesto Group and CLV had been founded before 1979. The Manifesto 
Group was formed to ensure the Right's natural majority was organised for PLP 
elections. CLV was created to counter CLPD, work for a Labour victory, increase party 
membership and activity, and to make the NEC more representative 33 . At its founding 
meeting in February 1977 (the day Tony Crosland died), it passed a resolution which 
regretted "the negative attitudes of the [NEC] towards the Labour Government"34 . 
Whilst the first issue of the CLV newsletter (in May 1977) concentrated on the general 
election and the electorate's concerns, by issue two it was leading on the need to reform 
the NEC, reject moves to widen the franchise for the Leader and to take action against 
Militant. It had acknowledged the fight had moved to within the party. These 
preoccupations were later reflected in a joint Manifesto Group/ CLV publication 
following the 1979 defeat 35 . 
Neither the Manifesto Group nor CLV were well positioned to resist the onslaught from 
the Left. The MPs were identified with a tired and latterly ineffective government. 
Two natural leaders (Jenkins and Williams) were out of the Commons. And the 
unpopularity of MPs led CLV to select a solid but unknown figurehead for what was 
meant to be a high profile campaign 36 . Equally damaging for the Right, there was no 
concerted union effort to ensure the party responded constructively to its electoral 
defeat. New general secretaries had emerged in some of the major unions, the Left's 
grip on the NEC was complete and, as important, the activities of the new Conservative 
government focused union attention on the interests of their members 37 . 
During 1979 and 1980, whilst CLV and the Manifesto Group struggled to motivate and 
mobilise the Right, there was little union input (the EETPU being the main exception 38) 
and they were hampered by a potential split. This was floated as early as November 
33 Labour Victory, May 1977. 
34 Central Hall, Westminster, 19 February 1977. Theirjoumal included a piece on "NEC - The Undermining of the Party", listing 10 major examples (Labour Victory, September 198 1, p. 5), CLV 
35 
papers. 
"Reform and Democracy in the Labour Party", in Labour Victory, October 1979; also CLV's The 
Future ofthe Labour Party, February 1980. 
36 Clive Wilkinson, Leader of Birmingham City Council, was chosen as Chairman to represent 
activists around the country, Clive Wilkinson interview. 
37 Alan Tuffin, interview, IS April 2002. 
38 The EETPU put resources into CLV (Clive Wilkinson interview). Other general secretaries, 
especially from AUEW, APEX and NUIý, made helpful interventions (Terry Duffy in Labour 
Victory; Sid Weighell in The Times) and a number placed advertisements in Labour Victory, helping 
to defray expenses. 
17 
Chapter 2 The Scene the Right Faced 
1979 in an internal CLV paper39. From Jenkins' Dimbleby lecture 40 onwards, a number 
of CLV members covertly mobilised to set up an alternative organisation (possibly a 
new party). Former Labour MPs Colin Phipps and Michael Bames were involved, 
whilst Jim Daly and Clive Lindley set up an organisation (the Radical Centre for 
Democratic Studies 41) to keep Brussels-based Jenkins briefed on the UK political 
scene 42 . They opened talks with the Liberals, two-day conferences being held at least 
twice, with other seminars on voting trends and policy, the first taking place near 
Monmouth in January 198043. Meanwhile, some of the Manifesto Group officers 
(Horam, Thomas and Wrigglesworth) were decreasingly seeing the Labour Party as 
their only potential home. The effect of such moves was to undermine the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings on the Right. 
Some discussions did take place between leading lights of the CLV/ Manifesto Group 
and trade unions, as a number of union leaders began to realise the importance of taking 
action to refocus the party on electoral matters, whilst simultaneously persuading those 
who were later to become the Gang of Three that the party was rescuable 44 . Prior to the 
1980 conference, CLV concentrated on putting the case for social democracy 
(publishing a "Gang of Thousands" advertisement45 to support the "Gang of Three" 
letter from Owen, Rodgers and WilliamS46 ) and on the composition of the women's 
section of the NEC47 .A CLV Conference in Birmingham in May rehearsed the party's 
problems and possible remedies". Tellingly, all the speakers (Rodgers, Owen, Horam, 
Williams and Nick Bosanquet) were to defect within a year. 
The 1980 Conference was a dismal failure for the Right. Not only were the hoped-for 
gains not made in the NEC49, but the conference voted for an Electoral College to select 
the Leader. Perhaps as important for subsequent events, the atmosphere in the hall was 
39 Though it was not until late 1980 that Hattersley, for example, first heard someone speak openly 
about this (Roy Hattersley interview). 
40 22 November 1979, BBC (reprinted in Wayland Kennet, Rebirth ofBritain, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
41 
1982, p. 9-29). This was when Jenkins hinted at a new political movement. 
Jim Daly papers. 
42 Jim Daly interview. 
43 Radical Centre for Democratic Studies Papers. 
Sidney Weighell, On the Rails, Orbis Publishing, 1983, Denis Howell, Made in Birmingham: The 
Memoirs ofDenis Howell, Queen Anne Press, 1990, John F. Spellar, interview, 18 February 2002; 
45 
Roger Godsiff, interview, 9 April 2002. 
Guardian, 26 September 1980. 
46 Guardian, I August 1980. 
47 CLV newsletter, Labour Victory, number 15, September 1980, and number 16, October 1980. 49 John Gyford papers. 
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poisonous. Delegates speaking - or sometimes even voting - contrary to the "Benn 
hegemony" were barracked5o. MPs as a species were in the firing line, alongside those 
judged likely to defect. Responding to the debate on reselection, trade unionist Sam 
McCluskie turned on the MPs' bank of seats and said, in relation to what one MP had 
called the "penance" of their subscription to the party: "They (the MPs) have been 
doing penance for years to keep the Prentices" in power, and it is .. underlined when 
you get Joe Ashton [MP] coming on that rostrum and telling us that Roy Jenkins, if he 
starts a middle party, would have 25 MPs who are already members of the Labour 
Party. Why don't you join them? 9952 . This was loudly applauded - taken 
by the Right 
as a signal that they were not wanted in the party. Later, a known Militant delegate 
Dave Nellist 53 returned to the theme - to similar acclaim - stating that "If there are 25 
Labour MPs .. who want to join Roy Jenkins and the so-called Centre Party, the sooner 
they do it and give us the chance to replace them with genuine Labour Party MPs, the 
better Party we are going to have for it9954. 
The main event, however, for much of the subsequent story, was the speech delivered 
by Benn on transferring responsibility for control over the manifesto from a joint 
Cabinet/ NEC meeting to the sole prerogative of the NEC. The debate had been opened 
by Patricia Hewitt (a CLP delegate) who claimed that "many of us.. are.. angry about 
much of what the last Labour Government did and a great deal of what the last Labour 
Government failed to do". This was met by applause as was her call for the 
constitutional changes to get rid "of the divide between the policies that we as a Party 
decide on, the policies on which we fight the election, and the policies which the Labour 
Government implement in off ice', 55 . Benn's response to the debate was a tour deforce 
on the iniquities of the Labour Government and its influence on the 1979 Manifesto. 
His speech, later reproduced by the Right with the "factual inaccuracies" clearly 
marked, became a symbol of all they believed was wrong with his campaign 56 . The 
EETPU even used videos of the speech to show shop stewards the "fallacy" which lay 
49 Report ofthe 1980 Annual Conference of1he Labour Party, pp. 59-60. so Or slow- hand-clapped. For example, ibid, p. 140. s' A reference to Reg Prentice MP who had crossed the floor. 52 Report ofthe 1980 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 142. 53 Later an MP. 54 
ibid, p 145. 55 ibid, p. 143. 56 Michael Cocks MP, Chief Whip, Speech to GMWU conference, 7 June 1981; "The Last Labour 
Government and the 1974 Manifesto", John Spellar/ EETPU archives (JSA), Bob Eadie papers. 
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at its heart 57 . But it was ecstatically received 
in the hall5g, except by most MPs. David 
Lipsey, lately a political advisor at Number 10, heard it with increasingly bitterness, 
muttering "Liar" at least 5 times in its duration". 
Despite Benn's urging, the NEC's amendment giving them control over the manifesto 
was defeated. There were also early indications of the role unions would take in 
changing the party. Basnett, GMWU General Secretary, introduced the report of a 
Committee of Enquiry not from the rostrum but from the platform - at that time, highly 
unusual. He was followed by Clive Jenkins, General Secretary of ASTMS, also not an 
NEC member, yet speaking from the hallowed platform. The report gave notice that the 
party's paymasters were taking a close interest in the way their money was spent. 
The most immediate issue, however, was the Electoral College, agreed in principle on 
the 2 October but without any particular method (or percentage splits between the three 
or four parts of the movement) being agreed 60 . Attention had to turn to the make-up of 
the College as there were already rurnours about Callaghan's likely resignation and 
61 subsequent vacancy. Jenny Pardington , making an off-the-cuff remark that night to 
Larry Whitty (GMWU research officer) that a Special Conference would be the normal 
way to resolve such issues 62 , saw 
him speed off to relate this to his boss, and then found 
herself hearing Basnett propose this in an emergency motion the next day 63 _ and hence 
the Wembley Special Conference was born. 
Before that could take place, however, the old system for electing the Leader was 
brought into use one more time. Callaghan resigned on 15 October and, despite calls 
from the NEC that the selection of his successor be delayed until a new system be 
established, the PLP decided (in a determined assertion of its own role) to proceed to 
elect a Leader. The Left were deeply unhappy about the next Leader being selected 
under the old rules and tried unsuccessfully to get candidates to agree to resign and 
stand for re-election later under the new system. 
57 JSA. 




Witnessed by the author. 
61 
Report ofthe 1980 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, pp. 148-155. 
62 
TGWU official, and joint secretary to TULV and to a Commission of Enquiry working group. 
63 
Jenny Pardington, interview, 2 February 2002. 
Report of the 1980 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 19 1. 
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The Right assumed Healey would be elected and that a new chapter in the party's 
fortunes could begin. They had calculated without their candidate's personality. Even 
his own team acknowledge he fought a dreadful campaign64 , though in truth he did not 
fight, assuming MPs knew him well enough. However, he grossly underestimated both 
the pressure on MPs facing reselection to back Michael Fooe5, and also the desire of 
many for a "quiet life" which they mistakenly thought would accompany a Foot 
leadership 66 . And three of the subsequently defecting MPs voted for Foot to hasten the 
party's demise 67 . For whatever combination of reasons, Foot won on 10 November 
1980, to the horror of the Right. 
The period between November and the Wembley Special Conference saw a flurry of 
activity. Foot and others worked to get an NEC proposal for at least half of the College 
votes going to the PLP. The Left wanted less for the PLP. Meanwhile, CLV and the 
Gang of Four were deep in debate as to whether the party had a future. A Fabian New 
Year School in Ruskin College, Oxford, led by Shirley Williams (the Vice Chairman of 
the Society) heard her warnings about the electoral challenges but understood her as 
seeing the party remaining viable. Yet at the same time, she was deep in discussion 
with Jenkins, Rodgers and Owen. They had agreed to give Labour one last go, deciding 
to remain if the Special Conference agreed to OMOV for the Electoral College. On 24 
January, Owen made as strong a case as any (until John Prescott's in Brighton a dozen 
years later) for OMOV but the union votes were already stacked against him. 
Meanwhile, the unions concentrated their efforts on patching majorities together for 
particular formulae for the College. A briefing paper by APEX research officer Roger 
68 Godsiff for his General Secretary laid out the options and the support each attracted 
The detailed work behind this was crucial for the unions' subsequent response to 
Wembley. Its research avoided wishful thinking, and meticulously calculated numbers. 
it showed that, correctly marshalled, unions sympathetic to the Moderate cause could 
command a majority. This became central to the soon-to-be-created St Ermins Group. 
In the meantime, the 24 January 1981 Wembley Special Conference produced a result 
no-one wanted. The NEC supported a 50: 25: 25 composition (50% to the PLP; 25% 
64 Giles Radice in The Battlefor Labour, BB C4. 
65 Patrick Seyd, op cit. 
Denis Healey in The Wilderness Years, BBC, 1995. 
67 Tom Ellis, Neville Sandelson and Jeffrey Thomas (Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 543). 
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each to the affiliated organisations and the constituency parties); the EETPU and the 
Owenites supported OMOV; and the Left supported 1/3; 1/3; 1/3. Initially, little 
consideration had been given to the USDAW's proposed 30: 40: 30 - with 40% for the 
affiliates. However, as the AUEW was committed not to vote for any proposal which 
gave less than 50% to the PLP, left-influenced votes were switched to the 30: 4030 
proposal, which USDAW (which had only tabled it to keep Audrey Wise happy and 
without any intention of pushing it 69) then had to support. 
The Wembley result could not have been better for the potential defectors. Instead of 
having to launch their party on the unpopular cause of Europe, they had their ready- 
made and popular cause: Labour's Leader to be elected with the largest block going to 
those same unions who, only two years before, had led the Winter Of Discontent. In the 
long run, Wembley might take the credit for OMOV, greater internal democracy in both 
unions and the party, and the rise of a popularist leader. But in the immediate 
aftermath, two things happened. One - the high profile creation of the SDP - was 
drastic for the Labour Party. The other - almost clandestine - would in time move the 
Labour Party back to the Centre-right and to electability. The story of the first of these, 
the January Limehouse Declaration and the March creation of the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), has been told elsewhere 70 . But the fightback of the Traditional Right 
within the Labour Party has not been documented. It started secretly in one case (the St 
Ermins Group) and sorrowfully in another (Solidarity) but first the old organisations 
had to die. CLV and the Manifesto Group both contained "stayers and goers", and thus 
had to go through the process of splitting before a single new organisation of the 
Moderate wing, the Labour Solidarity Campaign, could be created on 17 February to 
cover both parliamentary and constituency membership. Meanwhile, on 10 February, 
the St Ermins Group was bom in the Charing Cross Hotel. 
The main part of this thesis tells the story of these post-SDP split "fightback" groups. 
But first a brief description of the main issues and events of 1981 to 1987 is given, 
followed by the story of the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs which tried, but failed, to 
hold the Right in the PLP together. 
68 APEX Internal Paper, January 198 1. 
69 Jon Lansman in The Battlefor Labour, BBC4. Audrey Wise was an USDAW-sponsored MP. 
70 Bill Rodgers, op cit; Ian Bradley, Breaking the Mould? The Birth and Prospects ofthe SDP, Martin 
Robertson, 1981. 
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The 1981 Deputy Leadership election is now recognised as the high water mark of 
Bermism, although at the time it was seen by many as another step to a more left-wing 
party. Few would have predicted that Benn would be out of parliament (and thus from 
contention for Leader) only two years later. Indeed, his attempt at the Deputy 
Leadership was viewed as the forerunner of a challenge for the Leadership. Similarly, 
most commentators failed to note that, within days of Benn's defeat, the Right snatched 
five gains on the NEC, so increasing Foot's authority there and beginning their trek 
back into ascendancy. 
The Deputy Leadership vote was the first use of the Electoral College, and it produced 
for Healey a victory which would have been denied him had the College been 
segmented into thirds. The unions voted 25: 15 for Healey - their 40% tranche helping 
to provide his final 0.852%1 winning margin. (Had all the unions voted according to 
their members' wishes, his victory would have been more emphatic. If the TGVV'U had 
cast its 1.25 million votes - 8% of the entire College - according to its consultation, 
Healey would have polled 57.5% to Benn's 42.5%, a 15% majority2. ) 
There were to be implications for union democracy from such block-voting, but the 
interest of the contest for this thesis is what it did for the St Ermins Group and for 
Solidarity. For the former, the events demonstrated the accuracy of Godsiff s 
predictions and the role the Group could play in marshalling votes. For the latter, it 
strained the Moderate/Centre-left coalition as many could not stomach open support for 
Healey. Even Solidarity's co-chairman, Shore, whilst voting for Healey, never 
endorsed him publicly. 
More broadly, the contest demonstrated the gap between many union leaders and their 
members. NUPE, for example, whilst circulating statements from all three contestants 3 
George Cunningham argued that, had the abstentions been discounted first, and the votes actually 
cast then been counted, Benn would have won; George Cunningham, "Was Tony Benn the True 
Winner Against Healey? ", 1983 and Dianne Hayter, "What if Benn had beaten Healey in 198 17", in 
Duncan Brack and lain Dale, Prime Minister Portillo and other things that never happened, 
Politico's, 2003. However, the results were never questioned by Benn. Furthermore, they conf irm 
that each section retains its allotted quota regardless of how few of its members vote. 
Forward Labour, November 198 1. Alex Kitson - acting general secretary - opposed Denn's 
challenge and stopped the union nominating him, despite Benn's claim that he would have their 
support (Financial Times, 22 September 1981 and Brian Nicholson, interview, 6 March 2002). 
Bob Eadie papers. 
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(the third being John Silkin), expressed a clear preference: both Assistant General 
Secretaries together with 12 officers signed the Benn advertisement4 . The NUPE 
leadership expected to cast their votes (4% of the College) for him and were surprised 
that their branch ballot favoured Healey, leading Healey's team to claim: "it was the 
dinner ladies what won it for US,, 5. (NUPE's increased affiliation, to 600,0006 , also 
contributed to Healey's success. ) Other unions found similar results, though sometimes 
more closely allied with their leadership. The COME ballot gave Healey 57% to 
Benn's 33%, delivering 135,000 to the victor's talIY7 . The POEU, with a 
60% return, 
voted 72% for Healey and 20% to Benns. The unions' membership votes, where tested, 
favoured the incumbent. 
For some unions, the contest provided the opportunity to air their views on Benn. The 
EETPU, in particular, had been campaigning against him for some time, using material 
culled from his 1980 conference attack on Callaghan over the 1979 manifesto to 
highlight discrepancies between his allegations and the printed documentation. They 
also used Benn's speeches to highlight his "unsatisfactory" record. Responding to 
Benn's request for EETPU support, Chapple's 3-page reply rehearsed the union's 
objections, especially that he was "not very sympathetic to trade unions"'. The letter 
continued: "you also dismiss the views of the great bulk of members and shop stewards, 
blaming the media for brainwashing them. We reject this attitude of aristocratic 
disdain". He detailed their difficulties with Benn as employer (when a minister at 
Industry and Energy) before concluding: "We will, therefore, not be supporting you for 
the Deputy Leadership of the Party"9 . 
Organisationally, the St Ennins Group set to work at local and national level, circulating 
lists of potentially sympathetic CLPs to friendly unions to get branches to nominate 
Foot and Healey to their General Committees (GCs)'O - although only Healey faced a 
contest, this made the request more palatable locally. The closeness of the contest put 
4 Labour Weekly, 19 June 1981. 
5 Roger Godsiff interview. NUPE's membership voted 267,000 for Healey, 188,581 for Benn and 
28,568 for Silkin; Financial Times, 28 September 1981. However, NUPE's Reg Race claims that 
the result was narrower, with a couple of large branches able to make the difference - which he 




from 150,000 six years earlier, Lewis Minkin, op cit, 199 1, P. 199. 
Financial Times, 25 September 1981. 
Nick Butler papers (NBP). 9 Letter of 7 September 1981 from Chapple to Benn (JSA). 
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enormous pressure on every MP, especially those from left-wing constituencies (with 
reselection looming) - despite CLPs having their own vote for the first time under the 
Electoral College. John Grant MP urged colleagues to stand firm, although "the long- 
held principle of the secret ballot, free from intimidation, has been thrown away" with 
MPs' votes being recorded. He emphasised that it would not only be their GCs who 
would see these but "their wider electorate. It will be known and stressed at meetings 
and on the doorsteps ... They may succumb to pressure now - and 
find it backfires on 
them when they ask the ordinary voters, who have the last word, to return them to 
Westminstee" 1. Even Peter Archer felt the need to "explain" his vote for Healey to his 
moderate and loyal GC, emphasising that it was "the express wish of Michael Foot" that 
his deputy should be supported as he had "made it clear he can work well as a team with 
Dennis (sic) Healey"12 . Others went more public. The left-wing Janey Buchan MEP 
published an Open Letter to Benn in Labour Weekly as to why she could not support 
him, criticising his campaign's stance of "those who are not for us are against US943. 
Healey was more blunt in his rebuttal of these pressures, claiming that forcing MPs to 
be programmed to follow the wishes of CLPs - ignoring both voters and their own 
consciences - would turn MPs into zombies 14 . 
Silkin's manifesto, favouring "the complete withdrawal of Britain from the Common 
Market" and nuclear disarmament 15 would not attract any Right votes but was aimed at 
the non-Bennite Left. Whilst his candidature attracted 65 soft-left MPs 16 in the first 
round, it offered no respite from the Benn-Healey choice at the critical stage, leaving 35 
MPs the only option of abstaining 17 . Kinnock, who had opposed the contest and 
disagreed with Silkin's candidature", abstained on the second ballot. Sitting on the 
platform awaiting the result, he confided to Joan Lestor that he then wished he had 
voted for Healey as he thought a Benn victory would be a disaster for the party19. The 
impact of the abstentions was to hand victory to Healey but it also marked a major split 
10 Letter from Roger Godsiff, 9 July 1981 (St Ermins Group Archives: EGA). 
11 John Grant MP, speech to the EETPU, Brighton, 26 September 198 1, John Grant papers (JGP). 12 Peter Archer letter to his General Committee, 3 September 198 1. 
13 Labour Weekly, 7 August 198 1. 
14 Labour Solidarity, July 198 1. 
is John Silkin, Deputy Leadership leaflet, 1981. 
16 More accurately, 64 and John's brother, Sam Silkin, MP for Dulwich. 
17 37 actually abstained but two had voted for Healey in the first round. One appears to have missed 
the vote; the other was moving towards the SDP (The Times, I October 198 1). 
Neil Kinnock, The Battlefor Labour. 
19 Private communication with the author, October 2003. 
25 
Chapter 3 1981 Deputy Leadership Contest 
on the Left. Kinnock was attacked within hours (aggressively in the gents' toileeo; 
verbally at the Tribune rally) but the long-term consequences were seismic. It caused 
the split on the Left which led to the creation of the Campaign Group and with it the 
rightward shift in the Tribune Group. 
The contest consolidated the organisational push of the St Ermins, Group, and forced 
other unions to take more heed of their members' views. The unsatisfactory nature of 
the unions' consultation - some undertaking none at all - added impetus to demands for 
OMOV, with Hattersley urging this in September 21 and others after the vote 22 . 
Similarly, party members not on their GCs began demanding that their views should be 
sought before their CLP's vote was cast. Where constituencies balloted the 
membership, they all favoured Healey over Benn 23 - This added to the pressure for 
extending democracy to individual members. Whilst the Left had long supported an 
Electoral College, they had not anticipated its role in delivering the Right's demand for 
OMOV. 
At the start of the contest, Benn thought it would be "unifying for the Party .. [and 
would] consolidate our supporf' amongst the electorate 24 . Immediately after his defeat, 
he claimed he had "achieved the politicisation of the trade union movement" whilst 
accepting that in "the non-politically conscious unions, and among the non-politically 
conscious members of unions, there is a hell of a lot of work to be done"25. This 
assumption that all politically conscious trade unionists would support him was 
diametrically opposite to the St Ermins Group's conclusion that the more their members 
were consulted, the more they backed Healey. 
20 David Warburton, interview, 7 December 200 1. 
21 Financial Times, 25 September 19 8 1. 
22 Such as Phillip Whitehead MP in The New Statesman, 16 October 198 1. 
23 Nick Butler papers. 24 BBC TV news, 2 April 198 1. 
25 Morning Star, I October 1981. 
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The 1981 contest was Benn's last chance of high office (he lost his Shadow Cabinet 
place in November) and led to the Tribune-Campaign Group split. For the Traditional 
Right, it demonstrated (and rewarded) their organisational effectiveness (which had 
been lacking in the late 1970s). It boosted the case for OMOV and for intemal union 
democracy. Solidarity was adversely affected, because it was unable to wage a strong 
Healey campaign even though its members viewed a Berin victory as disastrous. 
Electorally, Labour Party support dropped 17% between July and December as the party 
fought the conteSt26. 
26 N Webb and R Wybrow, The Gallup Report 1981, Sphere, 1982, p 192. 
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The first use of the Electoral College for the party Leader was triggered, within 48 hours 
of the 1983 general election, by the unions which then effectively decided the outcome 
within weeks. Most notably, many of the St Ermins Group unions - who had worked 
closely with Hattersley's Solidarity - delivered their votes for Kinnock'. This chapter 
looks at how they did this, and at their reasons. 
The first blow struck for Kinnock was prior to the election when, through the EETPU's 
and Golding's efforts in Bristol South, the unions secured the winnable parliamentary 
2 
seat for Chief Whip Michael Cocks , leaving Benn to lose Bristol East and thus out of 
contention for the leadership after 9 June, giving Kinnock a clear run on the Left. 
Kinnock has since said he would have preferred to fight - and defeat - Benn then3, but 
at the time it allowed a clear break with the Bennite legacy. The second blow came in 
the immediate aftermath of the election. On Saturday II June, the left-wing Clive 
Jenkins visited Foot at his Hampstead home where the Leader supported ASTMS' 
proposal to nominate Kinnock4. On Sunday, Jenkins announced his union would back 
Kinnock5 - making public Foot's retirement decision6and triggering the unions' round 
of decisions. The General Council of the TGWU (Kinnock's union) quickly agreed to 
back him but then a different group of unions entered the fray. Jenkins, Moss Evans 
(TGWU) and the moderate Alan Tuffin met and agreed tactics over a barbecue at the 
US Ambassador's residence. Tuffin invited Kinnock to fly over to his union conference 
in the Isle of Man the following Saturday. Kinnock won a standing ovation and a vital 
nomination, Hattersley's request for support having been gently rebuffed 7. The CWU 
was the first of the moderate unions to plump for Kinnock, but others followed: 
I The other candidates were Peter Shore and Eric Heffer. 2 Robert Harris, The Making ofNeil Kinnock, Faber and Faber, 1984, p. 193, Martin Westlake, op cit, 
p. 208. The EETPU started work in Bristol early in 1982, in preparation for the boundary changes 
which would leave Benn without a winnable seat. By August, it had increased its GMC 
representation from 7 to 12, with more to follow; extensive work, including visits by head-office 
staff, ensured Cocks won the nomination for the safe seat (correspondence from EETPU to Bristol 
members, and reports to officials, 1982 and 1983, JSA). Benn was aware of this at the time (Tony 
Benn, The End of an Era: Diaries 1980-90, Hutchinson, 1992, p. 182). 
3 Neil Kinnock, The Battlefor Labour. 
4 Martin Westlake, op cit, p-217. 
5 Giles Radice, Friends and Rivals, Little, Brown, 2002, p. 312. 
6 Alan Sked and Chris Cook, Post- War Britain: A Political History, 1945-1992, Penguin, 1993, p. 434. 
It had been assumed Foot would "announce his intention to go this autumn" (private note for Peter 
Shore, 10 June 1983, NBP). 
7 Alan Tuffin interview; Richard Heffernan and Mike Marqusee, Defeatftom the Jaws of Victory: 
Inside Kinnock's Labour Party, Verso, 1992, p. 36, Guardian, 20 June 1983, Robert Harris, op cit, 
p. 2 15. 
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COHSE deciding on 15 June, the NUR by 9 July8 and the St Ermins' stalwart, the ISTC, 
which encouraged others to follow sui?. Kinnock had addressed the APEX conference 
- and received a standing ovation - prior to the electionlo, and 
its branch consultation 
now supported him. The EETPU, abstaining on the grounds that the election should be 
"conducted by an individual ballot of Party members"' 
1, further deprived Hattersley of 
an anticipated block-vote 12 . By the end of 
June, Kinnock had 3.8 million union votes 
3 
pledged to Hattersley's 1.8 million' . 
Equally unanticipated (at least in June) was that the majority of MPs would vote for 
Kinnock 14 , 
including Blair and all but one of the 1983 intake 15 . His victory thus 
comprised majorities in all three sections of the Electoral College 16 , bestowing on 
him 
the authority he would need - and use - in remodelling the party. It is noteworthy that a 
right-of-centre PLP and a moderate union movement joined the left-wing CLPs in 
supporting Kinnock over the Right's standard-bearer, Hattersley. The unions also 
helped ensure a rancour-free contest by championing the notion of a "Dream Ticket" - 
that the only viable option was Hattersley-Kinnock or Kinnock-Hattersley as Leader 
and Deputy, with each agreeing to serve under the other, and that everyone should 
support that duo, whatever their preference between the two. David Warburton claims 
credit for this "Unity Tickef ' notion, with the press renaming it "Dream Tickef '17 . 
The moderate unions and Kinnock were subsequently to collaborate closely on 
reforming the party, expelling Militant and working towards OMOV. Little of this was 
evident in 1983. So why did these unions, working to root out the Left from the party, 
8 Robert Harris, op cit, p. 224. 
9 Bill Sirs, HardLabour, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985, p. 130. The Executive Council selected Kinnock 
by 13: 8. 
10 Robert Harris, op cit, p. 198. 
11 Letter from Chapple to John Smith (Campaign Manager), II October 1983, in response to his 
request of 29 September for the union to reconsider its decision to abstain in the Deputy Leader 
contest (JSA); Frank Chapple, Sparks Fly! A Trade Union Life, Michael Joseph Limited, 1984, 
12 
P. 191. 
Equally surprising, both the right-wing National Union of Labour Clubs and the Fabian Society 
voted for Kinnock, the latter after an all-members' ballot (Report ofthe 1983 Annual Conference of 
the Labour Party, inside back cover). 
13 Martin Westlake, op cit, p. 218. 
14 Kinnock won 14.778% in the PLP section, to Hattersley's 7.833% (Report of the 1983 Annual 
Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 29). The Shadow Cabinet, by contrast, supported the runner up, 
15 
only 3 of the 13 non-candidate members voting for Kinnock, Martin Westlake, op cit, p. 240. 
The exception being Stuart Bell; Stuart Bell, Tony Really Loves Me, Spen View Publications, 2000, 
16 
P. 1 1. 
The figures were: Kinnock 71.272%; Hattersley 19.288%; Heffer 6.303%, Shore: 3.137% (Report of 
the 1983 Annual Conference of the Labour Party, p. 29). 
17 David Warburton interview. 
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line up behind this unlikely candidate? It has been assumed that Kinnock's near 
absence from parliament in 1982, in favour of visiting constituencies and unions", was 
part of his build-up to a leadership bid19. As such, it paid off: where unions consulted 
their members, Kinnock mostly won by a wide margin2o. For some, it left a bad taste in 
the mouth: "Kinnock, for some time prior to the election on some pretext or other, had 
devoted a major part of his time touring the country making himself known to union 
branches and constituency parties which must have been to the detriment of his duties in 
the House of Commons"21. Such campaigning - if that is what it was - continued 
during the 1983 General Election, when he barnstormed his way around 100 
constituencies, delivering 90 speeches (including to the EETPU conference), and 
spending only 2 out of 21 days in London 22 . However, interviews conducted for this 
research suggest two other factors contributed to the Moderates' support for him. One, 
negative, was their distaste for his opponent. The second was the real respect they 
developed for Kinnock from their personal exposure to him. 
The interviews reflected little enthusiasm for Hattersley from outside parliament. 
Former CLV Chairman, Clive Wilkinson, recalls his "big disappointment that Roy 
Hattersley.. was never a member" of CLV. Even within Birmingham, the MP "was 
never there. He never turned up except for advice surgeries. We could never rely on 
Roy Hattcrsley to give support". With hindsight, Wilkinson thinks Hattersley "couldn't 
have made the changes" that Kinnock achieved 23 . Jim Cattermole felt Hattersley was 
"never involved in anything - not prepared to put his head on the chopping block. 
When he was a Minister he let me down a few times"; despite the help given by this 
party official when Hattersley was looking for a seat, when he asked the minister to help 
form a Trade Union Lunch Club, "three times Roy Hattersley promised to come; three 
times he cancelled', 24 . Furthermore, he never "made any political sacrifice -)-)25 . 
More 
publicly, Chapple declared: "I wouldn't vote for Hattersley at any price, not if he was 
is Kinnock claimed he had done "over 200 Labour Movement meetings in each of the last 3 years", 
Broad Left Alliance Journal, October 1982. 
19 Martin Westlake, op cit, pp. 178 & 216. He also declined Shadow Cabinet promotion to "avoid a 
20 
damaging controversy with the right of the PLP" (ibid). 
ibid, pp. 219-220. 
21 Charles Turnock, "Rigorous Route by Rail and River". 1995, p-226. Unlike his union, the NUR, 
22 
Turnock supported Hattersley. 
Martin Westlake, op cit, pp. 205-6. 
23 Clive Wilkinson interview. 
24 Hattersley's cancellation rate is legendary - immortalised by the 'tub of lard' which replaced him on 
"Have I got News for You" when he pulled out at short notice. 
25 Jim Cattermole interview. 
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the only candidate". He called him a disaster "whose compromise with the left 
embarrassed those who wanted to fight for moderation in the Party. I said he harmed 
the Party by giving in to the left and added: 'If you deal with a shark then all you do is 
keep losing your limbs"'26 . John Smith, who ran 
Hattersley's campaign from a third 
27 floor flat in Pimlico , must have wondered who would support 
his man. 
However, it was not simply antagonism to Hattersley that won over the ModerateS28. 
Kinnock's campaigning brought him in contact with union officials - in their roles of 
attending meetings and chauffeuring politicians. In Kinnock, they saw a kindred spirit 
who, like them, believed returning Labour to power was the over-riding objective, 
taking precedence over intra-party wrangling 29 . For Chapple, he had "got 
ballS,, 30. This 
had been evidenced by his abstention during "the Deputy Leadership in 198 1. That 
changed the geography quite a bit.. the degree of mutual understanding changed 
exponentially after thaf 01 . Kinnock's personality also helped. Tony Clarke met 
Kinnock in the mid-I 970s, when they both addressed a May Day rally in Torbay, and 
their dialogue started then. Roy Grantham and Kinnock addressed an aerospace 
meeting during the 1983 election and spent two hours in Grantham's car afterwards, 
when they both agreed the party had to change. This key St Ermins Group general 
secretary recognised the Moderates would have to support Kinnock and work with him 
to make those changes 32 . Warburton's support stemmed from his desire to "jump a 
generation"33 , whilst Tuffin, who had also been on the campaign trail with Kinnock, felt 
he was "prepared to have a go at things and tear down some of the things that made us 
unwinnable,, 34 - Not every right-wing union supported KinnocO5 but the St Ennins 
Group had found they could do business with hiM36 and saw in him someone willing to 
do the hard work. Without referring to his opponent for the leadership, Kinnock 
describes the unions' attitude to some of their political soul-mates: "The trade unions 
26 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 19 1. 
27 Robert Harris, op cit, p. 229. 
28 Though it did deliver Golding for Kinnock. See p. 193. 29 Martin Westlake, op cit, p-164. 
30 Observer, 4 September 1983. 
31 Neil Kinnock interview. 
32 Roy Grantham interview. 
33 David Warburton interview. 
34 Alan Tuffin interview. 
33 The AUEW and GMWU voted for Hattersley - the latter finally only thanks to John Smith. Its 
ballot favoured Hattersley, but on the eve of the vote, Basnett phoned Hattersley and, on the grounds 
that the union always supported Labour Leaders and Kinnock was going to win, asked if he could 
switch the union's vote. Smith promptly visited him and protested it made a nonsense of the 
balloting. The union cast its vote accordingly (Roy Hattersley interview). 
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were really bloody irritated by the fact that they knew that a lot of the battle had to be 
conducted by infantry officers that were willing to walk with their men. And some MPs 
would get to a TV studio but they wouldn't to a GC or regional conference. They were 
seriously brassed off about that. That's one of the reasons I got on with the union 
lads"37 . 
There were other candidates for the leadership: Solidarity's Peter Shore had begun to 
plan his bid soon after the 1981 conference 38 , whilst Eric Heffer ran 
from the Left 
(attracting only 7% of the CLP vote - compared with Benn's 83% in 198139) . There 
was a second major ballot - for the Deputy Leadership, where the unions' commitment 
to the Dream Ticket saw 35.237% of their 40% share go to Hattersley, with just 4.730% 
to Meacher, helping to provide the new Deputy with a 67.266% to 27.886% victory 
over his closest challenger4o. However, the night of Sunday 2 October belonged to 
Kinnock, whose words in his acceptance speech echoed the unions' desire to win. 
Calling for unity, not just then, or during a campaign but "here and now and from 
henceforth", the new Leader pleaded: "remember how you felt on that dreadful morning 
of 10 June. Just remember how you felt then, and think to yourselves: 'June the Ninth 
never ever again will we experience that"'41 . 
36 Roy Grantham interview. 
37 Neil Kinnock interview. 
38 Private briefing paper for Shore by Nick Butler (undated), NBP. 
39 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, The End ofParliamentary Socialism, Verso, 200 1, p. 2 10. The Left 
was divided. LCC and Clause 4 supported Kinnock. CLPD, Socialist Organiser, Socialist Action, 
Campaign Group, Benn and the staff of Tribune supported Heffer (Report from CLPD Secretary to 
the 1984 CLPD AGM). 
40 Report ofthe 1983 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 29. Denzil Davies and Gwyneth 
Dunwoody polled 3.525% and 1.323% respectively. Hattersley won greater support from the CLP 
section than Healey in 198 1. This may have reflected the increased number of CLPs balloting their 
members (at least 64) rather than a rightward shift; JSA- 41 Report ofthe 1983 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p-30. 
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"If the Executive will not act [on Militant], the party's centre 
and Right-wing will conclude that the composition of the 
Executive must be changed. With the assistance of one or two 
big unions.. it can be done - andprobably will be"ý 
This thesis argues that Labour's Traditional Right, in despair after the 1981 split and at 
the NEC's ineffectiveness in tackling infiltration, set about restoring a moderate balance 
to the NEC. The purpose of this chapter is not to tell the story of Militant (which has 
been done elsewhere 2) but only as it relates to the NEC's role, the Right's determination 
to make changes and to its subsequent role in expelling Militant - including its lengthy 
struggle with the soft-Left. 
Militant was not new to the Labour Party, being formed in 1964 as successor to the 
Revolutionary Socialist League (which started its work inside the party in 1953)3. 
Whilst the NEC's role in suppressing the Underhill Report on Militant from 1975 forms 
the main part of this chapter, there was in 1976/1977 a major dispute between the NEC 
and the Right in the PLP over the appointment of Andy Bevan, a known Militant 
supporter, as the party's youth officer. Ron Hayward (who had been appointed General 
Secretary in 1972 on the casting vote of Benn) used his casting vote for Bevan on 24 
September 1976. This was an early test of the new Prime Minister (Callaghan)'s 
authority as he sought to stop the NEC ratifying the appointmene. He failed, and on IS 
December, Bevan was confirmed by IS: 12, to start work in January 19775. 
There followed a major argument. The Tribune Group had backed Bevan6 but the 
party's Agents' Union, NULO, objected on the grounds that this post should go to a 
former agent 7. Meanwhile, the right-wing Manifesto Group of MPs objected on 
political grounds8, one of their members having equated Militant in Labour Party with 
the National Front in the Tory Party9.40 MPs joined the anti-Bevan campaign, signing 
a letter drawn up by Ken Weetch, and a resolution condemning the appointment was 
I Joe Haines, "The Rape of Labour", Daily Mirror, 25 January 1977. 
2 Michael Crick, The March ofMilitant, Faber and Faber, 1986. 3 
ibid. 
4 Daily Telegraph, 25 November 1976. 
5 Daily Telegraph, 16 December 1976. 
6 Daily Telegraph, 30 November 1976. 
7 Observer, 21 December 1976, Daily Telegraph, II January 1977. 
a Daily Telegraph, 13 January 1977. 
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submitted to the PLP'O. This incident, which inserted an active Militant supporter into 
the party's headquarters, reflected both Callaghan's weakness at the NEC and the gulf 
between many MPs and the NEC. 
Meanwhile, the party's National Agent, Reg Underhill, who had "disclosed that six out 
of 11 members of the Young Socialists' national committee were.. under Trotskyist 
influence" as early as 196411, submitted a dossier to the NEC on 25 November 1975 
from which his Report concluded: "there is a central organisation associated with 
Militant with its own membership and full-time organisers" 12 . He was severely 
disappointed that NEC would not even consider it, leaving it "lying on the table"13 
Although not published, the subject of the Report was well covered in newspapers 14 .A 
campaign to expose Militant developed, with Shirley Williams attacking Trotskyist 
infiltration" and the matter pressed on the NEC so that it set up Sub-Committee 16 to 
consider Underhill's documents, though recalling its "Opposition to witch-hunts .. and 
McCarthyism" 17 
. The Sub-Committee's Report, whilst accepting secret meetings and 
similar existed, was against witch-hunts and believed "that Trotskyist views cannot be 
beaten by disciplinary action". It recommended that members be made aware of 
Militant's aims and claims (and therefore their Report should be circulated), alongside a 
membership drive, political education and improved meetings (which would not drive 
members away)18. This was approved by NEC on 25 May 1977 but Chapple 
immediately wrote 19 asking for the documents, not just the Report. Therequestwas 
refused, the NEC agreeing "that the background documents.. should not be circulated 
in any way"20 - Therefore none of the 10 documents was, seen other than by the five 
Sub-Committee members. 
9 Alan Lee Williams, The Times, 14 December 1976. 
10 7 December 1976, Ian Wrigglesworth papers (IWP). II Daily Mail, 27 January 1977. 
12 "Entryist Activities", Paper to 26 November 1975 NEC, NAD/92/11/75, Labour Party Archives 
13 
(LPA); Guardian, 15 December 1976. 
14 
Daily Telegraph, 6 December 1976. 
15 
As a "Revolutionary plot" inside the party, Observer, 31 August 1975. 
16 
Guardian, 22 January 1977. 
17 
John Chalmers, Tom Bradley, Foot, Heffer and Hayward. 
is 
Daily Mail, 27 January 1977. 
NAD/58/5/77 (LPA) and appendix to 1977 Annual Report. 
19 3 June 1977. 
20 Underhill letter to Chapple, 27 July 1977 (JSA). 
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Underhill retired to the Lords in 1979 but received 10 more documents which were 
covered in the Sunday Times 21 , 
in the Guardian 22 and as part of a 6-page supplement on 
"The Labour Party's Militant MoleS,, 23 _ each describing the degree of infiltration. Still 
the NEC refused to publish although it invited Underhill "to publish any documents he 
wisheS,, 24 . 
At his own expense, Underhill mailed his report to all CLPs, unions and the 
NEC25. 
The NUR's Sidney Weighell had criticised the NEC's failure to act, and outlined a way 
forward, suggesting that Militant be asked to provide details of their constitution, 
internal structure, aims, publications, finances, membership and links with foreign 
26 
organisations - and any failure to provide leading to expulsions . Underhill sent more 
information when the Organisation Sub-committee (chaired by Heffer) was considering 
a recommendation that "no action" be taken against Militant (at the same time agreeing 
to a Golding recommendation that the right-wing Social Democratic Alliance be 
expelled for planning to oppose Labour candidateS)27 . The sub-committee "was 
satisfied that there was nothing incompatible" in Militant with party membership as it 
was not fielding candidates, but Underhill again wrote showing Militant was in breach 
of the constitution as it "acts as a 'party within a Party' , 28 . This long-standing party 
servant received a 4-line reply "Your letter of II December to the General Secretary 
was reported to the [NEC] .. on 17 December when it was decided to take no action"29 
The issue rumbled on. On the eve of the Benn-Healey Deputy Leadership election, the 
Fabian Society published a pamphlet on Trotskyism in the party30, with a long extract in 
The Times 31 . There was a strong attempt to suppress the Fabian publication, led by 
Frances Morrell, Benn's former political adviser 32 . 
In November 198 1, Chief Whip Michael Cocks complained to the General Secretary 
about the treatment of Liverpool MPs, with I out of 5 deselected and 3 out of 5 having 
21 16 December 1979. 
22 Guardian, II January 1980. 
23 
24 
Tom Forester, New Society, 10 January 1980. 
25 
NEC, 27 February 1980. 
Lord Underhill letter, March 1980, JSA. 
26 1980 AGM speech, Charles Turnock papers. 
27 Daily Telegraph, 15 December 1980. 
28 Underhill letter to Hayward, II December 1980, JSA. 
29 Letter of 19 December 1980, LPA. 30 David Webster, The Labour Party and the New Left, Fabian Society, October 198 1. 31 By David Webster, 24 September 1981. 
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defected - he estimated the odds of this happening as 1: 183 0- and asking in vain for an 
enquiry 33 . The Manifesto 
Group wrote about "extremist infiltration", labelling Militant 
"a cancer in the body politic .. a party within a party", urging 
the NEC not to endorse 
Militant supporter Pat Wall as a candidate, and "to declare the activities and 
organisation of the Militant Tendency as incompatible with the constitution of the 
Labour Party"34 . 
At a 2V2-hour PLP meeting, "speaker after speaker insisted that something be done to 
curb Trotskyist militant tendency"; however, the Leader, Foot, said "that he would not 
support expulsions from the party or proscriptionS,, 35 . 
Despite John Morris, the Shadow 
Attorney General, believing that "the NEC could not ignore entry iSM,, 36 , 
Foot reiterated 
to the NEC that "I am against expulsions" and the NEC reaffirmed its rejection of any 
probe into Militan. t37. 
Something changed by December when "Foot wins call for inquiry on militant, 39. My 
assumption is that the following story - undated by its tellers - belongs here. Within 
the PLP, a "Group of Ten", had been meeting for some months in various people's 
flats". They were later to discuss getting rid of Foot as Leader (a cause ended by 
Labour's Darlington victory)40 . They felt Foot was "in denial", failing to see any 
"connection between Trots and Militanf'. So, they 
"went to see Michael in the Leader's Room before PM Questions.. things 
were so absolutely desperate.. and said, unless he denounced Militant and 
recognised it was a deep cancer in the party, the parliamentary party was on 
the verge of deeply splitting and was going to come apart. Just as the Benn 
vote was a turning point, this meeting also absolutely critical to events. And 
Michael was shaken to the core. This was a frank speaking meeting. He 
faced a range of people in party terms - Ann [Taylor] was on the Right; I 
was not in Manifesto Group; [Martin] O'Neill ran with Tribune, as did Jack 
Straw; Jeff [Rooker] not in either. .. Rooker told him as it bloody was. 'It's 
no good you just putting your head in the sand'. Michael .. was white as a 
sheet. [And] we were not taking no for an answer. This was not a plea, but 
32 Dianne Hayter papers. 
33 Charles Turnock, "Mersey Militants", 1987, p. 19. 
34 Letter to Hayward, 2 November 198 1, MGA. 
35 Times, 19 November 198 1. 
36 ibid. 
37 Times, 26 November 198 1. 
39 Times, 10 December 198 1. 
39 This mixed grouping (see annex 6) presaged the alliance of centre-right and soft-left which was to 
40 
emerge post-1983 (Giles Radice, interview, 26 November 2003). 
Giles Radice interview. Labour won the by-election on 24 March 1983, by 20,544 votes to the 
Conservatives' 18,132. 
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an ultimatum. If you don't.. there is going to be a war. And you'll lose a 
lot of people .. Straw quietly accumulated a mass of 
documents on Militant 
from moles. A Dossier. He gave to me. I passed it on"41. 
Whatever happened, on 9 December 1981 Foot's call for an enquiry was agreed 10: 9 by 
the Organisation Sub-committee (Kinnock's vote providing the majority)42 . Benn 
opposed, pledging to "fight like a tiger" against expulsions. Foot admitted "he had 
underestimated .. Militant .. and now 
believed they were dangerous". The resolution 
instructed Ron Hayward and David Hughes (Underhill's successor as National Agent) 
to report on the activities of Militant, and "whether these conflict with .. the 
constitutioif -A3 . There was widespread press coverage of Militantý4 - 
including by 
, 
45 Militant's Peter Taafe in Labour WeekIj . Copious evidence was submitted, 
including 
a "great deal of documentation" from SolidaritY46. 
The Hayward/Hughes report became the hook on which subsequent action against the 
Tendency was taken. Turning its back both on outlawing members for their beliefs, and 
on any return to the Proscribed LiSt47 , Hayward/Hughes proposed a Register of 
organisations deemed compatible with party membership, but simultaneously stated that 
Militant was not eligible to be included on the Register. Even going this far, the authors 
had to genuflect to Foot's line by writing: "We fully support the sentiments contained 
in the Party Leader's New Year Message 1982 against proscription lists, witch hunts 
and expulsions. Nevertheless the National Executive Committee has the right and the 
duty to safeguard the Party Constitution and Rules". It is hard to see how - without 
expulsions - they imagined Militant could be tackled. 
For many on the Centre and Right, the report was "a disappointment". Not only was the 
evidence to Hayward/Hughes again not published, but it only supported a Register, not 
41 Ken Woolmer, interview, 12 June 2003. 
42 The ten comprised Foot, Healey, Varley, Golding, Boothroyd, Tuck, Hough, Tierney, David 
Williams and Kinnock - some put on the NEC by the St Ermins Group only 2 months earlier. It was 
endorsed at the 16 December NEC by 19: 10 (LPA). 
43 Times, 10 December 198 1. 
44 Such as 3-pages in the Daily Star, 16 December 198 1. 
45 15 January 1982. 
46 "Militant Tendency Report" (known as the Hayward/Hughes Report), NEC paper, 23 June 1982 
47 
(LPA). 
which had been removed from the rulebook in 1973 (NEC Report to 1973 Conference, p. 11). This 
had debarred anyone belonging to any organisation on that list from party membership. In ending it, 
the NEC stated there were sufficient rules to safeguard the constitution and asked members to 
refrain from associating with political organisations whose aims and objectives were not consistent 
with those of the Labour Party. 
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expulsionsý8. Furthermore, other groups might refuse to register ("following successful 
precedent of the trade unions and the Industrial Relations Act"), CLPD already 
indicating that it would not do so. However, Solidarity members recognised that an 
immediate move to expulsion "cannot be got through the NEC without the support of 
949 Michael Foot' 
The NEC agreed the Report5o, and the new General Secretary, Jim Mortimer, 
immediately wrote to non-affiliated organisations (apart from Militant) asking them to 
Register". It later decided that no facilities be accorded to Militant (which included 
selling Militant at meetings or letting rooms to theM)52 .A resolution at conference 
condemning this was lost by 1,754,000 to 5,049,00053 . 
The Left in the party mobilised 
to oppose the ban, with identical resolutions from 26 different CLI's submitted to the 
54 NEC 
The NEC moved against the Editorial Board Of Militant whose members were expelled 
in February 198355. In 1984/85 CLPs began their own expulsions. The St Ermins 
Group supporters on the NEC wanted more and in December 1984 Ken Cure tried in 
vain to have a wider enquiry 56 . However, a year later, after Kinnock's major speech in 
Bournemouth attacking Liverpool's Militants, and following letters from Basnett and 
, 57 "the left-wing leader" of TGWU, Ron Todd, "demanding action' , the NEC (by 21: 5) 
suspended the district party and launched an enquiry. The Enquiry Team was heavy 
with St Ermins Group nomineeS58, the Left having failed (by 9: 17) to add Heffer to the 
teaM59. 
The majority Liverpool Report, which recommended action against unnamed members 
for involvement with Militant, was endorsed by the NEC on 26 February 1986, and was 
49 Briefing paper for Peter Shore, 22 April 1982, NBP. 
49 ibid. 
so Which was endorsed by the annual conference, 5,173,000: 1,565,000; Report ofthe 1982 Annual 
51 
Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 275. 
52 
28 July 1982, LPA. 
53 
NEC, 27 July 1983. 
54 
Report ofthe 1983 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p-75. 
55 
NAD 6/11/83,23 November 1983, LPA. 
NEC Report to Labour Party Conference, 1983, p. 22. The expulsions were confirmed at Conference 
56 
by majorities of approximately 5 million to 1 V2 million. 
57 
Charles Turnock, op cit, p. 26/7. 
Times, 28 November 1985. 
59 Turnock (Chair), Boothroyd, Tony Clarke, Haigh and Hough, with Beckett, Sawyer and Wise from the Left. 
59 Charles Turnock, op cit, p. 27. 
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circulated throughout the party in printed form. A minority Report, by Beckett and 
Wise, rejecting any expulsions, was defeated by 18 : 960 but nevertheless published by 
the party. The expulsions took a long time as the Left fought the action at every step. 
The Court having ruled that the 8 Enquiry Team members could not sit on the NEC to 
hear the charges 61 ,7 left-wing members 
62 walked out of the NEC meeting on 26 June 
1986, making it inquorate - as only 14 remained (and the quorum 15). So on 18 May 
the full NEC (by 18: 4) changed the quorum to 50% of those eligible to participate in the 
business 63 . Eventually the hearings took place and 
8 Liverpool Militants were expelled, 
the decisions overwhelmingly endorsed by the conference 64 . 
The party soon afterwards set up a National Constitutional Committee (NCC) which 
thereafter heard all the Militant cases though it was a number of years before the 
Militant MPs appeared there. Throughout, many on the Left fought against all such 
action. There was a minority on the Left who took a different view, such as Walter 
Kenda1165, who wrote: "allegiance to Marxism is one thing, allegiance to Leninism is 
quite another", asking Militant whether they fitted the latter66. Similarly, in July 1982, 
Bryan Gould (a parliamentary candidate and former MP) claimed that the party's "spirit 
of tolerance does not mean.. that no-one should be refused membership.. because of 
their ideas .. The notion that the party has no ideological boundaries is specious .. The 
only question is, where should the boundaries be drawn? ", arguing that Militant was 
beyond the boundarieS67 . Kinnock used similar arguments when, defending his vote for 
the Hayward/Hughes Report, he maintained Militant had exceeded boundaries, was a 
"party within a Party" and supported "democratic centralism" which was "arrogant and 
60 Charles Tumock, op cit, p. 224. 
61 Something which Kinnock had been warned about by barrister James Goudie. It was for that reason 
he had held back some "reliables" from the Enquiry Team, and allowed some of the Left on, so that 
he could still produce a majority at the NEC without the Enquiry Team's votes (Neil Kinnock 
interview). 
62 ibid, p. 230. 63 ibid, p. 235. 
64 Report ofthe 1986 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
65 Socialist historian and activist, a founder of the journal Voice ofthe Unions and author of The 
revolutionary movement in Britain, 1900-21: the origins ofBritish Communism, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1969. 
Tribune, 19 March 1982. 
67 Guardian, 26 July 1982. Despite these views, Nellist voted for Gould for the Shadow Cabinet 
elections, Dave Nellist MP Parliamentary Report, Summer 1987. 
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anti-democratic and absolutely contrary to the ideology of the Labour Party" whilst he 
still asserted: "There is no question of a witch-hunf 168 . 
Such support for action was a minority on the Left, partly due to their experience of 
intolerance by the Right in the 1950s and 1960s 69 , partly as they 
believed Militant was 
just the start and that the Right would then move on the rest of the Left70. In 1976, the 
editor of Militant described the Andy Bevan exercise as "commencement of a witch 
hunt" - stopping his appointment would be "the green light for the Right wing to 
attempt a return to the 1950s' .. expulsions"71 . Despite 
his dislike of TrotskyiteS72 , Dick 
Clements, recalling the MP Konni Zillicus' 1949 expulsion as "a victim of the Right's 
intolerance", pledged: "It must not happen . again"73 . 
The LCC 1981 AGM carried unanimously: "We should unequivocally oppose attempts 
to launch witch-hunts against any section of the Left" 74. CLPs started passing 
'Opposition to the Witch-hunt' resolutions 75 . 
Local groups became active, the Dulwich 
Labour Party newsletter writing: "Help Defend Militant.. If the attack on Militant were 
to succeed, next in line would be the [CLPD], [LCC] and then Tony Benn" and quoting 
Benn "There must be no registration of socialiSM1,76. Over 200 CLPs supported a 
"Defend Militant" campaign, with a Labour Movement Conference on II September 
1982. A Scottish circular claimed that over 2,500 delegates attended, whilst "it is only 
the right wing rump of the Labour Party, the camp followers of John Smith, Donald 
Dewar and George Robertson, who support expulsions"77 . Over 300 delegates in 
London's County Hall formed "Labour Against the Witch-hunt" on 30 October 1982. 
The "Southwark Labour Parties Against Expulsions" group held a rally on II 
December 1982, with Tatchell, Reg Race (Chair, Labour Against the Witchhunt) and 
78 MEP Richard Balfe 
68 Broad Lefl, 41liance Journal, October 1982. 
69 Dick Clements, interview, 9 July 2002. 
70 Reg Race interview. 
71 Letter to Daily Telegraph, 17 January 1977. 
72 Dick Clements interview. 
73 Tribune, 25 September 19 8 1. 
74 Undated letter from Michael Meacher, Audrey Wise and others, to LCC members. 75 Militant, II December 19 8 1. 
76 Dulwich Labour Party Contact, July 1982. 
77 Bob Eadie papers. 78 Collection of handbills. 
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NEC member Sawyer wrote in the Labour Against the Witchhunt Bulletin 
79 
. By April 
1983,55 CLPs had affiliated. The thrust of the work was to get the "Greenwich 
Amendment" -a resolution to scrap the Register - on the conference agenda. CLPD 
circulated model resolutions opposing witch-hunts and supporting the Greenwich 
amendment. By August 1983, a large number of resolutions from CLPs had been 
received by the NEC. In the resulting debate at conference, when Jack Straw called the 
term " 'witch-hunt'.. simply a smokescreen for those who wish to claim immunity 
80 
from the terms and conditions of our rulebook", he was slow-hand-clapped 
Nevertheless, the resolution calling for an "immediate halt to all witch-hunte' was lost 
by 4,868,000 to 1,913,00081. 
Pressure against expulsions continued, with the CLPD confirming by 150: 77: "that 
CLPD should continue to campaign.. to.. prevent the continuation of the NEC's witch- 
hunt of the last two years, and to reverse the proscriptions and expulsions which have 
been carried out"82 . When resolutions came to NEC (for example from Islington South, 
the CLP of Chris Smith who signed the Campaign Group Statement against the Witch- 
hunt 83), the NEC would inform the CLP that "protecting the constitution of the Labour 
Party is not witchhunting"84 . 
The flow of anti-expulsion resolutions to NEC continued throughout 1984 and 1985, at 
a time when 4,000 Militant supporters gathered in the Royal Albert Hall". Witch Hunt 
NeWS86 was launched by Labour Left Co-ordination, CLPD and the Campaign Group 
(the grouping included David Blunkett and Peter Hain 87). CLPDIs 1987 AGM agreed 
by 82: 2 "to campaign against expulsions .. by promoting an amendment to .. [the] Party 
constitution with a view to providing a legal basis for groups of.. members holding 
minority views to campaign within the Party and taking up individual cases .. where the 
existing rules provided no valid grounds for their expulsion"88. 
79 Number 4, May 1983. 
0 Report ofthe 1983 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 73. I ibid, p. 75. 
2 Minutes of 1984 CLPD AGM. 
3 March 1984. 
4 Paper NAD/69/3/84, to 28 March 1984 NEC meeting (LPA). 5 Guardian, 13 November 1985. 
:6 No 1, January 1986; Witch Hunt News; No 2, March 1986, Witch Hunt News; No 3, May 1986; 
7 
Witch Hunt News, June/July 1986. 
Guardian, 20 January 1986. 
Minutes of 14,21 and 28 February 1987. 
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This chapter has sought to describe how the Right - both in the PLP and the unions - 
were frustrated in trying to deal with Militant. One of their number attributed the poor 
1987 election result to this and to the "constant pussy footing around by the leadership 
to placate the extreme left,, 89. It was for that reason that the unions became so 
determined to alter the composition of the NEC and then play a role in expelling 
Militant. As one MP subsequently wrote: "For what seemed like an eternity, the NEC 
simply equivocated on countering the Trotskyist takeover bid. When Neil Kinnock 
finally had an executive with the bottle, it took action"90. 
89 Charles Tumock, op cit, pp. 268,273. 90 Frank Field in the Guardian, 10 June 2003. 
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In order to appreciate the importance of OMOV, a brief history of its development is 
outlined here. There were two aspects of OMOV: initially - and partly in response to 
the Left's reselection campaign - as the method of selecting parliamentary candidates; 
secondly, as the way of deciding how each CLP and union should decide their votes in 
the Electoral College. In both cases, the campaign was hard fought, and the issue used 
as a "marker' to label members "Left"(opponents) or "Right' '(supporters). 
Whilst it was resisted by most on the Left, OMOV was not simply a device invented by 
the Right in the 1980s to frustrate the Lefts attempt to wrest power from MPs. Its 
origins go back further, with proposals for a wider franchise being discussed in the 
1960s'. Any move to OMOV raised serious questions for the movement's constituent 
parts. The selection of candidates was the responsibility of GCs where union delegates 
played a large role. It was possible in many seats (especially, as in mining areas, where 
one union was pre-eminent) for one or more unions effectively to select the candidate. 
This could also work within a region, where perhaps one seat would be accepted as the 
TGWU's, the neighbouring one falling to the GMWU. Any move to OMOV, with only 
individual members voting, jeopardised the role of trade unions. 
In the case of the Leader, similar forces were at play. It had long fallen to the MPs to 
elect their own parliamentary leader (who was defacto - and later dejure - Leader of 
the Labour Party). The majority of MPs wanted to retain this position. OMOV was 
proposed only when a wider franchise was inevitable - and then only for the two new 
sections of the Electoral College, the PLP retaining some input. 
A number of unions had employed OMOV for internal elections for years - notably the 
EETPU and the AUEW. In the latter case, when postal ballots for officers; had been 
under attack by the Communist Party (in favour of branch ballots), an AUEW "Insight 
Group" paper set out the comprehensive case for OMOV2 . The EETPU also played a 
key role in the achievement of OMOV, by arguing the case and by funding local party 
ballots, a hitherto unreported, but significant, intervention. 
Political Quarterly, July 1960. 
"Postal Ballote', 1975, JSA. 
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Writing the authoritative How the Labour Party Works in 1975, the National Agent 
stated that parliamentary candidates were selected by GCs on a majority vote after an 
eliminating ballot 3, little suspecting the inter-party warfare that would erupt over this 
issue. And yet, as early as 197 1, a Fabian Group (which included Anthony Wedgwood- 
Benn4 and Reg Races) produced a pamphlet in which its editor and another group 
member favoured opening up candidate selection to all party members 6. Jim Daly 
started supporting members' participation in 1976 7 and, by 1977, OMOV was favoured 
by the Centre and Right of the party8. CLV's founding meeting 9 resolved to campaign 
for "the fullest possible democratic involvement of the Party membership" which soon 
became a call for membership involvement in candidate selectionlo. There were some - 
particularly MPs - who supported this in response to the Left's demands for reselection. 
For others it was a simply a logical extension of democracy. However, no sooner was it 
articulated, than it was attacked by CLPD1 1. London Labour Briefing called on the Left 
to expose "those who seek to 'extend democracy' by introducing a primaries system for 
the reselection process". Even worse, "Some members of CLV, not content with 
advocating that all members should be involved in the final selection, are calling for a 
postal ballot of all members to decide the candidate" 12 . 
Daly took his OMOV ideas to a CLV meeting early in 1978 13 where they became CLV 
policy. In 1979, CLV and the Manifesto Group called for the selection of candidates to 
be opened up to all party members of 2-years' standing 14 . Within parliament, Golding 
proposed to the PLP that, if reselection was introduced, "the vote should be given to all 
3 Reg Underhill, How the Labour Party Works, The Labour Party, 1975, p. 10. 4 Later Tony Berm. In 1971 he was an MP and Vice Chairman of the Labour Party. 
5 Later a Bennite MP. 
6 Inigo Bing "New Approaches to Democracy" and Oliver Stutchbury, "Reform of party 
organisatioW'in Inigo Bing (ed), The Labour Party. An Organisational Study, Fabian Society, 1971, 
7 
pp. 25,46 and 54. 
8 
Jim Daly, "Let ALL the Members Vote! ", Socialist Commentary, October 1976. 
Paul Tinnion, New Statesman, 21 October 1977; David Bean, New Statesman, 21 October 1977, 
Dianne Hayter, The Labour Party: Crisis and Prospects, Fabian Society, September 1977, Dianne 
Hayter, "NEC needs rank-and-file", Labour Weekly, 7 September 1979. 
9 19 February 1977. 
10 "Is it Democracy? ", Labour Victory, May 1977; CLV, "Let's have some real democracy in the 
Labour Party", 1977. 
11 For example, a piece on their behalf against "Why can't all members select their Parliamentary 
Candidate? " in Labour Leader, August 1978. 
12 Andy Harris, "CLPD slams CLV 'democracy' fraud", London Labour Briefing, June 1980. 13 Jim Daly papers. 
14 CLV and Manifesto Group, "Reform and Democracy in the Labour Party". Labour Victory, October 1979. 
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members of the party.. not just the few who got on the GMC"15. This betrays its partial 
origins in diluting reselection. Thereafter OMOV was seen as a right-wing ploy, 
making it difficult for anyone on the Left to support. Increasingly, as many of its 
proponents moved towards the Gang of Three (later Four and eventually the SDP), its 
chances of success correspondingly fell. The NEC set its face against OMOV, whereas 
the Manifesto Group began to see it as a central issue. 12 of their number (the "Dirty 
Dozen") supported OMOV16 and, following Callaghan's resignation, the Group 
prepared 10 questions for the leadership contenders, including "Are you in favour of 
one member one vote in selections and reselections? "17. However, with Foot as Leader 
opposed to it, the campaign stalled. 
In 1980, the EETPU's submission to the Party's Enquiry into Organisation 
recommended the use of "an individual postal ballot with a single transferable vote" for 
all members. Its second preference was for a ballot at a meeting "in which all members 
of the CLP are eligible to participate"18 . The paper showed the proportion of 
membership participating in reselections - from 3% in Norwood to 18% in Fife Central. 
Although the proportion reached 22% in West Dunbartonshire, this was from an 
extremely low membership. So, concluded the paper, the selectorate was 
unrepresentative of membership - and even less representative of Labour voters or the 
wider electorate (with just 0.05% of Benn's electorate in Bristol South East 
participating in his selection). 
After 1981, Labour Solidarity took up the cause 19 , with Frank Field then deciding to 
concentrate solely on this objective 20 . His support for OMOV pre-dated Wembley, 
when he urged that selection be by more than just "super-activiStS,, 21 . He wanted to 
maintain union involvement through the formation of party factory branches, favouring 
OMOV for selection and leadership elections 22 . Two years later he established "Labour 
Franchise", published a letter in Labour Weekly on a "One Person One Vote" campaign 
and put together a "pack" of supporting arguments, for local parties and friendly MPs. 
is John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 109. 
16 "Why the Labour Party structure must change" by Mike Thomas, George Robertson et al (most of 
17 
whom subsequently joined the SDP), The Times, 22 September 1980. 
October 1980; Tan Wrigglesworth papers. 
is "Submission by the E. E. T. P. U. to the Party Enquiry into Organisation", 1980, JSA. 19 See Solidarity chapter. 
20 Letter from Frank Field to Ken Woolmer, 10 November 199 1. 
21 Times, 6 November 1980; Guardian, 2 January 198 1. 22 John Gyford papers. 
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In the run-up to the 1983 leadership election, Field asked the four candidates their views 
on OMOV for selection. It was then that Kinnock agreed to it, leading to Field's 
expectation that all would then happen. But he had calculated without the unions which 
would take another decade to deliver 23 . There 
is an interesting postscript to Field's long 
commitment to OMOV. On leaving the Blair government in 1988, his resignation 
speech mentioned "initiating the one member, one vote campaign7 924 . Kinnock's former 
Head of Office, Charles Clarke, immediately disputed this in a "robust conversation" 
with Field 25 . But it is Clarke who was mistaken. Field was 
indeed one of the first MPs, 
and the first of the non-defectors, to back OMOV, and he went public long before 
Kinnock - or any of his staff - supported it. 
One union was consistent in its support. The EETPU took on the Left's opposition to 
OMOV. Its Political Bulletin confronted the "Elitist arguments against extending the 
franchise", contending that "Those who argue that the average Party member.. is not 
well enough informed about the issues to make a mature judgement, would find ample 
support from the Earl of Rutland, who in 1867 said 'I do not think the state of education 
in the Country is sufficiently advanced to enable the Government safely to propose so 
large a measure as that of household suffrage' , 26 -A paper circulated to friendly MPs 
included the GCs' voting figures for reselection of Campaign Group MPs (those most 
opposed to OMOV) - such as 28-26 for Margaret Beckett, 64-36-27 for Benn, and 15-9 
for Clare Short, with the numbers voting as a percentage of average CLP membership 
(respectively 12.5%; 29.39% and 5.55%). Tribune Groups' figures were little different, 
with 34-28 for Gordon Brown (14.35% of average CLP membership), 18-0 for Robin 
Cook (4-16%) and 23-19 for Harriet Harman (9.72%)27 . For the EETPU, this was a 
clear case for involving all party members. 
Solidarity's first OMOV leaflet was in 1983 28 , when Hattersley described the pressure 
for changes as "irresistible", whilst acknowledging that union support would be needed 
for their loss of control over selection29. As its supporters geared up for the campaign, 
23 Chris Savage, interview, 30 January 2003. 
24 Hansard, 29 July 1998, col 373. 
25 Letter from Frank Field to Charles Clarke, August 1988 (with kind permission of the author). 26 EETPU Political Bulletin, August 1983, pA 27 July 1984. The paper also noted how many of the Left, having vigorously opposed reselection from 
29 
a Shortlist-of-One, then took advantage of this and faced no opponent. "One Person, One Vote -True Democracy' leaflet. 29 Guardian, II February 1983. 
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the Left worked equally hard - and more effectively - to resist it. CLPD decided that it 
"should continue to give high priority to opposing the misleadingly named campaign for 
gone member one vote'... its propaganda gives the illusion that it would be an extension 
of democracy'930 . 
Simultaneously, the St Ermins-Kinnock majority on the NEC was moving inexorably 
towards OMOV, John Evans writing in support, partly as a recruiting tool: "Join the 
Labour Party and choose your MpOl. Kinnock echoed these views, publishing his 
letter to MPs which favoured giving GCs the choice of enabling all members to 
participate in selection. He asked opponents to "explain how in the name of democracy 
they can deny the chance to vote to the people who make up the party" and challenged 
their belief that only GC members could decide on the candidate, the supposed 
difficulties in organising ballots and on dangers to the union linO. He pointed to the 
tiny average number of GC delegates (37) voting in the latest 206 selections and 
stressed the potential of opening up this decision-making to 100,000 members. "Do 
those who oppose the proposals for direct membership voting really think that the great 
majority of party members cannot be trusted to make a judgement? Iftheydo, they.. 
had better admit it.. [and] tell the people of the Labour Party that it's their membership 
that is wanted, not their opinion, that they are a respectful audience, not a movement". 
This was strong stuff for a founding member of CLPD, and he was roundly attacked by 
the Left33 who began organising union resistance to the move, on the grounds it would 
reduce their role in selecting candidates. The NUM, for example, argued that, as a 
sponsor of 15 MPs, they should be specifically consulted and that the proposed change 
should be delayed a year to allow for such discussion 34 . 
The Tribune Group wrote to unions criticising the move to OMOV as "highly divisive", 
very difficult to implement and seriously weakening the party-union link35. John Evans 
responded in the Guardian, defending the proposal (of which he was the author) to 
30 Minutes of CLPD 1984 AGM. 
31 Guardian, 29 June 1984. 
32 Guardian, 24 July 1984. 
33 Including by Heffer, despite his view the previous year, that "I would have one person one vote both for election of leader and deputy leader and also for selection of candidates" (A Week in Politics, 
Channel Four, 13 February 1983). 
34 Letter from NUM General Secretary, to Labour Party General Secretary, 3 August 1984. 35 Letter from Tribune Group, 10 August 1984, signed, amongst others, by Tribune Secretary Chris Smith. 
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permit GCs to allow members the right to participate in selections 36 . By now, the 
Leader, NEC and local members supported the rule amendment. It was defeated by the 
unions in conference, though Kinnock claimed "We won the argument but lost the 
vote"37 . Solidarity similarly took comfort, saying it was "now irresistable (sic). It is not 
so much a question of 'if, but of 'when' victory comeS,, 38. The campaign continued, 
with resolutions reaching the NEC (for example, from Epping Forest and West 
Gloucestershire CLPs in favour of OMOV, and Southampton against - on the grounds 
that "The 'one member-one-vote' system would mean party members not attending 
meetings would come under the influence of the Capitalist press, rather than being 
involved in the democratic processes of the Labour Party"39). CLPD took a strong line 
against OMOV, resisting any widening of the franchise and seeking to retain power 
within GCs4O, though LCC made a brave move towards membership participation, Mike 
Craven arguing that at least a debate should take place on the Left4l . This was the first 
breach in the Left's almost unanimous hostility to OMOV42. With 5 OMOV resolutions 
on the 1985 conference agenda (including one from the EETPU), CLPD worked to 
ensure their defeat arguing they "would certainly not lead to a greater involvement even 
of individual party members" whilst they would reduce union input 43 . Two resolutions 
were debated, with the EETPU's (calling on the NEC to table a rule amendment) being 
remitted to the NEC. 
The campaign continued Nkrith Solidarity producing a leaflet, "One Person One Vote: 
They say it can't be done", which rebutted their opponents' arguments ("The Press will 
put pressure"; "It's a vote for sleeping members"; "It will exclude local unions", "It will 
be too difficult to administer") and extending their demand to giving all members a vote 
for a CLP's delegate to conference 44 . Meanwhile, the NEC established a Working 
Group 45 and issued a consultation document on "Party Franchise for Selection and 
36 Guardian, 28 September 1984. 
37 Labour Solidarity, November 1984. 
38 ibid. 
39 NEC Organisation Sub-Committee papers, February and March 1985 (LPA). 40 CLPD Newsletter, March 1985. 
41 Mike Craven, "One Person One Vote", The Journal, Clause 4, Spring 1985. 42 The exception being the ILP which, whilst highly critical of the Right, nevertheless supported "A democratic say for all the membership" in selections; John O'Brien et al, Who Rules: Annual 
43 
Conference versus the Parliamentary Party, Independent Labour Publications (ILP), 1979, p. 23. CLPD Circular, 25 July 1985. 
Labour Solidarity, January 1986. 
45 John Evans (Chair), Betty Boothroyd, Gordon Colling, Roy Hattersley, Larry Whitty and Joyce Gould; Consultation Working Party, Party Franchise, Labour Party, 1987. 
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Reselection of Parliamentary Candidates" which attracted 372 responseS46 . By 73: 10, 
the CLPD AGM reiterated "its belief that the GC is the nucleus of Labour Party 
democracy and will continue to fight any adulteration of this principle whether by 
OMOV or any other future manipulations"47. Its newsletter argued against "so-called 
'one member one vote"' and urged supporters to submit its model resolution to halt 
OMOV48 . The other left-wing group, LCC, had meanwhile turned to embrace OMOV 
(which they had helped defeat in 1984), an OMOV ballot of their own members giving 
it a 2: 1 majoritY49. Solidarity continued its long-standing campaign, offering speakers 
for meetings to build support for the case5o. 
John Evans, a staunch Kinnock supporter, author of the failed 1984 attempt and now 
chair of the Working Group, continued his proselytising: "I believe that the present 
method of re-selecting sitting Labour MPs is an enormous albatross which the Party has 
inflicted upon itself .. There are no inherent grounds for arguing against the principle of 
extending the right to every individual member.. of a vote in selecting and reselecting 
the.. candidate.. the time for 'one member one vote' has come; .. 
it will rejuvenate the 
Party.. the overwhelming majority of Party members, weary of narrow sectarianism, 
agrees with me"51. The Working Group produced a range of Options, from Mandatory 
Balloting to the status quo, rehearsing the arguments for and against each (and setting 
out the percentage of members participating in selections - an average of 8.4%)52 . The 
EETPU quickly prepared its response, outlining how reselection had failed to extend 
involvement to members, with often fewer than 20 participating in the vote. Reviewing 
the suggested Options, the union favoured Mandatory Ballots. It was, said the 
submission, no more than the One Person, One Vote which the party supported for all 
other forms of election. 
Most attention in this period, however, focused on the 1987 General Election, which 
produced few extra seats. Immediately after the defeat, OMOV was on the agenda as a 
new round of reýelections would start within 18 months. Some remained cautious; at 
46 4 February 1987; Charles Tumock papers. 47 Minutes of CLPD AGM, 14,21 and 28 February 1987. 48 CLPD Newsletter, June 1987. 
49 Guardian, 12 March 1987. 
50 Labour Solidarity, February 1987. 
51 John Evans MP, "One Member One Vote Democracy in the Labour Party", Labour Club News, 
52 
April 1987. 
Consultation Working Party, op cit. 
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an LCC Conference, "Robin Cook said that OMOV, whilst a good idea, was not a 
panacea to provide a better image for the Party"53 . However, Bernie Grant, newly 
elected for Tottenham, "At his first meeting of the Campaign Group caused a storm by 
making his position on One Member One Vote perfectly clear (he's in favour of it)9,54. 
Undeterred, CLPD urged: "Parliamentary Selection: reject pseudo-democracy Choices 
before Conference"55. Former General Secretary Mortimer similarly argued that 
"representative democracy is a sign of maturity". He also tried 'guilt by association' by 
linking OMOV with Owen's name before failing back on administrative difficulties: 
"A poll of members for the purpose of selecting a parliamentary candidate would 
require the careful checking of records and would be likely to lead to all kinds of 
unnecessary controversy"56 . The 1987 conference did vote to expand the franchise for 
selection, but a composite motion moved by the EETPU's John Spellar in support of 
OMOV was defeated in favour of a local electoral college 57 - This retained a 40% input 
from unions although it did extend voting for the other 60% to party members who 
either attended a meeting or, if they had good reason for non-attendance, applied for a 
postal vote. 
After the 1988 conference, CLPD, recognising the importance of union votes, went 
direct to unions, circulating a model resolution for 1989 union conferences which, while 
acknowledging OMOV had been agreed for the choice of Leader, called on each union 
to "oppose any further extension.. of non-participatory voting"58. The CLPD Executive 
tabled a resolution for its own AGM deploring the NEC's decision to take an OMOV 
amendment to the 1989 conference and calling for a campaign to retain decision-making 
at the GC59. Later, CLPD had to gear up to resist the extension of balloting to the 
choice of conference delegate, circulating a model resolution against postal ballotS60. 
Full OMOV for candidate selection still had some time to wait. "Labour FirSt, '61 set up 
a "One Member One Vote Now"campaign in December 1992 (with John Spellar as co- 
ordinator) and everything geared up to John Smith's mammoth battle at the 1993 
53 Clause 1r, July 1987, p. 4. 54 Clause IV, July 1987, p. 6. 55 CLPD Newsletter, September 1987. 
56 Jim Mortimer, "Narrowing Labour's franchise", Morning Star, 15 July 1987. 57 EETPU Political Bulletin, November 1987, p. 3. 58 CLPD Circular, II November 1988. 
59 CLPD Circular, 20 December 1988. 
60 CLPD Circular, October 1989. 
61 The successor to Solidarity. 
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conference, when - helped, or perhaps even saved, by John Prescott - the decision was 
finally taken, not without the twisting of a large number of arms. Union delegations 
were turned around, some at the very last moment, whilst others (such as the present 
author) with just a couple of votes to their mandate, were summoned to the Leader and 
warned he would resign if the conference defeated OMOV. His Leadership acceptance 
speech had committed the party to "one member one vote" in place of block-votes 62 and 
he believed he had to deliver. 
Whilst OMOV for candidate selection took until 1993 to be agreed, it came earlier for 
the choice of Leader - not least because of media attention on how unions cast their 
massive votes, and because of the importance of this choice for the whole country not 
just one seat. Much earlier, the 1972 conference had remitted two resolutions calling 
for the election of the Leader by conference, but it was 1976 before a motion was 
passed asking the NEC to set up a Working Party to consider widening the electorate for 
the choice of Leader 63 . Evidence submitted included I affiliate and 18 CLPs favouring 
selection by individual party members64. However, MPs remained firmly of the view 
that they should retain the sole rights of election65. The report to the 1977 conference 
and the accompanying resolution confirmed the MPs' role in the election of Leader 
(who would, for the first time, become the Leader of the party, not just of the 
parliamentary party)66 - Two amendments extending the franchise beyond MPs were 
lost. However, the campaign to change this was to continue each year, with the 1980 
Commission of Enquiry and the Bishops Stortford meeting seeing Callaghan acquiesce 
in an Electoral College, to the despair of the Right which saw it open the door to a Benn 
leadership. The wider franchise was narrowly adopted in October, its composition 
being decided at the 1981 Wembley Conference. 
Immediately after the 1980 Conference, when MPs had lost their monopoly, CLV called 
a meeting of its 100 key activists, which (unintentionally) took place between 
Callaghan's resignation and Foot's election. Whilst its focus shifted to post-Wembley 
considerations 67 , on the immediate issue, the meeting agreed (with Owen dissenting 68 
62 John Smith Leadership acceptance speech, 18 July 1992. 63 Report ofthe 19 77 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 11. 64 ! bid, p. 380. 
65 ibid, p. 3 8 1. 
66 ibid, pp. 3 79-3 82. 
67 The possibility of a new party being openly discussed; Shirley Williams' closing words were greeted enthusiastically: "If it is not possible to have democratic compassionate policies in this party then I 
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that CLV remained in favour of selection by the PLP and only if that failed would their 
choice be full OMOV. It was much too late to start a campaign for that option. 
6ka 
At Wembley, Chapple spoke fro rostrum: "The Labour Movement has always fought 
for the principle of one person one vote .. we should uphold that principle today. 
We 
support.. one member one vote, firstly because it is right in itself; next because it 
enfranchises the entire membership and gives each and every supporter an equal right in 
choosing the Leadee)69 . 
The case against OMOV was articulated by Militant delegate 
Pat Wall who claimed that "one man one vote" would give the 4 millionaires "who 
control the media.. the biggest influence in that ballot,, 70 . The proposal was 
bound to 
fail. It had only been grasped, late in the day, by MPs after failing to keep the decision 
firmly in their own hands 71 . Furthermore, being supported by Owen, Rodgers, Williams 
(who were to defect the following day) and CLV72, it was opposed not just by the Left 
but by many whose instincts warned them off such association. 
Outside the confines of the party, others saw more than just the birthpangs of the SDP, 
one armchair observer noting: 
"What was so startlingly clear from these television pictures.. was the 
sincerity with which some constituency Labour Party delegates oppose the 
principle of one-man-one-vote. From the gleam in the eye to the finger in 
the air their every mannerism shows that when it comes to privileged voting 
rights, no 19th century totalitarian Tory demanding them in the name of the 
abnormal extent of his lands could outdo a 20th Century totalitarian CLP 
delegate demanding them in the name of the abnormal extent of his 
actiVity-j973. 
The Left would oppose this extended democracy for another 8 years (and until 1993 for 
candidates), with few breaking ranks (although Meacher argued that union members 
will not go on being a fig-leaf. None of us should go off on our own, we must think together and act 
together. We cannot be used for something we do not agree with" (Ian Wrigglesworth papers - IWP). 
68 In favour of moving straight to OMOV. Other CLV members supported the principle but sensed 
69 
that the debate would focus on the proportions within an Electoral College. 
Report ofthe NEC to the 1981 Labour Party Conference, p. 125. Option 4 of the agenda was a ballot 
70 
of individual members, "Report of the Conference Arrangements Committee", 24 January 198 1, p. 2. 
71 
Report ofthe NEC to the 1981 Labour Party Conference, p. 127. 
72 
Mo Mowlam referred to the "impudence of back-bench MPs" in wanting more say; ibid, p. 145. Sunday Times, 7 December 1980. 
73 Chris Dunkley, "The'Left' exposes itself', Financial Times, 28 January 198 1. 
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should vote in their section, whilst GCs should decide locally, albeit mandated by 
branch meetings 74 
The biggest incentive on the party to change the working of the new Electoral College 
was its first airing - for the 1981 Deputy Leadership, with the image of unions casting 
large tranches of the vote often without consideration of their members' views. On 
television and in large spreads in the press, descriptions of the workings of delegations 
and executives shone unwelcome light on union decision-making 75 . The CLP figures 
were not much better, with few consulting their members. 22 CLPs did undertake some 
sort of ballot, with turn-outs averaging 73% for postal ballot, 88.6% for personal 
delivery and collection of ballot papers, and 35.67% for branch ballots 76 . 
In mid- 19 82, the NEC had yet to be convinced, judging: "It would be impractical to lay 
down a constitutional procedure for a one person, one vote electiorf 'in every CLP 
although it did propose that members could be involved by a ballot either at branch 
meetings or at a mass meeting at CLP level, or (the favoured option) by a postal ballot. 
It was for each GC to decide; but few would give up power to the membership77 . After 
the Right took the chairmanship of the NEC Organisation Sub-committee, they 
continued to face Left opposition to OMOV78 but were able to encourage full 
membership participation. 
By the 1983 leadership election, the demand for OMOV was taking root. Many unions 
and CLPs decided to determine their voting choice by OMOV79, contributing to 
Hattersley's "remarkable" 40-point victory over left-wing Meacher for Deputy Leader 
(309 CLPs supported Hattersley with just 280 for Meacher). Hattersley "won bands- 
down" in most CLPs that conducted individual ballots: of 54 parties using postal ballot, 
no fewer than 49 supported the victor. Meacher had a 2: 1 lead where GCs took the 
decisionso. In London, a third of the GCs kept the decision to themselves, 40% opting 
74 Michael Meacher, "Breaking the block vote", New Statesman, 13 November 198 1. 
75 e. g. Financial Times, 25 September 1981; "How three top communists swung 200,000 votes to 
BenW', Observer, 28 June 1981. 
76 See annex 5. 
77 NEC paper NAD/I 16/6/82,23 June 1982 MP). 
78 Guardian, 6 December 1982. 
79 Though some unions used other methods, such as the ISTC, whose general secretary wrote: "I was determined that as the union was now to have some say as to who the next Labour leader would be 
then that decision ought to be made by as many people within the union as possible. We therefore 
so 
asked all our 800 branches to let us know their viewe', Bill Sirs, op cit, p. 130. Peter Kellner, "Widespread balloting gives Hattersley landslide", New Statesman, 7 October 1983. 
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for a ballot of members, with a further 20% using a branch ballot8l. Where a ballot was 
open to all members, the percentage poll ranged from 21% to 82%, with an average of 
52%. With a ballot at branch meetings, the percentage poll ranged from 12% to 35%, 
with an average of 24%. 
While slow progress was being made on all-member ballots for selections (where 
vacancies were appearing), the debate went quiet for the leadership after Kinnock's 
emphatic victory ruled out any challenge. That was to change after the 1987 election. 
Early in 1988 Field returned to the fray, suggesting full OMOV for the choice of 
82 83 Leader . Meanwhile the Left were contemplating a challenge to Kinnock , which 
emerged when Benn and Heffer challenged Kinnock and Hattersley for their respective 
positions. Whilst the incumbents were always bound to win (although Prescott's entry 
as Deputy Leader challenger did raise some doubts), the contest again shone a spotlight 
on how union members and local parties were consulted. 
It was at this time that the EETPU swung into action. For any CLP where the union 
was affiliated, it offered to pay the postage costs of a full postal ballot to decide the CLP 
leadership vote 84 . 34 CLPs took up the offer, the union reimbursing a total of E2,449. 
The results overwhelmingly favoured the incumbents but of more interest was the high 
number of ballot papers returned - up to 545 in one constituency 85 . As the union 
guessed, once party members had exercised this right, they were unlikely to let it go. 
The following year, when the NEC began encouraging CLPs to involve members in the 
election of conference delegates, the EETPU repeated its funding offer to CLPs 86 . 
Support for full participation grew. The principle of OMOV in elections for Leader and 
Deputy Leader was agreed at the 1988 conference, with the appropriate rule amendment 
adopted the following March 87 . Later, when OMOV was extended to the election of 
NEC members in 1992, Brown and Blair immediately took advantage of this to stand, 
getting elected on their first attempt". 
$I London Labour Party Report, March 1984. 
92 Guardian, 9 January 1988. 
83 Times, 21 January 1988. 
94 "Leadership Election", EETPU Political Bulletin, July 1988. 95 JSA. 
86 EETPU Political Bulletin, July 1989, Issue 27. 7 The Independent, 7 March 1989. :9 
Andy McSmith, Faces ofLabour: The Inside Story, Verso, 1996, p. 323. 
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It had been a long battle, fought by Solidarity and its supporters, and by the EETPU 
which argued the case, tabled resolutions and funded exemplary ballots. For many, it 
was a struggle to wrest control from left-dominated GCs. For some it was to show the 
public that the party's Leader would not be selected by a handful of union leaders 
wielding unrepresentative block-votes. 
55 
Chapter 7 Manifesto Group of LabourMPs, 1974-1983 
The thrust of this thesis is that the Labour Party was, after many years of electoral 
failure, turned back towards electability by the activities of the traditional, loyalist 
Right, particularly in the unions, who conspired to change the political balance on the 
NEC and thus deliver for a Leader willing to change the party (Kinnock) the necessary 
majority for his agenda. It is therefore mostly the story of the 'stayers' from the Centre 
and Right who remained after the 1981 SDP split and who redoubled their efforts to 
'save'theparty. The unions played a crucial role in this. However, other forces were 
also at work, in the constituencies and within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). 
This chapter concentrates on the right-wing parliamentary grouping, the Manifesto 
Group of Labour MPs, set up to counter the Tribune Group and to deliver the PLP's 
enatural' centre-right majority in internal PLP elections. Although most of its activities 
pre-date the 1981 split, as there is no existing study of the Group, and few references to 
it in the literature, this chapter describes its history, reviews how successful it was and 
considers whether more could have been achieved within the prevailing culture in the 
party. 
Divisions within the PLP were not new, the most seismic having been the 1971 split 
over Europe. "The Labour cleavage was no longer.. Left/Right .. It was for or against 
the European Community"'. It heralded a longer term split, which Owen sees as the 
genesis of the SDp2 , and followed the 1969 division over In Place ofStrife 
3, when many 
of the 'traditional' union right-wingers sided with the Left. 
The majority of Labour MPs were increasingly out of sympathy with the party. On 
Europe, on defence, on relations with the government and on constitutional change, the 
moderate majority in the PLP had little in common with the NEC or the conference. 
This minority position within the movement was the major cause of weakness for the 
Manifesto Group, forcing it to keep its membership secrets and its presence apologetic, 
and making many MPs fight shy of it. Manifesto officers were intolerant of the 
I David Owen, Time to Declare, Penguin Books, 1992, p. 187. 2 "The true story of the formation of the SDP begins here in early 197 1 ", David Owen, op cit, p. 172. 3 The 1969 White Paper on union reform which was withdrawn in the face of opposition from the PLP, NEC and unions. 4 Jim Wellbeloved interview. 
5 Until February 1980 when a ballot of members decided by 30: 7 to opt for openness, Manifesto Group archives, Manchester (MGA). 
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"humbugs"6 or "cowards in the middle"7 , especially those whose public and private 
utterances were at variance8. However, not all of them were themselves so brave. One 
trade unionist recalls that when he would make forthright contributions against "the 
Trots" at his GC, John Cartwright (later to defect) would quietly say "well done" but 
not himself speak. Reproached for this, he replied that, as the Council Leader, "he had a 
responsibility not to be too provocative"9. 
Unpopularity within the party aside, there were other obstacles confronting the Group. 
Firstly, they were provided with no protective shield by the Leader, whether from the 
left-wing Wilson or, perhaps surprisingly, from the more right-wing Callaghanio. 
Secondly, they were effectively leaderless - or perhaps had a surfeit of leaders. Whilst 
there were strong and respected personalities on the Right, none put themselves at the 
helm of the Manifesto members or provided a single icon behind which to rally 
supporters. When in government, membership of the Group had been confined to back- 
benchers. From 1979, when the Shadow Cabinet could join and when the Right so 
needed a leader", the Group was unable to coalesce around any one candidate. Not 
until the 1981 Deputy Leadership election was the (then depleted) Manifesto Group 
wholly in favour of a single candidate - though they had come together for Healey in 
the final ballot in 1980 when he was 10 votes short of Foot's 139 votes. 
A third weakness stemmed from Manifesto members' conflicting urges. One was 
loyalty to the leadership (a reflection of a deeply loyalist tradition). However, their 
members were initially those who had largely supported George Brown against Wilson 
in 1963 and, in 1980, had without exception favoured Healey in the flnal ballot against 
the victorious Foot 12 . This was in stark contrast to the formative experience of many of 
6 Dickson Mabon, interview, 3 July 2002. 
7 John Horam, interview, 14 January 2003. 
8 John Golding, "The Fixers: The Rise and Fall of Benn and Heffer", 1988; Jim Wcllbeloved 
interview. 
9 Arthur Bonner, interview, 6 November 2003. 
10 Callaghan saw his role as balancing the forces within the PLP and was careful never to favour either 
11 
side (Tom McNally interview). 
Wrigglesworth regretted that: "the Left is writing the agende' and criticised the leadership for 
"assuming that its centre-right troops are created in its own image", and for putting left-wingers on 
the frontbench "to complement the trusty, loyal, Gwe'll-keep-our-heads-down' figures from the 
centre-right .. Those on the radical Right were being excluded.. The overwhelming need now is for leadership on the Right", to give MPs "a sense of direction and goal" and give party members "a figure behind whom to rally. .. Those who wish to lead the PLP must.. take on the NEC and expose 
12 
the cant of the dogma of the infallibility of Conference decisions" (draft speaking notes, IWP). It is alleged that at least three later defectors voted for Foot as a "spoiling" tactic, not because they supported him. See p. 8 1. 
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them, who - in their younger personae - had been active in CDS 
13 
. At that time, their 
loyalty to the leadership and their faith in Hugh Gaitskell came together in their shared 
position on defence 14 . There was no conflict between loyalty and the Leader. 
In the 1970s, it was an event in the PLP rather than in Conference which created this 
new Group: Tribune's surprise success in getting the veteran left-winger Ian Mikardo, 
elected Chairman of the PLP after the February 1974 Election". Tribune never had a 
majority of MPs (in 1977 it printed a list of 80 members 16 ) but the Right had carelessly 
nominated four candidates. When the temporary Chair of the PLP meeting announced 
(contrary to normal practice although apparently without a shade of conspiracy or ill- 
intent) it was First-Past-The-Post, the Right for once was too disorganised to react 17 , 
leaving Mikardo, home and dry". No sinister plot by the Left but poor tactics by the 
Right. They were determined not to let that happen again. The centre-right majority 
had been 'organising' votes for PLP positions, to counter the Tribune Group, with 
regular success. A no-name group had met informally in the tea-room to pass on 
intelligence and discuss tactics, voting slates and gossip. Wellbeloved, Mabon and 
others from this network formed the core of what became the Manifesto Group". So, 
after the Mikardo victory, when a first formal meeting was called, in the words of its 
first Chairman, we just "knew who to invite"20 . 
After the October 1974 Election, the Manifesto Group - initially acting slightly 
informally - immediately regained the Chairmanship (with Cledwyn Hughes). Then, in 
the election for the backbench members of the Liaison Committee 21 , they also won the 
Vice Chairmanship (Tam Dalyell) and took the next three positions (Willey, Mabon 
and Wellbeloved), leaving just two places for Tribune's defeated PLP Chairman, 
Mikardo, and Frank AllaUn22. 
13 Such as Hamilton, Hattersley, Howell, Magee, Rodgers, Stewart, Wellbeloved, Shirley Williams, 
14 
MGA; CDS names from Brian L. Brivati, op cit. 
ibid; Bill Rodgers, op cit. is Bill Rodgers, op cit, p. 167; PLP archives. 16 IWP. 
17 Alan Haworth, interview, 25 January 2002. 
is Mikardo 99; Arthur Bottomley 85; Fred Willey 4 1; Tom Urwin 27; Willie Hamilton 20 (PLP 
archives). 
19 Jim Wellbeloved interview. 
20 Dickson Mabon interview. 
21 The joint frontbench/ backbench Committee (when the party is in power), the backbench places 
22 
being elected by the PLP. 
PLP archives, 28 November 1974. 
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This was back to 'normality'. Part of the shock of Mikardo's March 1974 success had 
been its unusualness. For example, the 1972 Shadow Cabine t23 elections showed the 
Right in firm control. Tribune described these results as "obtained by a skilfully 
organised and determined campaign.. by [past] members of the Right-wing [CDS]"; 
every effort was made by this group to portray the contest "as a final battle which, if 
lost, would see the party firmly in the hands of the Left". Tribune's analysis of the 
MPs' voting patterns demonstrated how, by "plumping" for 7 of the 12 slots, together 
with judicial abstentions, they ensured the election of their "hard-line Marketeer" 
(Harold Lever) as well as Shirley Williams, thus moving an already centre-right 
Shadow Cabinet towards a more Euro-friendly position 24 . 
The wake-up call from the first 1974 Chairmanship election, together with other trends 
in the party, consolidated the need for a more organised response from the Right. 
Initially meeting with neither a name nor any officers, a group convened by Mabon and 
Wellbeloved decided that the Tribune Group could only be contained if the Right 
marshalled its forces 25. "We realised .. however deep our heads were buried in the 
26 
sands, we realised we had now lost control. So we said, all right, now let's do it" 
The main players were old hands at political organising, whether through student 
politics (Lee-Williams 27 , Wrigglesworth 
28 
, Thomas), in CDS (Howell, Wellbeloved) or 
within the Labour movement (Cartwright and Roper in the co-operative movement, 
Radice in the unions). Mabon, the Group's first Chairman, had been left out of the 1974 
ministerial appointments (no doubt reflecting his criticisms of Wilson") and was 
therefore available as a respected backbencher to attract widespread support. 
It was not until after the October Election (and the Group's immediate success in 
regaining the PLP Chairmanship) that named officers, a paper on the Group's purpose 
and its title emerged. Rodgers claims authorship of the nomenclature, writing of the 
Group: "My only contribution - as a minister I was excluded from formal membership 
- had been to suggest its name"30. However, the name reflected the members' 
23 The Parliamentary Committee, to give it its correct title. 24 Tribune, 17 November 1972. 
25 Jim Wellbeloved interview, Dickson Mabon interview. 
26 Dickson Mabon interview. 
27 Alan L. Williams, interview, 3 April 2002. 
29 Ian Wrigglesworth, interview, 4 November 2002. 
29 Dickson Mabon interview. 
30 Bill Rodgers, op cit, p. 167. 
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defensiveness 3 1. They could - despite the party's move to the Left and its adoption of a 
more left-wing programme - live with the manifesto on which they had fought the 1974 
Election 32 . But they wanted none of the further leftward shifts they felt around them. 
The importance of "keeping to the manifesto" in Labour parlance did not identify them 
as right-wing and, importantly, emphasised their loyalist nature, a Leader's mandate 
being to implement the party's programme as contained in the manifesto. Hence 
support for that was a nod to the importance of conference decisions while expressing 
loyalty to the Leadership - despite Wilson having been the choice of few of their Group 
following Gaitskell's death in 1963. 
To appreciate the defensiveness of these MPs - especially in relation to party activists 
and the NEC - it is important to remember the shift in party membership, to a younger, 
less deferential, more educated and articulate group, as a generation radicalised by the 
1960s made their presence felt in small, sometimes moribund, local parties. Overlying 
this had been the frustration with the latter years of the 1966-70 Wilson Government, 
damaged by in-fighting, the 1969 fall-out with the unions, and the government's failure 
to criticise the US over Vietnam. It had not seemed like a government worth 
championing - even to some of the newer, centre-right MPs such as Owen 33 , let alone 
the radical activists. The Manifesto Group, therefore, despite the majority it could 
deliver within the PLP, started life on the backfoot. Largely Euro-philes in a party of 
Euro-sceptics, Atlanticists in a party of unilateralists and about to challenge the moves 
to re-selection of sitting MPs - they were not swimming with the tide. 
Having selected its officers 34 and name, the Group was formally constituted at a well- 
attended meeting in Westminster HaI135 when its membership agreed to "register as a 
group with the Secretary of the PLP"36 , its formation being recorded as 17 December 
1974 37 . Its stated objectives (it could hardly say: "to run slates") were: 
To work for the implementation of the policies .. in the .. manifesto and to 
support the Labour government in overcoming the country's acute economic 
difficulties; 
31 Jim Wellbeloved interview; Giles Radice, interview, 8 October 2002. The group originally 
32 
considered calling itself the Social Democratic Group, Ian Bradley, op cil, p. 60. Dickson Mabon interview. 
33 David Owen, op cit, p. 9 1. 34 See annex 6. 
35 John Horam interview. 
36 Depriving Tribune of its status as the only permanent organised faction among Labour MPs. 37 Ian Bradley, op cit, p. xii. 
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To act as a forum for constructive discussion designed to relate democratic 
socialist philosophy to the needs of the present age; 
To endeavour to achieve a truly democratic socialist society through our 
representative parliamentary system 
38 
. 
An early list identifies 72 members - though some subsequently resigned on becoming 
ministers 39. As it was (unlike Tribune) confined to backbenchcrs, its true list of 
supporters - or "friends" as they are called in the papers and who received the 
"agreed 
list of candidates" for posts - was much higher with ministers included 
40 
. 
Labour was in goverm-nent during the Group"s formative years, and facing that divisive 
issue: Europe. In opposition, following Jenkins' and 68 other Labour MPs' vote with 
the Conservative Goverm-nent on 28 October 1971 to take the UK into the European 
Community, the party had, at Benn's urging, come out in favour of a Referendum on 
continued membership (causing Jenkins' resignation as Deputy Leader). Now in 
government, the party and Cabinet had to decide how to campaign in the 1975 
Referendum. A Special Party Conference in April 1975 voted overwhelmingly against 
the government's renegotiated "terms" for remaining in Europe - despite opinion polls 
showing a 2: 1 majority in favour of staying in, with Labour voters 5: 3 in favour4l. 
Tribune's 77 members (a quarter of the PLP, somewhat swelled by the 1974 intakes) 
were delighted but it heralded a new round of disputes between MPs and their 
constituency parties. 
One of the first to be affected was Reg Prentice. His was a cause close to the heart of 
many Manifesto members. The Group's Treasurer, Neville Sandelson (who would later 
experience similar problems before defecting to the SDP) asked the Prime Minister to 
"sanction the signature by Ministers" of a statement in support of the beleaguered MP. 
Wilson's response went wider and dealt with his role as a member of the NEC as well 
as his views on small membership. Hoping the NEC would not intervene, Wilson wrote 
that, should it do so, "I propose to depart from a rule I have strictly followed since I 
became Leader.. not.. to intervene.. in matters of Party organisation, relations with 
constituency parties, the selection of candidates, proceedings in relation to candidates or 
38 Notes from the meeting, MGA. 
39 IWP. 
'0 Tribune group membership: Economist, 26 April 1975; Manifesto membership: Wrigglesworth 
1977 list (IWP). The Group also had the "tacit encouragement of the Cabinet's moderates", 
Financial Times, 9 March 1977. 
41 Economist, 26 April 1975. 
61 
Chapter 7 Manifesto Group 
Members of Parliament". His rule would be broken because "I shall feel it my duty to 
raise the whole question of actions by small.. not necessarily representative groups who 
have secured a degree of power within a constituency". He recalled his concern about 
small parties, especially in safe seats, being unrepresentative of the "mass of Labour 
voters". His 1955 Report had recommended that CLPs membership should be at least 
one-twelfth of the Labour vote. In Prentice's CLP, "this would mean a membership of 
1,850, which would involve a greater degree of democratic control". The problem of 
small membership "needs to be tackled urgently". He drew a distinction between the 
selection of a candidate and "one who has received in a Parliamentary Election, the 
stamp of the electorate. Perverse action seeking to dismiss an M. P. can get very close 
indeed to constitutional interference in the rights and duty of an elected member"42 .A 
strong statement of support for the rights of MPs in relation to local parties, and music 
to the ears of the Group. 
Rodgers, meanwhile, was making a distinction between the legitimate Left and "a 
relatively small number of activists, many of them new to the party but rich in 
experience of fringe politics .. [who] do not share the democratic assumptions of the 
'legitimate' left. .. The clearest evidence of a new-style politics .. has been the 
uncompromising attack on the position of a number of MPs". Rodgers predicted that 
this new situation "threatens the party of [Nye] Bevan as much as the party of Gaitskell. 
It .. requires a tough response. .. the heirs of Bevan .. should support the heirs of 
Gaitskell and help rally wider opinioif '. The call went unheeded by the 'legitimate' 
Left and would lie at the root of further divisions within the party. Rodgers called for 
new safeguards for MPs, with a joint NEC-PLP conciliation committee replacing rules 
which "institutionalise conflict and treat human situations like a court of law". What 
was most needed was "to rally the party and to save it from enemies masquerading as 
friends. What is at stake is not a temporary phenomenon, characteristic of the ebb and 
flow of opinion within the Labour movement throughout its history, but a sustained 
attempt to destroy the movement f 943 rorn within9 . Writing long after the split, Rodgers 
reflected that "this 'legitimate left" failed to acknowledge that they had more in 
42 Letter of 21 july 1975 from Wilson to Sandelson, IWP. 43 Rodgers Press Release, 28 August 1975. 
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common with Shirley, myself and our friends than with the Trotskyites and other 
factions of the hard lef! V, 44. 
Militant was high on the Group's agenda. The NEC was to tolerate infiltration, despite 
protests from the Group, until the Right began to change its political make-up in 1981/2. 
In 1976, the Manifesto Group protested helplessly at the NEC's decision to appoint the 
Militant Andy Bevan to the staff45. Policy also drew the Group together. Members 
submitted a Memorandum to Wilson which set "out our view that a major economic 
initiative is needed', 46 . Their recommendations 
included a wages policy; bringing 
forward the proposed public expenditure cuts; consideration of temporary and selective 
import controls, modernisation of industry, a larger role for NEDC and progress on 
industrial democracy. 
Outside Parliament, local parties were becoming more questioning of their MPs while 
the Left-controlled NEC was giving the government headaches. Even before he became 
Leader, Callaghan, as Treasurer and hence on the NEC, was reprimanding it for 
"leaping on every bandwagon that happens to be rolling by" instead of supporting the 
Labour Government He called on the NEC to be "willing to defend the Government 
and explain the facts to the movement at large9947 . 
However, the purpose of the Manifesto Group was neither to get involved in CLPs, nor 
in the NEC, but - despite the lofty aims extolled for public consumption - to counter 
Tribune and to marshal the moderate majority within the PLP for elections. 'Slates' 
were therefore its meat and drink. In general, the Group was highly successful. In the 
Liaison Committee elections in 1975, for example, Manifesto member Fred Willey 
topped the poll - thus becoming PLP Vice Chairman - with the Group making a clean 
sweep of the remaining places, ousting the former PLP Chairman, Mikardo 48 . 
There were exceptions to this success. Two major obstacles faced them in the more 
significant PLP votes - for the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Party. One was the 
44 Bill Rodgers, op cit, p 168. 
45 Notes of November and December 1976, MGA. See p. 33. 46 Drafted by Radice. Signatories included Horam, Cartwright, Wrigglesworth, Tomlinson, Thomas, 
47 
MacFarquhar, Marquand, Watkins, Roper and Graham; May 1975, IWP. 
49 
Report ofthe 1975,4nnual Conference ofthe Labour Party. 
November 1975 results sheet, IWP; MGA. 
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lack of a single leader. The other was the desire of some of the centre-right to support a 
left candidate to produce a more consensual leadership team. 
Much has been written - most notably by Radice - about the rivalry between Jenkins, 
Crosland and HealeY49 . Nowhere was this more obvious, or as damaging to the right- 
wing cause, than in the 1976 leadership election following Wilson's resignation. 
Wrigglesworth, the Manifesto Group Secretary, as PPS to Jenkins played a key role in 
his campaign, as did Lee-Williams5o and Horam. Other of their Manifesto colleagues 
worked equally assiduously for Healey, Crosland and for the eventual winner, 
Callaghan (Wellbeloved 51, John Smith, Hattersley and Cledwyn Hughes 52). 
Furthermore, Kellner shows that some 19 Centre and Right MPs supported Foot on the 
first ballot - and as many as 30 in the run-ofe3, thus signalling a further split amongst 
the Centre-right, with some registering "none-of-the-above" to Radice's trio of giants. 
Callaghan's final 176: 137 victory over Foot reflected the essential non-left majority in 
the PLP. Yet it took three ballots to reach and it saw the Centre-right supporting four 
candidates in round one to the Left's two, and two (Callaghan and Healey) in round two 
to the Left's one. This was not an efficient marshalling of forces. The difference 
between this and internal PLP elections partly reflects the greater scrutiny by CLPs 
eager to know their Member's voting intention, with MPs from marginal seats keen to 
keep their activists happy - which they calculated a Foot victory would achieve54 . The 
result brought to a close conflicting electioneering by Manifesto members. However it 
posed a question mark over the Group's existence with Callaghan calling for all such 
groups to wind themselves up5s. Mabon immediately responded "We will dissolve the 
day after the Tribune Group dissolveS, '56 . To which the new Prime Minister replied 
"Quite right! "57. Mabon's own ministerial career was secure but a number of MPs were 
49 Giles Radice, op cit. 
so Alan Lee Williams, interview, 2002. 
51 Jim Wellbeloved interview. 
52 Giles Radice, op cit, p. 235/6. 
53 Peter Kellner, "Anatomy of the Vote", New Statesman, 9 April 1976. 
54 Kellner, ibid 
55 Sunday Mirror, 2 May 1976, Times, 22 April 1976, Wrigglesworth press release, 24 April 1976. 
Callaghan disliked factionalism. When Chapple complained about the lack of organisation of the 
Moderates on the NEC, the then Chancellor retorted: "We don't want a return to the squabbles of the 
Bevaniteperiod7'(FmnkChapple, opcit, p. 105). As Prime Minister, he changed his mind, 
appreciating Golding's efforts to co-ordinate support for the government in 1978/1979 (see chapter 9). 
36 Dickson Mabon interview and Times, 22 April 1976. 57 Dickson Mabon interview. 
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concerned that, despite a number of the Group having campaigned for Callaghan, 
continued activity in such a grouping might lead to a lack of preferment 58 . The Group 
also had difficulty in recruiting among the 1974 intakes - thus leaving it unattractive to 
both senior and newer MPs. 
The second major vote, by MPs but with an impact beyond the PLP, was for Deputy 
Leader (which carried an NEC seat) following the resignation of Ted Short. This took 
place in December 1976. Despite the centre-right majority amongst MPs and her 
popularity in the country, Shirley Williams lost by 38 votes to the Left's Foot59. It was 
reported that Callaghan favoured Foot, to cement his role as conduit to the Left and to 
union leaders, and to maintain some semblance of party unity by binding him closer to 
the leadership 60 . Despite the result, the Manifesto Group professed itself pleased with 
Williams' showing, which positioned her as a clear runner against any future left 
challenger such as Benn. However, with hindsight, the Group's inability to deliver for 
its own candidate presaged the leadership election which would follow four years later. 
The Manifesto Group turned its attention to the next PLP elections, and to policy. It 
issued a statement on economic policy, Keep on Course, which called for curbs on 
inflation, reduction in borrowing and selective import controls plus an import deposit 
scheme 61 . Success 
in internal elections continued, November 1976 seeing Cledwyn 
Hughes re-elected unopposed as Chairman of the PU62, with fellow Manifesto Grouper 
Willey topping the Liaison Committee poll, and thus remaining Vice Chairman. 
Manifesto members made a clean sweep of the remaining backbench places, with 
Tribune's entire slate defeated 63 . 
The Group was well established in the PLP's life, meeting weekly - at 6.30 pm on 
Wednesdays - to discuss "Next Week's BusineSS"'64 , elections to PLP Groups, the 
European Assembly and similar delegations, as well as policy. Their own elections also 
58 The Times, 22 April 1976. 
59 By 128 votes to 166. PLP archives. 
60 Financial Times, 22 October 1976. 
61 27 October 1976, IWP. 
62 Report ofthe 1977Annual Conference ofihe Labour Party, p. 83. 63 IWP, 9 November 1976. 
64 MGA. "Next Week's Business" is the standard agenda item for Parliament, Shadow Cabinet and the PLP, when the parliamentary timetable, and voting arrangements, form the substance of the debate. 
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took place and, at the end of 1976, Sydney Irving became Chairman 65 .A 
decision was 
taken to admit Peers into membership, which was to see some 20 j oin66 including 
(Dora) Gaitskell and former CDS member, (Patrick) Gordon-Walker 67 . 
Increasingly, attention turned to party management, and candidate selection 
(welcoming, if not endorsing, a call for all-member ballots for selections as early as 13 
October 1976)68. In December there was a lengthy discussion on Militant, and 
agreement on the need to field candidates in NEC elections. Recognising that, unless 
the NEC took action, Militant would not be tackled, 30 of their number signed a 
resolution that noted "with grave concern recent reports of infiltration into the Party by 
extremist groups and calls upon the NEC in conjunction with the PLP to investigate the 
situation with a view to taking remedial action including a review of the rules governing 
the selection and reselection of Parliamentary candidateS"69. 
Early in 1977, the Group made its most public appearance - and a break with its 
purpose of organising votes - with a pamphlet, "at We Must Do. For academic 
audiences, this might be most noteworthy for its illustrious authorship: (later Professor) 
David Marquand, (later Professor) Bryan Magee, John Roper, John Horam, (former 
Professor) John Mackintosh and Giles Radice 70 . Politically, its significance lay "in the 
recognition that the Centre-right was ideologically barren after the IMF crisis; 
Keynsianism had been defeated and old style Croslandism-in-one-country was in 
disarray. We needed to say something. The Left had all the good tunes - they had 
AES71. We felt that the Centre-right needed to take an ideological position. So it came 
out for a kind of marriage between Keynsianism and MonetariSM,, 72 . The publication 
was intended to take the social democratic case out to the wider movement where 
Tribune had been left a free hand. The pamphlet, which was well covered in the preSS73, 
65 See annex 6. 
66 As at August 1978, MGA. 
67 Notes of meetings, MGA. 
69 Notes of 13 October 1976 meeting, MGA. 69 7 December 1976, IWP. 
70 Giles Radice interview. 
71 The "Alternative Economic Strategy". 
72 Giles Radice interview. 
73 Telegraph and Financial Times, 9 March 1977, The Times, II March 1977, Spectator, 19 March 1977. 
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also reflected the impact made by John Wakefield's appointment as researcher/ 
administrator (funded by Rowntree)74. 
The pamphlet was probably linked to the February 1977 establishment of the Campaign 
for Labour Victory whose arrival was not greeted with universal delight within the 
Group. Some were upset at not having been informed in advance 75. Others were 
alarmed that attention on a non-Tribunite organisation would shine the spotlight on 
them within their CLPs where their membership of the Group had been a well-kept 
secret. Nevertheless, given that the Manifesto Group was solely parliamentary, the 
majority view was that a constituency-based sister organisation should be welcomed. 
Many of the key players were the same - especially CLV's two convenors, Cartwright 
and Wrigglesworth, Manifesto Vice Chairman and Secretary. From March onwards, a 
CLV Report normally appeared on the Group's agendas so that members were updated 
on activities. 
During 1977, the Manifesto Group discussed a wide range of issues at its weekly 
meetings, including industrial democracy, direct elections to the European Assembly, 
the Budget, the Lib-Lab Pact, pay policy, and internal party matters such as candidate 
selections, NEC elections and the Underhill report on Militant, which the Group urged 
76 
should be published . More discreet matters were also raised. A cryptic, handwritten 
note on the Secretary's II May 1977 agenda reads: "Peter Jay - tell D. O. 77 privately". 
It is hard not to infer some disapproval of the Foreign Secretary's appointment of Prime 
Minister Callaghan's son-in-law 78 as the UK Ambassador in Washington. The Group 
also had guest speakers (such as Varley, Owen and HealeY79 
In November 1977, at the beginning of the parliamentary year, Cartwright took over as 
Chairman, when Irving resigned (having acted as a "stop gap" but not wanting to 
continue)80. Cartwright was, therefore, a pivotal figure, being a member of the NEC 
(representing the Socialist Societies), PPS to Shirley Williams, active in CLV and the 
figurehead of the Manifesto Group. On becoming Chairman, he outlined his priorities: 
74 MGA. Wakefield was appointed over the favourite, Alec McGivan (later CLV Secretary), because 
73 
of his "intellectual spark7 which the Group felt the Right needed; John Horarn interview. 
76 
Notes of 8 February 1977 meeting, MGA. 
77 
Notes of 25 May 1977 meeting, MGA. 
David Owen MP. 
78 Peter Jay was then married to Margaret Callaghan (now Baroness Jay). 79 Calling notices, 6 July, 22 July and 23 November 1977, MGA. so John Horam, interview, 2003. 
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to campaign in the country about the government; the manifesto for the next election; 
and reforin of the party structureg'. The latter had been a long interest of his, having 
helped produce The Mechanics of Victory, in 1962 82 . 
The Group's success continued with another clean sweep of the Liaison Committee in 
1977.1978 saw a similar range of activities, with speakers Rodgers and Hattersley 83 , 
together with discussions on European elections, immigration, industrial democracy and 
the party's Working Party on reselection. The Group was vehement in its protest about 
84 there being only 3, rather than 7, PLP representatives on this . 
Internal party matters 
had become the dividing line between the Group and the NEC. In July 1978, Secretary 
Wrigglesworth wrote to the party General Secretary protesting against Jimmy Reid's 
adoption as parliamentary candidate for Dundee East, as he had less that the required 2 
years' party membership (having been in the Communist Party). Hayward's curt reply 
(I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 20 July.. I appreciate the propaganda motive 
in sending me this letter but I know you will also appreciate that I cannot recognise any 
group apart from our official group which is, of course, the Parliamentary Labour 
p, arty9985) was a deliberate put-down. Wrigglesworth's letter was ignored by the NEC 
which endorsed the candidature by 12: 6 votes 86 . 
The 1978 AGM re-elected Cartwright as Chairman 87 for what would prove a difficult 
year. 1979 started with a protest about the PLP's exclusion from the adoption process 
for the European Manifesto for the first direct elections - undermining the traditional 
NEC/PLP balance guaranteed by Clause V of the constitution88. Major work took place 
on a pre-election statement, "Priorities for Labour", on economic and industrial PoliCY89 
This stated starkly: "We believe the Labour Party must be the party of permanent 
incomes policy" and dealt with import controls, nationalisation and compulsory 
planning agreements (against all of them), favouring public spending, reform of CAP, 
tax reform and industrial democracy. 
81 Notes of 16 November 1977 meeting, MGA. 92 Jim Daly interview, 2 November 200 1. Tony Benn was also in the Group. Young Fabian Group, 
83 
The Mechanics of Victory, Fabian Society, 1962. 
94 
18 January and 26 July 1978 respectively, MGA. 
27 February, I and 8 March 1978 meetings, MGA. 85 Letter dated 27 July 1978, MGA. 
86 Notes of 26 July 1978 meeting, MGA. 87 Notes of November 1979 AGM, MGA. 88 Notes of 17 January 1979 meeting, MGA. 89 25 March 1979, IWP. 
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All was of no avail as the Labour Government was swept away in the 3 May 1979 
General Election, following the Winter of Discontent and the failure of the 
government's incomes policy, by Thatcher's overall majority of 43 (71 seats more than 
Labour). Ministers lost their cars; Shirley Williams lost her seat; but Wrigglesworth 
continued to organise. Within days, he was marking off a list of new MPs as: wet- 
centre, hard centre-left, OK (Tom McNally9o), soft-left, ambitious-left (Jack Straw9l), 
centre-left (Frank Dobson) and, delightfully, "eccentric centre" (Dale Campbell 
Savours). His list of the whole PLP, old and new, shows 149 from the Manifesto Group 
(64) and centre-right (85), with 94 from Tribune (57) and centre-left (37) leaving an 
"unknown" 25 from the depleted complement of 268 92 .A comfortable centre-right 
majority. 
Despite Wrigglesworth's prediction, McNally claims never to have joined the Manifesto 
Group (though he attended an early meeting 93). Partly McNally attributes this to not 
being a "joining" type, and to his distaste for some of its members such as Sandelson. 
But mostly because he was under intense pressure from his new GC (having been too 
close to the last government) and could not risk being linked to a centre-right group 94 
In fact, every new MP declined to j oin95, though Roger Thomas wrote "on crucial 
occasions, such as choosing the 'Shadow' Cabinet, to the extent that my votes count, the 
'right' people will get in7 596 . It was not simply new members who held back. Former 
ministers could nowjoin, but Healey held aloof Seeing factions at work on the NEC 
when a party employee decades earlier, had made him very anti all such groups 97 . He 
also slightly mistrusted those running it - claiming to have been correct because Horarn 
and Prentice later joined the Conservatives (and many more the SDP). Like McNally, 
he too found Sandelson "very odd" - demonstrating that the Group's Treasurer was not 
90 Former Political Adviser at Number 10. 91 Former Political Adviser to Barbara Castle MP. 
92 lWP. 
93 Notes of 15 May 1979 meeting, MGA. 
94 Tom McNally interview. Although McNally stated he neverjoined, a completed ballot paper in his 
name (voting against disclosure of the list of members) is in the archives, February 1980; in June 
95 
1981 he is listed as a member of a Manifesto working party (MGA). 
Brian L. Brivati, op cit, p. 285. 
916 Letter of 25 May 1979 to NevilIe_Sandelson, MGA. 
97 Denis Healey, interview, 16 October 2002. 
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the most effective recruiting sergeant. Even so, by 13 June 1979 the Group had 59 
members and 81 supporters 98 . 
The first post-election meeting, chaired by Wrigglesworth, had 40 present, with a good 
turn out of former ministers 99 although Mackenzie regretted the "sad lack of new 
members present". Discussion turned to the forthcoming Shadow Cabinet elections as 
well as to the Group's role. On the former, there was a lengthy debate on whether to 
run a slate, and if so whether to have a full slate of 12, or just 9 so as to allow some non- 
aligned members to be elected. Duffy was against any slate for this first round as this 
was "offensive to non-members (especially in TU Group)". In contrast, Ashley strongly 
favoured a slate, if only of 9 names, whilst Willey thought a slate of 12 was needed as 
that was what Tribune would have. Palmer, Archer, Mackenzie, Ennals, Roper, Owen, 
Sam Silkin, Rodgers and Horam. all supported a slate for this "popularity contest" 
(Horam's words) as did Douglas-Mann who supported a list of 9 to leave space for "the 
Shoresloo and [John] Silkins"101. 
Regarding the Group's purpose, Golding argued it should "stick to giving voice of silent 
majority" as well as fighting elections. Mabon stressed the need to be making speeches 
to outdo the Left. Thomas wanted the Group to become a broader church as well as a 
source of ideas. Howell warned of the "parlous state" of the party and, in particular, of 
"TU leaders" having "opted out of the struggle" 102 . Magee wanted to oppose the 
Conservative government as well as Tribune, whilst Palmer favoured the articulation of 
the Group's philosophy. Archer stressed the need to "get rid of idea of our being less 
socialist. We are in main tradition - we need to persuade"'. Ennals saw the "need to do 
some policy thinking because Transport House ain't going to do it" whilst Roper and 
Grant wanted links with unions. Owen correctly predicted "EEC issue going to be 
great" but warned they "mustn't let it divide group". Douglas-Mann predicted that there 
would be a "big battle over the future of PLP" and wanted work within the party in the 
country. Despite being "temperamentally opposed to Groups", Hattersley conceded 
99 Membership list, MGA. 
99 including Archer, Duffy, Ennals, Golding, Hattersley, Howell, Mabon, Owen, Rodgers, Sam Silkin 
and Wellbeloved. 
100 Peter Shore. 
10, Notes of 15 May 1979 meeting, MGA and IWP. 102 Denis Howell, as President of APEX, later played a significant role in re-engaging these union leaders. See St Ermins Group chapters. 
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"we need them" to organise'O'. That evening after the meeting, Wrigglesworth wrote to 
supporters asking for support for Willey (as Chairman of the PLP) and Michael Cocks 
(as Chief Whip)104. Both were elected comfortably - Willey by 151 to Tribunite 
Buchan's 87; Cocks by 188 to Flannery's 44105 - 
The next meeting, with 32 present, voted by 23: 3 that members could not be ordered not 
to stand for the Shadow Cabinet 106 , and decided on a slate of 
9, despite Wellbeloved's 
support for the maximum of 12. Those selected to be "recommended to members and 
friends" were former ministers Hattersley, Healey, Mabon, Mason, Owen, Rees, 
Rodgers, John Smith and Varley 107 . There was some discussion about the remaining 
places and the need to "make certain 3 Trib not at top of ballof'. The meeting also 
agreed that the Shadow Cabinet could be full members, though whether they could hold 
office was left open. 
The slate was circulated by Wrigglesworth who added "In choosing nine the Group had 
in mind that Members might wish to support individual personal preferences in addition 
to those the Group wish to recommend. It is, of course, a matter for you how many 
candidates you vote for, but it is very much hoped that you will feel able to support 
those listcd"108 . All but Mabon were elected, the remaining places going to John 
Silkin. 109 and Shore (in second and third place to Healey's first, suggesting strong 
Manifesto support" 0) with only Orme and Booth from Tribune' 11. 
In June, the AGM re-elected Cartwright as Chairman, with George Robertson replacing 
Wrigglesworth as Secretary, the latter having stood down after 3 years 112 . Robertson, a 
103 Notes of 15 May 1979 meeting, MGA. 
104 Letter of 15 May 1979, MGA. 
105 Circular from Frank Barlow, PLP Secretary, 17 May 1979, PLP archives. 
important for success is the discipline of not running too many candidates. This may explain a note 
from Mason saying: I have been asked by several colleagues to stand .. for chairman of the P. L. P. have begged leave to decline .. [as] a long-serving and much respected colleague is already in the field. I could not oppose a friend", 10 May 1979, IWP. 
107 Notes of 21 May meeting, MGA. This is the first showing John Smith's attendance; as a minister 
he had not been eligible to join. 
108 Letter of 24 May 1979, MGA. 
Silkin later boasted: "during the period 1979-86, there was only one MP not on a slate .. [elected] to the Shadow Cabinet. First it was me, [then] Denzil Davies .. when I decided to stand down" John Silkin, op cit, p. 80. Silkin was not as generous with his own votes: "A scrutineer at a Shadow Cabinet election noticed a ballot paper with a single cross for Silkin and was assured .. that this was his habitual practice", Edward Pearce, op cit, p 538/9. 110 Though also reflecting a strong anti-European sentiment as both were well known sceptics. Results in PLP circular, 14 June 1979, PLP archives. see annex 6. 
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former official with the GMWU, was a formidable organiser. There was a distinct 
northen flavour to the Group, reflecting its traditional moderate party. Horam. 113 , 
Radice and Wrigglesworth represented the North-East, supported by strong regions of 
the TGWU and GMWU. Such solid back-up would be needed in the months ahead. 
A whole new situation confronted the Group. Firstly, there was the shock of electoral 
defeat with the recognition that the party needed to re-engage with voters if it was to 
win in 1983/4. Secondly, an increasing number of members were under pressure from 
their local parties. Thirdly, an enormous debate was taking place on democratising the 
party - demands for mandatory reselection, NEC control over the manifesto, and a 
wider franchise for the election of the Leader. The Group concentrated on influencing 
the PLP discussions on these, but also collaborated with CLV in producing a joint 
statement, "Reform and Democracy in the Labour Party". Its opening words were "The 
Labour Party in 1979 is at the crossroads". It hinted that a "lengthy period of 
opposition" might be in prospect, pointing to declining membership, poor organisation 
and weak finances, and asserted "We cannot accept the allegation that Labour 
Governments have consistently betrayed the platforms on which they were elected"' 14 
This marked clear water between the predominant Bennite position within the wider 
party. The paper recognised the failure to find a solution to problems of low growth and 
slowly rising living standards, but went on to concentrate on internal party matters, 
pointing to the 1979 General and European election results as being the worst since the 
1930s, and to a party F. 1 million in debt. The system of electing the NEC was criticised 
for failing to provide a proper balance of opinions. The left-wing majority on the NEC 
was taken to task for failing to face up to the party's multifarious problems - financial 
and Militant (the report on which the NEC had refused to publish) - as well as acting 
"as if it was in permanent opposition to the Labour Government". The paper rebutted 
the proposals for constitutional change and proposed its own "'Agenda for Reform". 
This encompassed increasing membership (so that CLPs were representative of Labour 
voters), restructuring the NEC to make it representative of party opinion (creating PLP 
and local government sections) and improving policy-making to enable proposals to be 
113 TGWU sponsored. 114 CLV and Manifesto Group, "Reform and Democracy in the Labour Party", Labour Yictory, October 1979. 
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discussed with the PLP and TUC before adoption' 15. CLV distributed the statement, 
providing some alternatives for local supporters, should they wish to take on CLPD. 
Meanwhile, the debate raged within the PLP. On 19 June, Benn and Heffer called for 
the full PLP to have the "final authority" over the day-to-day work of the party in the 
Commons, the right to discuss all proposed appointments, all shadow ministers to be 
elected by open ballot, portfolios to be agreed by the PLP, subject groups to recommend 
front-bench speakers for debates and to nominate for positions on Committees. In 
addition, no names should be proposed for peerages, there should be regular 
NEC/Shadow Cabinet meetings, and Shadow Cabinet staff (then employed by the 
individual MPs) should become party staff. Their paper envisaged these changes 
continuing when the party was in office 116 . Perhaps the most far reaching proposal 
would have been the open ballots. The comfortable centre-right majority in the PLP 
produced through confidential voting would hardly survive scrutiny from left-wing 
CLPs. The Centre-right controlled the Shadow Cabinet, and the Benn-Heffer paper 
envisaged it losing virtually all its powers, as well as its staff. 
While the Bennite/CLPD proposals had been debated in the press and at party 
conferences, this paper now put the PLP itself on the agenda. It spurred the Right into 
action. A flurry of meetings and papers swirled around the House, with Thomas, 
Whitehead and Radice submitting a 4-page memorandum on "The Working of the 
PLP"' 17 . This was no defence of the status quo, as it recognised the lack of democracy 
within the parliamentary party. Neither was it about MPs' relationships with other parts 
of the movement (the unions, CLPs or conference) although it strongly "deplore(d) the 
0ý 
suggestion that Labour MPs should be intimidated by the removaiýýe principle of secret 
ballots in PLP elections". The authors' proposals were hardly far-reaching. They called 
for a formal agenda for PLP meetings, more consultation of the PLP by government, 
increased backbench input into policy and an extension of Clause V to give a greater 
role for the whole of the PLP (not just the Shadow or actual Cabinet) in the manifesto 
process. The paper went some way towards the Benn proposals, with backbench groups 
nominating to Committees and wider consultation before portfolios were allocated. It 
also suggested an increase of the Shadow Cabinet to IS elected members, with up to 3 
115 Labour Victory, October 1979. 
116 Tony Benn and Eric Heffer, "The Future Work of the Parliamentary Labour Party: An agenda for discussion! ', 19 June 1979, IWP. 
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additional spokesmen appointed by the Leader, and agreed that funds for the opposition 
from parliament "should be deployed for that purpose and an annual budget approved 
by the PLP", with consideration given to a new, elected post of PLP Treasurer 118. so 
the paper, overall, was a pale shadow of the Benn/ Heffer document, with no radical 
alternatives on offer. 
Consideration of these matters was something of a sideshow as the debate on the three 
major constitutional reforms was hotting up within the wider party. The Centre-right 
felt particularly unsupported by the PLP leadership. In July, a strongly-worded letter, 
signed by 107 MPs, was sent to Callaghan. This expressed their "deep concern .. about 
the changes in the constitutional position of Labour MPs and of the PLP" being 
advocated by some NEC members, and went on: "we believe the time has come for you 
and the Parliamentary Committee to make it clear to the NEC that to make changes of 
the kind proposed - on the PLPs rights over the Party Manifesto, on reselection of MPs 
and on the election of the Party Leader - would be to reduce the [PLP] to the role of 
poodle of the Party Conference and to move dangerously close to making individual 
MPs mandated delegates on pain of losing theirjobs". The letter called on the 
leadership to take these views to the wider party and concluded "The proposals of the 
NEC are designed to upset the careful balance between the different roles and 
responsibilities of the component parts of the Party.. They comprise a major threat to 
the unity of the Party. The time has come to say to this group on the NEC that 'enough 
is enough ... 119. Over 100 MPs - for once unafraid to be named - represented a 
significant expression of opinion 120 , and effectively positioned the Manifesto Group as 
the majority voice in the PLP. But they had little impact. The House rose for the 
summer and the party conference, where the Left's agenda would be in the ascendancy. 
Rodgers described the 1979 Brighton Conference as 
"a disaster. .. Although the proposal on the election of the leader was [temporarily] lost, resolutions on mandatory reselection and the manifesto 
were carried. Conference also established a Commission of Enquiry on 
organisation and finance.. [however] the NEC minimised the role of 
parliamentarians on it and ensured that it had a built-in majority of the left. Apart from the Leader and Deputy Leader, none of the 19 MPs on the NEC 
117 4 July 1979, MGA. 
I Is ibid. 
"9 Letter of 25 July 1979, MGA. 
120 A majority of the Shadow Cabinet would have supported these views but by convention would not sign a round-robin. 
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sufficiently command the support of their own parliamentary colleagues to 
get elected to the Shadow Cabinet, and 14 were unequivocally on the 
lefV' 121 . 
There seemed little impact the PLP could make within the wider party. But in the 
Commons, the Manifesto Group's work continued with Robertson circulating "a list of 
candidates for the chairmanships of the PLP Subject Groups" to sympathisers at the end 
of the recess 122 , and a call for a full attendance at a vital PLP meeting at the end of 
October 123 , with a special plea to Manifesto members to stay until the end and vote 
'24 
. 
He similarly wrote urging votes for Radice, Thomas, Urwin and Whitehead for the 5 
backbench places on the internal Enquiry (leaving a fifth place for others). 
As matters deteriorated, with the NEC moving further from the PLP, the Group 
discussed its response. In November, members worked on their evidence to the 
Commission of Enquiry 125 and sought a meeting with Callaghan about the state of the 
party 126 . 
Vice Chairman Radice considered their main task might "be to get all MG 
127 
reselected" 
It is about this time, as the NEC-CLPD proposals gained ground, that the first warnings 
appear of what was later to happen. First there was the Dimbleby Lecture on 22 
November 1979, when Jenkins first floated the idea of a breakaway party. Earlier that 
day, Horam, a Manifesto Group Vice Chairman, told Rodgers "that the Labour Party 
was finished"128 .A key staging-post can be seen in Rodgers' speech in Abertillery, the 
text of which he had shown to Manifesto members Horam, Maclennan, Wrigglesworth, 
Radice and Weetch 129 . In this public arena, the former CDS organiser, Cabinet minister 
and political-fixer predicted that the party had "a year.. in which to save itself .. A year 
to start winning friends amongst the.. 30 million.. who did not vote Labour last time"; 
he warned that "A party of the far left - in which Tribune members would be the 
moderates - would have little (electoral) appeal .. If the hard-line leaders of the Left 
21 Bill Rodgers, op cit, p. 190. 
22 Letter of 22 October 1979, MGA. 
123 Letter from George Robertson to sympathisers, 25 October 1979. 124 Letter from George Robertson to members, 25 October 1979. 125 Established by the 1979 Party Conference. 
126 Notes of 7 November 1979, MGA. 127 ihid. 
129 Bill Rodgers, op cit, p. 198. 129 ibid, P. 199. 
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want a fight to the finish, they can have it. But if as a result they should split the Party, 
they should not suppose that the inheritance will be theirs"130 . 
If not before, it was clear from this date on that senior Manifesto members could 
envisage a split within the party. In private, there were more signs. The day after his 
Abertillery speech, in a meeting with Jenkins, whilst both Williams and Rodgers 
stressed that their priority was to save the Labour Party, Rodgers had clearly given the 
matter enough thought to have judged that a new party could survive without trade 
union money 131 . From then on, it is hard to 
believe the Manifesto Group could have 
succeeded in holding the social democrats within the party, given the views of their 
leading lights. Furthermore, the chance of them attracting any more supporters ended 
with such open talk of a split. 
Before the year-end, Rodgers - stalwart of the parliamentary Right and of the 
constituency-focused CLV - was to have another major fall-out with the party. On 12 
December, one of Labour's Election Broadcasts carried a strong anti-European 
message. The Shadow Cabinet Member wrote angrily to Callaghan condemning the 
broadcast as "appalling" and "irrelevant to [a] by-election". More fundamental was his 
charge that "It seemed deliberately designed to divide the Party and raise old issues". 
Whilst recognising that the Common Market was unpopular, and seeing no objection in 
exploiting that, Rodgers distinguished that "from moving the Party increasingly into a 
position where it appears to be against membership on principle and ready to consider 
pulling out" 132 . 
If 1979 appeared stressful, it was only a gentle preparation for 1980. Nowhere were the 
issues as clearly contested as in the Manifesto Group which brought together the pro- 
Europe Right, aghast at the NEC and conference decisions, but faced with two emerging 
alternatives: to stay and continue the fight to bring the party back to where it had a 
chance of being electable, or to take the risk of creating a new party, without union 
affiliates, but able to capitalise on the electorate's emerging anti-Thatcher feelings. The 
arguments were strongest within the Manifesto Group as these were the key MPs whose 
defection, or continuation, would 'make or break' any new party. 
130 Bill Rodgers press release, 30 November 1979, MGA. 
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In early 1980, Manifesto meetings exhibited uncertainty, worry and overwhelming 
isolation. Knowing that the Left had made all the running in party debates 133 , members 
also acknowledged that they lacked the backing of union leaders 134 and were failing to 
attract non-Left PLP members, evidenced by the creation of an alternative centre 
grouping (the "soggy middle" in Whitehead's words), Labour First 135 . Members 
knew 
their right-wing image put off MPs and feared the split of the non-Left. The fort-nation 
of Labour First led to difficulties in agreeing the November slate for the Shadow 
Cabinet 136_ a serious weakness just when the Moderates needed to be at their strongest. 
The PLP was preparing its submission to the Commission of Enquiry, and thus the 
Centre-right needed a concerted voice. 
The NEC meanwhile sought to formalise groups within the PLP and wrote seeking 
details of staffing, funding and objectives. The Group's response set out the original 
three aims, confirmed that membership was open to MPs and Peers who took the 
Labour Whip, listed the officers' names and sadly recorded no finances other than 
membership subscriptions and a tiny amount from sales of publications, the Rowntree 
funding for a Research Assistant having ended in May 1979 137 . 
The less-remembered first Wembley Conference, in May 1980, unsettled Manifesto 
members. Summoned to endorse a "Peace, Jobs, Freedom" statement, it represented the 
adoption of a ftu-ther left policy agenda but, more significantly, reflected the tone of 
debate then current in the party 138 . "The new brutishness was very much on show"139. 
At one point, Militant delegate Terry Fields (speaking immediately before the present 
author who herself was well barracked) shouted to the Right to "Get out of our 
Movement. There is no place in it for you. Cross the House of Commons, join 
13, Bill Rodgers, op cit, p. 200. A group was meanwhile meeting in West London around former MPs Michael Barnes and Colin Phipps. Barnes had circulated to a select group a paper on "A new Centre 
132 
Party" which was discussed on 6 January 1980; Jim Daly papers. 
Letter from Rodgers to Callaghan, 13 December 1979, MGA. 131 Notes of 9 July 1980, MGA. 134 ibid. 
131 Notes of 26 March 1980, MGA. See chapter S. 136 Notes from November 1980 meetings, MGA. 137 Letter from Robertson, Secretary of the Manifesto Group, to Labour Party General Secretary, March 1980, MGA. 
132 Sunday Times, I June 1980. 
139 Edward Pearce, Op cit, p 532. 
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Prentice" 140 . The treatment meted out to Owen was a significant factor in his move 
from the Labour Party 
141 
Soon afterwards, the Group discussed "The present Position within the Party", with 
Rodgers opening and Owen winding up 142 . Later meetings reflected the Group's 
mounting concerns. Sandelson, openly admitting to "panicking", said he "couldn't 
decide whether to cut [his] throat or take [an] overdose" but nevertheless urged his 
colleagues to "stand up and fight". The MP later told the press that the NEC was 
"dividing the whole Labour Movement and sickening masses of Labour supporters". 
He called it a "malevolent group" that had "diseased the Party with its support for 
Communists, Trots and psychotic anti-social elements who have flooded in and by its 
espousal of ideologies which will destroy us at the polls" and warned that unless the 
composition of the NEC changed in the autumn, "the Labour Party will break up. There 
is no chance of winning the next Election with this poisonous bunch dictating our 
policies"143 . His colleagues might not 
have aurgued with his analysis, but it was exactly 
such intemperate language which put some MPs off the Manifesto Group. His 6-year 
spell as Treasurer of the Group ended at this time, being replaced by the more emollient 
Ken Weetch 144 . 
However, the major preoccupation for the Centre-right was what was happening within 
the wider party and on the Commission of Enquiry where Callaghan (and subsequently 
the Shadow Cabinet) accepted the concept of an Electoral College to choose the 
Leader 145 . David Basnett, GMWU General Secretary, had already swung behind a 
College giving 50% to the PLP with 25% each to CLPs and unions 146 , leaving the 
Manifesto wing of the PLP increasingly isolated over this issue. As rumours of the 
Commission accepting an Electoral College circulated, the Group condemned the 
outcome as "profoundly unsatisfactory"; such a change having "grave implications for 
the relationship of the different parts of the Party" and which "could substantially 
undermine the Party's commitment to parliamentary democracy". The Commission 
was "wholly at variance with the view of the.. the PLP [which] rejected 
"0 Report ofthe Annual Conference and Special Conference ofthe Labour Party, 1980, p. 25 1. " Ian Bradley, op cit, p. 74/75. 142 11 June 1980 notes, MGA. 143 Press Release from Neville Sandelson MP, 26 June 1980, MGA. 144 Circular from Robertson to Manifesto members, 7 July 1980, MGA. 145 11 June 1980 notes, MGA. 146 ibid. 
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overwhelmingly the specific proposal of an electoral college. .. We call upon the 
Commission.. to produce proposals which will command wide support within the Party 
as a whole" 147 . 
During the Summer recess members were not idle, with two major newspaper 
initiatives. The first was the "Open Letter to their Fellow Members of the Labour 
Party" from Williams, Rodgers and Owen in the Guardian 148 which labelled them the 
"Gang of Three". The second, in The Times, led to what became known as the "Dirty 
Dozen" statement 149 . This article on "Why the Labour party structure must change" 
not only appeared to accept the possibility of "a new Centre Party", but it downplayed 
the likelihood of the Centre-right making gains in the forthcoming NEC elections and 
questioned the union role in financing the party and casting block-votes at conference. 
It pointed to the historically low level of party membership, querying whether it could 
claim to represent Labour voters. The article proposed 6 changes to the party's 
structure, including OMOV for the selection of candidates, restructuring the NEC (to 
represent ordinary members, MPs and local government) and the creation of a directly- 
elected Party Chairman. All 12 of 'the Dozen' were major Manifesto figures, including 
Chairman Cartwright, Secretary Robertson, Vice Chairman Horarn and former 
Secretary Wrigglesworth'50. 
Despite such Centre-right initiatives, the October 1980 Conference was a triumph for 
the Left. Although they lost the vote on control of the manifesto, they won the principle 
of the Electoral College. Late in the day, the Group had began to consider OMOV as an 
alternative to a College. However, as this still removed the choice of Leader from the 
PLP (and thus undermined their main argument), it never received full support until it 
was far too late to be championed successfully. Owen and Rodgers called for choice of 
Leader to be by complete OMOV, for any candidate nominated by 20% of the PLP151. 
Hattersley moved to accepting a wider franchise, with 55% for the PLP and 45% spread 
between other parts of the movement (the largest part to CLPs, with OMOV and split 
preferences used)' 52 . Tribunite John Silkin and others supported 40: 30: 30 (the PLP 
147 Statement of 18 June 1980, IWP. "' Guardian, I August 1980. 
149 The Times, 22 September 1980. Thomas undertook much of the publicity around this and took 
150 
delight in the "Dirty Dozen" attribution; Mike Thomas, interview, 2 July 2002. 
ihid. 
15, Paper by Owen and Rodgers; it also recommended the alternative vote system (IWP). I" Paper by Hattersley, IWP. He also spelt this out in the Guardian, 24 November 1980. 
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having the 40%), leaving each GC to decide whether to ballot their own members 
153 
. 
(Apparently forgetting his support for a minority for the PLP, Silkin later resented this 
outcome, complaining - when standing for the Deputy Leadership - of the time 
he had 
to spend touring CLPs and union conferences 154 .) As the PLP vote approached - on the 
Shadow Cabinet's motion for at least 50% of the College to be for the PLP - Manifesto 
members tabled an amendment that if OMOV was not assured, then the PLP declines to 
accept a wider franchise'55. Whilst Willie Hamilton sought to have the "in-principle" 
decision rerun, Jack Straw urged support for the conference decision. The Left tabled 
an amendment to reduce the PLP's proportion to a third' 
56 
. The PLP adopted the 
Shadow Cabinet's motion in November, when the Group was busy ensuring the re- 
election of Willey, as Chairman of the PLP1 
57 
. 
In October a Leadership campaign took precedence, following a disastrous Conference 
for the Right, and Callaghan's resignation on IS October. On the 16'h, Robertson wrote 
round to ensure a good turn-out for the coming PLP meetings' 
58 (to halt attempts to 
elect an interim Leader until an Electoral College be put into place). The Secretary 
confirmed the Group's position of not endorsing any one candidate (though Radice was 
helping Healey's campaign'59), but that "the officers should approach each candidate to 
seek a meeting with representatives of the group to discuss the important issues facing 
the Party". This was surely meant to help Healey, who largely shared their views. 
Before any such meeting, the Group agreed to draw up a set of questions to put to the 
candidates. Thomas wrote the first draft, opening "This election is being held at a time 
of crisis for the Party and the Nation" and stressing two major issues: one of 
"Parliamentary democracy and the constitution and democratic functioning of the 
Labour Party" and the other of the credibility of the policies to be put to the electorate. 
He was emphatic about any Leader's willingness to defend the independence of the PLP 
and individual MPs, and about the need to reform the NEC and policy-making - as well 
as some of the policies (such as renationalisation without compensation, unilateralism. 
and exit from NATO) 160 . On 20 October, a meeting turned his draft into a list of 16 
"' Paper by Booth, Orme and John Silkin, IWP. 
154 John Silkin, op cit, p. 33/4. 
'55 PLP paper, PLP archives. The amendment was signed by 18 Manifesto members. 
156 ibid. 
157 Notes of meeting of 12 November 1980 and circular of same date, MGA. 158 Letter of 16 October 1980 to "Manifesto Group and Colleagues", MGA. 159 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 537. 161 Mike Thomas paper of 16 October 1980, IWP. 
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questions 161 - including on secret ballots, union block votes, rights of MPs, 
NEC 
restructuring, PLP's rights, the EEC, unilateralism and incomes policy. The final 
questions must have been aimed at Foot: "Do you see yourself as a caretaker 
162 in any 
sense? Are there any personal factors - age, health - that you feel might inhibit your 
perfonnance as leader? ". 
Whilst the questions were put to all four candidates, the greatest impact the meetings 
had was to alienate some of Healey's own supporters. The delegation to him got 
"decidedly short shrift. Healey was trying hardest to get the votes of the centre, of 
people scared of their constituency parties, above all of party loyalists unhappy at the 
new snarling developments, but prejudiced against splitters. He thought and said to 
their faces that they had nowhere else to go,, 163 . This might have cost him votes. 
Whilst Barry Jones'64"was asked by David Owen and Bill Rodgers to inspect their 
ballot papers" to see they had voted for Healey, "It is generally accepted that at least 
three MPs who later left Labour, first voted against Healey. Tom Ellis, Neville 
Sandelson and Jeffrey Thomas seem clearly to have made that decision"165 . Even for 
those who supported him, Healey's behaviour helped some later prove they did have 
somewhere to go by establishing the SDP 166 . Healey's mishandling of his natural 
supporters, together with his refusal to pen an article for the Guardian or to issue a 
"manifesto", was sufficient to make one of his own lieutenants, Whitehead, vote for 
Shore in the first ballot before supporting him in the decider 167 . 
Foot's election, on 10 November 1980, was the trigger for some members' subsequent 
defection 168 . For the entire Group, however, Healey's defeat was a body blow. 
Nevertheless, the work of their members continued, Radice and Robertson touring the 
169 Commons to maintain the nerve and resolve of despairing members 
161 1 Va. 
162 This referred to the suggestion that, if elected, Foot would stand aside for Benn. 161 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 542/3, and John Horarn interview, 2003. The delegation included Horarn 
and Thomas. 
164 On Healey's campaign team. 161 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 543. 166 Mike Thomas interview. He nearly sent Healey a postcard the day the SDP was created saying 
167 
, Have found somewhere else to go'. 
168 
John Golding, op cit, and Phillip Whitehead, interview, 9 January 2003. Tom McNally interview. 
Giles Radice interview. 
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In November, the group met with Frank Chapple, one of their few supporters within the 
senior ranks of the unions. The December AGM opened with an obituary tribute to 
Lord Gordon-Walker, one of the Group's links to the predecessor CDS. Radice took 
over as Chairman from Cartwright (who was to leave the party within months) with 
Weetch elected Treasurer. An issue which pushed some "beyond the pale" was also 
aired. Rodgers had thought to join Owen in not standing for the Shadow Cabinet but 
was persuaded by Roper and others to run. He did well, comingjoint eighth 170 _ only to 
be offered what he considered low status or inappropriate portfolios (such as Northern 
Ireland) by the new Leader, Foot 171 . It was not 
just personally insulting; itsentasignal 
to his allies that they were not valued or even wanted within the party. For Roper, it 
was his psychological moment of departure 172 .A year earlier, Wrigglesworth had 
regretted the number of left-wingers given positions by Callaghan 173 ; now a left-wing 
Leader was failing to bring the Right on board. The AGM also discussed the NEC's 
attempts to side-step Conference's rejection of its demand for sole responsibility for the 
manifesto (the "Clause V" issue) - seeking to undermine the PLP. 
Inunediately after Christmas, the most dramatic and personally difficult of all the 
Manifesto meetings took place 174 as the schism between stayers and leavers became 
clear. Beforehand, Chairman Radice had written in The Guardian on "Why the Labour 
Party Must Not Split"175 and circulated a "Note on the Manifesto Group's Future" 176. 
His note described the Group's achievements, pointing to the PLP elections, where they 
won 9 out of the 12 Shadow Cabinet places, along with the PLP Chairman and most of 
the subject group chairmen. The Group had "been most successful .. (in).. Articulating a 
centre-right Viewpoinf 'within parliament. It had "succeeded in.. sustaining a centre- 
right coalition in the PLP, much wider than its actual membership .. 
(and) helped keep 
in office the last Labour Government". However, he did not flinch about the 
weaknesses: "it has never had a constituency presence and its trade union links have 
been weak". He listed the dangers facing the Group: the formation of Labour First 
(which damaged its recruitment prospects); the swing to the Left, on the NEC, at 
conference and in the CLPs; reselection; and "Divisions within our own ranks". He 
170 PLP Circular, 4 December 1980, PLP archives. 
171 All the positions offered later went to non-Shadow Cabinet members. 
172 Personal communication at the time. 
73 See p. 57. 
74 Giles Radice interview. 
"" 12 January 1981. 
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acknowledged that some had decided "that there is no longer any room for a centre-right 
viewpoint within the" party. However, most "believe that the situation is retrievable 
and we should continue to fight on inside the Labour Party". The Manifesto Chairman 
recommended concentrating on: winning PLP elections; articulating Centre-right 
views; holding speaker meetings; helping members with reselection problems, and 
establishing union links. 
The 14 January 1981 meeting witnessed an outflow of emotions. Its Chairman recalls it 
as "the famous meeting.. Big Row between Hattersley and David Owen, Mike Thomas 
and Ian Wrigglesworth about them leaving" 177 . The memorable contributions were the 
statements of intent, albeit scarcely legible in Robertson's fast-deteriorating 
handwriting. Owen thought it "understandable that people would take different views - 
few had thought the party would degenerate so fast" and asked "Be tolerant if people go 
in different directions". Thomas felt "that fighting in L. P. has been done.. and believe 
strategy has failed". Wrigglesworth worried about the voters who were deserting the 
party and was "not prepared to see that vote decline". He had "tried hard" including 
forming CLV to work in the constituencies. But the stayers held their ground. Though 
some (Wayland Young) said they were "hanging on by eyelash", Golding said he was 
"Not abandoning the inheritance to bunch of lefties". Bob Mitchell, recalling that the 
"Left stayed in and fought", now urged members to do the same - though admitted it 
might be a "different ballgame if some not reselected". Owen hinted that there might be 
a coming together again at some later date but Whitehead doubted it as the 
"circumstances of a split will mean bad blood for a generation". Instead, we 6'must 
persuade people not to go out". Hattersley, the most senior stayer to speak, recalled 
how their section of the party had grown up being in the majority and were 
unaccustomed to being a minority. However, "so long as we control p. C. 178 we control 
the manifesto" and he was "not going to fight on anti-EEC or unilateral ism". He 
warned that the chances of fighting back were weakened if people threatened to 
leave 179 . After the meeting (which endorsed the Chairman's paper), the two factions 
"each gave separate press conferences"' 80. No doubt Radice was upbeat at his but, 
176 MGA. 
177 Giles Radice interview. 
178 Parliamentary Committee, or Shadow Cabinet. 
179 Robertson's notes of 14 January 198 1, MGA. 
1,0 Giles Radice interview. 
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asked in 2002 to assess the Manifesto Group, he judged: "It was a failed group - not 
entirely. But failed - because some of our members left and set up another party" 181 
A separate meeting with Foot prior to Wembley, with 28 MPs, and five peers present, 
urged him to do more to preserve the PLP's position. Foot said he had "done 
everything in my power to get the 50: 25: 25" but without the AUEW, it was not 
possible. He stressed he "want(cd) to keep people in" and offered "If anything I can do 
to help MPs under pressure [from reselection] then will help". The Manifesto Group 
members pushed him on Militant, the proposed referendum on the EEC, on "Death by a 
thousand cuts" 182 . Whitehead voiced the "fear that the Party is on the brink" and called 
on him to "speak out in interests of coalition or it will fall apart". Foot's response, to 
the despair of many, was noted as: "don't think on brink". Mason sadly recalled that he 
had "never seen such nastiness and intolerance in CLPs" and asked Foot to "make 
appeal for more tolerance or the party will split". The Group would stay and fight from 
within but to do so "we need your support. [The party] needs all WingS,, 183 . The 
Leader's response satisfied few, their Chairman recalling "He was rather awful"' 84 
Events worsened when, on 24 January 1981, the Special Conference decided on the 
composition of the Electoral College agreed in principle in October. The result was the 
worst of all possible outcomes for the PLP: just 30% of the total compared with 40% to 
185 the unions and 30% for the CLPs . It provided the 
defectors with a popular cause on 
which to split (unions being unpopular after the 1978-79 Winter of Discontent) rather 
than the European issue, which united the defectors but scored negatively in opinion 
polls. The Gang of Four exploited the unsatisfactory outcome to the full in the 
Limehouse Declaration the following day, as a dozen Labour MPs lined up to join what 
was clearly going to be a new party. 
The Manifesto troops were traurnatised. Meeting days later, 29 of them shared their 
despair. The first resignation 186 was reported but a number who were to defect later 
were there. Many still hoped the inevitable would not happen, talking of "if"not 
"' Giles Radice interview. 
182 Dickson Mabon, who accused the Left of repeatedly pressing things defeated at conference. "' Robertson's notes of meeting, MGA. 194 Giles Radice interview. 
5 Report of the NEC to the 1981 Conference, p. 1 55/6. 6 Lady Burton of Coventry, who hoped, after 36 years in the party, "that one day we shall all be together again", 2 March 1981 letter, MGA. 
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"when"' 87 or seeing it as "a catalyst. A warning signal to people including Tribune" 188 
Magee thought the Limehouse supporters might one day wish to come back and urged 
colleagues "Don't push them". Weetch urged that they "Keep door open" whilst 
admitting the "time for conciliation is very short". But Bob Cant retorted that Owen 
"the ambitious" and Rodgers "the conspirator.. have weakened us. If welcomed back 
then I will resign". A major concern was the ver y future of the Group. Bob Mitchell 
acknowledged that their association with Prentice had harmed them. Underhill warned 
that "Any suspicion that the MG is openly connected [with the Limehouse group] will 
damage. Manyjoined because of link with the unions and if they don't split then we 
don't". Parker concurred: "no future of a soc[ialist] party without roots in unions". 
These predictions were to prove accurate, the unions' complete solidarity helping 
Labour to triumph over the SDP. Summing up, Radice announced that the public 
statement would be "that we stay in and fighf"89. 
Later, on the eve of the Council for Social Democracy's metamorphosis into the Social 
Democratic Party, Radice and Robertson, as Manifesto Chairman and Secretary, issued 
a statement claiming that the SDP was "bound to become more right wing and anti- 
union.. [its] intervention could stop Labour candidates winning and so assist another 
Conservative election victory. .. Running away from the struggle for a broad based, 
tolerant Labour Party and for effective socialist policies in favour of an illusory middle 
ground is not only defeatist but a betrayal of Labour Party supporters and members"190. 
There were no personal attacks and the authors kept their own sadness to themselves. 
Given that those leaving included their former Secretary (Wrigglesworth), Chairman 
(Cartwright), Secretary and Chairman (Horam) and Treasurer (Sandelson) together with 
name-giver Rodgers and a host of their close political friends, this showed remarkable 
constraint. To his predecessor, Robertson wrote "You did much for the Group, and 
within the Party. Maybe that is why your departure is so sad"191. 
And so a chapter ended. The Group continued to exist, but bereft of a swathe of its 
members, until after the 1983 election192. It had to contend with distaste arising from its 
former association with those who had defected, as well as suspicion that others might 
187 Willie Hamilton saying he hoped "they will stay in and fighf', MGA. IRS Bruce Douglas-Mann, who would be one of the last to join the SDP. 1 99 All quotes from Robertson's handwritten undated notes, MGA. no Press release, 25 March 198 1, MGA. 19, Letter to Ian Wrigglesworth, 16 March 198 1, MGA. 
85 
Chapter 7 Manifesto Group 
yet leave (as many indeed did). Furthermore, it was now fighting on two fronts: 
against the Left in the PLP and against their former members in the SDP. 
Despite this, activity did not wane. Circulars went out urging attendance at PLP 
meetings which, surprisingly, had been poorly attended, to make the "voice of the 
centre-right heard7' 193 . The 
Group held meetings with Healey (Deputy Leader) and 
Hattersley 194 , and an important one with the 
Leader on Militant, when members spelt 
out the effects Militant was having in constitucncies'95. Palmer related how Militant 
had "wiped out total EC of Bristol NW" and led to a situation where "TGWU members 
196 not paying levy" . Magee described "Hordes of them.. coming 
from Newharn NE" 
into his Leyton constituency and how Militant "had plenty of money. We don't have 
the resources to fight". He called on the party to "introduce the proscribed lisf' 
although predicting it would "not be done by this NEC". He warned that Militant "will 
destroy party. They are revolutionary and antagoniste'. Bob Mitchell had two full-time 
organisers in Southampton and described how, in the Southern Region, the "TGWU 
noted widespread political levy withdrawal". Boothroyd recalled there was "already a 
proscribed list of one [SDA 197]99 so thought it could be widened. Ford recounted how 
Edward Lyons was spending all his time in Bradford West fighting them, the older 
members having been pushed out. It was, he said, a "sick atmosphere". Golding, 
mocking their "Nazi salute with arthritis", pointed out that Militant had more organisers 
than the party, and that they kept meetings going until 3 a. m., so no-one could compete. 
Do not "allow them to come in and destroy the party" he pleaded. Whitehead's 
experience was similar: it was "Very hard to get people to go to meetings. London is 
crumbling". In Derby there were disaffiliations from ASLEF and TGWU. Underhill 
added to his earlier report, describing how Militant had "branches in CLPs and full-time 
organisers. They can get money.. which should be going to the party". 
"' See Solidarity chapter. 
193 Circular, 4 March 1981, MGA. 
"' On 25 March, and 8 April 1981 respectively. 
195 On 18 March 1981. 
Like other unions, the TGWU had a political levy which members could opt out of. Finally, it was 
this union pressure, in Liverpool and elsewhere, that persuaded a number of unions - not least NUPE - that tolerance of Militant was no longer an option. 
In December 1980, the NEC resolved that "in the light of the decision of the Social Democratic 
Alliance to maintain a political organisation .. with its own separate and distinct programme, 
principles and policy and to promote candidates .. in opposition to the Labour Party" the NEC declare it "ineligible for affiliation .. and membership of this organisation is therefore incompatible 
with membership of the Labour Party", NEC Report to 1981 Labour Party Conference, p. 8. 
86 
Chapter 7 Manifesto Group 
Responding to this catalogue, Foot said he would "Take seriously what they said. Do 
not believe they are going to take over. Can be counteracted effectively". He did "not 
think best way is proscribed lisf', the answer was to "defeat them in debate" though he 
acknowledged the problem of violence and intimidation, and recognised the difficulties 
some MPs, were having in reselection. The priority was to "engage in the argument" - 
198 though he (accurately) surmised that this might be seen as "an inadequate response" 
After Foot left the meeting, the Group - whilst expressing their disappointment - agreed 
to gathering further documentation. However, they feared there "Will be other people 
who will go after conference" so the "timescale is short" and agreed to press that view 
with the Leader 199 . 
In the Group's internal discussions, John Smith warned of the possible consequences of 
the forthcoming political fund ballots, but mostly members contemplated the potential 
effects of reselection whilst re-affirming their role in defending the leadership and in 
countering the well-organised Hard-left. They were also busy on policy, setting up 
200 
working parties on industrial policy and defence 
However, as soon as the Group settled down to its new existence, it was confronted by 
the first ever Deputy Leadership election not to be decided by MPs alone. At the 
beginning of April, Benn announced he would challenge Healey, using the new 
Electoral College. Ever loyalist, the members agreed "Must rally around MF. We must 
protect him from those who voted for him" and saw the need for a "thumping vote in 
PLP" for Healey. They would campaign around "Support for existing leadershi P,, 201 
and they openly took sides, urging "that all our members, and as many MPs as possible, 
personally nominate Foot/Healey for the joint leadership"202. Members were urged to 
get CLPs to support this ticket and to "all pull our full weight for Michael Foot and 
Denis Healey"203 - this from the very people who seven months earlier had worked 
desperately to prevent Foot becoming Leader. There was a third candidate, John Silkin, 
but given he favoured "Withdrawal from the E. E. C. " and "Nuclear disannament', 204 , he 
Robertson's notes point out that the SDA had only threatened to put up candidates and that "there 
was not a word or suggestion of witchhunts then". 
Quotes from Robertson's handwritten notes, 18 March 198 1, MGA. 
99 ibid. 
200 June 1981 papers, MGA. 
201 Notes of 9 April 198 1, MGA. 
202 Circular from Robertson, Secretary of the Group, 25 May 198 1, MGA. 
203 ihid. 
204 June 1981 letter from John Silkin to all CLPs 
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would not find support in this Group. By the "hair of one of my eyebrows', 205 , Healey 
retained the Deputy Leadership. 
In October, the Group backed Dormand for PLP Chairman 206 , who polled 102 votes on 
the first ballot. The runner-up, Mikardo, with 65, then withdraw, removing the need for 
a second ballot207 .A full slate of 15 for the newly enlarged 
Shadow Cabinet was 
circulated 208, the Group having helped ensure Cocks' re-election as Chief Whip209 . it 
had lost the battles over re-selection and the Electoral College, but was not going to 
admit defeat over Militant, appealing (unsuccessfully) to the NEC not to endorse 
Militant supporter Pat Wall as a Prospective Parliamentary Candidate, and "to declare 
the activities and organisation of the Militant Tendency as incompatible with the 
Constitution of the Labour Party"210 . 
An end-of-year letter from the Chairman and Secretary recorded: "This has been a 
traumatic year for the Party, and for the Manifesto Group. However, we must not be 
disconsolate". It took comfort from the NEC gains 211 and from their efforts on Militant 
having "sparked off the process which has resulted in an inquiry" though "the pressure 
for action on the entryists must be kept up". Members were urged to "Get resolutions in 
to the NEC supporting Michael and the Militant inquiry. Others are organising fast `9212. 
This represents the first documented attempt to influence the NEC, perhaps reflecting 
the increased number of Manifesto friends now on it. 
The Group continued to meet throughout 1982, agreeing a full slate of 15 and 
maintaining pressure over Militant. The NEC had finally voted to set up a Register but 
Robertson predicted that the debate at the autumn conference would be "violent and 
rigorous. .. Militant 
is mobilizing its forces and will be mounting a fierce propaganda 
campaign". He recalled that Militant had admitted that their Fighting Fund had massed 
E103,000 in 1981 as well having a "'drilled organisation, enormous energy.. fighting for 
their very existence". An added problem was that "resistance to the idea of a Register 
is now being well orchestrated, often by non-Militant people" and urged members to 
205 Denis Healey interview. 
206 Letter of 20 October 1981 to members, MGA. 207 PLP circular, 5 November 1981, PLP archives. 2os i id. 
2og 
By 156 to Martin Flannery's 5 1, PLP archives. 21o 
21 
Letter from Radice, Robertson and Weetch to Hayward, General Secretary, 2 November 198 1. I See chapter 10. 212 Letter from Radice and Robertson, December 198 1, MGA. 
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write to the press, and to get resolutions from local parties and unions to the NEC213. 
Opposition to Militant now extended beyond Manifesto and Solidarity members (for 
example, to Straw214 ) but it was far from universal. "Labour Against the Witch-hunt" 
(with many Tribune MPs in support) was flooding the NEC with resolutions. 
One of the first organisations to register under the new provisions was the Manifesto 
Group, setting out its officers, purposes, and finances in a letter to the new General 
Secretary, Jim Mortime? 15. So the Group had achieved one of its long-standing aims - 
action against Militant - but only after the SDP split, and when its own membership 
was at its smallest: just 27 MPs and 7 peers. Within the PLP, the Group continued to 
216 
meet for another year, when it merged into Parliamentary Solidarity , where its 
members continued to prepare and work for Shadow Cabinet slates. 
The Manifesto Group was set up to marshal the Centre-right majority for PLP elections. 
In this, it was - with one major exception - overwhelmingly successful. It dominated 
the PLP, holding the Chairmanship and Vice-chairmanship continuously from late 
1974, making a clean sweep of the Liaison Committee from 1976, and winning most of 
the Shadow Cabinet places after 1979. Whether it was wise to 'take no hostages' and to 
enforce such hegemony is open to question, as it delayed any rapprochement with the 
Centre-left and gave an impression of authoritarianism2 17 . That was not how its 
members saw things. Excluded from the NEC, beleaguered within their own CLPs, 
Manifesto members who had loyally supported first the Labour Government and then 
the Opposition Leadership, were perplexed and then angered by their alienation from 
the new Left within the party which had been their life. They saw their success in 
internal elections as a fair representation of the views of the PLP. Some of the older 
MPs were influenced by their 1952 "Keep Calm" Group attempts to cooperate with the 
Left, which made them vow not to make the same mistake again2". 
In the single most important PLP election, however, that between Foot and Healey in 
October 1980, they failed to deliver, and thereby contributed to the creation of the SDP. 
211 1 July 1982 circular, MGA. 
2 14 Tribune, 9 July 1982. 
215 19 July 1982, MGA. See annex 6. 
216 See p. 198. 
21' Lewis Minkin, interview, 10 December 2002. 
211 Particularly George Strauss and Michael Stewart; Michael Stewart, Life & Labour: An 
Autobiography, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980, pp 85 and 268. 
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Some of the failure can be laid at Healey's door219, and some to the short-sightedness or 
cowardliness of the Centre. The Manifesto Group nevertheless failed because of its 
inability to build a coalition for Healey's candidature. 
Before looking at its wider success and failures, it is worth listing the Group's strength 
and weaknesses. Its major handicap was its isolation from prevailing opinion on the 
NEC, on GCs and at party conference 220 . Some of its members were not sufficiently 
linked into the party; they were perhaps "intellectual" socialists rather than embedded in 
the party's grassroots 22 1. They had little contact with members of the NEC222. 
Others of the Group's members added to its problems, with both "that asS"223 Sandelson 
and Prentice putting off potential recruits 224. Its hard-right image made it unattractive 
and it failed to recruit the non-Tribune Centre who were key to achieving its objectives. 
However, it was not just the Group's image that hampered recruitment, but the fear - 
even terror - of pending reselections which dominated MPs' waking hours. Even those, 
like McNally, who voiced distaste for Sandelson, admitted that the reason for not 
joining was his fight with his own GMC where "he felt real hatred -)225. party 
membership had declined so much that it could no longer be said to represent Labour 
voters, to whom MPs feel a strong affinity. The party - all of it, not just the PLP - had 
failed to respond to this or to the arrival of the 1960s generation amongst party activists. 
This was a party-wide problem but it particularly weakened the Manifesto Group. The 
PLP was out of tune with the wider party, and this was reflected in - rather than caused 
by - the Manifesto Group. Furthermore, although loyal to the leadership, the Group got 
little in return by way of support, whether from Wilson, Callaghan or Foot. Their 
members had voted for neither the first nor last of these, yet were committed - in their 
aims and by temperament - to supporting the leadership: an unrequited loyalty. The 
Labour Government's unpopularity was also a problem, as the Group was committed to 
its defence, before a party troubled by its record. 
219 As he himself acknowledges; Denis Healey interview. 
221 Weetch confessed to rarely attending (communication to the author, March 2003). 221 Kinnock interview. 
222 John Horam, interview, 2003. Williams and Cartwright were on the NEC, but others were less linked in with the movement. 
223 Letter from George Cunningham to the author, II May 2003. 211 See p. 69. 
225 Tom McNally interview. 
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The Manifesto Group was effectively leaderless. Its hard-working officers had neither 
the stature nor the position to offer an alternative to the scene-stealing Tony Benn. 
Healey was outside the Group, and the Cabinet (and later Shadow Cabinet) was 
debarred from holding office. Williams, a possible contender, was outside the House 
from May 1979. So a surfeit of talent failed to be translated into effective leadership. 
Finally, the Group had within it the seeds of its own destruction. The SDP split came 
entirely from within it, and on the very issues that had united its members against party 
conference: Europe and the Electoral College. 
Ranged against these manifold weaknesses was the Group's single strength: its size. 
Whether measured by Callaghan's 1976 majority over Foot (176: 13 7), Wrigglesworth's 
1979 estimate of 149: 94, or by the 107 MPs willing to sign a letter to Callaghan 
protesting at the party's constitutional changes, the views represented by the Manifesto 
Group were those of the majority of the PLP. Thus whilst MPs might have been out of 
step with the party, the Group was not out of step with them. 
Given all its weaknesses, and its one single strength, did the Group achieve its aims of 
supporting the government in implementing manifesto promises, acting as a forum for 
constructive discussion, and working to achieve a democratic socialist society through 
parliamentary means? In truth, such aims were beyond the means of an underfunded 
gathering of MPs, without staff for most of its existence. Had the Manifesto Group not 
been created, however, it is difficult to imagine where the Centre-right, loyalist, pro- 
leadership view would have been articulated. The NEC and Tribune attacked the 
government; the NEC and the party became pre-occupied with internal party reform. 
There was no other machine championing Labour values against an increasingly radical 
Tory government, and no-one else arguing against EEC withdrawal, unilateralism, and 
renationalisation without compensation. Had this flag not been kept flying, it might 
have taken Kinnock much longer to begin his rewriting of policy into an electorally- 
attractive package. Finally, on internal matters, it was only the Manifesto Group (and 
CLV) which supported OMOV prior to the split, and only the Manifesto Group (and 
later the St Ermins Group and Solidarity) which kept up the pressure on Militant which 
was eventually to lead, timidly under Foot, wholeheartedly under Kinnock, to action 
against them. 
The Group failed in its desire to restructure the NEC to include representatives of 
ordinary party members, local government and (crucially for them) the PLP. These 
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changes had to await Blair's premiership. The Group also failed to promote any 
alternative modernisation agenda to reselection and the Electoral College. It was late to 
champion OMOV (largely because this would have excluded trade unions from 
candidate selection, and removed the PLP's monopoly in leadership elections). It thus 
had no positive agenda to offer. However, its stated aims never included party refonn. 
so it might be unfair to rank this as a failure to meet objectives. The most valuable 
success of the Group - despite Radice's view that it failed because the party split - was 
to prevent a greater haemorrhaging, to offer solidarity to MPs under pressure, to 
reassure them they were not alone and to prove, after 198 1, that Centre-right, social 
democrats could be at home within the Labour Party. 
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For a section of MPs, the Manifesto Group was a bridge too far. Tainted by being so 
Right-wing, and concentrating on organisation rather than discussion, it held little 
attraction for MPs who disliked the two established sects but recognised the need to 
meet together for support and debate. Labour First's inaugural meeting took place on 
25 March 19801. At the time, the PLP felt marginalised by the Left, particularly by 
their demands for mandatory re-selection, taking the choice of Leader out of MPs' 
hands, and for removing MPs from decisions on the manifesto. Labour First was set up 
amidst numerous PLP meetings to agree ajoint submission to the Committee of 
Enquiry, and when cataclysmic warnings about whether the party could ever form a 
government were daily in the papers. 
The MPs who formed the Group 2 were not just concerned about winning the argument 
within Westminster. The choice of name reflected the founders' desire to put Labour, 
as opposed to any particular faction, first. They saw the other groups undermining the 
"unity and cohesiveness of the Labour Party, both in Parliament and in the country" and 
wanted to counter such divisions. However, this was seen by others on the Right as the 
66soggy middle', 3 _ at best naYve, at worse as cowardice - leading to the soubriquet, 
"Safety First'A . Nevertheless, the some 30 MPsjoinred5, although the atmosphere 
dictated that the list be kept secret 6. 
The Group embarked on an active programme of debates, largely organised by its hard- 
working Secretary, Edmund MarshaI17. Within two years, Labour First organised 16 
meetings outside the House, in which panels of MI's answered questions and 
participated in discussion with party activists. Five of these were conference fringe 
events, but 11 others were held around the countryg. In the House, 32 meetings were 
held, virtually all with speakers, who included Foot?, Healey, Hattersley, Benn, Harold 
I David Clark papers. It was initially called the "Non-Group" meeting (letter from David Watkins to 
the author, 19 April 2004). 
2 Bryrunor John, David Clark, Terry Davis, John Grant and Edmund Marshall (Edmund Marshall 
letter to the author, 12 November 2003). 
3 Phillip Whitehead; notes of 26 March 1980 Manifesto Group meeting, MGA. 4 As recalled by Nick Butler; interview, 2 March 2003. 5 See annex 6. 
6 Edmund Marshall letter, 12 November 2003. 
7 Lord Clark of Windermere (David Clark), interview, 2 December 2003. 8 "Report on the Year's Activities", by Edmund Marshall, Secretary, Labour First, 31 March 1981 and 20 April 1982, David Clark papers. 
9 Then Leader of the party. 
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Wilson, Lord Carver 10 , Gordon Borriel 
1 and trade unionists Alan Fisher, Clive Jenkins 
and Len Murray. 
The Group also produced one paper, on internal party organisation 12 . At the end of 
1980, when the conference had decided in principle to amend the system for electing the 
Leader, but had failed to agree a method, the PLP sought to coalesce around one 
position. Labour First's submission called for an OMOV ballot of all party members, 
instead of an Electoral College. This was supported by many of the MPs who 
subsequently defected but not by the Shadow Cabinet nor the PLP (which went along 
with an Electoral College, with half the votes for MPs). In this one collective position, 
therefore, Labour First firmly placed itself on the Right. Yet, by holding aloof from the 
Manifesto Group, it was seen by the Chairman of the latter as damaging his Group's 
recruitment prospects 13 , weakening the Centre-right in the PLP. 
What was the purpose of this non-aligned Group, and what did it achieve? Its 
instigators wanted a forum for discussion outside of the polarised choice within the 
PLP. Benn described it as being "set up by people who are dissatisfied with the 
Manifesto Group which is right-wing and pro-common market, and with the Tribune 
Group which they think of as dangerously left-wing" 14 . However, Golding wrote that 
"the moderate members of Labour First were far from being dissatisfied with the 
Manifesto Group and helped create Labour First as a meeting point with those in the 
Tribune Group who opposed the excesses of Wedgie and Eric Heffer"15. John Grant, 
one of the original Vice-Chairmen, defined it as a Group who were "deeply unhappy 
with the faction fighting which.. bedevilled the parliamentary party as well as the party 
16 beyond" . 
One Manifesto Group stalwart was less charitable: "They were Soft-left. 
t917 Decent, but couldn't bring themselves to call themselves 'Right' Perhaps "soft- 
Right" would have been more appropriate. 
10 Former Chief of the Defence Staff, Field Marshal Carver. 
11 Director General of Fair Trading; now Lord Borrie of Abbots Morton. 12 "Proposed amendments to the Labour Party Constitution to implement a new system for electing the 
13 
Leader of the Labour Party", Labour First, II November 1980, David Clark papers. 
Note to the Manifesto Group by Radice, January 198 1, MGA. 
4 Tony Benn, op cit, p. 12. 
5 John Golding, op cit, 1988, Chap 14, p. 7. 
16 John Grant, Blood Brothers, Weidenfeld &N icolson, 1992, p. 102. 17 Jim Wellbeloved interview. 
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Brynmor John (the Chairman throughout its existence), Grant, Marshall, Clark and 
Davis had sounded out other like-minded MPs to set up something to counter the 
polarisation and foster "an improved spirit of tolerance". They resented the 
effectiveness of the other two slates, and - according to Grant - in 19 81 put up their own 
list, representing what they defined as "the middle" and which helped see John, 
Dunwoody and Archer elected to the Shadow Cabinet. The Secretary of the Group, 
Edmund Marshall, remembers it differently, claiming that Labour First did not run any 
slate "although it would not have been surprising if members of Labour First supported 
those [of its] members who were candidates for the Shadow Cabinet"' 8. 
The Manifesto Group sensed there was a separate slate19 and resented the consequent 
dilution of its own effectiveness. Despite such hiccups, members from Manifesto were 
welcomed into Labour First, and there were a number active in both (such as Archer) as 
well as some who were later prominent in Solidarity (Woolmer, Jack Cunningham, 
Clark, Mitchell and O'Neill) and others subsequently to defect - Grant, McNally, 
Douglas-Mann and, much later, Marshall when no longer an MP. Perhaps the most 
significant role the Group played was the provision of mutual support. The pressure on 
MPs was intense, and the bitterness in the party palpable. For example, although Clark 
had no Militancy within his own CLP, his experience in another seat which he . visited 
as a Labour First speaker, remains live in his memory: 
"I remember speaking at one in Haltwhistle, with Arthur Davidson (who 
was himself close to Tribune) in the Miners' Hall. The feeling was intense. 
My wife was there - and had a box of leaflets under her chair. One woman 
at the meeting -a long-standing councillor - said to my wife: 'I hope that's 
a bomb'. Such was the atmosphere. Then they slagged off Arthur. Said he 
and others were'milking the Labour Party; lining their pockets'. Arthur 
Davidson -a QC - said he could make far more as a barrister"20 . 
For Clark and his friends, Labour First provided a handrail on the route back to a more 
collegial party and a source of support and encouragement. Labour First continued to 
meet until Easter 1983 when attention turned to the forthcoming General Election. By 
the year end, the Group had been subsumed (along with the Manifesto Group) into 
Parliamentary Solidarity, with Brynmor John becoming Chairman of the new Grouping 
and Clark a Vice-Chairman2l. The size of the election defeat was the trigger - only 209 
Is Edmund Marshall letter, 12 November 2003. 
19 See Manifesto Group chapter. 
20 David Clark interview. 
21 'Solidarity Committee paper and minutes, 14 December 1983 (DRWI/2; DRIVI/24). 
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MPs - and the shock of the response on the doorstep. "Two per cent fewer votes and 
22 
we'd have been finished. After that, the soft-Tribunites were talking very differently" 
That the Left was split, between those (like Benn) who considered the 1983 election a 
victory for a good socialist manifesto, and the bulk who acknowledged the scale of the 
crisis, was evidenced by the likes of Blair and Brown who, as new MPs, joined the 
Tribune Group. The presence of such typically Centre and Centre-right members in 
Tribune altered its colours and nearly shot the Right's fox. The Common Market had 
also dimmed as a marker, not least as events in eastern Europe (such as Solidarity in 
Poland) were shifting the European debate. It was time for a new focus in the PLP; 
Labour First found it quite comfortable to make the move into Labour's SolidaritY23. 
Looking at achievements of the Group, its former Secretary concludes "it is difficult to 
measure any specific legacy left by Labour First. Clearly we did not dissuade the 
formation of the SDP, nor did we have any marked effect on restoring Labour Party 
fortunes. One indirect result of our existence may have been the failure of Denis Healey 
to become Leader of the Labour Party, which election came only shortly after he had 
baldly declined an invitation to come to speak at one of our meetings! Michael Foot did 
accept such an invitation"24 . However, the fault for this does clearly lie with Healey, 
who similarly upset the Manifesto Group. Marshall does not mention what might have 
been their greatest strength - to bring some of the Soft-left into debate with the Centre- 
right. To a degree, this was a characteristic of Labour First from the start, drawing on a 
wider spectrum within the PLP than the Manifesto or Solidarity groupings. A number 
of Tribunite and non-Tribunite Left were found in its midst, some of Labour First 
members' more sceptical views on Europe perhaps making this easier. Thus Labour 
First maintained a dialogue which even Solidarity found difficult to sustain. This was to 
pay off at least once, when, after the 1983 election, two vacancies occurred in the 
North East when MPs announced their retirements. Labour First was able to do a deal 
with the Tribune members in the region, whereby one group would run a candidate in 
each seat, with both groups then working to support each other's nominees - vital in 
CLPs where Militant were strong. Labour First, given Gateshead East, ran Joyce Quin; 
Tribune chose Albert Booth for Sunderland North. In the first case, Quin won by the 
22 David Clark interview. 
23 David Clark interview. 
24 Edmund Marshall letter to the author, 12 November 2003. 
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slenderest of majorities against Militan t25. In Sunderland, despite considerable work by 
Labour First, the ex-MP and older Booth was unable to fight off Bob Clay 26 . However, 
it showed the potential of the groups co-operating against the Far-left. 
The full centre and soft-left alignment, which only really occurred after 1987, was 
undoubtedly helped by these earlier activities, but might perhaps have been brought 
forward had this grouping been more strategic, and concentrated on that objective. At 
the time, it was instead seen by the Right as being coy about declaring its anti-Benn 
sentiments. By failing to take an early stand against the Hard-left, it could be said to 
have provided the breathing space that allowed this Left to continue to damage the party 
and its electoral prospects. Nevertheless, for its members, it gave support and solidarity 
- attributes sorely lacking but essential for the day-to-day political battles. 
The Group had one more contribution to make. Another Election on, and the Labour 
Solidarity Campaign was wound up. But neither the individuals concerned, nor the 
need for organisation, disappeared. The phoenix which arose in 1987 (again aided by 
Spellar and Godsiff) wrote to Brynrnor John 27 seeking permission to take on the name. 
In response, John gathered the remaining members together to wind up the original 
Labour First formally, and then bequeathed the name to the emergent body28 which still 
exists today. 
7.5 Though she questions how much real help was offered by Labour First (comment to e author, July 2004). th 
26 David Clark interview. 
27 Letter of 6 November 1987 (JSA). 28 Letter from Brynmor John, 17 November 1987 (JSA) and John F Spellar interview. 
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The St Ermins Group of trade unionists was born on 10 February 198 1. However, a 
number of overlapping developments preceded this. One was a 'Loyalist Group' on the 
NEC, one was a 'chewing the fat' coterie of moderate general secretaries, often over 
dinner at the St Ermins Hotel, a third was a pro-incomes policy grouping, a fourth was 
of union political officers and yet another was a sub-set of unions which supported the 
constituency-based CLV. Thus, prior to the St Ermins Group, the key players met in a 
variety of gatherings as well as at the TUC General Council. 
Another dimension linked many of the people who were to play key roles in the party's 
fortunes. By 1981, a significant group of Midlands men found themselves occupying 
national positions in London: Denis Howell (MP for Birmingham Small Heath, former 
CDS union organiser', President of APEX); Roy Grantham (former Midlands 
Organiser, General Secretary of APEX2); Jim Cattermole (former East Midlands 
Labour Party Organiser3); Terry Duffy (Black Country AUEW President); John 
Golding Mp4 and Bryan Stanley (POEU, a close colleague of the party's national agent, 
Reg Underhill, from the latter's days in the Midlands). Later activists included the 
West Midlands AUEW's Ken Cure 6, together with two staffers who had first 
collaborated in South Lewisham Young Socialists in the 1960s: Roger Godsiff and 
John Spellar (later both West Midlands MPs). Other alliances were important, such as 
the 'Triple Alliance' of coal, steel and rail, which saw ISTC's Bill Sirs in close contact 
with the NUR's Sidney WeigheI17. 
The background of these men helps explain their politics. They comprised, in the main, 
general secretaries of manual unions, men who had left school at 14, with little formal 
education, and who made their way up through their unions -a demonstration of 
intelligence, leadership, determination and sheer hard work. Sandy Feather, one of their 
number (though not a general secretary - albeit the son of a TUC General Secretary), 
I Denis Howell, op cit, p. 103. 2 Denis Howell, op cit, p. 267; Roy Grantham interview. 
3 Jim Cattermole interview. 
4 Brought up in Birmingham Sparkbrook, Guardian, 14 July 1983. 
3 Bryan Stanley, interview, 24 January 2003. 
6 Andy McSmith, op cit; Lord (Tony) Clarke of Hampstead, interview, II February 2002; Charles 
Tumock, interview, 29 January 2003. 
7 Sandy Feather, interview, II September 2002. 
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attributes a fiirther quality to the coterie: "There's a breed of 'fix-it' people. Don't 
usually fix it for themselves"8 . 
Sidney (Sid) Weighell's grandfather, father and brother worked on the railways9, though 
he alone made a union career which saw him become NUR General Secretary as well as 
a Labour Party Agent in the 1950s and on the NEC in the 1970slo. It was here he saw 
the Left caucusing and began his passion to "save the party from the LefV" 1. He wanted 
Labour to be a broader-based party whose conference "would more accurately reflect 
the views of ordinary rank-and-file and Labour voters" and an NEC with a "powerful 
and sensibly balanced representation of the trade unions, the constituency parties and 
MpS9912 . He believed passionately in the party. At the height of the Winter of 
Discontent, be let it be known that he was "in the business of saving the Labour 
government"13 . Despite his role in the Group - and his personal sacrifice 
14 _ Weighell 
received little thanks, being offered no peerage and being beaten by a young Anthony 
15 Blair for the Sedgefield nomination in 1983 
Terry Duffy, the straight-talking President of the Engineering Union, was endlessly 
underestimated - even mocked - by Labour's intellectuals. Yet he was to prove the 
fulcrum on which the party's fortunes turned. He had beaten left-winger Bob Wright 
for the Presidency. "For the left within the union, and indeed for the Labour party left, 
this was seriously bad news" 16 . Under Duffy, the AUEW's "was the block vote which 
Neil Kinnock or John Smith knew they could count on"17 . Many failed to recognise the 
brain behind the face. Following the 1981 Wembley Conference (when his union was 
locked into a prior decision to support nothing less than 50% of the College for the PLP 
and thus unable to vote to prevent a worse outcome), the middle-class, university- 
educated John Silkin (unfamiliar with union procedures), disparagingly suggested that 
Sandy Feather interview. 
Sidney Weighell, op cit, Terry Pattinson, Obituary of Sidney Weighell, Independent, 15 February 
10 
2002; John Lloyd, Financial Times, 18 February 2002. 
11 
Sidney Weighell, op cit, p-23. 
12 
John Lloyd, Financial Times, 18 February 2002. 
13 
Sidney Weighell, op cit, pp. 135/6. 
14 
Bernard Donoughue, op cit, p. 266. 
is ee next chapter. 
:6 
Indepen ent, 15 February 2002. 
7 
Andy McSrnith, op cit, p. 13 5. 
ibid, P-136. 
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the working-class Duffy supported a 40%, 40%, 40% formula". Hisunion 
collaborators saw Duffy differently: he was "superb - he always delivered on what 
needed to be done" 19. "Terry was.. lovely.. It was like a breath of fresh air.. Hewas 
prepared .. to try to make things 
better. Because he had this view that the union and 
Labour movement were being held back with things as they were"20 . Others recognised 
his effectiveness: "Particularly important for the eventual success of the counter- 
insurgency against the left.. was the election in 197 8 of Terry Duffy and John Boyd, 
two classically anti-communist leaders 21 , as President and General Secretary 
respectively of the Engineering Union"22 . Dick 
Clements, who worked for Foot and 
Kinnock, described him as "helpful"; Duffy "would say to me 'Tell me what you want 
me to do and I'll do it'. And then did', 23 . Another concurs: "The 'chatterers' were 
dismissive of Duff-y.. they underestimated him. He played an important role in 
24 initiating St Ermins" . Amongst all the Group papers, almost the only reference to 
anyone by name occurs when Duffy's death was noted with sadness, not only for the 
Group but because of the loss of a powerful vote within the General Council25 . "More 
926 than any other union leader, he was the one who halted the TUC's leftward drift' . 
Bryan Stanley helped bring about the first meeting of the Group. A self-styled "middle 
of the roader', 27 , he was an unlikely ally: opposed to the Common Market and a 
unilateralist. But his similarities were greater than any policy differences. A Post 
Office employee from 14, Stanley's strengths lay in the characteristics of his union, and 
in his personality. The Post Office Engineering Union was "not one of the very big 
unions and not in a mainstream industry. So we were not trying to poach members. 
Not in competition with other unions. It was twentieth in size. They didn't fear us )928 
John Silkin, op cit, p. 38. (He would perhaps rue such comments when the AUEW helped defeat his 
bid for the Deputy Leadership. ) 
9 Roger Godsiff, interview, 4 December 200 1. 
20 Bryan Stanley interview. 
21 Sir John Boyd was notjust anti-communist. He could not tolerant Trotskyites and wanted to "cleanse" the party, describing Militant as "a sewer with all sorts of rubbish floating in if' (Guardian, 24 April 1992; Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party, Manchester 
22 
University Press, 1988, p. 234). 
23 
Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. ISO. 
Dick Clements interview. 
24 Lord (Richard) Faulkner of Worcester, interview, II March 2002. 23 Notes of 22 October 1985 meeting, EGA. 26 Andy McSmith, op cit, p. 13 7. 27 Bryan Stanley interview. 
28 Bryan Stanley interview. 
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His own personality helped; he never fell out with anyone 29 . His ability to get on with 
everyone enabled him to encompass the ego-driven Basnett and keep an eclectic group, 
from the staunchest right-wingers to the left-leaning, together. Outside the meetings, "I 
did manage to get Basnett, Chapple and Duffy round the same table over lunch - but I 
had to be there. They argued all the time. I had to stop them dealing with subjects 
30 
where they would fly apart" . Politically, Stanley "was terrific! This guy had never 
been a phone engineer - but his phone-engineering, in terms of in thinking through 
circuits and finding answers, was terrific. .. [He saw] politics as serious business. This 
wasn't for sectarian or sectional purpose within the Labour Party. It was for the 
party"3 I. 
Stanley had been on the NEC and was in contact with other general secretaries who 
shared his distaste about what was happening in the party. He decided to do something. 
As did Roy Grantham. The APEX General Secretary was midwife to the Group, not 
just ensuring it was delivered, but producing its nurse-maid, Godsiff (see below), 
without whom St Ermins might have been born a poor wee thing 32 . Grantham's union 
was central to the Right - in the European movement, CLV and later Solidarity. 
Golding Icarrit his fixing as the POEU education officer. At that time, it was unusual 
for working people to have access to telephones at work. Post Office engineers were 
the exception. So early on Golding became accustomed to "ringing round" to ensure 
people turned up, or supported particular candidates. He helped run BLOC (the 
moderates within the union) which was a miniature St Ennins, controlling elections to 
the Executive; the skills thus leamt remained with him 33 - He became an MP (thanks to 
his colleague 34 ) and a minister, though his heart remained with the union and he later 
resigned his seat to return as General Secretary. But it was on the NEC he forged his 
lasting reputation. In 1978, "the left had apparently been strengthened by the election of 
Dennis Skinner and Neil Kinnock to the NEC's constituency section. But little noted at 
29 Peter Archer, interview, 27 January 2003. 
30 Bryan Stanley interview. 
31 Neil Kinnock interview. 
32 Bryan Stanley interview. 
33 Norman Howard, interview, 14 February 2002. 
3, The Newcastle-under-Lyme party invited Stanley to be their MP. He "declined but recommended the young John Golding. The Potters [Ceramics] union conveniently called a meeting half an hour before the start of the selection conference, though expenses for attending would be handed out after the selection. The 90 or so who went, and stayed throughout the party meeting, ensured Golding 
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the time was the simultaneous election.. of John Golding, a right-wing machine 
politician .. a key player 
in the formation of a hard-line right-wing group of union 
leaders, known as the St Ermin's Group, determined not to compromise.. in the 
counter-insurgency against the new left. He was to play the leading role in challenging 
and eventually defeating Benn's and Heffer's leadership of the NEC,, 35. Golding was 
the Group's link with the Leader's office and head-office 36 . Early on, Kinnock realised 
"that the very effective organiser of this combined action and the main political 
stimulant was John Golding. And that he was putting into literal effect the maxim 'the 
victory of political ideals must be organised' ', 37. No matter how intense the politics, 
Golding's 'hinterland' was never far away. He fished enthusiastically and would have a 
TV at meetings to watch the racing 38 . Bill Sirs wrote: "The man who was a fount of 
information and most active was John Golding. None of the politicians could hold a 
, 39 candle to him' 
In time, Charlie Tumock took over Golding's role as the 'whip' on the NEC. Self- 
taught and an NCLC alumni, Tumock has an extensive library ranging from Lenin and 
Trotsky through virtually the whole of Labour history 40. "At St Ermins meetings he had 
a big leather case. Full of papers. Would dig in his bag to find the requisite paper 41 . 
His nose for detail was to prove devastating for Militant, particula4jin Liverpool, when 
he chaired the Enquiry. His life was not always led out of a briefcase. He followed his 
father onto the railways at 14, before going into the Commandos. After the war he rose 
from a passenger guard to become an NUR organiser. Beaten by Weighell to the 
general secretaryship, he remained a staunch ally of his new boss and collaborated with 
him in furthering the St Ermins GroUP42 . Together with Duffy, he is the other member 
named in the minutes, on his retirement, being thanked "for his unstinting efforts" and 
66outstanding contribution"43 . Another NUR man was Russell Tuck, "nobody's idea of a 
right-winger [but] frustrated by the weakness of the party. And as a classic NUR man, 
was selected" (Bryan Stanley interview). Golding admitted the selection had been fixed - not as a 
35 
confession but to expose the injustices of the old selection system (Guardian, 14 July 1983). 
Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 15 1. 36 Sandy Feather interview. 
37 Neil Kinnock interview. 
38 Gordon Colling, interview, I November 2002. 
39 William Sirs, letter to the author, 21 October 2002. 
40 Charles Tumock interview. 
41 Gordon Colling interview. 
42 Charles Turnock interview. 
43 Notes of 22 September 1987 meeting, EGA. 
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he wanted to do something about it. Absolutely classic role of the National Union of 
44 Railwaymen over the first 80 odd years of its history' 
Gordon Colling, who became one of Kinnock's closest confidants, recalled the cloak- 
and-dagger mode of invitation. "Somebody sidled up to me and said: 'A group of us 
meet now and again. Exchange information and views. Would you like to come along? 
Interested in discussing NEC positions' 45 . He shared their objective of returning the 
A6 
party to sanity and electability and was "our rock' 
Chapple, though a rare attendee at St Ermins meetings 47 , was a powerful 
figure behind 
its success. As with Grantham, part of his contribution was to bequeath the services of 
his political officer, Spellar, to their work. Chapple was an experienced organiser who 
had taken on and beaten the Communist Party within his own union. He had served on 
the NEC - where he had "remonstrated with Jim Callaghan, the [then] Chancellor of the 
Exchequer" at the end of his first NEC in 1965 "that the moderates were not putting up 
948 any sort of figlif . Much later, during the 1978/9 Winter, he tried to rescue Prime 
Minister Callaghan: "I don't actually support any fucking incomes policy, but I will 
support one now if it will help this fucking Government"49. The determination he had 
shown against the communists appeared again with the Bennites and Militants in the 
Labour Party. He kept Healey briefed about the Group, who commented: "I didn't 
encourage them [the St Ermins Group]. They encouraged me"50 . 
There was one empty chair. Despite the GMWU's traditional Centre-right politics, its 
('weak and vain boss"51, David Basnett, was never to grace the meetingS52 . His 
colleagues put this down to personality. The kinder attribute it to a role he sought for 
himself. "Basnett wanted to keep close to the TGWU and to Clive Jenkins. He didn't 
bother with the St Ennins group people"53 . He "saw his role as the mediator between 
Left and Right, even though he was basically a moderate .. Also David didn't get on 
44 
Neil Kinnock interview. 
45 
Gordon Colling interview. 
46 
Sandy Feather interview. 
47 Frank Chapple only went once - to the first meeting (in bow tie and DJ! ) - and then left Spellar to 
48 
do the business after thaf' (Roger Godsiff interview). 
49 
Frank Chapple, op cit, P. 105. 
Bernard Donoughue, op cit, p. 267. so Denis Healey interview. 
51 Bemard Donoughue, op cit, p. 266. 52 Nor did his successor, John Edmonds. 53 Roy Grantham interview. 
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with Frank Chapple - because of the Isle of Grain inter-union dispute. I still have a 
message sent by Basnett to Callaghan which reads: 'The Isle of Grain is keeping us all 
apart' )-)54. Others are less charitable. Callaghan's aide-de-camp: "It was Basnett's 
vanity. Basnett was the first GMWU leader to take pride in being thought of as part of 
the Left rather than taking pride in being a good old right-wing union boss who looked 
after the Leader. He got flattered by the Left into re-positioning the G&M .. in ways 
which made it difficult"55. Foot's aide-de-camp found him a chore: "Basnett was quite 
loyalist but you had to go through the whole palaver over and over again. With others, 
easily settled: like Duffy who'd say to me 'Tell me what you want me to do and I'll do 
it'. And then did. David Basnett needed many lunches, many explanations"56 . This 
indecision - or need of flattery to make him feel in charge - is echoed by Godsiff. 
"Basnett wouldn't go because he couldn't run it9557 , and by Feather: "Some of our 
people would approach Basnett. He was usually reliable but would never deliver 100% 
- because he wanted some say himself Of course 
he would always need to support the 
TGWU. But he would chop and change his votes for the smaller unions"58. Godsiff 
developed a modus operandi: "Once it was agreed what would be done, I had to phone 
Basnett to tell him - but in a certain style. For example, when they wanted to support 
Sarn McCluskie, I said 'How would you feel about Sam as treasurerT Hesaid'Quite 
happy'. I'd then say 'You'd be quite happy'. That was how it had to be done. Basnett 
had a veto"59 . 
Only one commentator attributes Basnett's stand to any political belief Shaw 
incorrectly assumes that the whole union kept its distance from St Ermins. He suggests 
that Basnett "swung his traditionally solidly right wing union on to a more centrist 
course", his footnote adding: "Thus the GMWU never participated actively in the St 
60 Ermine's (sic) Group of right-wing unions" . In 
fact, Burlison, Hough and Hadden did 
attend and, from the first meeting, the former Head of the GMWU Research 
Department, Radice, represented the union, acting as a "go-between" with Basnett 61 
"Denis [Healey] was keen I should be there. Basnett not exactly keen but knew.. I was 
34 Giles Radice interview. 
55 Tom McNally interview. 
56 Dick Clements interview 
57 Roger Godsiff interview. 
': 
. 
Sandy Feather, interview, 6 November 2002. 
5 Roger Godsiff interview. 
60 Eric Shaw, op cit, p. 359/360. 
61 Roger Godsiff interview. 
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sent by the Group to talk to him. I went to most meetings .. until I got on to the Shadow 
Cabinet" in 1983 62 . 
Stanley was the other conduit 63 . He saw some rationale 
behind Basnett's caution. 
Radice's replacement as Head of Research, Larry Whitty, was very close to Ken Gill's 
wife, Tess Gill, and Basnett perhaps knew there would be few secrets between them. It 
led to some "cloak-and-dagger" meetings, as Stanley recalled: "in his heart, he knew the 
extreme Left in the Labour Party and the extreme Left in the TUC had to be defeated. 
But he would not stick his head above the parapet. [Automaticity]64 was where Basnett 
was true. He'd never show it but he was true to this Group. But I had to meet David 
Basnett in his secret [GMWU] office in Duke Street or where he was having lunch - or 
sometimes, at conference, I had to go to his bedroom"65 . 
There were other senior trade unionists, some on the TUC's General Council, some on 
the NEC (overlapping membership being banned), who were active in the Group, such 
as Tony Clarke of the Post Office Workers, Alan Tuffin (his union's General 
Secretary); Tuff in's predecessor, Tom Jackson; Sandy Feather, Roy Evans and Keith 
Brookman of the ISTC; the GMV*'U's Neville Hough and Tom Burlison; Tom Breakell 
(EETPU); Alex Smith (NUTGW), David Williams (COHSE), Bill Whatley 
(USDAW), Richard Rosser (TSSA), John Weakley (AUEW) and David Ward 
(NCU)66 . No names were included on the Group minutes and no list ever circulated. 
The power behind the St Ermins Group was the initial core (Chapple, Duffy, Grantham, 
Stanley) together with Golding and Turnock. But there were two other "special 
ingredients" to whom all pay tribute and without whom the venture would have little 
success. "Roger Godsiff and John Spellar. They were the mechaniCSI'967. "They were 
ultra-diligent - they left no stone unturned. They were figures men. They worked the 
columns. They used the phone. They got in touch. Nothing was too hot or too heavy. 
They did play a hell of a big part. Ensuring first that their people have voted. Secondly 
that they have all voted in a consistent, organised way because they explained the 
62 Giles Radice interview. 
63 Roy Grantham interview; Bryan Stanley interview. 
64 The system for electing the TUC's General Council; see p. 133. 6S Bryan Stanley interview. 
66 Alan Tuffin interview, Tony Clarke interview, Roy Grantham interview, Gordon Colling interview, 
67 
Sandy Feather interview. 
Gordon Colling interview. 
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purpose of following it through. And why elections to Regional Executives mattered. 
And why who was on the political committees of the national union mattered. And 
worked it through in a systematic, organised way - without which politics is pleasant, 
but it's only poetry'968 . 
Now MP for Howell's old seat, Godsiffs contribution was his masterminding of voting 
figures. He was "one of the small circle of union officials who, when every one else in 
the Labour Party appeared to retreat before the advancing Bennites, set about counting 
where the block votes lay and brokering secret deals to turn them over. .. Godsiff .. was 
the man with the pocket calculator, who worked out exactly how many block votes were 
pledged to each candidate in.. NEC elections"69. He "was the master of calculation and 
the formulation of deals. Thinking arithmetic all the time, he would always be working 
out what deal to make .. Roger's 
key understanding was that winning seats was more 
important than the size of the majority, except to individual egoS,, 70 .A member of 
Kinnock's office confirmed that Godsiff was "always reliable. Not involved in policy. 
Just reliable numbers , 71 . This was the case even when the news was 
bad 72. "Roger 
would put deals in an absolutely honest way - you will get more votes but you won't 
get on"73 .A number-cruncher extraordinaire, he was also trusted. He got on well with 
Golding from the start and managed to persuade some unlikely figures to follow his 
road-map. He did not simply use a calculator. If not actual strong arm-tactics, there 
were smoke-and-mirror methods in his armoury: "the best wheeler-dealer ever - even 
with Clive Jenkins"74 . Approval came from the top: at a conference reception when the 
Godsiff formula had been pulled off with just 40,000 votes to spare, Kinnock made a 
point of crossing a crowded room to thank its architect in person"S. 
Spellar's Midlands connections started though his wife (who hailed from his original 
Birmingham seat) but grew through St Ermins and the Labour movement. His Warley 
West seat now places him firmly amongst the Midlands Labour Right. However, from 
his south London origins he hardly crossed the Thames (parliament aside), spending his 
68 Neil Kinnock interview. 
69 Andy McSmith, op cit, p. 219. 
70 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 13/p. 8. 
71 Neil Stewart, interview, 14 March 2002. 
72 Gordon Colling interview. 
73 John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 182, quoting Doug Hoyle. 
74 Sandy Feather interview. 
75 Roger Godsiff interview. 
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working life at the Bromley-based EETPU, as political secretary to Chapple, Hammond 
and Jackson, successive general secretaries of an ever amalgamating and name- 
changing union. It is hard to overemphasise Spellar's impact on the Group, whose 
members - being elected national officers (mostly general secretaries) - were senior to 
him and Godsiff. Alan Hadden, a former party Chairman, judges that "Spellar was the 
real political push7' behind the Group 76 . He was not afraid to take on the Left. At one 
London party conference, "Arthur Latham, in the Chair, asked 'if anyone wanted to 
vote or speak in favour of good socialist comrades being thrown out of the party'. One 
voice 'YesP It was John Spellar. He was heartily booed. However, Ken Livingstone 
later remarked: 'But two years later they were out; and four years later his side had 
won' s977 . Spellar was trusted by his various 
bosses, and was their surrogate at St 
Ermins meetings. Golding described Spellar as "a prime driving force.. providing 
long-term tactical perspective, continually pushing hard and.. persuading the hard right 
f f178. to agree to deals from which they got little bene I 
Those are the dramatis personae of the St Ermins Group. The Group's birth followed a 
gestation period when some were already beginning to conspire to change the party. A 
'Loyalist Group' on the NEC had been instigated by Stanley in 1978, who asked 
Golding to "form an alliance" with Tuck, McCluskie 79 and others to "organise a 
defensive group for Jim Callaghan" following the NEC's constant attacks on his 
Government. Not all were right-wing, but all were from the unions, motivated by the 
need to unify to win the election. It was a minority, but it offered some resistance to the 
unremitting attacks on the Government. It also accustomed an inner group to working 
together, reaching agreements and keeping to them. The Loyalist Group "first met 
under the Chairmanship of Russell Tuck at the North Western Hotel in Euston"; 
Golding was made the convenor (despite being a minister, he was reckoned to have the 
time! ). The Group worked by agreeing voting arrangements - taking account of each 
person's personal and union sticking points - often arriving at what Golding called "a 
shoddy compromise". The convenor'sjob, to "maximise the support for Jim Callaghan 
and the Labour Government", involved pre-planning but also ensuring "that loyalists 
stayed for vital votes on the [NEC] and then voted as they had agreed. If there was no 
76 Alan Hadden, interview, 23 January 2002. 
77 John Lloyd, interview, 18 March 2002. 
78 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 13/p. 7-8. 
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hope of winning a vote, [Golding's] job was to prevent a decision from being made". 
There were major obstacles: the Left "held all the chairmanships and controlled the 
Secretariat"80 . 
Despite the Kogans' assertion that the union group had no pre-meetings", meetings 
were held, but kept secret -a pattern later followed by the St Ermins Group. But one 
man did know; Callaghan approved of what was going on, and perhaps took comfort 
from their few successes. How rare these were is shown by the Loyalists' delight on 
winning a resolution supporting the Labour Government - on the 28 March 1979, the 
day of the Vote of No Confidence in the Commons 82 . Their influence was more critical 
over the manifesto when, in coalition with the Cabinet 83 , they gave "Callaghan greater 
strength in ensuring that the General Election was fought on a realistic manifesto"84 . 
Where they wanted to differ from Callaghan (such as over abolition of the House of 
Lords, where they would have sided with the Left), however, they were unable to 
extract any concession from the Prime Minister 85 . 
In addition to the Loyalist Group, the problems in the party led a number of unions to 
support CLV 86 . APEX, POEU, NUR, GMV*'U, UCW, AUEW and even a section of the 
NUM took advertisements in its publication, Labour ViCtoryV. When, in due course, 
CLV's leading lights largely defected to the SDP, the union members stayed loyal to the 
party. 
A further dozen general secretaries were brought together by junior minister, John 
Grant, who persuaded them to sign a pamphlet on pay policy". The signatories 
included Chapple, Duffy, Grantham, Jackson, Sirs and WeighelI89 who would comprise 
79 McCluskie's responsiveness, despite his left-wing allegiances, was largely the result of being 
so 
defeated by Heffer for the chairmanship of the Organisation sub-committee (ibi4 chap 4/p. 4). 
ibid, chap 4/p. 1. 
31 David Kogan and Maurice Kogan, op cit, p. 74. 
92 John Golding, op cit, 2003, pp. 77 and 79. 
83 Under the party rules, the manifesto is agreed at a joint Cabinet-NEC meeting. 84 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 4/p. 6. 
Is ibid. 
86 The activist-based Campaign for Labour Victory. 
87 Gerald J. Daly, "The crisis in the Labour Party 1974-81 and the origins of the 1981 schism", 1992, PhD Thesis, University of London, p. 267; Charles Turnock interview; CLV archives. 88 A Better Way, published by the Signatories (which did not include its un-named author, Grant), January 1979. It also "shows a new preparedness to organise on the Labour Righf, (New 
Statesman, 2 February 1979). The pamphlet sold 8,000 copies. A slight surplus (095.57) was later 
29 
sent to charity (John Grant papers - JGP). 
Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 148/9. Dinners were held at the Great Northern Hotel on 20 November 1978,9 January and 26 February 1979 (JGP). 
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the core of the St Ermins Group two years later. Yet another group had been meeting in 
David Owen's office in Old Scotland Yard well before Wembley. Although mostly 
MPs, it included Chapple, Weighell, Sirs, Grantham as well political officers Spellar 
and Feather9o. The staffers were already members of TUPO (Trade Union and Political 
Officers Group) which met at the Commons. This was a selective grouping of 
"trusties", whose general secretaries sent them with their blessing. It was rather 
clandestine and too junior to achieve much. However, it spread useful intelligence and 
91 began co-operating on number-crunching for TUC and NEC votes 
At a senior level, Grantham and friends (especially Duffy) had been meeting before 
1979. This (no name) group met over dinner at the St Ermins Hotel to discuss "TUC 
General Council Business" - and talk politics. At one point, a party official wrote 
complaining about the meetings. Grantham's reply, to the effect that "general 
secretaries have to look after the other interests of their members - so do have meetings. 
The unions were the creators of the Labour Party, and have to decide what to do as 
unions about certain things", appears to have forestalled any ftirther enquiry 92. This 
group wanted to change the make-up of the NEC, with an attempt in 1978 to remove 
Joan Maynard and Renee Short from their seats 93 . 
It was the continuous undermining of the Labour Government and the break-down in 
government-NEC relations which forms the backdrop to St Ennins and led to the 
determination of these general secretaries to change the composition of the NEC. The 
unions were vital to the party. They had set it up and trade unionists formed the 
backbone of the membership. In the fifties, three-quarters of trade unionists were 
')94 affiliated members but "by the mid-Eighties this had shrunk to little more than half 
From early on, constituency membership was to the Left of the unions. In 1952, for 
example, Bevanites won six out of the seven constituency places on the NEC, whilst 
Gaitskell's speech "made him leader of the moderate factor inside the parliamentary 
party and the favourite of the big unions, who, in 1954 voted him into the party 
treasurership and increasingly saw him as their candidate for the succession"95. CLP 
seats on the NEC were thenceforth filled by the Left with their candidates winning "all 
90 Sandy Feather interview. 
91 Sandy Feather interview. 
92 Roy Grantham interview. 
93 
- Patrick wintour, "Can the Left win this time round? ", New Statesman, 20 July 1979, p. 87. 94 John Silkin, op cit, p. 7. 
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seven places in 1967,1968 and 1969. Denis Healey successfully challenged this 
monopoly between 1970 and 1974. The complete left-wing monopoly of this section 
was re-established in 1975 and [was] maintained .. [for many years], with the sole 
,, 96 exception of Jack Ashley's election in 1977 
It was not simply that the unions were on the Right. They had an ingrained loyalty to 
the leadership. "During the Attlee governments the right-wing trade union leaders that 
dominated the movement had often shared the sentiments of resolutions criticising 
government economic policy, but had always successfully instructed their delegations to 
vote against them', 97 . The unions were not uncritically leadership-led, crucially refusing 
Gaitskell's attempt to change Clause IV. As Radice foresaw, "If there was ever to be a 
real chance of changing the clause, then the leader had to have both the big unions and 
potentially hostile rivals like Bevan and Wilson on his side"98. The unions did, 
nevertheless, at the second asking, support Gaitskell on defence. They had earlier 
chosen him as Treasurer and, in 1967, repeated their prediction for Leader by electing 
Callaghan Treasurer over Fooe9. At this stage, the NEC supplied comfort to the 
Leader. Jack Jones recalls how, in 1964100, he was unimpressed with his first meetings 
of the NEC, when the ministers loyally supported Wilson. Jones was told "that 'the 
trade union section always vote together, Jack', and 'we hope you will follow the same 
pattern'. I [said] that if that meant I would be expected always to vote with the top of 
the table, it was not on. My reaction surprised them"101. 
Jones marked the beginning of a leftward shift in the unions. As early as 1965, Mikardo 
could "sense a new political radicalism among the union delegations at party 
conferences and appreciate what this might mean for the party: 'Watch the Unions: 
That's My Tip', he told his readers in Tribune" 102 . Union hesitancy on some policies 
was evident, with conference votes against the war in Vietnam, economic policy and 
incomes policy. "But it was not only the government's policies that were being 
95 Giles Radice, op cit, p. 98. 
% Patrick Seyd, op cit, p. 207. 
97 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 2 1. 98 Giles Radice, op cit, p. 114. Tony Blair had Gordon Brown and John Prescott, as well as the unions, on his side when he achieved this over 30 years later. 
Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 109; David Owen, op cit, p. 153. The year Chapple failed to get elected, motivating the EETPU to change the composition so that it could be represented on the NEC and TUC (Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 102). '01 Jack Jones, Union Man: An Autobiography, Collins, 1986, p. 167. 102 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 2 1. 
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challenged. Also brought into question was the authoritarian manipulation of the 
unions' block votes by their leaders .. and deference towards the leadership as 
constituting the primary meaning of solidarity. This change gradually found expression 
at the level of the unions' national leaderships. Left-wing union leaders were elected in 
the late 1960s in four of the six largest unions". In the mid-1970s, the changes 
produced a left-wing majority on the NEC' 03 and " the right-wing trade-union bloc vote 
was no longer dominant at the Party Conference" 104 . 
A left-dominated NEC was bound to be on a collision course with a more right-wing 
PLP and government. "The party pressures upon Harold Wilson were the pressures 
which arise from continuous tension. During 1974-6 .. the party 
in the country 
remained.. the source of his strength. .. But relationships with party headquarters, 
Transport House, which he had always neglected and with the [N. E. C. ] were bad and 
forever worsening" 105 . Even in opposition, "he had to fight against the party being 
committed to some breathlessly hare-brained schemes .. It was .. a struggle .. about the 
supremacy of the Parliamentary leadership and its freedom to resist domination by the 
party outside Parliament. .. A temporary reconciliation with the N. E. C. - which had 
moved decisively leftwards - came after the first election victory of 1974 but then the 
leader-N. E. C. relationship resumed its deteriorating course"106 . Wilson's "tactic for 
dealing with the N. E. C. was simply not to turn up at its meetings and ignoring any 
decisions .. with which he disagreed .. He was sorely tried by if" 07 . The NEC had 
became unrepresentative of the movement and "By the end of Harold Wilson's 
premiership, the situation was little short of open hostility"108. Callaghan had little 
better luck. On one occasion, at a tense Cabinet/ NEC meeting, he upbraided the NEC 
for being too negative and urged that they tell the country more about the Government's 
achievements' 09. The NEC members did not heed his request, casting 23 successive 
votes critical of the Labour Government over 14 successive meetings' 10. 
'03 ibid, p. 22; Eric Shaw, op cit, P-viii; Gerald J. Daly, op cit, p. 63. 104 Patrick Seyd, op cit, p. 47. 105 Joe Haines, op cit, p. 11 106 
ibid. 107 
ibid. 
08 ibid, p. 14. : 09 16 February 1977. John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 2/p. 1. 110 Tom McNally interview and Gerald Daly, OP cit, p. 113. To some, this was 'just rewards' for Callaghan's 1969 vote on the NEC when, although a Cabinet member, he voted against In Place of Strife, David Owen, op cit, p. 154. 
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Under Wilson, the NEC refused to do anything to prevent MPs being 'sacked' by their 
CLPs' 11. Under Callaghan, "The NEC attacked the Government, went public, refused 
to take action in 1975 on the Underhill Report, endorsed Left-wing Parliamentary 
candidates while upholding the deselection of Right-wing MpS,, 112. Furthermore, "all 
the polling evidence .. showed the policies the 
NEC supported were the policies the 
British electorate would never ever support"' 13. Yet it was the union block-vote which 
kept an unrepresentative minority in control of the NEC throughout the 1970s despite 
14 
most union leaders being from the Right and Centre-right' . 
At the 1976 conference, Callaghan used his first address as Prime Minister to voice his 
goal "to re-establish the dominance of the parliamentary leadership over the NEC", 15. 
In 1979 he appointed Owen to the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee which he 
hoped "would become as important as the NEC"' 16 . He succeeded in neither ambition. 
The 1969 'In Place of Strife' episode had lined up many centre-right MPs against the 
government and seen Labour's left-wing collaborating with union leaders who had 
hitherto resided in a different camp. Whilst even the left-wing union leaders were 
cautious of pre-empting the autonomy of the parliamentary party, and did not "see 
themselves as rivals for political leadership of the Labour movement"I 17, this experience 
had, nevertheless, given rise to the Left's belief "that the unions were the principal 
institutional base for socialist advance.. This.. furnished a source of support within the 
18 
movement which enabled the left to capture a locus of power on the NEC"' . The 
"alignment of the trade unions with the Tribunite position" in the early 1970s heralded 
6(an unprecedented degree of influence [for the left] on the making of Party policy"' 19. 
The estrangement of the unions from the leadership and the desire for revenge after the 
11, Joe Haines, op cit, p. 14. 
112 Gerald J. Daly, op cit, p. 113. 
113 Lord (Bernard) Donoughue interview with Gerald Daly, 5 April 1989 (ibid, p. 12 1) and David 
114 
Owen, op cit, p. 430. 
Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 148, Lewis Minkin, The Labour Party Conference, 
Manchester University Press, 1980, p. 358-361. 
Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, P. 176. 
David Owen, op cit, p. 42 1. 
Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 25. 
Alan Warde, Consensus and beyond. The development ofLabour Party strategy since the second world war, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 163. 119 ibid, p. 171. 
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Winter of Discontent, together with a demoralised and divided Right, were crucial in the 
success of the Left 120 . 
The unions' reaction to In Place of Strife and the Winter of Discontent fuelled a 
union/left-wing alliance which helped cement a left-dominated NEC. This gave them 
the chairmanships of the major committees (from 1978 all three were chaired by the 
Left: Benn, Lestor and Heffer) 12 1 as well as control of staff appointments - something 
which an earlier Leader, Gaitskell, never allowed to happen. He had ensured that 
Transport House was packed with his placemen - an advantage which Wilson lost 
through neglect 122 . Tony Page claims to be the last non-Bennite to join the party staff 
for a decade, the subsequent recruit being the Militant Andy Bevan 123 . It was Bevan's 
appointment which fuelled Stanley's determination to end the left-wing majority on the 
NEC, which was helping destroy the party. He had been astounded to find the General 
Secretary voting for Bevan and the NEC rubber stamping the decision 124 . '. And so we 
appointed what was the greatest danger to the yS125 movement - we appointed him to 
the organiser and officer of the yS! iA26. Whilst new staff were henceforth Bennites, 
the majority - especially in the regions - remained Centre. The resulting fissure 
between the NEC and employees, and the NEC's constant attacks on the government, 
led to staff demoralisation 127. "The frequent overturning by the NEC of enquiry 
recommendations was particularly resented by regional officials because it undermined 
their political standing. By suggesting they did not enjoy the full confidence of their 
masters, it diminished their authority" 128 . 
it was not just on the NEC that the Moderates were losing. The Left had been winning 
"time and time again because they were organised. The Right had the numbers but 
didn't use their majority. There was nobody to pull it together. Reg Race"' and NUPE 
were running rings round them"130. Nowhere was this more clear than in the Left's 
120 Gerald J. Daly, op cit, p. 164; K Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, Macmillan, 1990, 
12 
p. 245. 
, Gerald J. Daly, op cit, p. 16 1. 
122 Joe Haines, op cit, p. 13. 123 Tony Page, interview, 21 March 2002. 
124 See p. 133. 
125 Young Socialists (the party's youth wing). 
126 Bryan Stanley interview. 
127 Roger Robinson, interview, 29 November 2002. 
122 Eric Shaw, op cit, p-216. 129 NUPE official. 
130 Roger Godsiff interview. 
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agenda for constitutional change. Their three demands were for mandatory reselection 
of MPs, a wider franchise for the election of the Leader, and the NEC having sole 
control over the manifesto. These became the battleground. Between 1979 and 1982, 
"the issue of democracy and power in the party became dominant almost to the point of 
making substantive issues secondary" 13 1. Even before any change in rule had been 
passed, the NEC used its majority to assert its right to determine the manifesto for the 
1979 European Parliament elections 132 . These were the first 
direct elections so there 
was no precedent for agreeing a manifesto. However, for General Elections, Clause V 
of the constitution was clear: a joint Cabinet (or, in opposition, Shadow Cabinet) and 
NEC committee made the decision. The Euro-Manifesto reflected the changing balance 
between the parliamentary leadership and the NEC. 
The unions had never pressed for the changes promoted by the Left which "appeared to 
threaten the balance of the coalition groups inside the Labour Party by entrenching 
activist and NEC power and thus establish a Left-wing hegemony over the Party" 133 
Indeed, as Minkin has demonstrated, in 1979 "not a single resolution or amendment was 
submitted by the unions relating to the three constitutional issues"134. "More than that, 
the union majority had actually voted against the amendments" 135 . Before the 1979 
conference, a high level delegation gave the "unanimous view of all the trade union 
leaders associated with the TULV 136 that all constitutional matters be once again put off 
until after a Commission of Inquiry into the organisation of the party had been 
established and reported". However, the "NEC stood up to the pressure". They agreed 
to the inquiry but refused to take issues off the 1979 agenda (despite Foot, Golding and 
four trade unionists voting to do SO)137. 
The Commission of Enquiry irnmediately caused upset. It was established with a 2: 1 
majority for the Left138 and with no PLP representation (other than the Leader and 
Deputy). It was left to Healey to lead "the attack on the way the National Executive had 
rigged this Committee of Enquiry. It had appointed seven left-wingers to represent 
131 Lewis Minkin, op cit, 199 1, p. 192. 
132 David Owen, op cit, p. 149. 
133 Gerald J. Daly, op cit, p. 17. 
134 Lewis Minkin, Exits and Entrances: Political Research as a Creative Art Sheffield Hallam 
University Press, 1997, p. 127. 
131 Lewis Minkin, op cit, 1997, p. 277. 
I" Trade Unions for a Labour Victory. 
131 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 179; 'and Lewis Minkin, OP Cit, p. 197. 138 Alan Sked and Chris Cook, op cit, p. 423. 
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itself, while the trade unions chose a balanced team of five, picked from all the main 
currents of opinion, and the Labour MPs were allowed only two representatives, Jim 
Callaghan and Michael Foot; so the National Executive had a built-in left-wing 
majority". The PLP appointed Healey to put their case to the NEC. "They simply 
ignored my arguments"139 . 
The Commission, started in January 1980, led to the casus belli of the SDP split. Its 
final meeting at Bishop Stortford on 15 June agreed, by 7 votes 6, to recommend an 
Electoral College 140 to choose the Leader. A staffer recalls Callaghan remonstrating 
with its proponents: "you only want it because it would elect Benn"141 . Nevertheless, 
he gave way. For the Right, Callaghan's capitulation remains inexplicable. Grantham 
reflected: "Good men don't always do the right thing". He thought that the Prime 
Minister did not talk enough to friends, who rarely went to Number 10, yet "the critical 
142 
issues were party issues, not government ones" . Could the decision have been 
overturned? Healey judged that "A battle against the Bishop Stortford agreement 
would have meant a break, not only with Jim, but with the majority of trade union 
leaders who had supported it, believing that it would at least protect the Party from a 
takeover by the Left. The fight I was being asked to lead .. had no prospect of victory. 
It would have meant splitting the party"'143. Chapple's view was different: Callaghan 
was "much to blame for the slide. .. he went along tamely with those who sought to 
remove from Labour MPs the exclusive right to choose the Party leadee9i 
44 
.A crisis 
was developing. By tradition, the unions"were expected to stabilise the Party 
situation". However, now "The NEC was under the control of the Left and deeply 
hostile to the interventions of union leaders. Also, there was no consensus on the Right 
as to how to move forward" 145 . There was a 
lack of leadership and organisation. 
"Reform of the election of the Leader could have been averted.. had the Right been able 
to secure a measure of agreement on what it wanted, communicate this to its union 
allies and 'police' the united strateg 
"146 
. y 
139 Denis Healey, The Time qfMy Life, Michael Joseph, 1989, p. 474. 
140 with 50% for the PLP; 25% for the CLPs; 20% for trade unions and 5% for the socialist societies. 141 Jenny Pardington interview. 
142 Roy Grantham interview. 
143 Denis Healey, op cit, p. 475 - 144 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 161/2. 
145 Lewis Minkin, op cit, 199 1, p. 20 1. 
146 ibid, p. 200. 
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The proposal for the manifesto to fall under NEC control was defeated in 1980 but two 
of the Left's changes were passed. Mandatory reselection was adopted by 3,798,000 to 
3,341,000, probably without a union majority in favour 147 . More significantly, 
delegates voted by only 98,000 to support an electoral college. "The moderate unions 
were completely outmanoeuvred by the Bennite forces"148. There was probably a union 
majority against this and it would have failed without NUPE's increased affiliation 
(from 150,000 in 1974 to 600,000 in 1980)149 . Furthermore, had each union respected 
its mandate, the proposal would have been lost. The Boilermakers had decided, at their 
pre-meeting, to vote against the Electoral College. However, when the two senior 
members, Chalmers and Hadden, were called away, "the delegation was left in the 
hands of Len Hancock. When they got back, they found he'd voted contrary to that 
decision"150. Without the Boilermakers' 75,000 votes, the motion would have been lost 
by 3,586,000 to 3,534,000 -a majority against of 52,000. 
The unions had, by accident or design, created the Electoral College and cemented 
mandatory reselection -both seen as undermining the PLP. The Left majority on the 
NEC - provided in part by the unions - put itself at the service of those demanding 
change'51. The out-numbered Centre-right ploughed a lonely furrow. Even in 
Chapple's time, when there was a right-wing majority, Wilson "seldom asserted himself 
or used his authority as Prime Minister, simply ruling himself out of disciplinary 
matters by saying that he didn't want to be an unfair influence". Even their majority of 
one "was seldom of any real value since, either through absences or lack of genuine 
debate, votes were rarely called for". On one crucial vote, when "Labour was in 
disarray over Britain's pending entry into the Common Market, .. I was persuaded.. to 
attend the all-day NEC .. I was assured that heads had been counted and that my vote 
was vital, but at the meeting, Shirley Williams, who was supposed to be against a 
[special] conference, voted for one. Once again the moderates had miscalculated" 152 
Later, when there was no chance of having the numbers, the Moderates paid the price of 
having lost control over the bureaucracy. The Bennite "research staff, like Geoff Bish, 
147 ibid, p. 195. 
148 Sidney Weighell, op cit p. 137. The figures were 3,609,000 to 3,511,000 (Report of 1980 Labour 
149 
Party Conference, p. 152). 
ISO 
Lewis Minkin, op cit, 199 1, p. 199, and Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 152. Alan Hadden interview; Robert Taylor, Observer, 5 October 1980. 13, Lewis Minkin, op cit, 199 1, p. 196. 
152 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 129/3. 
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would try and swamp the committee with so much paper that things would slide 
53 through"' . Cartwright, 
Williams and Tom Bradley therefore "devised a system where 
they would each take chunks of the agenda and see what was going on, so we could 
alert the others. And there were some other trade unionists who worked with us. Not 
very organised on their part. But we three were more organised"' 54 . Cartwright 
found 
Callaghan no different to Wilson. "Callaghan was a great disappointment to me. Given 
his reputation for being an apparatchik, and product of the organisation, I assumed when 
he took over as Leader he'd take greater interest but he didn't .. He was trying to keep 
the government, and the policy, and the PLP on an even course. The battle with the 
Left therefore never really took place on the NEC. There was no organised attempt to 
fight it. He was never interested in head-on battle"155 . 
NEC meetings had become bear-fights. After the 1979 election, Williams was out of 
parliament but remained on the NEC which she found "increasingly unpleasant and 
unrewarding" 156. "The main battlefield in the war for the Labour Party's survival was 
its National Executive Committee, which in 1979 was solidly dominated by the Lefe 9 157 . 
Healey -a beachmaster in the war and never afraid to take on the enemy - had lost his 
NEC seat in 1975 so there was no political leadership for the Moderates. In addition to 
Bevan's appointment, the other decision which convinced Stanley that that left majority 
had to go was the Underhill Report. "In spite of clear evidence in this, the left-wing 
majority on the NEC constantly described any attempt to criticise or to investigate the 
Militant as a witch-hunt. And used any and every excuse to take no action and to cover 
up the damage that was being done to the party and to its prospects of ever forming a 
Labour Government" 158 . 
Whilst moderate union leaders grew exasperated at the party, elsewhere things were 
moving apace. Despite Williams' 1979 view that "there has been a considerable shift of 
power in respect of our major unions .. They are clearly moving back to the centre. It is 
only a small handful now which represent the far left"' 59, she and her fellow Social 
Democrats despaired of progress and the Gang of Three published an appeal in the 
153 John Cartwright, interview, 6 March 2003. 
114 John Cartwright interview. 
155 John Cartwright interview. 
156 Bill Rodgers, op cit, p. 192. 
157 Denis Healey, op cit, p. 47 1. 
11: Bryan Stanley interview. 
is Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 15 1. 
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Guardian on I August 1980. Union members had been slipping away electorally, with 
Labour winning "only half of the trade unionists' vote, while the Tories won nearly a 
third" in 1979 160 . As the unions 
felt the impact of a Conservative government (with 
unemployment, tax concessions to the wealthy, public expenditure cuts, privatisation, 
erosion of union rights), their leaders "became increasingly anxious to restore unity and 
prepare the Party for Office"161 . 
The 1980 Conference was the final straw for many Social Democrats, though the failure 
to agree a formula for the Electoral College delayed the inevitable until after Wembley. 
Whilst the Gang of Four (with Jenkins now added) planned their move, many sought to 
dissuade them. Healey tried: I spent several hours in a private discussion [with Owen, 
Williams and Rodgers] in September.. [and told them] that the moderates had a good 
chance of winning a majority on the National Executive and thus transforming the 
situation - but this was bound to take several years"' 62 . 
Union leaders tried: "Sid [Weighell] and I had a long meeting with Shirley Williams at 
the Charing Cross Hotel. We invited her to lunch and tried to persuade her of the error 
of her ways. This was about a month before Wembley. There was no going back with 
her. She was definitely convinced. She listened to the arguments. But she was too 
deeply committed with the other three" 163 . Her union also tried. "Denis Howell and 
Roy Grantham worked hard on Shirley Williams"164 - The persuasion was not all one 
way. Alan Tuffin was in their sights. "I was being canvassed quite heavily by Shirley 
about leaving the Labour Party. They were desperate for a big union. It never 
happened. Just wasn't going to happen. Even today, with the Labour Party, it's not so 
much national, it's local. There are thousands of trade unionists who are local Labour 
councillors. Their union - the break would destroy that. Never, never a reality99165. 
At Wembley, the arguments continued. Stanley recalled: 
"Shirley Williams approached me in my seat at the end row of POEU 
delegates. Since I held the union's voting card, I was reluctant to move far 
160 Denis Healey, op cit, p. 466. 
161 Lewis Minkin, op cit, 199 1, p. 194. 
162 Denis Healey, op cit, p. 477. In 2002, his memory was slightly different: "In my meeting with Shirley and others, I told them just to wait 6 months. The NEC would change. I knew from Roy 
Grantham that things were happening. I knew who the candidates were, and who would win", Denis Healey interview. 
163 Charles Tumock interview. 
'64 Roger Godsiff interview. 
165 Alan Tuffin interview. 
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away from my seat. Therefore I said, we can have a talk but we will have to 
sit on the stairs. Shirley's message was clear. Owing to the Left-wing 
control of the NEC and Trotskyite infiltration.. the Labour Party was 
unelectable and it was time to look at a new party based on social 
democratic beliefs. Shirley was saying to me: 'Look, I don't agree with you 
on everything but you are prepared to fight the Militant and the extreme 
Left. And that is what we want to do, but in a new Social Democratic 
grouping. Will youjoin us? ' I said 'Now look, Shirley, I do respect you 
and I do like you personally, but I will never leave the Labour Party. I've 
been a member for 30 years, and I want to be a member until the day I die. I 
agree with you that things are wrong, but what we've got to do is work 
together to put them right; and if that means organising to defeat the well- 
organised machine that the Left operate, then we've got to do that from 
inside the party. If you go, you will come to grief because there's an innate 
loyalty of Labour Party members and trade unionists to the party.. there is 
no way the majority of us are ever going to leave'. I tried to persuade her 
not to go, )066. 
Before the final vote, there were pleadings from defectors and stayers. At a packed 
Fabian lunchtime meeting (fortified by sandwiches from the near-empty Williams' 
meeting next door 167) , 
Hattersley made a vigorous case for staying 168 . 
For the Fabian 
audience, it was an effective rallying cry. But organisationally, it was a disaster as "the 
Left were going round switching to the USDAW formula. It was such a cock-up. We 
169 had been out-manoeuvred by the Left" . 
Over lunch, CLPD decided to support 
USDAW's 40: 30: 30 amendment 170. "In the absence of effective organisation on 
moderate side, it was a foregone conclusion that the better organised Left would 
dominate the conference"171 . The result was "due to 
disarray of the Right"172. It Was all 
unnecessary: "The unions could have outvoted the constituencies but they were 
disorganised and uncertain" 173 . The AUEW, forced to abstain by a prior decision of 
their executive (and despite the urgings of many 174) , 
bequeathed USDAW's formula to 
the party, the largest share going to the unions (unpopular with the electorate) and 
handing this issue - rather than unpopular Europe - to the Gang of Four as the rationale 
166 Bryan Stanley interview. 
167 Baroness (May) Goudie, interview, 7 January 2003. 
168 Giles Radice interview and author's notes. 
161 Giles Radice interview. 
170 John Silkin, op cit, p. 38. 
'71 Bryan Stanley interview. 
172 Gerald J. Daly, op cit, p. 198. 
173 Phillip Whitehead, The Writing on the Walk Britain in the Seventies, Michael Joseph, 1985, p. 36 1. 174 TV footage showed Basnett urging them to vote (Roger Godsiff interview). 
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for their defection. It was, said Weighell, "A disastrous Saturday's work" 175 . The 
Limehouse Declaration followed on Sunday, foreshadowing the SDP. 
For Radice, "That was background to St Ermins - lack of organisation. How 
incompetent we'd beeW'176 . Another observer watched from the balcony: "Ken 
Livingstone was there and said: 'the unions will always win these arguments'. I 
thought: that's not right. It was the beginning of a lot of us realising we were not 
paying enough attention. We all had our own industries to run and we were not paying 
enough attention to what was going on. Typical situation, like NEC meetings, London 
EC meetings, they would sit there patiently to the late hours, provided they always had a 
quorum. And people like myself, who'd been working all day in the office, and a case 
full of work to take home. So 10 o'clock - I'm going home. This was their work. It 
wasn't our work"177. Post-Wembley, things were going to be different for the unions. 
"The SDP split forced the party to recognise the reality, that if the good guys didn't get 
together, the left would always win. The split made Sirs, Grantham and the others say: 
4we've got to do something about this' " 178 . 
Frank Chapple, who had been close to CLV and those who were to form the SDP, 
contended "that if a Labour split was inevitable then it should be the left, not those who 
truly represented millions of working people, who should be forced to quit.. The best 
prospect for halting the leftward drift lay within the unions and not in the confusion of a 
new fourth party", noting that Jenkins had "declared that a trade union based rescue of 
Labour was unacceptable". He now decided "I wanted to help mobilise trade union 
moderates to oust the unrepresentative left-wing majority on Labour's NEC"179 . 
Stanley was similarly determined. I made up my mind that I would do my utmost to 
bring together leaders of the Labour movement to combat the organisation and 
manoeuvring of the left-wing factions"' 80. 
175 Sidney Weighell, op cit, p. 139. 
176 Giles Radice interview. 
177 Alan Tuffin interview. 
179 Sandy Feather interview. 
179 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 164/5. 180 Bryan Stanley interview. 
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"Both in 1931 and afterwards the influence of the trade 
unions had steadied the Labour Party: in 1931, when there 
was a danger that MacDonald might carry a greater number 
with him; afterwards, when the reaction threatened to swing 
the Party over to the Left"'. 
The union leaders, outflanked at Wembley, had worse to contend with the following 
day, as some of their erstwhile friends lined up behind the Limehouse Declaration. All 
their gentle persuasion had come to nothing. A stark choice faced them. They would 
not leave, but would they do more and steady the Labour Party as their predecessors had 
done 50 years earlier? Their response drew on the groupings that already existed, but 
suddenly it was serious. This chapter sets out what they did, and how. 
Grantham talked urgently to fellow general secretaries. Together with Stanley and with 
the wholehearted support of Duffy, he quickly convened a meeting for 10 FebruarY2. It 
was to turn into the inaugural meeting of a very significant grouping. 
There was "no letter. We were approaching people on the phone. We 
approached the general secretaries.. in all the unions where we felt we 
could trust people. We decided the best place would be a central London 
hotel. We asked all to keep confidence. We invited Denis Healey because 
he seemed the person in the top levels of the party who could help us greatly 
if we were going to be effective. We met in the Charing Cross Hotel. And 
we immediately realised that we were all on the same wavelength. And 
whilst Denis said 'I cannot be party to any grouping that you have, you are 
doing the right thing which is so badly needed. But I can't be part of it: I 
wish you well'. He left. The meeting went on and we appointed people to 
dovariousjobs. The most significant of the appointments was to take up 
Roger Godsiff s offer to be Secretary/ Organiser. John Golding was going 
to be the contact in PLP. I was going to be the link with all the different 
groups that we had to consult, bring together, notify of what we were going 
to do', 3. 
Howell chaired this first "Meeting of General Secretaries" at which there were 17 
present 4. Beginning a practice that continued throughout the Group's life, no list of 
attendees appears in the minutes, but participants included: Grantham, Stanley, 
I Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: A Biography (ed Brian Brivati), Politico's, 2002, p. 219. 2 Roy Grantham interview; Bryan Stanley interview; Roger Godsiff interview. 3 Bryan Stanley interview. 
4 Notes of 10 February 1981 meeting, St Ermins Group Archives (EGA). 
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Chapple, Duffy, Healey, Weighell, Tom Jackson, Turnocks, Sirs, Radice, Bill Whatley, 
Golding, Feather, Spellar and GodsifI6. 
Godsiff had already demonstrated the value of careful number-crunching. Prior to 
Wembley, he prepared a paper for APEX on the Electoral College 7. This detailed each 
union's size and voting intention, and concluded that a "consensus" position giving the 
PLP 50% could be won, provided it had some CLP support, although "the attitude of.. 
U. S. D. A. W. .. could well be crucial in determining the outcome of the 
final result". He 
was right. The Group knew they had lost at Wembley through lack of planning, 
organisation and discipline. Now, in front of this intimidating array of general 
secretaries and three former ministers, the young research officer ventured "something 
like: 'With respect, if you look at the figures, you can achieve things if you put it 
together'. They more or less said 'OK; get on with it'. So I did a paper with the figures 
for NEC seats" for the next meeting. Godsiff was to be proved right again. Before, 
"the Right had the vote but never organised. Once they did, they won'18. 
The rationale behind the group was clear. The unions wanted a Labour Government 
and believed it would only come with a move to the Right9. "The aim of the Group was 
to retrieve the Labour Party from the mess it was in and ensure the TUC General 
Council was reformed to become a better representative of the unions" said one 
convenor'09 the other agreeing: "St Ermins came together for the purpose of removing 
the artificial dominance of the Left over the NEC and General Council"". The Group 
never dealt in policy, only in positions together with the structure of the TUC12. The 
absence of policies made co-operation easier. "Some were from left unions. They'd got 
difficult situations to control. Principle is we'd talk about mechanisms. Means to end 
to return sanity to the party" 13 - Another member commented: "The cement that 
brought us all together was not only self-preservation of the unions but our dream - all 
"Russell Tuck was on the party executive - nice but not Politically conscious. So Sid Weighell sent me. He couldn't go to first St Ermins Group meeting as it clashed with executive of the NUIV, Charles Turnock interview. 
6 Roger Godsiff interview; EGA; Giles Radice (unpublished) diary; John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 
7 
IN p. 5. 
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Paper dated 20 January 198 1, 
Roger Godsiff interview. 
9 Gerald J. Daly, Op cit, p. 227. 10 Roy Grantham interview 
Bryan Stanley interview. 
13 
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we wanted to achieve needed a Labour Government. That was the Common 
Denomination. Survival and social progress. We had to be electable for our aims to be 
attainable"14 . Turnock knew that the Group "had to change NEC. And what went on 
within the TUC. Also Automaticity". Some didn't want to entangle TUC and party but 
I saw them as intertwined"16 . 
There was a degree of self-interest for some unions which were denied a "seat at the 
table" by the existing political carve-up. So it "also offered mutual protection. 
Everyone got something out of it. The Leadership got a supportive NEC"' 7 whilst the 
members simultaneously pursued their unions' objectives. For the ISTC "getting Roy 
Evans elected to NEC was an objective. Therefore the ISTC had a particular interest in 
St Ermins -it meant they could get on the NEC"18. Similarly for the GPMU, an entree 
into the political councils was central to its industrial interests'9. APEX's Grantham 
had been kept off the TUC because of his pro-EuropeafflSM20. 
The February meeting established their way of working. Monthly meetings would 
henceforth take place (up to 1995)21 . Detailed papers were prepared by Godsiff. 
Spellar liaised with union political officers and Golding with the PLP. Stanley: 
6'realised that if anything was going to succeed, someone had to link up with 
all the prominent players who wouldn't link up themselves. And therefore I 
was the go-between. I would personally arrange a meeting with each of the 
principal unions who shared our view. And they, if the general secretary or 
president, they would arrange a lunch and we'd deal with it, or more 
frequently, they would nominate a representative. I had to go to every union 
to clear the way forward, to determine the names of candidates and then, 
after the meetings where it was finalised, to convey to them what was going 
to happen and to be sure we'd got their support. There was absolutely no 
point in putting forward candidates which were going to be shot down 
"22 because there was no unity. So I had to go and clear all the candidates 
This is referred to in the minutes as "Further discussions"23 . 
14 Tony Clarke interview. 
is See p. 13 3. 
16 Charles Tumock interview. 
17 Roger Godsiff interview. 
is Sandy Feather interview. 
19 Gordon Colling interview. 
20 Jim Cattermole interview. 
21 Monthly agendas and minutes, EGA. 
22 Bryan Stanley interview. 
23 "Code for work we had to do behind the scenes", Bryan Stanley interview. 
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Meetings were to be kept completely confidential, though not without an initial hiccup. 
"Just before we left that first meeting, everyone expressed the view that the 
meeting must be behind closed doors otherwise it wasn't going to succeed. 
Everyone present said 'no publicity'. I had a drink in the hotel bar with one 
or two before we left .. There were newspaper sellers outside the Charing Cross hotel, a placard which bore the heading 'The March of the Labour 
Party Moderates'. It was the Evening Standard. It was reporting the 
proceedings of the meeting I'd just left. It must have been printed while the 
meeting was going on! Fortunately, we had anticipated that the Charing 
Cross was too prominent a place and so we'd agreed to arrange the next 
meeting in St Ermins - more off the track. They let hotel rooms set up for 
conferences; we just gave out the hotel room number. So from then on, 
although the Left found out we were meeting at St Ermins, there was no 
leak and no publicity but we became known as the St Ennins Group"24 . 
St Ermins Hotel, near Scotland Yard, had long been a venue for Labour movement 
machinations. Used for the bondage scene in the 1985 film "Mona Lisa7, this former 
monastery played host to innumerable business meetings, surreptitious liaisons 
(including diplomatic and political) as well as to the Prime Minister's team in the 1979 
Election. Used as offices during the war, it was considered as party headquarters 
afterwards 25 but reverted to a hotel. It remained a favourite - for meetings between 
union leaders and the General Secretary (Morgan Phillips) and Treasurer (Gaitskell) in 
1955 26 ; for a "tactics" meeting between Rodgers and the party's conference-fixer, Derek 
Gladwin, before the 1970 Party Conference on Europe 27 , and for the meetings which led 
to CLV28. Union leaders frequented it - often linked to negotiations with employers. 
On such occasions, after the hard bargaining was over, talk would turn to union and 
party matterS29. Sometimes the leaders would "have a lunch together after the NEC or 
General Council. They used to meet on the same day, on a Wednesday morning 30 so 
everyone was in town and looking for lunch and it was very convenient to put lunch 
on 9%31 . 
24 Bryan Stanley interview. 
25 Norman Howard interview. 
26 Christopher Hemming, "Labour's 'penny-farthine machine: was Labour's local organisation better 
than the Wilson spin suggested? ", 2002, p. 7. 27 Bill Rodgers, op cit, P-125. 
28 Ian Bradley, op cit, p-61. 
29 Roy Grantham interview. 
30 The overlap continued until Prime Minister's Questions moved to Wednesdays, and NECs to Tuesdays. 
31 Bryan Stanley interview. 
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The Group, with only two minor exceptions, henceforth kept the proceedings almost 
completely secre t32. Part of their success lay in the virtual absence of written material 
and the bland minutes produced. Members were highly cautious about what they said 
and wrote. One only ever wrote "Group" in his diary 33 .A latejoiner commented: 
"The letter inviting you just said: 'There will be a meeting at this place at 
this time'. They made it clear to me, that I'd been well vetted and that the 
meeting was secret. If a story broke which had come from the group, there 
would be a 'Court of Inquiry'. How could anyone know that? It must be 
someone here. And in some way, the one who was suspected wouldn't 
come any more! Someone would say 'the only person there who hadn't 
)34 been before was so-and-so'. Ones who'd been before were trusted' 
There were only one or possibly two leaks throughout its existence - and both when 
outsiders had joined them for a specific iteM35. It is surprising that j ourrialists found out 
so little as, by the end of 1981, the Group had moved to Swinton House (ISTC 
Headquarters) in Grays Inn Road where they then remained. This was chosen because 
it "was cheaper, and we could concentrate on business, it was very discreet. No 
journalists around! It was away from the limelight! -06 . That description was not entirely 
accurate as it was 
"virtually next door to Acorn House, the journalists' union. And we drank 
afterward in the Lucas Arms - the NUJ pub. Some of St Ennins people not 
that well known but even so ..! It was extraordinary it wasn't rumbled. [it 
helped] that Mrs Thatcher was distancing herself from the union movement. 
Therefore unions less important, less courted and less covered and followed 
by the press"37 . 
As a result of this discipline, until 2003 the literature revealed little of the Group. 
Maintaining their oaths of confidentiality, neither Weighell, Chapple nor Howell 
mention the Group in their autobiographies 38. Even like-minded politicians knew 
nothing about it 39 . Academics fare little better. Seyd makes no reference to it despite 
32 The March meeting discussed the leak, which apparently resulted from Duffy speaking to 
journalists. It was agreed that meetings would be conducted on the basis of complete 
confidentiality; documentation would be tabled at meetings and collected at the end; 
33 
correspondence would be conducted using home addresses (John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 1 8 1). 
Sandy Feather interview. 
34 Gordon Colling interview. 
31 Roger Godsiff interview; Sandy Feather interview. 
36 Roy Grantham interview. 
37 Sandy Feather interview. 
38 Sidney Weighell, op cit; Frank Chapple, op cit, Denis Howell, op cit. Howell makes just one 
reference to Swinton House, when he describes arriving "at the headquarters of the Iron and Steel Trades Union for a discussion about trade union and Labour Party matters to be met by Sandy Feather, who asked me to telephone home at once"- to learn of the car accident which killed his son (op cit, p. 371). 
39 Peter Archer interview. 
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claiming that "Only one .. group, the Campaign for Democratic Socialism [in the 60s], 
on the Labour Right, compares for organisational ability [with CLPD] in the history of 
Labour factionaliSMiA0. Shaw does not include St Ermins in the index, though it 
appears twice in footnotes, both times mis-spelt as "St Ermine' SrA 1. Pearce also 
misnames it "St Ermine's" and completes his description in five lines 42 . Kogan and 
Kogan make no mention at a1143. The main chronicler of the unions, Lewis Minkin, 
makes passing references to the Group and, by inference, mis-dates its creation. He 
suggests that, in 198 1: "An extension of the 'St Ermin's' alliance took place. The 
leaders of the AUEW,.. APEX, EETPU, ISTC, NUR, POEU and USDAW (the core of 
the St Ennin's Group) were now joined by the GMWU and the UCW, which had in 
recent times kept aloof from the Rightwing grouping"A4 . 
The UCW was actually 
involved from the start, whereas the GMWU held aloof Panitch & Leys misunderstood 
the modus operandi: "The right-wing St Ermin's group of unions similarly began to 
take the initiative for the counter-insurgency from the TULV, flexing their muscles with 
well-publicised plans to reverse the Wembley decision and to secure right-wing control 
of the NEC"45. Well-publicised they were not! Whilst 2003 saw John Golding's 
brilliantly atmospheric descriptions of many of these events published posthUMOUSIY46 , 
he too maintained silence in his lifetime. 
The St Ermins Group was not the only response to Wembley and the SDP. On the 4 
March, Howell 
6(gave a report on the Labour Solidarity Campaign which had been set up 
with the support of 120 MPs. He referred to the work.. to secure office 
accommodation, issue a regular bulletin, obtain finance and donations and 
to set up regional organisations. He also advised the meeting that a letter 
would be sent to Trade Union General Secretaries .. explaining why the Solidarity Campaign had been set up.. It was agreed that wherever possible 
the Campaign should be supported by.. the placing of advertisements in 
their bulletin"47 . 
The Group's initial objective was to win NEC seats. Godsiff produced a paper for the 
March meeting, the first of four held at the St Ermins Hotel, concentrating on the five 
40 Patrick Seyd, op cit, p. 117. 
41 Eric Shaw, op cit, p. 358/9. 
42 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 557. 
43 David Kogan and Maurice Kogan, op cit. 
Lewis Minkin, op cit, 1991, p. 325. 
45 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, OP Cit, P. 194. 46 John Golding, op cit, 2003. 
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women's places. Although theoretically elected by the whole conference, the unions' 
near-90% share of the vote gave them control. Godsiff's paper set out the 1980 results, 
emphasising that the top three runners-up 48 were all "sensible", whilst the left-wing 
Margaret Beckete9, lying fifth, was a prime target. Carefully detailing every union's 
size and voting intention, he indicated which votes needed to be harnessed, and 
concluded "If there is a will on the part of 'moderate' trade unions to make really big 
changes in the composition of the NEC then it can be done in both the Trade Union and 
Women's Section but it requires a belief, commitment and voting discipline which has 
been lacking in the pasf'50. Golding, meanwhile, had begun discussing a "slate" for 
support. "Boothroyd, Surnmerskill, Hayter and Dunwoody had 'picked themselves' for 
support in the women's section7' and by April, they had 12 names for the union seats, 
including McCluskie and Kitston -supposedly on the Left 
51. The minutes record that 
"Attention was drawn to the need to ensure that 'uncommitted' unions were contacted" 
to get their support for the IiSt52 . For this 
initial round, no deals were made. The aim 
was to harness the moderate unions to support the slate. It was the first time it had 
happened, and "it proved that the composition of the NEC could be changed by co- 
ordinated organisation7'53 . 
Discussions with the swing votes were about to begin. However, on 2 April, plans were 
thrown into disarray by Benn's challenge to Healey. Suddenly there were more 
important stakes; item one of the April agenda was the Deputy Leadership, the NEC 
54 
elections taking second place . Much of 1981 was taken up with this contest, which 
many saw as a struggle for the survival of the party. The 24 June meeting, for example, 
discussed a paper on the Deputy Leadership which identified which unions needed to be 
contacted, and members undertook to make various approaches. The Political Officers' 
47 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 13/ p. 7. (The unions were as good as their word, placing a number 
of advertisements in the newsletter. ) 
48 Betty Boothroyd, Shirley Summerskill and Dianne Hayter (Fabian Society General Secretary). 49 Former MP for Lincoln. She laterjoined the left-of-Tribune 'Campaign Group' (1983/84 Annual 
Report of Campaign Group of Labour MPs). 
50 2 March 1981 paper; EGA. 
31 John Golding, op cit, 19 88, chap 13/p. 10. 
5, Notes of 15 April 1981 meeting, EGA. 
53 Roger Godsiff interview. 
54 14 April 1981 Agenda, EGA. 
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Group55 continued to meet, convened by Spellar and Golding, and fed in other 
intelligence - such as changes in affiliation 
(and hence voting) numberS56. 
Three other items appeared on that summer's agenda. One was the Group's (half- 
hearted) attempts to revise the Wembley formula (to 50: 25: 25), which got nowhere. 
The second concerned the seats on the TUC's General Council (GC). A meeting was 
held when the list of nominees appeared, to deal with these elections 
57 
. The Group had 
difficulty finalising its slate, so Grantham asked them to phone him in Blackpool on the 
eve of voting to be given the final recommendation 
58 
. The third matter was the election 
of the party Treasurer. At its 15 April meeting, the Group agreed to support Eric 
Varley. NUM-sponsored, a former minister and, importantly, former Chairman of the 
PLP Trade Union Group, he would start with the advantage of NUM support, despite 
his and their politics. 
These moves had not been kept completely secret, although the Group's name never 
appeared. The Daily Mirror reported that "A hit list of Left-wingers has been drawn up 
by Labour's increasingly active Right" and said the Group "hopes to dent - or even 
overturn - the Left's dominance of the ruling National Executive .. Top of the hit list is 
party treasurer Norman Atkinson. .. Other prime targets are 
left-wingers Joan Maynard 
and Renee Short"59. The Times added that "With the minor scandal of the right wing 
slate for the TUC General Council elections unburied, it came to light that the anti-left 
liaison group 60 wants a clean-up of the militant-dominated Labour Party leadership. 
The list circulated to unions proposes that four left-wingers should be ousted"61 . The 
Mirror repeated their StorY62 whilst David Gow discounted the chances of succeSS63. 
The tally and rallying of votes for the treasurership and other NEC seats were critical to 
the September results. Just two days after Healey's wafer-thin victory over Benn, five 
seats fell to the Moderates. Varley beat the left-wing incumbent and AUEW member, 
53 TUPO - see previous chapter. 56 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chapl3/p. 1 1. The EETPU research department produced lists of each 
57 
union's membership, political fund size and expenditure QSA). 
Notes of 25 August 1981 meeting, EGA. 
58 Letter from Grantham to members, II August 198 1, EGA. 
59 7 September 198 1. 
60 The Group had originally been known as 'Labour Liaison' (Sandy Feather interview). 
61 The Times, 8 September 1981. 
62 Daily Mirror, 25 September 19 8 1. 
63 With the exception of Hayter who he erroneously thought would succeed, The Scotsman, 29 
September 1981. 
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Norman Atkinson, but only by Duffy persuading his delegation to withdraw support 
from one of their own members. Beckett and three other left-wingers lost their seats. 
The Right was strengthened enormously. Boothroyd kept the seat she had inherited on 
Williams' resignation, and was joined by Dunwoody and Summerski1164 . At the result, 
Renee Short shouted "This is all your fault, Terry Duffy"; "Guilty" Duffy cheerfully 
retorted 65 . However, it was not Duffy's handiwork alone. The results were no surprise 
to those close to Godsiff. A comparison between his prediction and the actual results 
shows a mere 4.4% error 66 : Golding won a wager with Callaghan over this result but - 
perhaps because he had used insider information with Godsiff s predictions - he never 
cashed the cheque 67 . 
"Moderates sweep to victory on the NEC" claimed The Financial Times; 
"The changes mean that there has been a fundamental change in the balance 
of power within the Labour Party. They indicate, far more convincingly 
than Mr Denis Healey's narrow victory .. that the tide has now turned 
against Mr Tony Benn and the far Left and that at last the attempts of right- 
wing union leaders to organise against the left have paid off. They mean 
that Mr Foot should now be able to command a majority on the executive,.. 
on most issues Mr Benn will now be in a minority"68 . 
A little premature, but its analysis that the Left's 19: 10 dominance had been replaced by 
a committee with "the balance .. tipped in favour of the moderates and centre-left by 
15: 14" was about right. Boothroyd recalled the ModerateS69doing "spectacularly well 
in the NEC.. We broke the hard left's grip by making five gains. I held my seat with 
strong trade union support and Gwyneth Dunwoody swelled the anti-Militant ranks. .. 
The terminal dangers facing the party were far from over, but we had edged away from 
the abyss"70 . 
Panitch & Leys acknowledge the significance of the result. "The Labour new left's 
defeat.. was not restricted to the deputy leadership.. far more important .. was another 
set of votes for the National Executive.. The right-wing leadership of the Engineering 
Union finally fulfilled its promise.. to produce a right-wing delegation.. (t)hat went so 
far as to vote to remove Norman Atkinson, himself a member of the union, from the 
post of Party Treasurer. .. It was, however, only a small part of a much larger targeting 
64 Report ofthe 1981 Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 95. 65 John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 197. 
66 See annex 3. 
67 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 14/p. 15. 
69 Financial Times, 30 September 1981. 
69 Without mentioning the St Ermins Group. 
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and purge of those members of the NEC who supported the new left"71. The Mail, 
hailing Duffy as the "master mind", claimed that they had "served notice that their next 
targets would be the Trotskyist Militant Tendency,, 72 . The Moderates chalked up one 
other success - defeating the NEC's proposal to have sole responsibility for the 
manifeSt073 - their case being articulated in the debate by Radice and Stanley 
74. 
The Right did not, however, have a majority on the NEC as Foot refused to support 
them, voting to leave the existing sub-committee Chairmen in place 75 . Thus Benn 
retained the Home Policy and Heffer the Organisation chairmanships. The PLP 
responded badly to Foot's action76 . They had voted Benn off the Shadow Cabinet in 
1980 and against him for Deputy Leader. His re-election to this NEC position 
accentuated the PLP/NEC divide. Furthermore, Benn got the Organisation sub- 
77 
committee to reject an enquiry into Militant . It was a year to the day that Foot had 
been elected Leader, since when the SDP had defected, Healey had nearly lost the 
Deputy position and PLP/NEC relations had hardly improved. The Left continued to 
exert their strength, replacing Tuck as Chairman of the Finance Committee with 
78 Kitson , ftuther 
incensing the Group. Despite their five gains, knew they must 
redouble their efforts for 1982. 
The 1981 successes assisted negotiations for the coming year. However, the Group 
recognised that even sympathetic general secretaries needed to keep their delegations on 
side. The slate therefore embraced as many unions as possible 79 , with general 
secretaries given latitude to vote for a left-winger, favoured by their union, who was 
bound to get on, so that they could then support a marginal name on the list8o. This 
attention to marginal candidates was in part the secret of Godsiff s success. 
Sometimes, right-wing unions "might have to vote for a Leftie - it was part 
of a deal. Naturally I would question that: 'are you sure you want me to do 
thaff 'Absolutely, then we can get someone else to vote for you'. [It 
70 Betty Boothroyd, Betty Boothroy& The Autobiography, Century, 2001, pp. 109/110. 71 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 199. 
72 Robert Porter, The Daily Mail, 30 September 1981. He noted where the Group mctý albeit calling it 
the St Ermine's Hotel. 
73 Report ofthe 1981 Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 212. 74 ibid, pp. 207/208. 
75 John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 213. 
76 The Times, 10 November 198 1. 
77 ibid. 
79 The Times, 24 November 1981. 
79 It included left-wingers McCluskie and Kitson who were bound to be elected. so Bryan Stanley interview; Sandy Feather interview. 
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would have been Godsiff or Spellar replying. ] We were relying on the skills 
of the organisers. The list they sought support for was maximising the 
support they could get for the Group as a whole. When they were working 
on the list I had to get the OK from my union political people that I could 
trade votes. And others could trade votes. And you didn't do it yourself. 
Everything done through Spellar and Godsiff. We would try and get as far 
down the St Ermins list as possible. Some of people on the list squeezed in 
by narrowest of margins. Only way it could be done was to leave Spellar 
and Godsiff to do it. If we'd all tried, we'd get chopped up and would 
fail"81. 
Twenty years later, one union official still recalls the horror of being asked to vote for 
Scargill (for the TUC). It hurt, but by following orders it got another union to support a 
marginal candidate the Group wanted elected 82 . At times, Godsiff managed some 
unlikely deals. He recounted one: 
"The EETPU could never get their person on - but nevertheless ran Tom 
Breakell. But G and M wouldn't support him - so for a couple of years this 
became a bit difficult. I told Eric Hammond that the EETPU must vote 
Hoyle, so as to get ASTMS to vote for the rest of the St Ennins slate, and 
told him -a general secretary! - that he had to show the ballot paper at 2.30 
pm. There was Clive Jenkins and Doug Hoyle, plus Eric Hammond and 
John SPellar plus the ballot papers. ASTMS had indeed voted the St Ermins 
slate other than for the EETPU. After this, Hoyle asked me 'Will I win? ' 
To which I replied 'No'. And he didn't that yeae"83. 
Godsiff recognised that union loyalty and institutional ties (such as between the GMVvrU 
and NUPE) had to be respected, particularly the Triple Alliance of mining (NUM), rail 
(NUR) and steel (ISTC). Other factors helped: it was easier to get Tony Clarke elected, 
because "everyone loves a postman "84 . The "marshalling of votes to prevent some of 
those of the left getting on even continued on the conference floor right up to the time 
that the ballot papers had to be put in the boX,, 85. In the year Colling was elected, 
"Stanley had persuaded his [leftish) POEU delegation that the NGA was on the Left. 
After the meeting, Alan Meale 86 visited the delegation and said 'Hang OnV and 
explained the real politics. So they had a second delegation meeting. The POEU 
81 Gordon Colling interview. 
82 Arthur Bonner, Chairman of the NGA political committee, interview, 28 October 2003. 13 Roger Godsiff interview. Hoyle was defeated in 1982, elected in 19 83. See footnote on p. 106. 14 Roger Godsiff interview. 
95 Charles Turnock, op cit, p. 203. 86 Alan Meale, who did the Left's slate, would compare notes with Godsiff (Roger Godsiff interview). 
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swapped - but although they came off Colling they then supported another good 
candidate! "87. 
The Group meanwhile turned its attention to the composition of the TUC General 
Council (GC), where a restructuring was the objective. At the time, the whole TUC 
voted for the seats in every section - such as engineering, transport, electricity. This 
gave the big unions - particularly the TGWU - considerable power as they effectively 
determined the composition of the whole GC. The big unions were politically 
insensitive in their use of these votes, preferring communists from smallish unions (such 
as Ken Gill) to the mainstream, pro-European Grantham - who was out of line with the 
left-wing TGWU88. In the 1960s, this strength had been used to keep the EETPU's Les 
Cannon off, in favour of a small union (which later became the part of the TGWU). 
The main electricians' union - and the only one with the muscle to close the country 
down - was therefore not represented at the unions' top table. This weakened the TUC 
as it was not reflecting industrial reality. The TUC also did not represent the politics of 
its true paymasters - the rank-and-file of affiliated unions. In the seventies, the 
Communist Party "probably played a larger part on the national scene .. than evee". 
With the support of Jones and Scanlon "the TUC left, largely marshalled by Ramelson9o 
and Ken Gill, co-ordinated the unions" fight against the two Wilson governments"91. 
Chapple had wrested his union from communist control, only to see it denied a place at 
the TUC by that same Communist Party. Although by 198 1, the electricians had won 
their seat, the "sheer outrage" felt by the EETPU fuelled its motivation to change the 
system 92 . 
By "picking people who were absolutely unrepresentative of the unions in any 
particular group" the TGWU ensured that eventually there would be a response. "'We 
saw the key to breaking the stranglehold. If we could persuade the unions in all the 
sections that they were going to benefit.. by changing the voting methods - whether 
lefties or not - their union interest was to make the change. I had a brilliant young 
7 Roger Godsiff interview. 
8 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 130; Jim Cattermole interview. Howell blamed an inter-union dispute with ASTMS which "cost Roy Grantham his seat on the general council.. an act of petty vindictiveness", Denis Howell, op cit, p-271. 
19 Eric Hobsbawm, Interesting Times, Allen Lane, 2002, p. 266. 90 Bert Ramelson, the Communist Party's industrial organiser. 91 Eric Hobsbawn, ibid. 
92 Frank Chapple, op cit; John Spellar, interview, 2003. 
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research officer, Chris Bulford. I talked to him in total confidence. 'This is the problem 
and this is the objective. To free General Council from these extreme left-wingers 
(even communists). We can't whilst the TGWU votes in every section. But we won't 
get change without getting it through the Congress probably for two years running 
because there'll be a fightback.. The scheme has got to hold water and has got to pull 
the votes of the middle range of unions'. He said 'I'll come back with some ideas'. 
That was how the two of us formulated the POEU motion for Congress"93. The answer 
was 'Automaticity' whereby all the larger unions were represented on the GC, with II 
seats reserved for unions with under 100,000 members. 
The effect was enormous, not just on the TUC but on the Labour Party because the 
myriad of deals done for the NEC and GC had been intertwined. Once the TUC places 
were released from TGWU control, unions could cast their NEC votes without 
jeopardising their own GC seat. Even behaviour at the TUC changed, as smaller unions 
no longer needed TGWU patronage so did not "have to kow-tow; they could say what 
they believed"94 . Stanley was right that it took two years to achieve, as there was stiff 
resistance. "There were people in the T and G [Walter Greendale] terrifically opposed 
to anything which smacked of democracy"95 - 
Stanley and Bulford devised the strategy but St Ermins produced the votes. The 1979 
TUC Congress had asked the GC to consider Automaticity but no progress had been 
made. It had been raised in 1980 but no action taken 96 . The POEU's first attempt in 
1981 saw the motion adopted, but left-wing unions quickly launched "a campaign to 
overthrow the proposals approved .. in September". An "invitation only" meeting, 
chaired by Kitson, was called "to assess the strength of opposition to the proposals 
, 97 which were comfortably approved by congress' . Meanwhile, St Ermins discussed the 
issue on 25 May 1982 (when they learnt that one union was "to submit a motion 
restoring the status quo"), 6 July, 27 July (when it "seemed likely that the General 
Council would support the decision of last year's Congress .. to give automatic 
representation.. to unions with 100,000 or more affiliated members. A number of 
unions who had originally opposed the change were now prepared to support the 
93 Bryan Stanley interview. 
94 Bryan Stanley interview. 
95 Charles Turnock interview. 
96 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 173. 
97 The Times, 9 December 1981. 
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decision"), 24 August (noting an attempt to defer the decision for a year) then, after 
their success, to discuss implementation of Automaticity, with "further consultations" 
on candidateS98 . The period had witnessed intensive persuasion, as they gradually 
brought all but the TGWU on board. These talks were kept very quiet, Bulford having 
advised keeping everything confidential so that the TGWU would never realise how 
many votes were coming over. Any leak - especially over their confidence that they 
could win - would have produced a heavyweight counter-response. The TGWU was so 
convinced they would retain the system they had run for so long - one official laughing 
at the idea of defeat - they were surprised when it went through. Bulford attributes 
some of their success to the TGWU being in crisis as Moss Evans was ill, leaving 
Kitson in charge (whose interest was the NEC rather than the TUC) and the union less- 
focused than under Jack Jones". 
However, it took until 1983 for Congress to implement the new system' 00. This was a 
difficult year for its architect. Stanley was in hospital with cancer of the hip. His 
doctors advised him to "put his affairs in order" but his response was that he had to go 
to Congress. He left hospital, went home and learnt to walk on crutches. At Blackpool, 
when called to speak, he was jeered as he hobbled up, delegates trying to block his way 
and one threatening: "we'll break the other leg"101. They had misunderstood both his 
strength and the determination of the St Ermins Group. 
Automaticity did not relieve the Group of any effort, as unions with fewer than 100,000 
members still competed for II seats. However, hard and persistent work would ensure 
that the St Ennins Group slate had won all II seats by 1986 102 . 
The NEC seats were, nonetheless, the Group's focus and where they made the biggest 
impact, especially in 1982, when there was, however, one big downside: "Sid Weighell 
put his neck on the block"103. "Sid broke his mandate and didn't vote for the Triple 
Alliance (miners; steel; rail - they'd always voted for each other). Sid asked me about 
the figures. I showed him them and said 'we can't quite do it'. He commented: 'Unless 
I don't vote for the miners' and I said 'I know I can't ask you not to do that. He said 
99 Notes of dated meetings and of 16 November 1982, EGA. 
Chris Bulford, interview, 12 April 2003. 
100 Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 186. 
101 Bryan Stanley interview. 
102 Roger Godsiff interview. 
103 Bryan Stanley interview. 
134 
ChaplerlO StErmins Group- The Story 
no more. And then he didn't vote for the miners. It was done not for the NUR man but 
the wider Group. The NUR man was in anyway - he was on both slates, Left and 
Right. So it was done for the wider Group" 104 . 
The vote for a St Ermins Group candidate (Breakell) rather than for the NUM's Eric 
Clarke was immediately obvious - not least to an NUR scrutineer. Weighell faced the 
wrath of his executive and offered his resignation. Within weeks, a special delegate 
conference voted to accept it - "a sorry day for the NUW"05. Weighell's "conscience 
was clear; because he thought Labour had little chance of winning the next election if it 
was run by the far left and he believed his actions were in accordance with the wishes of 
the majority of Labour Party supporters"' 06. "At least one other general secretary did 
the same as Weighell with his union's votes at the 1982 conference but was not found 
out 107 . He and Weighell shared what was then a widespread view that the party was 
08 finished unless it moved back to the centre"' . 
Weighell's fellow union leaders had not asked him to break his mandate and did not 
"want one person to take the responsibility on his own shoulder. They wanted to 
persuade the delegates who to vote for or to give the mandate to the general secretary. 
We didn't want anyone to defy their instruction. It would bring our efforts into 
disrepute"109. Furthermore, "Weighell's control of NUR was already tenuous -and 
nothing was worth jeopardising thaf " 10. St Ermins had lost a stalwart founder member 
but the 1982 results gave them the majority they desperately sought on the NEC. 
Howell (who had chaired the first St Ermins meeting) beat Eric Clarke, and Anne Davis 
defeated hard-left Maynard. Furthermore, friends within the National Union of Labour 
and Socialist Clubs (Labour's drinking clubs)"' enabled MP John Evans to oust Les 
Huckfield from the Socialist Societies' seat, whilst Varley beat off Meacher's challenge 
for the treasurership 112 . 
"' Roger Godsiff interview. 
105 Charles Tumock, op cit, p. 203. 
106 Terry Pattinson, Obituary of Sidney Weighell, Independent, 15 February 2002. 107 Bill Sirs, who told Richard Faulkner. 
"' Richard Faulkner interview. 
109 Bryan Stanley interview. 
, 11 Roy Grantham interview. 
Particularly NULSC President (Brian Baldwin, EETPU) and Treasurer (Bill Thomas from the West Midlands, later Spellar's agent). 
Report ofthe 1982 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 66. 
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The results caused considerable interest on the Tuesday morning of conference. Not 
only the NUR vote, but Davis' unexpected victory, was followed at 10.55, just as Chief 
113 Scrutineer Dorothy Lovett finished, by a bomb scare evacuating the building 
Standing outside, Stanley heard party staff debating "How did Anne Davis come from 
nowhere, an unknown, and get elected? "' 14 . The conspirators - who kept their support 
for Davis secret to prevent any counter-measures' 15 - had done their job well. 
The Group did not win everything. The NUR and APEX tried unsuccessfully to change 
the structure of the NEC, to create a PLP section, confine the CLP section to non-MPs, 
and add two local government seats. This was similar to what Blair introduced 15 years 
later but it had little support in 1982. The NEC election results were also "offset by the 
carrying of a pure unilateralist motion [by] .. votes which 
had just decimated the left on 
16 the NEC, passed moreover by a two-thirds majority"' . 
Nevertheless, the Moderates had obtained their majority on the NEC, a victory 
celebrated with a cake baked by Patsy Feather - iced with the words "St Ermins" 117 
The NEC's Register of Non-affiliated Organisations - the first step in dealing with 
Militant -was overwhelmingly endorsed by Conference' 18. The Moderates took 
control of the NEC committees in November when they used their voting strength 
single-mindedly, taking no prisoners. "We moderates were exhilarated and the lcft 
utterly demoralised as we walked out of Walworth Road that day. What we had done.. 
was to end the dominance of extreme left wing socialists .. and bring about the fall of 
the Benn-Heffer axis which would never carry credibility again"I 19. Beim, Heffer, 
Richardson and Allaun were culled from the key Chairmanships, and the Moderates 
then set about their objectives. The NEC proscribed Militant at the end of 1982, and 
went on to expel the five members of its editorial board 120 . 
The injection of numbers also changed the dynamics of the NEC. Healey, as Deputy 
Leader, had found his role difficult as Foot never involved him, so he was unable to 
organise. With the extra votes, Healey provided more leadership. His political advisor, 
13 ihid, p. 67. 
14 Roger Godsiff interview. 
I" John Golding, op cit, 1998, chap I 8/pA 
116 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 571; 1982 Conference Report, p. 280. 17 Sandy Feather interview. 
Is 1982 Conference Report, p. 275. 
119 John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 261. 120 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, op cit, p. 204. 
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Richard Heller, started writing briefing notes for the NEC and sub-committees, working 
alongside Golding, and advising Healey which sub-committees to attend. They were 
assisted by the triumvirate of women: Boothroyd, Dunwoody and Surnmerskill121. 
Golding ascribes successes at the NEC more to his tactics and the Group's cohesion 
than to Healey's politics. Planning tactics for the NEC was as important as winning 
seats. Prior to 1982, this had been arranged by Golding's "ring rounds". Following the 
increase in numbers, a more formal approach was taken and one dinner held at Locketts 
restaurant. It was hardly an auspicious start: Foot was also there and must have noticed 
the troupe of Moderate NEC members 122 . The dinner did sort out the arrangements for 
the take-over of sub-committees, but its location would not guarantee confidentiality 123 
A subsequent dinner was therefore held at Boothroyd's flat, and a couple at Howell's 
before they settled on the Tufton Court home of Helen de Freitas 124 . From then 
onwards, immediately after the St Ermins Group (which met on the evening before the 
NEC at Swinton House), those who were on the NEC would bundle themselves into 
Tony Clarke's or Ken Cure's car and make off for Tufton Court. Here they would meet 
up with their NEC allies, the MPs plus the trade unionists not in the Group. 
Boothroyd's autobiography revealed all. At the time, however, neither Healey, Radice 
nor even Stanley knew of these secret suppers. "We called ourselves the Beaujolais 
Group because we planned our strategy over food and a glass of wine. I kept the 
accounts. It was hardly high living; we ended 1984 with a deficit of E24.05, which was 
cleared by everybody paying a modest SUM,, 125 . The group included Hattersley, 
Dunwoody, Colling, Renee Short 126 , Howell, Turnock, Tony Clarke, Hough, Cure, 
McCluskie, Golding, Ambler 127 , Davis, Tierney, David Williams and Tuck (but never 
Healey nor Varley) 128. "We met to discuss tactics on the eve of every meeting of the 
full NEC. Sam McClusky (sic) .. usually sat in Helen's spacious rocking chair, but 
tended not to come when there was something on the agenda on which he could not 
121 Richard Heller, interview, 22 January 2003. 
122 Richard Heller interview. 
123 John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 256. 
124 The widow of Boothroyd's former boss, MP GeoffiTey de Freitas. 
125 Betty Boothroyd, op cit, p. 112. The next year's deficit was L37.62 (following 7 such dinners); 
accounts from Turnock's private papers. 
126 Once she had joined the moderate cause. J27 His son-in-law, Brian Key, had been deselected as an MEP, bringing home the difficulties in 
constituencies (Richard Tomlinson, interview, 28 January 2003). 
John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 22/ p. 1; Charles Turnock interview; Gordon Colling interview, Roy Hattersley interview. 
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follow through". The suppers always finished by the 10 prn vote "so that nobody would 
notice our absence. .. It was an effective alliance, masterminded by John [Golding]... 
He reported the results of our deliberations immediately after every meeting to Neil"129 . 
Turnock, who later took over as 'whip' of the Moderates, described how they used these 
suppers to decide "Who'd move resolutions; whether we took a particular line" 130 
When he was elected in 1983, "The moderate group on the NEC consisted of 14 
members. Three did not attend the meetings but accepted the decisions. Some others 
131 attended irregularly" . Out of an NEC of 29, it was a useful 
dinner party. 
Nevertheless, decisions were not sufficient. Delivering the Beaujolais vote was also 
challenging: "I had to place myself at National Executive meetings not only so that I 
could always catch the Chairman's eye but also so that none of the Moderates could 
leave without passing me. I had constantly to keep a majority - or, if that was not 
possible, to ensure there was no quorum"132 . The group increased the NEC quorum 
133 from 10 to 15 "to make it impossible for the Left ever to be in a working majority" 
Many of the St Ermins Group hailed from the Midlands. Another group lived in St 
Albans, Bedford, Borehamwood and Radlett 134 so discussions continued in the j oumeys 
home as one of them acted as chauffeur. They then took to the telephone. Golding, 
whilst "whip.. would spend hours on the phone on Sunday evenings" 135as did Colling 
later: "I would ring them every Sunday - especially Sunday before NEC but actually 
every Sunday. 2pm to about 7pm every Sunday". If an issue proved difficult, he would 
get Kinnock to make the necessary call 136 . 
This intelligence, planning and confidentiality verevital because of the issues facing the 
NEC, press interest, party hostility and their lack of a comfortable majority. Militant 
was the major challenge, but there were other decisions including the appointment of a 
General Secretary, preparation for the election, Europe, party management and OMOV. 
'29 Betty Boothroyd, op cit, p. 113. 
130 Charles Tumock interview. 
131 Charles Tumock, op cit, p. 229. 
132 John Golding, op cit, 198 8, chap 21/ pA 
133 ibid. 
134 Clarke, Colling, Stanley and Turnock. 
'" John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 2 1/ p. 3. 136 Gordon Colling interview. 
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The St Ennins Group held 59 meetings between 1981 and 1987 137 to work on a range of 
issues. 
The first - which they lost - was the replacement in December 1981 of Hayward as 
General Secretary, where Foot's support 138 for Mortimer 139 saw him beat the unions' 
Alex Ferry by one vote. The Left never subsequently claimed much success for 
Mortimer's tenure. As Dick Clements -a close ally of Foot, albeit a candidate for the 
post 140 _ admitted: "Everyone thought he was a good organiser but no-one questioned 
his politics! ". Asked when it became obvious that Mortimer was not the best choice, he 
replied "Pretty early on. He was a sad mistake"14 1. The Right's opposition was 
vindicated by his "hopeless" performance in the 1983 election but at the time "his 
appointment was a reverse for the moderates and this defeat strengthened .. our desire to 
get control over the NEC"142 . 
One crucial vote - and an important thank-you - the Moderates did win, despite a 
vehement campaign from the Left, was when the NEC endorsed Godsiff as the 
prospective candidate for Birmingham Yardley 143 . The Group also took pleasure in 
Spellar's election in the Birmingham Northfield by-election in October 1982. The NEC 
also dealt with appeals from sitting councillors de-selected by their local parties. St 
Ermins Group allies on the London Regional Executive 144 had done their best to prevent 
the destabilisation of Southwark where council leader, John O'Grady, and others had 
been ejected by the Left. Some were reinstated, but not all, and the row was growing. 
The NEC asked Heffer and David Hughes to seek a solution. This failed and, in due 
course, led to the ill-fated Bermondsey by-election - caused as much by Foot's 
ineptitude as by the St Ermins Group's weakness on the NEC 145 . 
Another individual who was to cause trouble was Tariq Ali. He had stood (whilst in the 
IMG 146 ) against Syd Bidwell, the MP for Southall, in 1979 (winning 77 votes). Bidwell 
described him as a "rich playboy" - in contrast to Benn's description: "civilised and 
"' See annex 4. Average attendance was 10.5. 
138 The Times, 15 December 1981. 
139 Former Chairman of ACAS and the London Transport Board Member. 
140 Editor of Tribune. He received one vote - Kinnock's (Dick Clements interview). 14 1 Dick Clements interview. 
142 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 18/ p. 2. 43 ibid, chap 17/ p. 10. : 
44 Particularly Spellar, Tuffirt, Hayter, Bonner and Helen Eadie. 145 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 17/ p. 18. 
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charming" 147 . He now applied to 
(re)join the party 148 . Golding and Healey moved "that 
Tariq Ali be not accepted into membership" (Benn and Maynard pressing acceptance). 
The former duo won 11: 6. However, the local party (Hornsey) voted to admit him and 
had to be brought into line by the National Agent. In August 1982, his exclusion was 
re-confirmed by the NEC although it had to be endorsed at the 1983 conference. He 
149 was finally expelled at the 26 October 1983 NEC . 
In these long and twisting sagas, 
Golding recalled, "I would need to seek advice on how to play it from my brothers at 
the Swinton House meeting" 150. These meetings - chaired by Stanley or sometimes by 
Grantham or Howell - settled in to a regular pattern, sustained by fruit and coffee 
151 
Golding would give a report on "what was happening on the NEC, .. responding to 
questions about the possibility of making progress on a number of pet projects near to 
the moderates' hearts, such as the introduction of one member one vote .. [However] I 
usually had to impart bad news - that it was Michael Foot and not the Mods that had 
control of the NEC"' 52 . 
This was often the case when dealing with the other perennial problem - of MPs under 
threat of de-selection. Sometimes, as in Brent, the NEC could help, and one major 
victory concerned rules for new parliamentary boundaries where the 1981 conference 
had sought to make MPs go through a second re-selection if their boundaries changed. 
This was causing considerable alarm to an already jumpy PLP. Delays (helped by the 
Chief Whip) led to the NEC agreeing a new system whereby MPs in constituencies with 
no major changes could retain their seats without a further re-selection. Even this did 
not assist every case. In Tower Hamlets, where Peter Shore represented Stepney and 
Poplar, with Ian Mikardo in Bethnal Green and Bow, the Boundary Commission rotated 
the divide, making the seats "Bethnal Green and Stepney" plus "Bow and Poplar". The 
Left were happy with Mikardo but not with Shore. The NEC had agreed that any MP 
who, after boundary changes, still, represenia'l majority of the new constituency, 
would be automatically reselected. If it was less than 50%, there would be an open 
selection. Shore fell just below 50%. The Left was entitled to a full selection. Friends 
146 International Marxist Group. 
47 Tony Benn, op cit, p. 180. 
" Guardian, 20 November 198 1; Tribune, 27 November 198 1. 
149 Guardian, 27 October 1983; John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 273. 150 John Golding, op cit, 1988, chap 17/ p. 20. 15, All for L5, paid regularly by APEX to ISTC (EGA). 152 John Golding, op cit, 1988 chap 18/ p. 1. 
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came to his aid; David Bean 153 drafted a let-out clause: "Where the boundaries of two 
or more constituencies adjacent to each other with endorsed candidates are altered, but 
where the number of seats remains the same and no other constituency is involved, then 
each of the endorsed candidates shall be treated as having a majority claim in any of the 
new constituencies which includes a part of his or her old constituency". This went 
(from the National Agent's Department) to the NEC' 54 . The Moderate majority adopted 
,, 155 it with Benn, Shore's old family friend, muttering I know what you're doing! 
Dealing with Militant was a continual challenge for the NEC members, who reported 
back to the Group on progress and setbacks, including how CLPs facing legal 
156 
challenges from Militant were faring and proposals to rid the YS of Militant They 
also dealt with organisational issues, from the launch of Labour Party News 157 rules for 
Socialist Societies and regional conferences 158 to staff appointments' 59. Staff 
appointments were very important in changing the party, and "recommendations and 
suggestions" were often made 160 . 
The Group's whip, Colling, "ended up chairing the 
Staffing Committee, working with Larry [Whitty] on clearing out the staff situation, 
which was highly organised by Militant. Andy Bevan was leader of the whole staff 
-461 group' 
The St Ermins Group's achievements owed much to planning, discipline and single- 
mindedness, as well as to effective whipping. Golding had originally been the task- 
master; on his departure in 1983 he was replaced by the newly-elected Turnock'12. It 
was an inspired choice. Well-read, hard-working and committed to the party's re- 
election, he tackled the task with gusto. He was also a smart political operator, 
understanding the need to anticipate press attention. One example relates to an incident 
when there was a vacancy for Chair of the Home Policy Committee. Hattersley was 
anxious to take this on, so he could table more appropriate papers than those produced 
153 Now Sir David Bean, a High Court Judge; then a Solidarity activist. 154 NEC paper, NAD/I 09/3/83,23 March 1983 (LPA). 
155 David Bean, interview, 28 May 2002. 
156 Notes of 25 March 1986 and 24 March 1987 meetings, EGA. 157 Notes of 25 February 1986 meeting, EGA. 
158 Notes of 22 April 1986 meeting, EGA. 
", Notes of 22 July 1986 meeting, EGA. 
160 For example, notes of 25 November 1986, EGA. 
161 Gordon Colling interview. 
162 Charles Turnock, op cit, p. 229; Charles Turnock interview. 
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by party Staff163. The Group was in favour but Sawyer was also standing - and could 
attract soft- and hard-left support. Turnock warned his colleagues that they must leave 
it to him to count the votes at the meeting, as the absence of any one of them could 
mean defeat and a major embarrassment for the Deputy Leader. Turnock's head-count 
revealed two votes short, so he made no nomination and Sawyer was elected 
unopposed 164 . 
Turnock had more success earlier when he needed to teach the new General Secretary 
the way of the world. His practice had been to find out which Ennins Group members 
wanted to be on which sub-committee and then meet with Mortimer (with whom he had 
a good relationship from London Transport days). 
"The outcome of the meetings with the General Secretary resulted in our 
Group having a majority on every committee. As a consequence, we got the 
Chairmen we wanted, and could vote down any alterations the Left 
proposed at the first NEC after Conference .. When Larry Whitty took over, I adopted the same procedure with him, although I did have a feeling of 
apprehension in the first year knowing his past association with Benn. We 
were taking a family holiday in Tenerife which unfortunately clashed with 
the full NEC. I decided to fly back to attend the meeting. After arrival at 
Heathrow early the previous afternoon, I called at Walworth Road only to 
find that what Whitty had drafted was way out of line with what we had 
discussed. He accepted he would have to alter it or face an unholy row the 
next day. The amended recommendations went through with only a few 
minor amendments that did not affect the balance. He did not make the 
same mistake again"165 . 
Later, Colling followed Tumock as the Whip. 
"I thought I'd only be on one year - having just scraped on - so may as well learn as much as I could in that 12 months and do as much as I could. I did 
everything Charlie wanted me to. He was enormously impressed. I was at 
every meeting he'd asked me to be at. Did what Id said I'd do. Sometimes 
he'd give me a bollocking if I hadn't said the right thing! " Colling 
understood that organising the NEC was as important as winning seats. 
"Often it was a case of getting a proposal in first. Then have that proposal 
discussed rather than something else. Worse thing was to waffle. If turn up 
without a line, hard-left and soft-left would get together" 166 . 
In due course, Colling became Whip to the entire union group, "Not just the little band 
of Moderates"; the GMWU and TGWU came under his wing by the end 167 . By 1987, 
163 Charles Turnock, op cit, p. 236. 
164 Charles Turnock interview. 
165 Charles Turnock interview. 
166 Gordon Colling interview. 
167 Gordon Colfing interview. 
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Kinnock could rely on the whole NEC in a crisis except for Benn, Skinner and 
Livingstone. If the office or Leader needed something, they would speak to "the trade 
union Whip, Colling, who would say: 'I'll speak to my friends', which was code for 
'they'll vote that way' , 168 . Nevertheless, even after Kinnock had a comfortable 
majority, a number of MPs from the constituency section could not be seen to vote with 
the Leader - though they could be absent. One of Kinnock's team described how: 
"Colling or Haigh would take the lead on many policies on the NEC.. I 
would have a list, marked-up as: 'For; Against; and Abstain or Leave 
early'. This continued right up to the '92 election. On the day of Nellist 
and Terry Fields 169, Kinnock only had 13 votes in advance. He would have 
resigned if it had not gone through. We had to know the numbers, so I 
would talk to Gordon and he fixed if 9170. 
There were occasions when something went wrong, as at the first NEC after the 1986 
conference. Someone broke ranks, to the Group's disapproval. There was: 
"reference to .. misunderstandings and problems which had occurred over 
the appointment of various persons to Chair the Sub-Committees .. it was 
emphasised that the success which had been achieved in electing a more 
responsible N. E. C. over the last five years had been due to a lot of hard 
work and collective action, and that this should not under any circumstances 
be placed in jeopardy. It was also pointed out that the success of the 
leadership of the Party reflected a widespread political opinion and any 
success in the future will also have to be based on the same criteria. It was 
felt that many of the misunderstandings could, in hindsight, have been 
avoided but it was hoped that discussions would take place amongst 
171 members of the N. E. C. to avoid these problems happening in the future" 
Given that normal minutes were brief in the extreme, this was an unusually long and 
sensitive paragraph. 
Whilst those on the NEC struggled to make their votes effective, and deliver a majority 
for the Leader, the St Ennins general secretaries and trusties continued their regular 
monthly work. NEC slates constituted the main business, but there was a range of other 
preoccupations. In January 1983, a paper on "A system for Balloting in the Labour 
Party"' was discussed - the long campaign for OMOV for the election of Leader and 
Deputy Leader taking shape. The Moderates got the Organisation sub-committee to 
endorse the principle, though it would not apply for some years. Following the 
resignation of Foot and Healey, the meeting discussed the "procedures being used by 
162 Mike Watts, interview, 7 May 2002. 
169 The NEC meeting to expel Militant MPs Dave Nellist and Terry Fields. 170 Neil Stewart interview. 
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unions who were seeking the views of their wider membership" regarding the contest. 
The Group noted the CLPD's support of Heffer for Leader and Meacher as Deputy 172 , 
neither of which would draw their votes. 
Late in 1984, the meeting discussed the proposal to allow CLPs to involve the 
membership in the selection of candidates, although this presented difficulties for 
unions as it weakened their input into GCs. In mid-1985, the Group agreed that OMOV 
should be dealt with at the 1986 conference 173 . In January the members "agreed that the 
views of interested parties should be sought as to whether this matter should come up at 
this year's Conference" 174 but, following consultations, suggested it "should not be 
brought up again [this year] but that the N. E. C. should approve the principle and then 
conduct a detailed investigation as to how it could best be implemented" 1 75 . In 
February 1987, the party sent out a consultation document for comment. The Group 
76 
thought "there was an obvious need, particularly in the light of events in Greenwich, 
to ensure that a wider selectorate [was] involved in the choosing of Parliamentary 
candidates" 177 . Kinnock favoured a 
local electoral college, and his office was "taking 
soundings" on this. The Group hoped that "the situation that arose at the special 
Wembley conference [where the unions had not co-ordinated their votes] would not 
repeat itself' and that an extension to the franchise would be agreed 178 . 
The Group stepped up their efforts for the TUC GC elections with the first use of the 
Automaticity process. In January 1983, they agreed 7 names for the II seats reserved 
for the 83 unions with under 100,000 members, and considered Godsiff s 
recommendation "that we consider voting for the Musicians' Union and the National 
Union of Seamen in return for their support for our candidates and.. more important, 
for support for our [NEC] nomineeS,, 179 . This could 
be the year Godsiff was referring to 
when he related how he often appealed to Ego rather than Principle when winning 
votes. "John Morton [Musicians' Union] was key at one point. I went to see him. He'd 
been soft-left. I said - we can put you top of the poll. But you have to do so and so .. 
171 Notes of 25 November 1986 meeting, EGA. 
" Notes of 23 June 1983 meeting, EGA. 
173 Notes of 7 May 1985 meeting, EGA. 
174 Notes of 21 January 1986 meeting, EGA. 
175 Notes of 22 February 1986 meeting, EGA. 
176 Where a left-wing by-election candidate had lost to the SDP. 
177 Notes of 28 April 1987 meeting, EGA. 
178 Notes of 21 July and 22 September 1987 meetings, EGA. 
179 TUC Slate, EGA. 
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His eyes lit up - and he delivered"180. In March, Godsiff presented a detailed analysis 
of TUC affiliation figures and the 29 candidates for the II seats, where the Left was 
hopeful of making gains, the Left unions having also been meeting, with ASLEF, 
ACTT and the FBU involved'81. The September results were heartening for the 
Moderates, when 7 of their slate were elected. The Daily Mail hailed this as "Right 
82 Turn"and "Militants are purged"' . It was a substantial tilt: the enlarged GC had a 
31: 20 moderate majority as opposed to 22: 23 before. By January, work started on the 
183 1984 slate, with a detailed assessment of the 1983 results . In 1984, the Group made 
another two gains, with 9 of their slate elected (and the remaining two the runners-up), 
due partly to: 
"Much more discipline amongst those unions who supported all, or most, of 
our recommended candidates and considerable indiscipline amongst the 
unions with candidates on the 'left slate' cause by blatant 'self-interest' and 
also by the fact that they only ran a slate of 10 candidates. It is quite 
obvious from the voting that a number of sitting members on the left slate 
did not vote for other candidates on the slate and were only interested in 
their own self-survival. The real cause for satisfaction was in the fact that 
the discipline exercised by [our] unions ensured that, almost without 
exception, all of our candidates advanced together"' 84 . 
Although not minuted, the Group took delight in ousting two prominent lcft-wingers, 
Alan Sapper (ACTT) and Ken Cameron (FBU). 
Discussions on the 1985 slate began in the February with the full slate of II (including 
Grantham as APEX's membership had dipped below 100,000) finalised in July. All but 
one were elected (ASLEF's Ray Buckton being the Left's sole success)185. This was 
not sufficient for the Group which wanted a full house. In September 1986 they "noted 
with satisfaction" that all II on its list were elected' 86 . However, they failed to appoint 
a whip as "on a number of recent votes on the General Council, the moderate majority 
had not asserted itself due to a lack of cohesion and it was agreed that discussions 
'80 Roger Godsiff interview. 
18, Financial Times, 18 April 1983. They were called the 'Tuesday Club% despite meeting on Mondays, in the Red Star, Soho Square, where they took turns to pay for supper. The group, which included Ken fill, Ken Cameron and Walter Greendale (but not Kitson) was close to Benn (though he did nottatlenaýAfter the Red Star, they met at different union offices until Nicholson found out they were meeting at the TGWU's Transport House - and Moss Evans said they had to go (Brian Nicholson interview). 
192 Daily Mail, 7 September 1983. 
, Godsiff paper, EGA. 11: 
4 EGA, 17 September 1984. 
13 Paper for 25 March 1986 meeting, EGA. 1: 6 Notes of 23 September 1986 meeting, EGA. 
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should be held with interested parties with a view to trying to ensure that this problem is 
187 
overcome" . In July 
1987, Godsiff credited the success over the previous four years in 
winning all II seats to 
"coordinated hard work and discipline based on mutual self interest, which 
has been greatly facilitated by the gradual emergence of a clear moderate 
majority among unions with under 100,000 members. It has also been 
helped by the fact that our recommended candidates have come from unions 
which reflect a wide spread of industrial interests, which had allayed the 
fears of a number of people that automaticity would lead to a 'take-over' by 
188 white collar unions in this Section7' 
The union leaders had achieved more than a simple transfer of power. Their work had 
helped strengthen the moderate forces within individual unions so that political belief 
rather than simple "deals" accounted for some of the results. 
The level of affiliation to the party became another problem, as unemployment soared 
and union membership declined. "Strong emphasis was placed by the meeting on the 
need for affiliated trade unions to retain and, if possible, increase their affiliation to the 
Party in view of the importance of the N. E. C. elections. It was agreed that discussions 
should be held with a number of unions" 189 . 
By mid- 1984, they had a new worry when the party entered discussions about reducing 
the unions' vote at conference from its existing 89%. In the 1950s, the union-CLP 
balance had been about 75: 25 but by 1981 it was nearer 90: 10, which was unsatisfactory 
for constituency members. The 1983 conference remitted a resolution calling for a 
rebalancing towards the CLPs; in May 1984 the NEC sought views on this. This 
timing was particularly unfortunate given that affiliates were preparing for the first 
round of ballots on the retention of Political Funds. "It was, therefore, agreed that 
unions should write to the Labour Party pointing out that this matter should not be 
pursued until all affiliated unions had conducted ballots in accordance with the new 
legislation"' 90. On behalf of APEX, though expressing the views of the other unions, 
Grantham stressed that no changes should be proposed "until all affiliated organisations 
have completed the ballots on the retention of their political funds as any controversy 
187 Notes off 24 February 1987 meeting, EGA. 
"' Notes and paper from 21 July 1987 meeting, EGA. 
189 Notes of II January 1983 meeting, EGA. 
190 Notes of 12 June 1984 meeting, EGA. The ballots were approached with concern. A poll for Channel Four's "Union World" showed that 55% of members thought unions should not be involved 
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arising from such proposals could adversely influence such ballots"191. In July 1985, 
the NEC drafted proposals for the 1986 conference to bring the two parts more into 
balance. Meanwhile, the Group emphasised the importance of maximising affiliation 
levels for the 1985 NEC elections 192 . 
Over time, the Group began to discuss conference resolutions, whereas in the beginning 
the focus had been on elections. In 1986, some pro-leadership resolutions were 
circulated and the Group agreed to support a TSSA resolution "seeking a wide-ranging 
re-examination of the Party's constitution" and one from APEX on the Labour 
Women's Conference 193 . The Group continued to take an interest in the wider party, 
but in November 1983 "Concern was expressed that the work of the Labour Solidarity 
Campaign had become moribund over the last few months". Members no doubt 
compared Solidarity with the activity rate of CLPD, whose literature was distributed to 
them by Godsiff. As this reflected the output of a dedicated team of hard-working 
volunteers, with detailed circulars, model resolutions, voting records from the NEC and 
methodical planning for conference 194 , the more modest output of the centre-right 
group, dedicated less to activists and more to parliamentarians, would have looked poor 
by comparison. However, in February 1984, they showed "more satisfaction with 
Labour Solidarity, and agreed to appoint three trade union representatives on to its 
Steering Committee". The Group also agreed to support "Labour Students 
195 Solidarity" , and 
in 1986 had a report back from Solidarity's National Advisory 
Council 196 . This was all in contrast with their view of Tribune, in respect of which they 
had urged unions to consider its tone before placing advertisements in it197. In 1987 the 
Group met with Solidarity to discuss NEC elections'98. 
The Group also looked at developments in the union movement, discussing a left-wing 
union conference held in Sheffield, and other left-wing groupings. The St Ermins 
Group worked with some non-affiliated unions to counter the Left, which led to the 
in party politics (Guardian, 2 March 1985). The final ballot was not due until December 1985, 
191 
leading to a year of uncertainly. 
Letter to David Hughes, Labour Party National Agent, 18 June 1984, EGA. 192 On 23 October 1984 when reviewing the 1984 results and again in February 1985; EGA. 193 Notes of 22 April, 20 May and 22 July 1986 meetings, EGA. 194 CLPD Bulletins, Newsletter, Executive minutes, AGM reports and minutes, EGA. I" Notes of May 1985, EGA. 
196 Notes of 20 MaY 1986 meeting, EGA. 
"' Notes of 22 July 1986 meeting, EGA. 
19, Notes of 24 March 1987 meeting, EGA. 
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creation of another organisation, "Mainstream", on 30 March 1985199. In addition, 
representatives from some non-party unions met with the Group occasionally, joining 
the Swinton House meetings at 6.30 pm, after Labour Party issues had been discussed. 
Turning to other business, the Group had a first discussion on the post-Mortimer 
General Secretary candidates in February 1984, and about the equivalent TUC position 
on 9 May after Len Murray announced his retirement. It was followed by a letter from 
Godsiff on the 14 May alerting members to the fact that Gavin Laird (AUEW) was 
interested in the post. When it later became clear there were just two in the race, 
Norman Willis (TGWU) and Murray's deputy, David Lea, there was the usual paper 
detailing the TUC's 10.135 million affiliated membership - which necessitated the 
winning candidate attracting 5.068 million votes. Godsiff's breakdown of committed 
support shows Willis with 50.78% (plus a further possible 4.5%) and Lea with 23.4%. 
On that basis, the final figures would be 70: 30. The actual figures were 7,362,000 to 
2,678,000 200. 
The following year, the new General Secretary of the party was appointed. A senior 
elected union official might have been expected to apply and for a time the smart money 
was on the GMWU's effective political operator and Chairman of the Conference 
Arrangements Committee, Derek Gladwin2o. In the event, it was another GMVYIU 
employee, Larry Whitty, who was also secretary to TULV, who beat the party's 
Scottish Secretary, Helen Liddell, to the post. The Group subsequently "agreed that 
every assistance should be given to him in dealing with the difficult problems with 
which he will be faced"202 .A hefty overdraft and continuing stffing problems were 
just two of these. His proposal for reorganising headquarters was discussed along with 
the action being taken against Militant in LiverpoOI203. Another crucial area was 
regional staff appointments, particularly Regional Secretaries, which were then in the 
hands of the NEC. The Group "was relentless" on these, understanding the importance 
199 February 1985 paper, EGA. 
200 August and September 1985 papers, EGA. 
201 
1 
But he was not asked. Had Kinnock said the word, he would have applied (Lord [Derek] Gladwin 
211 
of Clee, interview, 29 November 200 1). 
203 
Notes of 26 February 1985 meeting, EGA. 
Notes of 18 June 1985, EGA. 
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of organisational staff to achieving the electoral and political changes they were 
planning 204 . 
One issue which concerned the NEC, and the Group, was 'Black Sections' where these 
were apparently being set up (when GCs still selected candidates) to influence the 
choice of MPs. The unions believed such groups were unrepresentative of the black 
members they purported to represent. The 1984 conference voted 5 million to I million 
against Black Sections, so the Group supported the NEC "in upholding the Party 
constitution against those constituency parties who were seeking to subvert it". In June, 
the NEC was urged "to assert its authority over East Lewisham Party" where a 
candidate had been selected with the unauthorised participation of a Black Section 
delegate, contrary to an NEC ruling205. Whilst the NEC would never learn of such 
urgings, these minutes are evidence of NEC members taking advice from fellow Group 
members. 
Women's seats on the NEC were not the only female matter which engaged this all- 
male group. They arranged a slate for the TUC Women's Advisory Committee and in 
1983 they discussed the anti-union sentiments expressed at the National Conference of 
Labour Women, concerns shared by the TGNW206 - Little seemed to have improved, as 
there were continuing reports from the 1984 Conference 207 . In 1986, following concern 
over "open hostility towards trade union delegations", the party held a meeting with 
union representatives 208 . In March 1987, the party issued a consultation note on the 
future of this conference and the Group agreed a response to improve the situation. In 
1985, it had been the TUC women's conference which led to complaints, with the union 
leaders agreeing to take up their concerns about voting procedures with the TUC209. 
Throughout all of this, the Group's preoccupation had been on increasing their vote on 
the NEC. 1983 was always going to be difficult, Weighell's 1982 action and his 
subsequent departure jeopardising the NUR's vote. Jimmy Knapp, his successor, was 
on the Left, opening the possibility of left-wing gainS21 0. To make matters worse, the 
204 John Spellar, interview, 2003. 
205 Notes of 18 June 1985 meeting, EGA. 
206 "Why our women are so angry", Margaret Prosser, TGWU Record, EGA. 207 Notes of 12 June 1984 meeting, EGA. 
2011 Notes of 22 July 1996 meeting, EGA. 
2" Notes of 26 February 1985 meeting, EGA. 
210 Ohserver, 27 March 1983. 
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POEU, reflecting an internal shift to the Left, decided not to re-nominate Golding 
which, Martin Linton assessed, would "have a profound effect on the Labour Party". 
Linton portrayed Golding as "hardly a charismatic leader with his shambling look and 
his grey suits .. but he is far the most politically astute among the trade union 
211 
representatives that give the right its majority" . 1983 saw considerable changes to 
the slates and to voting. It was the first year when a full list of how each organisation 
had voted would be published. CLPD claimed that this meant "any repeat of the NUR 
-)212 saga will be on record .. which will 
be a strong deterrent against any repetition7 . In 
fact, the major effect was to end Militants standing in the CLP section (their candidates 
withdrew and never stood again), as votes for them would be obvious to any delegate's 
own CLp213 . Furthermore, because the general election had seen Joan Lestor and Ann 
Taylor lose their parliamentary seats, they were no longer automatically eligible for the 
NEC214 - though this took time to be confirmed. Ann Clwyd MEP had earlier written to 
Grantham seeking support, but without success215. However, when Taylor - on the 
Ennins' list - was ruled out, the Group switched to Clwyd (which saw her elected in 
second place on her first attempt). 
CLPD had been hoping for considerable gains in 1983.1982 had been a bad year for 
them, not so much for the loss of the Left majority on the NEC but because of "Deep 
,, 216 divisions within the CLPD . 
Their secretary, Vladimir Derer, in his AGM report on 
25 January 1983 (when CLPD had 1,203 members) wrote that " 1982 was a year of 
continual in-fighting". This resulted from their debate about whether to Register but the 
Militant issue spread into every consideration. Sawyer, on the Left's slate, was writing 
for LabourAgainst the Witch-Hunt and CLPD pressed for opposition to Witch-hunts to 
be the focus for conference activity. The Left seemed set to recapture the NEC217 . Its 
slate included anti-witch-hunters Beckett, Patricia Hewitt and Maynard together with 
Renee Short 219 . 
211 Guardian, 14 July 1983. 
212 CLPD "Guide for Conference Delegates", 1983. 
213 Tribune, 7 October 1983. 
214 Unless they became delegates from, and nominated by, their home CLPs. 21,14 July 1983 letter, EGA. She was pro-European, but against expulsions. 216 CLPD Newsletter, Number 27, May 1983. 
217 Tribune, 22 July 1983. 
21s CLPD circular, 20 June 1983. 
150 
ChaplerlO StErmins Group- The Slory 
The St Ermins Group was worried, not just because of CLPD. Its number-cruncher 
predicted: "In the women's section we are likely to lose two seats and could possibly 
lose all four" and would only achieve a small margin for Varley over [Albert] Booth as 
treasurer. Assuming Kinnock and Hattersley won the leadership and deputy leadership, 
the best guess was for 9 Moderates, 5 soft-left and 15 hard-left, giving the hard-left an 
overall majority of one 219. The actual results were better for the Group, even though 
Hoyle dislodged Howell. Judith Hart was defeated and Beckett failed to win. They lost 
Davis but Boothroyd, ClýWd and Dunwoody won - along with Maynard. Tribune 
judged "Kinnock holds the balance" (12: 12)220. It was, initially, unclear how the NEC 
would divide on key issues, with a new leadership in place (Hattersley having beaten 
the Left's Meacher as Deputy). In theory, "the right lost its overall majority .. returning 
its balance, as in 1981-2, to the centre-left leadership loyalists". In fact, this centre-left 
grouping, when aligned with the Right, "narrowly outnumbered the left"22 1 and Kinnock 
could command a majority. 
At the subsequent Swinton House meeting, there was satisfaction with the results 
"particularly bearing in mind the tremendous efforts that had been made by the 'hard 
Left' to try and defeat other sitting members"222 . Godsiff s analysis showed: 
"Due to indiscipline on the left and a lot of hard work we were able to 
minimise the damage in the [union] section and only Denis Howell lost his 
seat. Our [3] marginal candidates.. were all elected.. The discipline 
amongst our Group compared with the indiscipline on the left was crucial in 
minimising our loss of one seat.. the fact that the left slate only consisted of 
II candidates helped us considerably. .. Prior to Conference we expected 
the left to gain three seats .. In the event, the discipline amongst our Group, 
together with the indiscipline among the left.. resulted in a nett loss of one 
9223 seat and the important defeat of Judith Hart. .. we were lucky' 
They were not complacent; in February they started work on the 1984 slate. In looking 
at whom to support, the March meeting had a breakdown of Sawyer's votes on NEC 
decisions (such as: Tariq Ali; selections following boundary changes; Militant). This 
showed him voting contrary to the leadership on 15 key votes. Meanwhile, a new 
candidate was needed as party treasurer. Varley had resigned mid-term, allowing the 
runner-up Booth to replace him. Turnock observed that at "the first tests he joined the 
219 Godsiff paper, July 1983, EGA. 
220 Tribune, 7 October 1983. Similarly "A net gain of three" for the Left, had Kinnock holding the balance; Financial Times, 5 October 1983. 
221 
Eric Shaw, op cit, p. 254. 
222 Notes of I November 1983 meeting, EGA. 
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left.. [over] two issues. One was the student Conference, .. Booth voted with the left. 
The second issue [was] the proposed expulsion of 6 Blackburn members for Militant 
activity. Same voting". Booth had voted with Blunkett, Hoyle, Meacher and Sawyer 
against Kinnock and the Moderates 224 ; he had to go. The brothers noted that 
McCluskie (who was often helpful, wherever possible supporting Kinnock) was 
standing, so discussions began 225 . On the basis that the Group would support 
McCluskie and that he would win, Godsiff s May 1984 prediction was that "our 
position this year is 29,000 votes worse than last year due to reduced affiliations and 
we, therefore, need to ensure the maximum unity of support from amongst those unions 
who would normally support our candidates". Dropping Clwyd ("in view of her voting 
record"), they ran Boothroyd, Davis, Dunwoody, Diana Jeuda and Renee Short - 
supported in view of her "excellent" voting record and who thus moved directly to the 
Right slate from the Left's. By June, Godsiff was no more upbeat. "The position from 
which we start this year is no better than last year. Nearly all unions have suffered 
drops in their membership and.. a number of moderate unions will have reduced theirs. 
We had the advantage last year because the 'left slate' had only 11 names on it and a 
number of left unions cast at least one of their votes for moderate candidateS,, 226. Their 
nervousness showed, and a number of approaches were made to potentially sympathetic 
unions, with Godsiff preparing careful briefs for each union to help the particular Group 
member nominated to approach them. His emphasis was always on the marginal 
candidates, stressing to one general secretary, for example, that if he failed to get his 
delegation not to vote for Maynard, then to try and support the marginal Davis or Jeuda 
but certainly avoid Beckett "who could be a potential threat to one of our sitting 
candidates"227 . 
Despite Basnett failing to vote for Sawyer 228 , the 1984 results swung slightly to the 
Left229 although McCluskie held off a challenge from Booth for the treasurership and 
Davis replaced Clwyd 230 . Godsiff s verdict was that "Bearing in mind that on a straight 
223 January 1984 paper, EGA. 
214 Charles Tumock, op cit, p. 232. 
225 See Godsiff's recollection; p. 104. 
226 June 1984 paper, EGA. 
227 Briefing notes, August 1984, EGA. 
228 He promptly apologised to NUPE for this "erroe', Tribune, 5 October 1984. 
229 ibid. 
230 According to a teller, Boothroyd and Dunwody had "received only II constituency party votes apiece" (Tribune, 5 October 1984) - leading to pressure from the Left to remove the women's seats from union control. 
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calculation of figures between 'left' and 'moderate' we were 500,000 votes behind, the 
231 
results were not at all bad". The balance moved to a 17/12 Moderate majority . 
Tribune commented "Despite a paper majority for the Left in the trade unions and an 
overwhelmingly Left majority among the constituency parties, various deals between 
trade unions resulted in a seven-to-five majority for the Right in the trade union section 
and a four-to-one majority to the Right in the women's section". The paper blamed the 
TGWU, claiming it had "clearly struck some poor bargains" as it had voted for 9 right- 
wingers as well as failing to support TGWU-sponsored Beckett232. Perhaps Kitson 
topping the poll, with a massive 5.33 million votes, explains the TGWU's decision, 
concentrating unwisely on the size of an individual's majority in contrast to Godsiff's 
preoccupation with marginal candidates. Tribune noted the GMWU's failure to vote for 
Sawyer, despite their normal support for NUPE. However, as Sawyer was comfortably 
elected, further votes would have been wasted -a point the paper failed to grasp. The 
Campaign Group thought that the result was an improvement but should have been 
better as the Left had "a commanding 300,000 majority"233 . Other commentators 
noticed the imbalance between numbers and the results, Rodney Bickerstaffe 
complaining to Spellar: "Every time I go to Labour Party conference thinking we've 
got a left majority and every time you do itp-)234 . The Campaign Group noted the 
unsatisfactory result in the women's section where "the left should command a safe 
majority.. The fault seems to lie in the voting of the TGWU .. who could.. have.. 
elected at least M. Beckett and C. Short if they had strategically voted. However.. 
other unions also made misjudgements. .. unions.. do not seem to take the election in 
the women's section as seriously as other sectionS', 235. There may have been more to it 
than that. The Campaign Group Secretary (who presumably drafted these words) was 
the Left's number-cruncher, Alan Meale. According to one St Ermins Group activist, 
they benefited from "Meale's inability to count. Godsiff ran rings round hiM"236. 
In the treasurership election, McCluskie's narrow 46,000 victory was partly due to the 
Dyers and Bleachers' surprise vote (a union liberated from TGWU pressure by 
231 Godsiff paper, EGA. 
232 Tribune, 12 October 1984. 
233 1983/84 Annual Report of Campaign Group of Labour Mps, p. 16. 234 John Spellar, Interview, 2003. 
235 1993/94 Annual Report of Campaign Group of Labour MPs, P. 17. 236 John Spellar interview. There is no equivalent or counter balancing record of Meale's vote- gathering and counting in, for example, Benn's diaries for this period. 
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Automaticity 237 - though they might have supported McCluskie so that their left-wing 
nominee, Haigh, could capture the vacated seat). Despite his provenance, Haigh turned 
out to be a "Hero" to the Moderate's Whip: "Eddie was hung out to dry on one issue. 
Had said to me 'if I'm there for that issue, I will have to vote the way the union wants'. 
I told him: 'You go to the toilet, we'll spring the vote'. And we did just that! 99238 . (He 
joined the Moderates' slate in 1986 239. ) 
The new NEC had hardly got to work before work started on the 1985 slate. By May, 
10 of the names for the union section were agreed, with "finther discussions" to take 
place for the remaining two places. Richard Rosser and Ted O'Brien were then 
added 240 . The women's slate was finalised 
in July. Godsiff remained pessimistic, as 
"the 'moderate' unions trailed the 'left' unions by 500,000 votes last year 
and if anything will be accentuated through reduced affiliation [and 
mergers]. We need .. to ensure that the candidates we recommend .. 
have 
the widest possible appeal beyond our own group and also maintain 
maximum discipline.. to secure the extra votes which our marginal 
ý241 candidates will need to be elected' 
He thought the women might do better because of splits among the Left groups on their 
varying slates. The actual results, despite the Left's expectation of making gains 242 P 
gave "some considerable cause for satisfaction" as nine of their slate were elected in the 
union section. "There was intense competition for the marginal places .. but thanks to 
some favourable arrangements and the generous assistance of the moderate unions", the 
243 Group displaced Hoyle and got Colling elected . One women's seat was lost, when 
Beckett (this time with TGWU support) beat Davis. Overall, the Moderates would have 
a 15/14 majority on most issues "and on the big issues, where the credibility of the 
Leadership is at stake, the majority could be as high as 20: gi, 244. 
237 See above, p. 133. 
Gordon Colling interview. At times, the gents toilet must have been a busy place. 238 Kinnock also 
relates how often NEC members decided they needed to go, just when an awkward vote was coming 
(Kinnock interview). 
239 Notes of 22 July 1986 meeting, EGA. 
240 List of the slate, EGA. 
241 Godsiff paper, June 1985, EGA. 
242 Tribune, 23 August 1985. 
243 Helped by Meale having put Colling on the Left slate, even claiming his election as a success for 
244 
their side (1984/1985 Annual Report of Campaign Group of Labour MPs, p. 15). Godsiff paper, October 1985, EGA. 
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Shortly after, the CLPD Secretary wrote, under the subhead "The Decline of the Labour 
Left", that in 1981: 
"the Left lost five seats on the National Executive, and Tony Benn was 
defeated in the Deputy Leadership contest because the hitherto Left-wing 
NUPE cast its vote in favour of the Right-wing candidate. .. [In 19 82] the Left was routed over the Register and the scene was set for the expulsions of 
[Militant] supporters .. In the NEC election of that year there were ftirther Left losses. .. 1983 .. saw the Left-wing candidates in the Leadership and Deputy Leadership contest heavily defeated. An overwhelming majority of 
CLPs, and a sizeable majority of Left Labour MPs, voted for Neil Kinnock 
in preference to Eric Heffer. TU delegations voted for Kinnock en masse. 
and only a few supported Michael Meacher for Deputy Leader. In 1984 the 
pace of erosion of the Left's influence seemed to have slowed .. Yet the Left lost the .. Treasurership .. The miners' defeat early in 1985 and the isolation 
of Liverpool council.. gave the Leader and the NEC Right-wing majority a 
new strength at the 1985 Party Conference"245 . 
The Bulletin, circulated to the St Ermins Group, must have brought a knowing smile to 
the authors of these changes. 
Despite the 1985 successes, the grass was not allowed to grow before work on the 
following year's contests started. In February, support was agreed for McCluskie as 
treasurer and for the 5 women, plus 9 names in the union section while "discussions 
should continue with other interested persons". July saw a detailed, 15-page briefing on 
the candidates and voting numbers, which showed that, while in 1985 
6'we had to exercise considerable agility and flexibility in order to get 9 of 
our candidates in the Trade Union section and 3 .. 
in the women's section 
elected.. [as] we were over 600,000 votes behind [the left] in the .. 
Unions' 
section and nearly one million votes behind in the women's section. There 
are.. indications that the situation in the Trade Union section will have 
improved the prospects of moderate candidates". The meeting noted "the 
need to maximise the support for our recommended candidates and to 
ensure that the credibility and trust which has been built up over the last five 
years, thereby enabling major changes to be made in the composition of the 
q-)246 N. E. C., was retained 
Howell withdrew his nomination "in order not to split the votes for recommended 
candidates" (the Group wishing him good luck for the 1992 Olympic bid he was 
overseeing), and Lestor was agreed as a reserve for the women's seat. 
Godsiff s 1986 briefing paper was more Optimistic as "Political changes within TGWU 
could result in gains for moderate candidates". McCluskie had indicated he would 
245 , Secretary's Statement", CLPD Bulletin 11, january 1986. 
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continue as treasurer even if he became general secretary of the NUS, rather than move 
to the General Council. However, despite the better omens and at a time "when the 
political climate has moved strongly against disruptive elements within the party and on 
the N. E. C. ", Godsiff as ever writes "it is essential that unity and discipline is maintained 
247 among the moderate unions" . On the eve of conference, Godsiff noted that, of the 12 
supported for the union seats, nine "were well placed to retain their seats" but maximum 
support was required for the marginal three. On the women's section, problems were 
anticipated and 
"mindful of the.. widespread agreement on the need to ensure that an 
increased number of persons were elected.. who will be supportive of the 
leadership of Neil Kinnock, thereby enabling him to spend more time out 
and around the country campaigning on behalf of the Party, it was agreed 
that every effort should be made to maximise the support for Anne Davis 
and Diana Jeuda who were best placed to gain seats currently held by 
Beckett and Maynard". In a telling note, he recommended that if support 
was needed to bolster Lestor, "it would be taken from Renee Short or Betty 
Boothroyd who were already guaranteed re-election with very large 
majorities"248 . 
On the opposing side, Blunkett was urging support for Beckett and Maynard, who 
would be successful "if the constituencies and not the block vote of the trade unions 
9249 counted' 
The actual results were evidence of the Group's efforts. The unusually long minute 
gives an insight into the modus operandi of the Group. In the union section, 10 of the 
12 were elected, Rosser being beaten by the NUM's Clarke despite 
"considerable effort and organisation [being] expended on maximising [his] 
vote.. After 'arrangements' had been made with some 'I eft' union, it 
appeared, with half an hour left before the ballot closed, that Rosser would 
be elected. Unfortunately, the 'left' were then successful in persuading 
GMBATU250 to switch their votes to Eric Clarke.. [Had] the GMBATU 
voted for Rosser instead of Clarke, which they had originally intended to, 
Rosser would have been elected 10,000 ahead of Clarke". The women's 
section reflected some equally nifty footwork. "In the women's section we 
gained an extra seat with the election of Diana Jeuda at the expense of Margaret Beckett. Again, 'arrangements' with certain 'left' unions worked 
to our advantage, particularly the support obtained from ASTMS for Jeuda. 
.. Anne Davis was in contention up until Monday lunch-time but was finally 
246 Notes of July 1985 meeting, EGA. 
247 Notes of 21 January, 25 February, 22 April, 22 July and 19 August 1986 meetings, EGA. 249 Notes of 23 September 1986 meeting, EGA. 
249 David Blunkett Column, Tribune, 5 September 1986. 
The GMWU had been through a number of name changes, at this stage having merged with the Boilermakers Union. 
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beaten by the decision of the UCATT delegation, after three ballots, to 
support Maynard and not Davis". Overall, Godsiff s plotting and 
"arrangements" led to a gain of one seat in the women's section and "a more 
reliable replacement for Alex KitsoW 9251 -a Moderate majority of 18: 1 1252. 
CLPD concurred, heading their report "NEC Elections - Right Gains Significantly"253 . 
The Times'succinct "Right wing tightens grip on NEC" took account of a further 
Moderate gain, where Heffer was defeated in the CLP section by Tam Dalyell, 
benefiting from his persistent criticism of Thatcher's Falklands role254. Shaw described 
how, "By 1986, the work, begun several years earlier by John Golding, of constructing 
a solid bloc of leadership loyalist encompassing virtually all trade union members of the 
9255 Executive had been completed' . CLPD later noted: "Since 1981 the political 
composition of the NEC has been changing. Increasingly nominees of the party's right 
wing have been elected. This partly reflects the shift of opinion in the country. But it is 
also due to successful electioneering by the right wing in the party and the trade unions. 
Its effectiveness was not matched by the left. As a result, the right wing has made 
substantial direct gains in the Trade Union and Women's Sections"256 . 
After the 1986 results, Godsiff allowed himself the luxury of reviewing their NEC 
losses and gains, noting that "The Conference in 1981 marked the beginning of the 
'fight back' by the moderates .. to stem the advance of the broad left". He set out the 
changes which "culminated in the election this year of an N. E. C. overwhelmingly 
supportive of the Parliamentary leadership and with a very large moderate majority,, 257. 
The Group took no respite, and the 1987 slate was in preparation by February, with the 
added complication of Turnock's retirement258. The list was finalised in July, Lestor 
taking the place vacated by Boothroyd (who was about to become a Deputy Speaker in 
the House of CommonS)259. Problems were anticipated, the meeting urging maximum 
support "for our 3 most marginal candidates" in the union section. The women's 
section was fluid although it was "quite possible that all five .. could win .. provided the 
maximum discipline was maintained, but that any fall off in support could result in the 
251 Jack Rogers of UCATT. 
252 Notes of 21 October 1986 meeting, EGA. 
253 CLPD Newsletter, Conference Edition. 
251 The Times, I October 1986. 
255 Eric Shaw, op cit, p. 270/1. 
256 CLPD letter to supporters, August 1987. 
257 October 1986 paper, EGA. 
259 Notes of 24 February, 24 March and 29 April 1987 meetings. Unusually, Turnock was named - to be thanked - in the September 1987 minutes, EGA. 
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loss of one seat". All five were deemed "marginal" so maximum support sought for 
a11260. (In previous years, votes could be switched from Boothroyd, who attracted 
widespread support and was bound to win, to help a worse placed sister - something the 
former cheerfully accepted. ) In fact, the 1987 results were the "Best Evee 9261 . All ten 
union seats were retained plus two gained in the women's section so that, for the first 
time, all five were in Moderate hands. The number-cruncher commented that 
"Bearing in mind.. we were more than 180,000 worse off than last year, 
these results give considerable cause for satisfaction and were due to the 
overall excellent discipline exercised by those unions who support our 
recommended candidates and.. the very considerable help given by unions 
in the arrangement which were made to protect.. our most marginal 
candidateS"262. 
Early in 1986 the Group started thinking about the composition of what was to become 
the National Constitutional Committee (NCC). One of the Group's early objectives had 
been to rid the party of "infiltrators". St Ermins Group members of the NEC had been 
in the forefront of this unpalatable work. Ken Cure chaired the Appeals and Mediation 
Committee from 1983 to 1987, leading a number of difficult investigations. Turriock 
led some of the biggest enquiries - especially into Liverpoo1263 . The NEC itself 
undertook expulsions - spending days on the Liverpool Militants, for example, and 
running into legal difficulties when the same people who had conducted an enquiry also 
then tried to hear the expulsions. The demands on the Leader's time in these cases was 
wasteful, the publicity damaging. Natural justice demanded a separate body to 
adjudicate on cases once the NEC had decided to formulate charges. Hence the creation 
of the NCC. 
In summer 1986, the Group welcomed the plans for such a committee and "agreed that 
consideration should be given.. to the names of persons who unions would wish to 
nominate .. [as] a postal ballot would take place" after the October conference 264 . The 
balancing of unions' interests had to be carefully weighed. As there were to be only 5 
union and two women's seats (the latter effectively union controlled), "it was 
"' Notes of 21 July 1987 meeting, EGA. 
260 Notes of 22 September 1987 meeting, EGA. 
261 Godsiff paper, 27 October 1987, EGA. 262 ihid. 
263 Turnock and Cure were involved in reports on St Helens, Sparkbrook, Knowsley North, Brent East 
264 
and Bristol South (Charles Turnock's papers). 
Notes of 22 July and 19 August 1986 meetings, EGA. 
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recommended that no union should consider nominating for both"265 . Godsiff s paper 
in October noted that a number of unions wanted to make nominations but that there 
was "an obvious need to ensure that those unions who do not have a nominee already on 
the [NEC] are sympathetically considered". Despite that hint, the Group agreed to 
support nominees of the AUEW, GMWU and TGWU and to consider Keith Brookman 
(ISTC) and Rose Degiorgio (APEX), whilst further consultations took place. The list 
posted out on 14 November did not include Alan Quinn of TGWU in view of his 
association with Militant, but urged full support for the others "in view of the absolute 
necessity to ensure that the [NCC] has a clear majority of members who will act 
responsibly to ensure that the rules and constitution of the party are upheld', 266 . The 
elections - unusually at that time by postal ballot - gave the Group four of the 5 union 
places (Quinn having been elected). It would, said Godsiff s paper, have been unheard 
of for any TGWU nominee to be defeated in a trade union election, though that union's 
mistake in choosing such a candidate almost achieved the impossible. All the unions 
which normally followed the Group slate voted for Eric George rather than Quinn, other 
than the GMWU - without whose votes the TGWU flag-carrier would have lost. In the 
women's section, the GMVrU supported the slate so both candidates were elected over 
the TGWU nominee, as "favourable arrangements" had been concluded. The balance 
on the NCC was 7: 4 for the Moderates, a result which was "much welcomed" and only 
achieved "because of the discipline which existed amongst those unions which 
traditionally supported our recommended candidates"267 . 
After the 1987 conference, the Group reviewed the impact they had made since 1981 
across the NEC, NCC and TUC General Council. On the NEC, the Group had won 10 
out of 12 union and all 5 women's seats; on the NCC, 4 out of 5 union and both the 
women's seats; and all II in the "under 100,000" GC seCtion268. Outside observers 
concurred: the 1987 NEC providing "a comfortable soft-left/ centre-right base" for 
KinnoCk269. It was a mammoth achievement for these dozen men, who had met 
monthly and laboured hard by persuasion and some darker methods (or "hairy 
265 Notes of 23 September 1986 meeting, EGA. 
266 Sandy Feather papers. 
267 Notes of the 27 January and 24 February 1987 meetings, EGA. 268 Paper for 27 October 1987 meeting, EGA. 
269 Alan Sked and Chris Cook, op cit, p. 568. 
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stunts', 270) to change the political complexion of the governing councils of the Labour 
movement. 
From the disaster of 1981 to the June 1987 election was barely six years, but in this time 
the Moderates felt the party's fortunes had been turned, even though an election victory 
was still ten years' off. A Leader determined to change the party had been elected, and 
he was backed by an NEC determined to walk that road with him. Could it have 
happened without the St Ermins Group? It seems unlikely as, again and again, the 
Moderates lacked the numbers but made up for it with discipline and cunning, both in 
marshalling votes for NEC seats and then in utilising them on the NEC. 
It is said by some that it was not organisation but the shock of the SDP departure, 
followed by the 1983 election disaster, which turned the party around 271 . This 
underestimates the impact of Duffy's success in moving the AUEW to the Moderate 
cause, which he achieved by late 198 1272 as well as the unions' determination to rid 
themselves of Thatcher. It was their members who suffered from her industrial and 
other policies and they knew this prior to the 1983 defeat. As the archives show, their 
efforts and some of the major victories (Automaticity, seizing the NEC majority and 
Healey's Deputy Leadership victory) preceded that election. The Moderate NEC 
members found that they had many years of neglect to correct, as the Left's long control 
of the NEC had secured a staff immune to their objectives, a deep penetration of the 
party by Militant and an electorate hostile to Labour. They were also dealing with a 
1273 large organisation which "like an oil tanker, is hard to turn round, 
Commentators have stressed the importance of organisation in political partieS274 but 
few have glimpsed the professionalism and determination of this Group of union 
leaders. Some did understand it: "The preconditions of Labour Party recovery would 
be brought about.. by untrumpeted union men .. who would work - much as [Bill] 
Rodgers had worked twenty years before - through the unions, to shift the NEC back to 
reason q1275 . Pearce refers to the "regular gatherers at the St Ermine's (sic) Hotel, 
` Roger Godsiff interview. 
271 Tom McNally interview. 
272 Roy Grantham interview. 
273 Gerry O'Brien, interview, 16 February 2002. 
274 Patrick Seyd, op cit, p. 113; Eric Shaw, op cit, p. 224; 
- Unions in British Politics, Longman, 1982, p. 24. 273 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 535. 
Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook (eds), Trade 
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Labour's favourite resort of conspiracy and so known as 'the St Ennine's Group'. .. The 
campaign, not just to re-elect Healey, but over a longer period to restore a moderate 
NEC and put the Labour Party back on the rails deserves a full study to itself. It came 
. )276 before red roses and mattered more' 
Two politicians confirm this. Healey admitted: "Without the unions, change wouldn't 
have happened"277 . The other was Kinnock, both in intervieW278 and in his inscriptions 
in a couple of books. In Tony Clarke's copy of his book, Kinnock wrote: "Without you 
many parts of this book would not have been written', 279 and on Turnock's monograph 
he wrote "to Charlie with thanks for sense, socialism - and some of the best laughs 
too!! -)128O. It should be remembered that Kinnock's crucial 1985 Bournemouth speech, 
on Militant, was delivered with the massed ranks of a supportive NEC behind him on 
the platform. 
Kinnock also acknowledged not only their diligence and discipline, but the unpopularity 
this sometimes brought them within their own unions: 
"Self-discipline and collective discipline.. They had a fundamental belief in 
the use of votes .. At a later stage, they said, we've got to win the 
arguments as well as votes. What made them say that to me was that, even 
with good organisation, even with winning seats consistently on the NEC, 
they never had quite enough to ensure a guaranteed outcome when just one 
or two of the trade union group voted in another direction.. In order to 
ensure unanimity, or something like it, in the trade union group, they had to 
win arguments, .. they had to win the vote and arguments .. 
So they 
acknowledged having a solid, disciplined group with particular organised 
political objectives in mind, would be crucial but sometimes it wasn't quite 
enough.. The trade union people were putting themselves on the line; they 
were representing their leadership stance but not the unanimous view of 
their annual conferences. Didn't automatically win them popularity and 
support within their own unions. So they took some riskS,, 281. 
276 ibid, p. 557. 
277 Denis Healey interview. 
2711 Neil Kinnock interview. 
279 Tony Clarke interview. 
211 Charles Turnock, "Labour Needs 30 Miracles", 1987 - front cover. 28 1 Neil Kinnock interview. 
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Thus whilst unions were blamed, following the Winter of Discontent, for Labour's 
travails, there seems little doubt that this committed band harnessed the resources and 
commitment to Labour within the movement to steer the party back towards electability, 
for, without a compliant NEC, it is unlikely that Kinnock could have succeeded. The St 
Ermins Group continued for nearly another decade but its toughest assignment had been 
completed by 1987. Just as, in 193 1, trade unionists including Ernest Bevin had played 
a decisive role in steadying the party, 50 years later it fell to another generation of union 
leaders to maintain the party created by the unions in 1900 as an electoral force. 
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"Giles Radice is given the creditfor building up something 
calledthe 'Manifesto Groupwhich helpedsave theparty. So 
far as I remember, it was Solidarity which did thisjob over the 
dead body of the Manifesto Group 
Austin Mitchell, Solidarity Treasurer 
"Solidarity .. tried hard [but] had neither the resources 
nor the leadership to be successful" 
John Golding, Solidarity Member ý 
The Manifesto Group had failed to deliver the party leadership for Healey or to hold the 
PLP together. The party adopted the Wembley 40: 30: 30 formula for the Electoral 
College, leading to the Limehouse Declaration within 24 hours and the SDP within two 
months. Wembley also led to the creation of the St Ermins Group and to the better 
known Labour Solidarity Campaign. This was set up 24 days after the conference, 
partly in recognition that the Moderates' failure to organise 3 had allowed the Left to 
engineer the very formula that would produce the schism. Solidarity was created to 
reverse that formula and to stem the flow of defections from the party. The vitriol 
within the party, and the condemnation of the 1974-79 governments, had left the 
Moderates on the backfoot. They now believed that they had to act if the party was to 
return to "sanity" and electability. Their aims consolidated as: changing the Wembley 
formula, OMOV, expelling Militant, creating a tolerant party, getting a Moderate 
majority on the NEC, keeping members in the party, arguing the case for representative 
(or parliamentary) democratic socialism - and achieving these by organising the natural 
majority within the party. 
This chapter tells the story of Solidarity and tests the above views of its Treasurer 
(Austin Mitchell) and a supporter (John Golding), one of whom praised, one of whom 
questioned, the role it played in "saving" the party. Mitchell places it above the 
Manifesto Group, Golding below the St Ermins Group. Both may be correct. 
Austin Mitchell, "Party People: Review of Dictionary of Labour Biography". The House Magazine, 
4 November 2002. 
John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 18 1. 
Cited by Spellar, quoting the Left's tale of its better organisation: Chris Mullin in Tribune, 30 
January 1981 (JSA). 
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Immediately after Wembley, centre-right MI's experienced the loss of colleagues - and 
the haemorrhaging of Manifesto Group numbers - to the SDP. Confronted with 
resignations from the PLP, the Moderates had to act fast. Their response was a 
Statement by 150 MPs - Tribunites as well as Manifesto members - which, while 
accepting an Electoral College, disagreed fundamentally with the formula. "All of us 
agree that the decision of Wembley was a mistake and should be rectified at the earliest 
opportunity'A . These 150 were the pool 
from which Solidarity emerged, and comprised 
the invitation list for its February founding meeting. 
Within days of Wembley, Spellar wrote to a number of senior MPs (who became the 
Solidarity leadership) and senior trade unionists calling for the creation of a 
organisation to replace CLV, involving general secretaries, MPs and party members. 
"If the moderate majority in the Party are to assert themselves and turn the tide then we 
will have to become as effectively organised as our opponents" wrote Spellar, proposing 
as priorities: ajournal, regional conferences, control of the NEC and a "statement of 
purpose" drafted by Hattersley. This latter described how: 
"For too long, the natural majority within the Labour Movement - left, right 
and centre - has allowed unrepresentative minorities to impose their own 
narrow views upon the Party .. To leave the Party now is both defeatist and divisive. Our prime task is to put the Party back on course and .. save the ,6 country from the ruinous policies of Margaret Thatchee . 
Spellar's paper, slightly redrafted, was adopted by the Group together with a statement 
of purpose: "The recreation of a Labour Party which is: genuinely representative of the 
millions.. who support the Movement; broadly based and tolerant of all democratic 
socialist opinion; safeguarded against infiltration and domination by extremist factions; 
determined to protect the democratic rights and electoral responsibilities of Members of 
Parliamenf'. The immediate objectives were: "To reverse the Wembley decision; to 
obtain a moderate majority upon the N. E. C.; to seek the adoption of moderate 
candidates; .. to confirm in office the elected leadership of the LPO. 
It is interesting to note this early preoccupation with infiltration, and the need to defend 
the position of elected representatives. The paper reflected the Group's analysis that 
4 Statement by ISO MPs, January 198 1, MGA. 
Including John Smith, Robertson, Hattersley, Shore, Radice, Healey, Mitchell, Golding, Boothroyd, 
Dunwoody (handwritten notes, JSA). 
6 Undated paper, JSA. 
7 Woolmer's handwritten amendments to Spellar paper, MGA. 
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without a change to the NEC, few problems would disappear. The suggestion of 
finding reliable candidates mirrors one of the successful activities of the earlier CDS8. 
The cornment on the "elected leadership" was a portent of Benn's challenge to Healey 
only weeks later9. 
Whilst Spellar put pen to paper, MPs knew they must act urgently to hold on to 
members and reassure them that the bulk of Moderates were remaining in the party. 
Hattersley credits the energy behind this to Howell: 
"Solidarity wasn't my idea. Nothing about it was my idea. Denis Howell .. 
came into my office after the Wembley conference .. and said 'You've got to take the lead. You have got to do all these things'. I said: 'Why me, 
why not Denis HealeyT .. He said 'Denis Healey won't'. I suspect he had 
asked already asked Denis [Healey]. .. Denis Howell called the meeting in 
the Grand Committee Room; Denis Howell sent out the notices; Denis 
Howell phoned round people; Denis Howell badgered me into phoning 
round people; Denis Howell attended the meeting and announced to them 
that I was the Chairman of this new organisation"10. 
An initial group, including Howell and three acting officers (Hattersley as Chainnan, 
Woolmer as Secretary and Mitchell as Treasurer), met before the inaugural meeting. 
Preparations included the choice of a name". This emerged in a meeting in Healey's 
room in the Shadow Cabinet corridor when a group was "picking his brains, and it was 
at the time of Lech Walesa in Poland. It was Healey's idea: 'only one namc you can 
give it: Solidarity' he said"12 . 
On 17 February, 102 MPs 13 from the IS 0 signatories met under the chairmanship of 
Hattersley and agreed to establish the Labour Solidarity Campaign 14 .A Steering 
Committee was appointed" - drawn from the Manifesto Group, Labour First and 
Tribune - and the meeting agreed to advertise its presence, organise regional rallies, 
issue a newsletter and open an office. Within two days, its Treasurer was soliciting 
funds from MPs, whilst others were building up contact lists. On the 18 February, the 
officers circulated a statement endorsed by the 102. This referred to those defecting, as 
1 Denis Howell, op cit, Brian L. Brivati, op cit, Jim Cattermole interview. 
Woolmer always suspected this would happen (Ken Woolmer interview). 
10 Roy Hattersley interview. 
11 Suggestions included Democratic Labour Movement, Labour Movement Action, Representative 
Labour Movement; Labour Representative Movement (JSA). 
12 Ken Woolmer interview. 
13 Including Healey. The initiative was further supported by 10 absentees, Guardian, 18 February 1991. 
14 Notes of the meeting, JGP. 
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well as to others "who don't believe in Parliament" trying to take over the party, and 
defined the organisation as being "to give Labour new life as a tolerant party that 
believes in carrying out effective socialist policies through action in Parliament". The 
Group set itself limited objectives, as Geoffrey Smith noted, when he described 
Solidarity "with backing from some of the reasonable left as well as from the right and 
centre" as being "well placed to isolate the Militant Tendency and other representatives 
of the hard left". But its aims concerned only "the way in which Labour conducts its 
affairs, not [its] policies"16 . This accurate portrayal 
belies that fact that, for Solidarity, 
there was no hope of changing policies until the composition of the NEC, and the 
pressures on MPs from hard-left activists, could be changed. In addition, the breadth of 
support of MPs meant that "Members of the Campaign have widely different positions 
on current political issues"17 . Indeed, short of agreeing that Thatcher was 'a bad thing', 
the Steering Group might have been hard pressed to draft any policy the 102 MPs could 
endorse. But that was its strength. By abstaining from policy, Solidarity could attract 
MPs from a wide spectrum, making it easily the major grouping in a PLP of 251 
members. 
Only the names Hattersley, Woolmer and Mitchell were initially on the headed 
notepaper. However, at the first recorded meeting of the Steering Committee, 
Hattersley welcomed Shore's attendance and invited him to become Joint Chairman. 
Howell had pressed on Hattersley the need for a second figurehead - and another 
"aspirant for leadership" of the party - so that the organisation did not look like an 
18 
embryo 'Hattersley for leader' campaign . Shore accepted, stressing that the "only 
people not organised in the Labour Party are the great majority"19. By this first 
meeting, the group had already raised E400 together with the promise of a E6,000 
donation. They knew they must spend fast (initially on advertisements in Tribune and 
Labour Weekly) to build momentum. The veteran journalist John Bevan 20 agreed to edit 
a newsletter while an Organising Committee, chaired by Jack BrookS21, set about 
is See annex 6. 
16 The Times, 27 March 1981. 
17 John Grant The Post, July 198 1. 
Is Roy Hattcrsley interview. 
19 Steering Committee Minutes, 24 February 198 1, DRIVI /2 (Roy Hattersley/ Labour Solidarity 
Archives, University of Hull). All Solidarity papers are from the Hull archives unless otherwise stated. 
20 Lord Ardwickf-c, r-b: 5 merý, hes-). 21 Lord Brooks of Tremorfa; Callaghan's Agent, Chairman of Welsh Regional Council of the Labour party and Leader of South Glamorgan County Council. 
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finding offices. At first, proceedings were a little informal, early minutes referring to "a 
lot of humming and Hahing" and "a vague Treasurer's report which seemed to satisfy 
some people who were worried about finance', 22 but gradually the more formal 
requirements of an organisation emerged, not least when Mary Goudie became the 
National Co-ordinator 23 . 
Within the PLP, Solidarity's first aim was to stem the trickle of defectorS24 . However, it 
had also to replace the former activists' grouping, CLV, many of whom had joined the 
SDP, and assure the wider party that the mainstream were remaining in the party and 
fighting - this being the critical period between the Limehouse Declaration of 25 
January and the SDP's launch on 26 March. Its priority was therefore to establish a 
presence and to sign up supporters. Fringe meetings at all the regional conferences 
(between March and June) were quickly arranged whilst work began on the newsletter. 
John Grant, MP and former j ournalist, agreeing to write and to drum up advertising 
revenue from unions, to meet costs but also to emphasise that all the centre-right unions, 
and their leaders, were remaining in the Labour UP. 
Solidarity set out its stall as being "broadly representative of the Party's natural 
mainstream majority" which should now "vigorously assert itself and reverse the 
narrow and intolerant decision which unrepresentative minorities have" imposed upon 
us. Wembley, "the most recent self-inflicted wound.. must be overturned". The 
founding statement flagged up the need for the NEC to "more adequately represent the 
wide variety of Party interests. .. We have no doubt that to leave the Party now is both 
defeatist and divisive .. our over-riding priority .. is to get the Party back on course. 
We pledge ourselves to fight enthusiastically and unswervingly to that end"26 . The 
Group had to react to fast-moving events, not least the resignation on 2 March of 12 
MPs from the PLP (as a prelude to moving to the SDP). That day, Solidarity regretted 
"the divisive and defeatist decision of the small group of dissident MPs, who have 
mistakenly opted to defect.. and to abandon the real battle against both this appalling 
Tory government, and against the unrepresentative minority in our own ranks.. A major 
I Steering Committee minutes of 26 February 198 1 (DRWI /2). 
23 Though this formal title was not used until 1982; Steering Committee minutes, 24 November 1982 
(DRIVI/2). 
24 Giles Radice interview. 
Woolmer recruited Grant to try and prevent him defecting - something that did happen, albeit not until November (Ken Woolmer interview; and JGP). 
26 Solidarity Archives, Hull. 
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fight back is now under way.. We urge real Labour supporters everywhere to pledge 
their immediate backing for the Labour Solidarity Campaign"27 . On 26 March, 
Solidarity described the SDP launch as a "declaration of war on Labour, led by those 
who owe both their reputations and their careers to the Labour Party.. It is now clear 
that the defections were plotted long before.. [the] Wembley.. decision on the 
leadership election -a decision which Labour Solidarity wants to see rectified "28. The 
defectors had been fortunate that Wembley had voted for such an untenable formula, 
giving the SDP this, rather than the less popular Europe, on which to make their stance. 
Hence the importance of Solidarity emphasising that Wembley was not universally 
applauded within the party. 
In February and March, the priority was to emphasise these views and make it clear that 
this Group was not defecting. CLV's mailing list, held on the EETPU computer, was 
made available so that in February a circular could go from Mitchell inviting members 
to sign up to Solidarity. His letter claimed "There is no salvation29 outside the Labour 
Party. .. It is essential to fight back. Desertion reinforces weakness". The CLV list, 
together with contacts from MPs and others, was used for the first edition of the 
newsletter which appeared in March, with its leader "The Road Back from 
Wembley"30 . In common with the composition of the Steering Committee, the 
contributors reflected the breadth of support, with Manifesto members (Radice and 
Hattersley) being joined by Tribunite Ashton (on "How to choose a delegate to 
conference") and Field as well as the anti-Marketeer Shore. Shore criticised the NEC 
for encouraging some "whose faith in democratic and parliamentary socialism is 
virtually non-existent", failing to safeguard the party's constitution and tilting the 
balance of power away from elected representatives. He saw the party being "seriously 
threatened by both splitters and wreckers" whilst "the majority opinion.. is not being 
reflected in the present disputes". Local government was represented by Jack Smart, 
Chairman of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities. The newsletter and other 
publicity quickly attracted supporters (including a young Tony Blair3l); by September 
there was a mailing list of 5,000. 
27 Reprinted as "Their Mistaken Option", Labour Solidarity, March 198 1. 29 Press release, JGP- 
29 Later versions amended this to "Solution". 30 Labour Solidarity, March 198 1. 
31 Letter of 14 April 198 1. 
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Meanwhile, the Organising Committee 32 found premises at 62 Charles Lane, in 
London's St Johns Wood 33 . The Campaign moved 
in at the beginning of June, hitherto 
the work having been done at the Commons or Goudie's home. Goudie was to be the 
lynchpin throughout Solidarity's life, taking no salary from the Group - and even her 
expenses not always reimbursed when the finances were stretched 34 . In April, the 
Committee agreed to engage a paid administrator and Chris Inman was taken on for the 
remainder of the year, with Goudie using her extensive contacts, built up over years of 
party and Fabian activity, to recruit volunteers to asSist35. 
Goudie's priority was to set up Fringe Meetings, most urgently at the party's regional 
conferences and at the Annual Conference in Brighton. Her address book of members 
around the country - and her persuasiveness - brought in volunteers to book rooms, 
print flyers and distribute leaflets. It was partly the success of these which gave 
Solidarity life, as party members could see the presence of the Group and hear Healey, 
Shore and Hattersley not only say 'we are staying' but also 'we are fighting our comer 
and we will take on the hard-left'. This was a message Moderate members had long 
sought but had found neither from the Manifesto Group (which had no constituency 
presence) nor from CLV which was too overtly pro-Europe and always had a hint of 
distance Oustified when most of their leaders did defect). Solidarity filled a great need; 
its newsletter and fringe meetings were testimony to its seriousness. The Telegraph 
acknowledged "the group has made a considerable impact on the party by staging fringe 
meetings at regional conferences"36 . At the first of these, in Camden Town Hall during 
the London conference, Hattersley set out the task facing Solidarity: "a re-affirmation 
of faith in the Labour Party", victory at the election, and to oppose "with all the vigour 
at its disposal, the enemies of democratic socialism" - the Tories, the defectors and the 
"unrepresentative minorities within the Labour Party.. [who] pursue their own sectarian 
causes". He attacked the "bitter propaganda of the Rank and File Mobilising 
Committee, the devious manoeuvres of Militant, the divisive threats of litigation from 
the [CLPD] .. and all the "disruptives, .. authoritarian extremism" dressed up "in 
32 See annex 6. 
33 Rented from Labour-affiliated Poale Zion. 
34 For example, in 1984 (DRH/l/24). In 1986 she even had to guarantee the Organisation's overdraft 
35 
(DRIVI/3). 
Including Jennifer Beever, Richard Tomlinson, Alison Butler and Evan Durbin s widow, Marjorie, with Kay Graves, Jo Wilkins, Sally Graveling and Betty Clarkson helping Out - sometimes paid, sometimes for the cause. 36 Daily Telegraph, 20 April 198 1. 
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acceptable socialist language", and calling on "real Labour Party members to play an 
increasing part in the work of the movemenf', including having a direct vote in the 
Electoral College. He turned on the Left's "category of alleged crimes committed by 
the last Labour GovernmenV' (an attack on the un-named Benn)37. 
A notable Fringe Meeting took place in Ely, on a sunny Saturday lunchtime on 13 June. 
Shore was to speak but when Weetch checked the room, he found it was a long way 
from the Eastern Regional Conference. He asked Shore how he felt about outdoor 
meetings and, receiving an enthusiastic reply, set up a massively successful rally on the 
Green which (despite "heckling from the Trots") gave real energy to the large, loyalist 
38 membership that existed in East Anglia 
Whilst practical and propaganda hands were turned to the mechanisms of setting up a 
new body and building its profile, Dewar, Field and Radice penned "a brief note on 
strategy,, 39. This suggested that the Group's objectives should be, inter alia, 
encouraging members not to leave the party, making the party more tolerant and more 
representative, and arguing the case for representative democracy. The three MPs 
raised questions for urgent decision, such as the preferred formula to replace 
Wembley's and whether it would include OMOV in the CLPs; whether to have a slate 
for the NEC or to propose a change in its composition (such as adding PLP and local 
government sections), and whether to ask for an enquiry into Militaneo. They 
prioritised an office, newsletter, meetings' programme and supporters' list, all of which 
were quickly achieved. The following week - in a bid to involve unions - it was agreed 
to prepare a letter, from Healey and the Joint Chairmen, to general secretaries. 
Meanwhile, the officers found the party unwelcoming, with the General Secretary 
(Hayward, whose sympathies lay with the Left) objecting at the Shadow Cabinet to the 
advertisement placed in the party's Labour Weekly. Labour Week y then refused to te IA 
letters or advertisements from Solidarityý'. This would not be the only tussle with 
headquarters, which repeatedly omitted Solidarity from the list of friendly organisations 
37 Roy Hattersley Speech, Solidarity Meeting, 7 March 198 1. Other speakers were Roy Shaw, Leader of Camden Council, and John Grant who appealed for funds for a "sustained campaign, a long hard struggle" against "the resources of Militant and the [SDPj .. There, s a price to pay for the kind of 
33 
Labour Party we want to see. It's a hard slog and cash will help" (speaking notes, JGP). Ken Weetch, interview, 3 April 2003. 
39 Steering Group minutes, 3 and 4 March 198 1. 40 All of these would be achieved eventually. 41 Steering Committee minutes, 25 March 1981. 
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42 in the pocket-diary . 
In 1984, the party's European Campaign Pack's list of contacts 
included the LCC but not Solidarity4'; on more than one occasion the Group's Fringe 
meeting was omitted from the Conference Diary of Events 44 . 
Meanwhile, the officers continued their work amongst MPs. A Recall Meeting (of the 
initial 102) was held at the end of March, when over 40 MPs signed in45. More MPs 
were added to the Steering Committee and it was agreed to set f 10 a month as the 
subscription 46 . In 
fact, the letter to MPs asked for E5 a month and soon there were 44 in 
operation, bringing in L259 a month. Regional representatives were nominated to help 
with fringe meetings, provide names for the database, and involve local memberS47. A 
second Recall Meeting, with Shore and Hattersley speaking, was held in July, when the 
35 signatories included Boothroyd and John SMith48. 
It was not just in parliament that Solidarity was organising. In Hackney, Islington, 
Lambeth, Stevenage, Ealing and Teeside, and in Scotland, local groups were rapidly 
established, with MPs doing sterling service in speaking at these and the various fringe 
meetings. Hattersley took on much of this work: "He was a great traveller - the Marco 
Polo of Solidarity"49 . 
Whilst the Wembley formula and the SDP split were the catalysts for the creation of 
Solidarity, the aim of changing the former quickly slipped away. The Steering 
Committee did fix on an alternative of 50: 25: 25 (in preference to 30: 30: 40), and with 
OMOV postal ballots for CLPs5O, but there was little energy behind this, not least 
because of the lack of support within the movement. Woolmer circulated a draft rule 
change in June5l but by August, according to The Timespolitical editor, Julian 
Haviland, Solidarity had "tacitly agreed that this objective .. is out of reach"52. 
Solidarity failed to get its model motion on the conference preliminary agenda, although 
42 Goudie's 7 October 1982 letter to the Director of Communication was "lost" in headquarters 
resulting in this omission for which an apology was received on 25 April 1983 (DRIVI/26). The 
error was repeated in 1984 (DRH/l/27). 
43 ForwardLabour, April 1984. 
Organising Committee minutes, 14 July 1981 (DRIVI/1). In 1986, the party omitted Solidarity's meetings from the Fringe Guide and Labour Weekly listings (DPJI/1/3). 
45 Including McNally, who would defect in October. 
46 Notes of 30 March 1981 meeting (DRII/i/2). 
47 Notes of 24 March 1981 meeting, JGP. 
4 15 July 1981 (DRII/l/55). 
4: Ken Weetch interview. 
50 Minutes of 25 March 1981 (DRWI/2). 
51 Letter of 4 June 198 1. 
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the UCW tabled an amendment giving the largest say in the Electoral College to MPs. 
However, there was no support for this. For Haviland, Solidarity had failed "both to 
organize and to persuade"53 . Despite this, he was generous in his praise of Solidarity's 
core of 60 MPs who "possess a quality which is becoming steadily less common: they 
have little fear of Mr Benn's supporters". Furthermore, with some 4,500-5,000 
supporters, as well as local groups, he acknowledged that "the fight goes on". 
Whilst Wembley had to be put to one side, the issue of infiltration - Militant - moved 
centre stage. Alone in the party, it was Solidarity which openly called for action on the 
Tendency. Their union friends wanted this, Chapple informing Woolmer that the 
EETPU had "overwhelmingly" passed a resolution that: "This Conference is alarmed at 
the degree of infiltration of the Labour Party at all levels, and at the unwillingness of the 
[NEC] to take any action'954 . The Steering Committee had already asked Woolmer and 
Field for a paper on Militant" and later the Group produced a leaflet on Militant, 
written by Joe Haines 56 , which was widely distributed. 
"Solidarity also enlisted the help of Lord Underhill and the evidence of several 
defectors to compile a scventeen-page report detailing Militant's history, organization 
', 57 and finances; Roy Hattersley subedited it, added a few literary touches . Militant 
remained a constant theme in the Group's work (it was disgust at the Tendency, and at 
the NEC's failure to act, which attracted many to Solidarity). QC John Smith (and 
through him Derry Irvine, assisted by the young Blair) were to provide legal advice 
during the process of expelling Militant 58 . 
Before Solidarity could set about their objectives (on Militant, Wembley or the NEC), 
they were hit within weeks by the 2 April announcement of Benn's challenge for the 
Deputy Leadership - and the first use of the Electoral College. It could not have come 
at a worse time: the office was not yet open, mailing lists were incomplete and the SDP 
was drawing electoral and membership support. Furthermore, it exposed divisions 
52 The Times, I August 1981. 
53 ibid. 
34 Letter from Chapple to Woolmer, 18 August 1981 (DRWI/32). 
5S Minutes of 25 March 1981 (DRWI/2). 
51 Harold Wilson's former press officer, whom Kaufman had involved; Jack Cunningham, interview, 5 February 2002. 
57 Michael Crick, op cit, p. 195. 
58 Michael Crick, op cit, p. 208; Dominic Egan, Irvine: Politically IncorrecO, Mainstream Publishing, 1999, P. 101. 
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within Solidarity as not all had yet made the break with Benn. Solidarity's priority had 
been "to strengthen its support on the left,, 59, not to invite its members to walk one side 
or other of the dividing line. The Steering Committee viewed its major task as Healey's 
re-election (no mean feat) whilst also holding the Solidarity coalition together. On the 
15 April they agreed the careful line "That Solidarity would support the collective 
leadership'960 . This drew Foot into their strategy and enabled them to be seen as loyal to 
the left-wing Leader (for whom few had voted in October 1980). Healey's support for 
Solidarity had been given "with Michael Foot's encouragement, '61 and helped bring the 
organisation close to the Leader in a way that had never been possible with the 
Manifesto Group. Solidarity "deeply regret[ed] Tony Benn's announcement.. [which] 
can only produce a public conflict in the party.. To insinuate that the present leadership 
cannot be trusted to keep faith with the party's wishes is an attack on Michael Foot no 
less than on Denis Healey.. Labour Solidarity Campaign believes the team of Michael 
Foot, and Denis Healey as his Deputy, provides the best combination for election 
victory', 62 . Even this careful enjoining of Foot's name was not enough to hold the 
fragile coalition together. The effective support for Healey caused problems and in June 
"the Committee supported the collective leadership but also [recognised it] must take 
into view the cross section of our membership"63 . 
Shore was outspoken. "In an onslaught on virtually everything Mr Wedgwood Benn 
stands for.. [he said] that the Labour Party might never recover if the far left's 
campaign for 'the supremacy of party democracy over that of parliamentary democracy' 
succeeded"64. He attacked Alan Fisher (General Secretary of NUPE) for promising his 
union's support to Benn (little knowing that NUPE members would opt for Healey). 
However, it was not simply the person that Shore feared, but a Deputy Leader being 
imposed on the PLP contrary to its own preference. 
Solidarity struggled to hold its disparate membership together. One draft release, 
calling on the movement to keep "the present balanced leadership team" reminded 
colleagues that many who had not voted for Foot now loyally defended him and 
considered "that Denis Healey is entitled to similar consideration". But the battle in the 
59 Julian Haviland, The Times, I August 1981. 
60 Steering Group minutes, 15 April 1981 (DRIi/l/2). 
61 Julian Haviland, op cit. 
62 Labour Solidarity, May 198 1. 
63 Steering Committee minutes, 3 June 1981 (DRIVI/2). 
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constituencies and in the unions was hotting up, and a later draft reads "The Labour 
Solidarity Campaign unequivocally advises its supporters to vote to retain Denis Healey 
as the Party's Deputy Leader". Though drafted on 3 June, it was immediately overtaken 
by events when Foot threw down his challenge to Benn to run as Leader, rather than as 
DepUtY65 . The Group then used Foot's own attack on Benn to call on the party "to keep 
the present balanced leadership team"66 . This was still too much for some and O'Neill 
resigned 67 . He saw Solidarity becoming the Healey campaign rather than the broader 
based group he had wanted (and into which he had even tried to draw Kinnock). He 
believed that, in being so committed to Healey, it would fail to attract a middle group 68 
In September, he was to vote for Silkin in the first ballot, and then abstain69. (He was 
not alone amongst Solidarity members. Ashton and Davidson followed suit, whilst 
Field voted Silkin then Healey 70. ) 
However, Foot's tacit support for his Deputy (though he would abstain in September) 
allowed Solidarity to organise the Deputy's campaign, which Healey undertook with 
gusto. Whilst the May issue of Solidarity only argued "Why Benn is Wrong to 
Stand 9M , in June it told readers to keep the Foot and Healey team 
72 
. The race 
intensified; in July the Steering Group agreed: "The Joint Chairmen to write the front 
page article including supporting Denis Healey, and the Editorial would also come up in 
support of DeniSv73. Whilst the choice of speakers for the conference Fringe (Healey, 
Shore and Hattersley) clearly indicated Solidarity's thinking 74 , the Group's decision to 
come out for Healey never happened. As requested, Grant: 
"penned a forthright pro-Healey leading article [but] our arrangement was 
that I needed the approval of the co-chairmen for contentious pieces which 
committed Solidarity.. Hattersley agreed with the pro-Healey article. Shore 
.. was away and returned just in time to use his veto, much to my disgust. I had a heated argument with him. In deadlock, we recalled the committee to 
64 7he Times, 27 April 198 1. 
63 Labour Solidarity, June 198 1. 
66 Documents of 3 and 4 June 198 1, JGP. 
67 Steering Committee minutes, 17 June 1981 (DRWI/2). 
68 Martin ONeill, interview, 17 September 2003. 
61 Report ofthe 19811abour Party Conference, p. 343. 
70 ibid. 
71 Labour Solidarity, May 198 1. 
72 Labour Solidarity, June 198 1. 
73 Steering Committee minutes, 22 July 198 1, DRIVI /2. 
74 Labour Solidarity, August 198 1. 
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decide. 
.. 
We had a wrangle.. but the majority favoured a toned-down 
version"75 . 
Nevertheless, the September issue makes fascinating reading. The Chairmen's front 
page praises the "Foot-Healey" team three times but fails to name Healey (the only one 
up for election) alone. Shore wrote merely that it would "weaken the Parliamentary 
Party if someone is imposed upon it who does not carry the confidence of the majority". 
According to some of the Shadow Cabinet researchers, Shore "never endorsed Denis 
Healey"'76. One page of the newsletter gave "Three Good Reasons for Saying No to 
Benn" and another, on Healey, is headed "The Man Best Fitted to work with Michael 
Foot"'M . This reticence stemmed not just from qualms within the committee but from 
the recognition that Healey's unpopularity with party memberS78 could best be 
overcome with the link to Foot. It is indicative of the difficulty of being a Healey 
supporter that his campaign badges contained both names "Foot. Healey" to protect 
their wearers. Healey's unpopularity stemmed largely from his role in the 1976 IMF 
cuts; he also carried activists' resentments for all the shortcomings of the 1974-79 
governments. 
Whilst many MPs equivocated about supporting Healey (the only one who could stop 
Benn), Roy Jenkins ran Labour a very close finish in the Warrington by-election on 16 
July 1981, providing stark evidence of the inroads the SDP was making into Labour's 
heartlands 79 . Yet little time could be spent campaigning against the SDP (or the Tories) 
as the summer of 1981 was used amassing votes for Healey. The I'Sherpas" - advisors 
to the Shadow Cabinet - doubted that the politicians did as much as the staff or unions. 
One Steering Group member did "fuck all" and another of the supposed team "was in 
the US all summer - so didn't do anything"80. Healey himself campaigned hard and 
admitted "I leamt more about the inner workings of the trade union movement in those 
six months than in my previous thirty-seven years of Party work"81. Other Solidarity 
members were similarly busy, with Goudie and Inman organising innumerable 
75 John Grantý op cit, p. 107. 76 
77 
Sherpas, interview, 21 March 2002. Though Shore did vote for Healey. 
Labour Solidarity, September 198 1. 
78 Even a moderate party (Braintree) voted for Berm. "People who voted Benn here were the 'Starry Eye'd' not the sinister. They really did see Benn as he would like to see himself - as the repository of some native, indigenous, radical, tradition: 'Foot Writ Young... (John Gyford interview). 
Labour's Doug Boyle just held the seat with 14,280 votes to Jenkins' 12,521. 810 Sherpas interview: Political Advisors to the Shadow Cabinet, 1979-83 (Tony Page [Varley], David Cowling [Shore], Richard Heller [Healey], Patrick Cheney [Howell]). 
Denis Healey, op cit, p. 482. 
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meetings, mailings and leaflets. They were looking for votes for Healey and for the 
NEC. Whilst the unions were successful in this, Solidarity failed to swing constituency 
votes for any of their candidates (Ashley, Hattersley, Radice and Shore). It was a 
reminder of the distance Solidarity had to travel that the top-placed (Ashley) got only 
219,000 votes to the lowest elected's 259,000. Solidarity's Chairmen attracted just 
176,000 and 183,000 - reflecting the Left's pre-eminence on GCs where votes were 
decided. 
The Eightieth Conference of the Labour Party opened in Brighton at 5.30pm on Sunday 
27 September 1981, chaired by Alex Kitson of the TGWU. The outcome of the Deputy 
Leadership ballot was still unknown but the result, 3 hours later, was to mark a turning 
point for the party. Before the conference, Grant predicted that if Benn won, "some 
people who have been supporting us williust pack up and go. I am not sure they will 
join the SDP .. it is more likely they will 
just walk off the pier', 82 . Elsewhere, there was 
talk of a "UDI" within the PLP, with MPs electing their own Deputy Leader 83. it 
remains the view of many that a different result "would have made the divisions in the 
party even more bitter. There would have been more defectionS,, 84 ; "Terminal 
disaster"85 ; Healey considered that if Benn "had become Deputy Leader there would 
have been a haemorrhage of Labour defections to the SDP .. I do not believe the Labour 
Party could have recovered , 86 . Electorally, "The Conservatives, the Liberals and the 
SDP [had] been denied their most wanted prize"87 . 
The overwhelming response at 8.31 pm was relief, despite the narrowness of the margin 
(as Radice said: One is enough in politics 88) - The Healey camp installed themselves in 
the Old Ship Hotel to savour a rare victory. The abstaining MPs (who had denied Benn 
victory) had a harder time, Kinnock being attacked as "Judas" and Lestor being on the 
receiving end of Beckett's sharp tongue". For Solidarity, however, the result marked 
just the beginning of its work. Conference was noted for the 5 seats won on the NEC 
(though credit belongs to the unions) plus highly successful fringe meetings (with 800 at 
82 The Times, 24 September 1981. 
13 Guardian, 28 August 198 1; Sunday Times, 30 August 198 1. 
Ken Woolmer interview. 
John Gyford interview. 
86 Denis Healey, op cit, p. 482. 
87 Peter Shore, The Times, I October 1981. 
as Giles Radice interview. 
89 Robert Harris, op cit, p. 165. 
176 
Chapter II Labour Solidarity Campaign 
one) which offered mutual support and encouragement to delegates who were isolated 
within their own constituencies. Solidarity was in the vanguard of preserving the 
Shadow Cabinet's role in the manifesto, a major defeat for the Left. 
Despite the newness of the organisation, helped by the unions, Goudie established an 
office in the Old Ship Hotel from which daily briefings were distributed to delegates by 
teams of volunteers. The mastheads on these read: Monday : "A Vital Victory"; 
Tuesday "The Tide has turned"; Wednesday: "Clause V: The Case for Partnership"; 
and Thursday "Drive to Victory". The following day, Hattersley used a speech to 
Lambeth Solidarity to invite defectors to return, as the conference victories had shown 
there was "not even a plausible excuse for desertion .. Now that the Labour Party can be 
seen as a broad based party once again, I hope that they will come back home and work 
with us"90 - an unrequited hope. 
Conference over, MPs returned to the harsh realities of Westminster. The immediate 
task was the Shadow Cabinet election, the first since the SDP defections had removed a 
chunk of Manifesto votes, so the Tribune slate might well benefit. The 1980/81 
Parliamentary Committee (to give it the correct title) had seen 4 elected outwith the 
Manifesto slate, with a fifth (Benn) joining when Rodgers defected. The 1981/82 
balloting began with the Chief WhiP, when Cocks comfortably beat the Left's Martin 
Flannery by 156: 51. Mikardo (whose 1974 election had led to the formation of the 
Manifesto Group) ran for the Chairmanship but was easily defeated by Jack Dormand9l. 
There had been controversy about Benn's candidature for the Shadow Cabinet, with 
2 Foot warning him that, if elected, he would have to accept collective responsibilitY9 
Despite this, the "Left within the LefV'- led by Benn - signed an "oath of loyalty" 
expressing "a commitment to the constitutional changes and central policies agreed at 
Labour conferences" and claiming their right "to advocate the whole range of such 
policies" including unilateralism and withdrawal from the EEC93. This indicated that, 
even in the Shadow Cabinet, Benn would assert his right to support policies contrary to 
the agreed line. Solidarity worked hard to maximise support for its candidates. Whilst 
five Mps from outside its original "List of 150" were elected, the three top positions 
90 Financial Times, 3 October 198 1. 
91 PLP papers, November 198 1. 
92 Financial Times, 3 October 1981. 
93 Guardian, 31 October 198 1. 
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were held by Solidarity's Shore, Kaufman and Hattersley; Benn was joint 20th, well 
below the elected fifteen 94 . 
Solidarity began discussing: Where Now? Spellar wanted to widen the group beyond 
parliament, and proposed a "National Solidarity Organising Committee" comprising 
two MPs, two general secretaries, one person from the NEC and one from the co- 
operative movement". Field also drew up some "First Ideas for the Campaign" which 
recommended focusing on "a blocking mechanism for the PLP in the choice of leader or 
deputy leader", OMOV in each part of the Electoral College and a concerted effort to 
get Solidarity supporters onto the NEC96. Shore summoned the troops immediately 
after Brighton, writing: "There is no possible alternative for those who oppose Bennism 
to fight back. This fight must be stronger, more formidable and better thought out and 
organized than anything attempted so far' Others believed that the structure of the 
Campaign had to change. The Lambeth Group stressed "If Solidarity is going to have 
any effect at all in the country then it must stop being run by the PLP. Senior trade 
unionists must be brought on to the Committee and space made available for 
constituency and area groups of Solidarity. .. It is vital that the Solidarity Campaign 
takes itself out of Parliament within days rather than weeks". Lambeth members were 
critical of the newsletter which, whilst they understood its perforce pro-Healey stance, 
regretted its "strident manner" which appeared close to "reds under the beds. There is 
far, far, too much at stake in terms of the future of the Party to allow anyone to be 
alienated from Solidarity - whether Left or Right - who supports a democratic socialist 
PoSitiolf, 
98. 
Another submission" wanted Solidarity to campaign for OMOV and the creation of "a 
new political image which is identified with the democratic spectrum of Left and Right, 
with additional [Members] .. from the Tribune Group" and a national committee to 
include representatives from CLPs and unions, plus activities for supporters and some 
full-time staff. This note identified Solidarity's right-wing image as an obstacle and 
called for a new statement of aims which stressed "the desire to .. work with the 
democratic leftwing" and the recruitment of left-wingers to positions in the 
94 PLP papers. Healey was on as Deputy Leader. 
95 Undated discussion paper, JSA. 
96 23 September 1981, JGP. 
97 Peter Shore, The Times, I October 198 1. 
93 Letter from ClIr Nick Grant, Chairman, Lambeth Solidarity, tO Woolmer, 9 October 1981 (NBP). 
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organisation. The author asked for a week-end meeting of contacts from around the 
country "within the next month". 
There was much soul-searching amongst the committee. Hattersley tabled a paper on 
whether Solidarity should adopt policies so as to give the Group a positive purposeloo. 
He ruled out anything on unilateralism or Europe (as that would "destroy Solidarity 
both in the House.. and, perhaps more important, in the country"). Instead he proposed 
opposition to illegal or extra- parliamentary action combined with advocacy of "genuine 
democracy" within the party, which he defined as (a) OMOV in CLPs and consultation 
in the unions for Electoral College votes; (b) CLP choice as to whether to go for full 
reselection; (c) PLP and local government seats on the NEC and a change in the 
women's seats; and (d) "the exclusion of.. [people] who are members of organisations 
which are inimical to the Party's aims". Clinton-Davies questioned the value of "a 
witch-hunt.. [re Militant] because some of the soft-left groups would probably not 
continue to give us their support". Keeping the more left-wing MPs on board was a 
priority for those who saw Solidarity's right-wing image as its biggest handicap. 
However, if it could not agree on the EEC, unilateralism or Militant, it left the Group 
with little but OMOV in common. Nevertheless, some did want a position taken on 
policies although Hattersley reiterated that this would force some members out. 
Above all, the electoral impact of the party's polling position was jeopardising their 
own livelihoods. The Liberal and SDP successes in London's Croydon North West and 
St Pancras North. 101 made unhappy reading. At a Solidarity meeting in Rotherham, 
Shore warned that "our party faces its gravest crisis since the 1930s. .. the SDP alliance 
with the Liberals faces us with a challenge that is now truly fonnidable". He criticised 
Foot for keeping Benn as chairman of the NEC Home Policy Committee, 02 and said the 
party "had inflicted hideous wounds on itself'. He was determined to take on the far- 
Left, declaring "No longer can we allow organized infiltration and organized 
conspiracy" 103 . 
99 Possibly by Peter Archer, 20 October 198 1. 
100 Minutes of 28 October 1981 (DREVI/2). 
10, On 22 and 29 October respectively. The SDP also won local government by-elections. 102 With the new 5 right-wingers on the NEC, this could have been changed with the votes of Foot and his allies. It upset Shore that his old friends was failing to address the issue he took so seriously, the onward march of Bennism. 
103 The Times, 31 October 1981. 
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Continuing bad news 104 led Woolmer to warn that "outside the PLP the situation is very 
serious - we don't have several years to play with". Dewar reported that within the 
PLP 
"'we have lost ground last week or two. A lot of people depressed or gone to ground. 
Going to see more defections". Radice concurred: "Morale is very low. Losing 
members of the party. It is not right wing to object to Militanf'. Robertson concluded 
"it is slipping away". While the MPs despaired, Godsiff chided them that the unions 
"want to see your leading lights reassert yourself - time is not on our side"' 
05. 
Following the discussion, Godsiff drafted a paper on the "Future of Labour Solidarity 
Campaign" which recalled that Solidarity was set up to "counterbalance the unrelenting 
activities of the 'hard left' within the Party" and, given the "limited" objectives the 
Group set, assessed that it had achieved "a reasonable success" although this had been 
"based on reacting to issues .. precipitated 
by the hard left.. therefore the Solidarity 
response has been perceived as negative .. The need now is for the Campaign to rethink 
its role and to take a more positive approach .. while acting as an umbrella organisation" 
for the Manifesto, Labour First and other groups, which could pursue their own 
viewpoints on policy. He wanted the organisation strengthened so it could influence 
individual CLPs 106 . 
The paper was debated by the committee, which confirmed that Solidarity would 
continue in existence, but better organised and with a drive to build contacts in CLPs 
and unions, more fringe meetings, a reinvigorated newsletter and model resolutions. In 
the discussion (which started with news of Grant's resignation from the newsletter and 
the party), Shore described how "things are getting worse" and stressed the need to 
"broaden their appeal and muster democratic socialists against the authoritarians. There 
are people seeking to make us into a vanguard party. They are much more of a danger 
because there are many more of them than the Trots. Our immediate objective ought to 
be to put the NEC under pressure". Golding reminded them that "Solidarity existed to 
stop the drift and to keep people in the party. Winning seats on the NEC. .. But it was 
Foot who holds the balance" 107 . The amended paper replaced phrases such as "hard 
left" with "undemocratic lefV'and'firined up the proposals. Whilst recognising, that the 
In addition to the by-elections, the NEC endorsed a 12-month timetable for withdrawal from the 
EEC, and the TUC General Council supported withdrawal without a referendum; Williams was fighting Crosby and the Left was mounting a pro- Tatchell campaign. 
Jos Minutes of 28 October 1981 (DRWI/2). 
10(, Roger Godsiff, "Future of Labour Solidarity Campaign", 4 November 198 1. 
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organisation had seen a more representative NEC, the retention of Clause V and the 
maintenance of "the balanced leadership of Foot and Healey", nevertheless "The crisis 
facing the Party is clearly deepening.. substantial numbers of voters are now deserting 
[Labour] .. the changes on the NEC 
have not resulted in a clear or decisive majority for 
common sense"; the nature of the party had not been clarified and the Electoral College 
remained unchanged. Furthermore, the internal struggles meant that policy was not 
being addressed. The paper concluded that the Group had "to counter attack and expose 
the whole political philosophy that lies behind the attempts to distort and undermine the 
traditions of democratic socialism.. We have to expose and overcome Trotskyism in all 
its many forms and disguises within the Party". Its priority was the defence of 
democratic socialism, the parliamentary process and the role of elected representatives. 
The Group's objectives were: (1) further gains on the NEC; (2) tackling infiltration, 
starting with an NEC-instigated inquiry; (3) exposure of party policy-making 
weaknesses; (4) increased CLP and union activity; (5) OMOV; (6) modernise the NEC 
and conference and reconsider mandatory reselection and the electoral college 
procedures; and (7) attack the government and win the election. 
A week later (by which time Peter Tatchell had been selected for Bermondsey, Spellar 
having been kept off the short-list), it was agreed to hold a Recall Meeting of MPs, 
tabling the new paper, to raise morale within the PLP (though Warburton warned that 
"the Newsletter makes Solidarity look like 'a self-protection society for MPs' and they 
should .. get other names on it,, )108 . However, before any Recall Meeting could be 
arranged, Field resigned and the Group reconsidered whether press coverage of their 
document was advisable on the eve of the Crosby by-election'09. Field's resignation 
followed his plea that Solidarity should be wound up because "its great weakness is that 
it hasn't managed to build an effective bridge with the democratic left". However, his 
reason for going was that the key issue, "of fundamental importance to the Labour 
Party's future", OMOV, was "the only constitutional change which can now prevent the 
Party being turned into a vanguard party". Since its achievement depended on getting 
support "from all sections of the Party" and not "allied exclusively to any particular 
Minutes of Steering and Organising Committees meeting, 4 November 1981 (DRIVI/2). 
Minutes of 11 November 1981 (DRFVI/2). 
109 Minutes of 18 November 1981. 
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group", he intended to devote his efforts to campaigning for OMOV110. Hisresignation 
did not prevent him collaborating with the Group and he pursued his OMOV campaign 
in the newsletterl 11. 
Swirling around the depleted Group was more bad news. McNally had left the party in 
October, Grant in November, with George Cunningham and Douglas-Mann to follow 
before the end of the year. While the Right slipped away, left-wingers were selected for 
safe seats, while existing MPs faced difficult reselection battles. Clinton-Davies, for 
example, scraped home in Hackney Central by a narrow margin 
112 
, Hamilton faced a 
second ordeal in Fife Central when he tied with challenger Henry McLeish, and 
Reston's Ray Fletcher was de-selected' 13 . Even the Chief 
Whip was not safe: Cocks 
faced a vociferous challenge in Bristol. Meanwhile AUEW General Secretary John 
Boyd protested to Foot over the exclusion of moderate candidates from shortlists 
114 
. All 
of this fuelled the MPs' desire to see CLPs allowed to choose whether to go through a 
full reselection. However, the 1981 conference having failed to halt mandatory 
reselection, the Group fell back on offering "shoulders" for those in trouble. "Life was 
a misery. People can't imagine now the malevolence, and often violence, that went on 
against people. When one went to your monthly constituency meeting - your stomach 
was churning. A perpetual sense of stress. Deep anxieties. It was a time when - unless 
you were a fighter -the easiest thing was to back-off'. The friendly shoulder helped 
and "Quite a few stayed in the party because of Solidarity. It gave them a home and a 
sense of belonging. There was a fight. Vast majority of people faced by a crisis are 
frightened"' 15. Even John Silkin -no friend of the grouping -recognised the role it 
played: Solidarity "gave many MPs an opportunity to affirm their support for Labour 
governments .. it gave some MPs a feeling that.. they were not completely alone as 
with heavy hearts they headed towards their constituencies and confrontation with their 
detractors" 116 . Reselection and activist hostility towards politicians were taking a 
heavy toll. 
110 Letter from Field to Woolmer, 10 November 198 1. 
OMOV (Labour Solidarity, October 198 1). 
11, Labour Solidarity, November 19 82. 
112 Sunday Times, 15 November 198 1. 
I" Labour Weekly, II December 19 8 1. 
114 Guardian, 21 December 198 1. 
"' Ken Woolmer interview. 
116 John Silkin, op cit, p. 38. 
Field had already written on the importance of 
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Meanwhile, in Bermondsey, Tatchell had been selected to replace Bob Mellish, 
supported by many of the younger members though not - despite Foot's allegations - 
Militant. He seemed to London activists more radical and energetic than the old 
guard' 17 , but to the PLP Tatchell was a reminder that the party was changing and they 
were losing out. On 3 December, Foot (unwisely) told the House of Commons that 
Tatchell was "not endorsed" and would not be, starting a struggle with the local party he 
was to lose and creating more damaging attacks in the press"g. Foot was pushed into 
this partly to stop MPs defecting. He failed in this and in stopping Tatchell. 
Whatever doubts Solidarity had about re-fuclling internal debates, they felt that a fight- 
back was the only option. After the SDP's success in Crosby they decided to press 
ahead with the new document, as "a concerted and nationwide counter attack against the 
undemocratic left as part of a determined drive to save the party"' 19. This was not their 
only statement. Grant had ghosted the lead article in the post-conference edition of 
Solidarity 120 as well as one under his own by-line on the outcome of the conference. 
The former vowed "We shall stiffen our Campaign7'. In claiming Brighton as "a 
watershed for the Labour movement", it nevertheless warned "we cannot afford to be 
complacent". Radice added: "Now is the time to win the hearts and minds of the 
activists" whilst Warburton reviewed the NEC elections, the newsletter coining the term 
66a solidarity of trade union leaders" to describe Boyd, Duffy, Grantham, Jackson and 
Sirs; who joined John Smith on the Solidarity platform at Brighton 121 . 
However, a wider audience was needed for Solidarity's message. They therefore 
arranged a centre spread in the Mirror, authored by Callaghan, on "Here's How we can 
Save Labour"122 - Repaying the loyalty his Deputy had given him 
123 
, Callaghan had 
remained loyal to Foot as Leader but now wrote that "The Crisis in the Labour party is 
caused by small, single-minded (and narrow minded) groups. Until they are defeated 
there will be no peace or unity within the party and its standing with the voters will 
continue to decline". He welcomed the NEC decision not to endorse Tatchell (little 
knowing he would soon re-emerge as the official candidate) and the moves to establish 
117 Matt Tee interview. 
I" Peter Tatchell, op cit. 
119 Times, 19 November 198 1. 
120 Draft article, JGP. 
121 Labour Solidarity, October 199 1. 
22 Daily Mirror, 10 December 198 1. 
23 Especially during the IMF crisis, and the Winter of Discontent (Roy Hattersley interview). 
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an inquiry into Militant. He outlined what had to be done: expel Militant, disaffiliate 
the YS, improve the system of electing the leadership, adopt a new process for 
reselection and have a meeting between the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet "to re- 
establish confidence in each other and to place on record that each has its own 
responsibilities and that neither is subordinate to the othee. Such a meeting would take 
place in January 1982, leading to "the Peace of Bishops Stortford" which promised an 
end to constitutional changes. 
1981 ended with mixed news. The NEC voted not to endorse Tatchell, and to set up an 
inquiry into Militant. But Douglas-Mann defected and the unhappiness within the PLP 
was palpable. Solidarity had ensured - albeit by a whisker - Healey's re-election and 
seen 5 places change on the NEC (though, lacking Foot's support, without the hoped-for 
changes in sub-committee chairmanships). Benn had failed to be re-elected to the 
Shadow Cabinet. The outside world was stormy. Williams had returned to the 
Commons from Crosby whilst Jenkins - flushed with his Warrington performance - 
was encircling other seats. The SDP were winning local by-elections, and holding 
continuous a lead in the opinion polls. A final Recall Meeting of MPs before Christmas 
gave unanimous backing to the statement of objectives and endorsed Shore's resolution 
that Solidarity "believes that actions to re-affirm and reinforce the truly democratic and 
parliamentary traditions of the Labour Party must be fully and unequivocally supported, 
and calls on all members of the Party to unite behind the Leadership of Michael Foot 
and Denis Healey.. to defeat the Tories and return a Labour Government"124 . Not every 
intervention was in harmony. Campbell-Savours thought their attacks "have been too 
hard and that some of our comrades are having to look over their shoulders .. The main 
thing of the future must be the danger of Militant". Underhill believed "It's in the CLPs 
that we must make ground and must direct the work of Solidarity" and Weetch warned 
"If we do not get this Party into some sort of order shortly more decent people will be 
leaving the Party and some of us will not be here any longer". An interesting exchange 
followed non-Solidarity member Stan Ncwens urging Solidarity "to disband because we 
are making matters worse and that it would be our fault if we lose the .. Election"and 
pledging "he would always be a Marxist". From the chair, Shore responded: "We 
respect you.. for coming to this meeting and saying what you have to say to us, but it is 
124 Minutes of Recall Meeting, 16 December 1981 (DRII/i/2). 
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those who are Marxist/Leninists who we have to worry about" 125 . This encapsulated the 
challenge that Solidarity faced - the desire of many Labour voters and members to 
expel Militant but a denial on the soft-left that it posed any threat. 
By early 1982, Solidarity's place in the struggle was assured; its newsletter, 
advertising meetings in North Wales, Cheshire, London, South Wales, Lambeth and 
Teesside, foretold a year of activity 126. Its front-page leader, "An Unpleasant 
Necessity", signalled determination, calling for support for Foot in his conflict over the 
Tatchell candidature. Inside, it renewed calls for OMOV in the Electoral College. 
CLPD, London Labour Briefing and the IMG (whose efforts led to the deselection of 
councillors, divisions and defections) were lambasted. "The Solidarity Campaign exists 
to destroy the SDP, defeat the Tories and help Labour back to power" it proclaimed - 
which needed compromises, although not at the expense of leaving Militant untouched. 
In January, straight after the Bishops Stortford conclave (with the Shadow Cabinet, 
unions and NEC brokering a peace accord), Foot spelt out "My kind of Socialism" in 
27 
two long Observer articles' , taking on Benn's arguments and giving comfort to 
Solidarity. He staunchly defended past Labour Cabinets (in which he and Benn had 
served) against Benn's charge of betrayal, and reasserted the role of parliament in 
achieving democratic socialism. Meanwhile, Hattersley was calling for Militant to be 
thrown out of the party 128 . The 
following week the Solidarity-supporting Leeds SE MP, 
Stan Cohen, was replaced by the (then) left-winger, Derek Fatchett - the sixth such 
deselection 129 . 
Solidarity sent out model resolutions, together with invitations to "Key Workers" to a 
Forum at the end of February in Swinton House. The Committee wanted to focus on 
130 
priorities for the party in the light of Bishops Stortford , preparing for an election, and 
priorities for Solidarity. Particular questions were whether to run a slate for the NEC, 
the newsletter, and plans for a wider national meeting of supporters. Shore opened this 
first meeting of 50 Solidarity activists - including a dozen MPs - recalling the 
125 ibid. 
126 Labour Solidarity, January 1982. 
127 10 and 17 January 1982 (and reprinted for wider distribution). 
128 Observer, 14 February 1982. 
129 Guardian, 22 February 1982. 
130 Whilst deciding to continue to push for OMOV, the committee agreed to "try not to be seen to be the first to break the Bishops Stortford agreemenf'. Steering Committee minutes, 20 January 1982 (DRIVI/2). 
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"appalling" Wembley and other conferences 131 . 
He saw Bishops Stortford as "at best a 
truce .. 
[as] the lion won't lie down with the lamb". As for the NEC, speaking just days 
after it accepted Tatchell's candidature, he despaired. It was "Shocking that NEC 
should have agreed to endorse Militant candidates. Should have postponed it pending 
inquiry. .. First aim 
is to make further gains on NEC. NEC has the power". His co- 
Chairman agreed that "Gains on NEC are .. absolute necessity: 
but the whole campaign 
will take years. We have to win arguments and not just rely on organisation. We have 
to win over to us the idealists and sentimentalists who hope the trouble will go away". 
There was little disagreement amongst the dozen others who spoke, with warnings that 
it was the working-class who were leaving the party whilst middle-class membership 
was holding up. Good councillors were being lost, Liverpool council was a disaster. 
Contributors recommended activity in constituencies, the gamering of evidence for the 
Militant inquiry and more effort to increase union delegations to GCs. Goudie's report 
from the Forum identified 16 points including the need for firm, positive leadership; a 
move away from a Westminster-based organisation; liaison with CLPs and unions; 
agreement for a slate; higher public profile; and to "encourage support from the soft- 
leff'132 . Larger meetings were planned for the summer. 
The March newsletter argued that nothing in the Bishops Stortford truce 133 precluded 
moves towards OMOV, whilst the inquiry remained important to "defend the 
constitution as it stands". In vain, the newsletter advised "If the NEC insists .. on 
endorsing candidates who are open supporters of Militant, they will be making a serious 
mistake"134 . The 
following month, the newsletter reported that Jenkins, Hillhead 
victory witnessed the electorate voting "against what many saw as the leftwing drift in 
the Labour Party", Benn's name having "cropped up every day on the doorstep". 
However, the Group's aim was not to denigrate party members but to show the "SDP's 
true colouTS", pointing out that Jenkins had defended private health and independent 
schools whilst Rodgers (formerly GMWU-sponsored) now confessed "his dislike of 
Trade Union sponsorship". Jenkins and Williams had "fought a shrill and unpleasant 
campaign" which repeatedly "misrepresented and abused" their former party. The 
newsletter attacked the Tories but found time to highlight the speech of Militant 
13, All quotes from 28 February 1982 meeting from David Bean notes. 132 DRIVI/49- 
133 The agreement to no Ruther constitutional cbanges. 134 Labour Solidarity, Marcb 1982. 
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supporter Pat Wall (about to become the Bradford North candidate) to his SWp135 
branch, concluding there was no place for his like in the Labour Party. The NEC, it 
said, had "a duty to acf'136 . 
Meanwhile, responses to a questionnaire 137 to Solidarity supporters had been 
analysed 138 . These showed an activist membership (over 60% holding office in their 
CLP or union), half under 51 years of age and with a strong preponderance of men. 
Their views on politics made grim reading. Just 8% were happy with the state of the 
party (against 90% not), 2% believing Labour was certain to win the election (a further 
9% in the 'probable' camp and 38% 'possible'). 47% had written off that eventuality. 
Asked the reason for the poor electoral prospects, 83% cited the party's own divisions 
(particularly the activities of the undemocratic left). 90% saw the SDP/Liberals as a 
threat. Half thought Militant infiltration was already a problem. Only 3% thought 
Trotskyism was compatible with Labour's aims and objectives (although 27% agreed 
with Newens' view 139 that Marxism was compatible). 
Between February and June 1982, the political map of Britain changed. While Labour 
continued to falter (despite an opinion poll hike after Bishops Stortford'40), Jenkins 
swept to victory in Hillhead 141 . But on the day he took his seat, 30 March, the first 
statement on South Georgia was made in the Commons 142 . By 2 April the Argentineans 
had invaded the Falkland Islands. Mrs Thatcher's determined response, and the 
despatch of the task-force, restored Conservative fortunes and saw the SDP vote slide in 
the May local elections, the 27 May Beaconsfield by-election (with its young Labour 
candidate, Blair) and, notably, at Mitcham and Morden on 3 June when the SDP's only 
MP to resign, Douglas-Mann, lost his seat to the Conservative Angela Rumbold 143 
. By 
the Falklands victory on 14 June, the SDP/Liberal poll lead had melted away. 
Despite - or perhaps because of - their despondency, Solidarity supporters were keen to 
meet, key workers assembling in early June and over 200 activists later that month. 
135 Socialist Workers' Party. 
136 Labour Solidarity, April 1982. 
137 John Gyford papers. 
" By Shore's advisor, David Cowling, now BBC's head of Polling (DRIV 
: 
31 See on page 185.1/33). 
140 Observer, 21 March 1982. 
141 25 March 1981. Jenkins (SDP) 10,106; Conservatives: 8,068; Labour 7,846. 142 Margaret Thatcher, op cit, p. 177. 
113 Conservatives: 13,306; SDP: 9,032; Labour: 7,475. 
187 
Chapterl] Labour Solidarity Campaign 
Mutual encouragement helped compensate for their isolation within CLPs. As one 
recalled: "It created a focus for individual party members who had just had enough. 
So 
it helped [people] realise there WAS a constituency out there who were loyal, and 
144 
moderate. It held the tide against the SDP" 
On 6 June, the eve of the final Falklands battle, Shore reminded the key workers that 
"the Falklands factor has acted to detriment of SDP rather than of Labour - so no 
comfort from that. A clear majority on the NEC this year [was] essential. Militant is a 
Leninist party - primitive, pre-democratic. The great temptation will 
be for the NEC to 
fudge. If they do, they will face an onslaught from us. The NEC has power to enforce 
rules by expulsions"145 . Hattersley pointed to a 
dichotomy: "On the one hand the 
public want us to stop fighting; on the other, they reject the hard lefe'. However, "The 
hard left certainly know now (if they have canvassed anywhere) that it is they who lose 
us doorstep support". For the rank and file attendees, there were local imperatives, with 
Lambeth's Nick Grant 146 stressing "Solidarity has got to come out of Westminster: as it 
promised that it would. The Steering Committee must have TU and CLP members. We 
must NOT become another CLV. We must get people like Kinnock and Rooker in, 
even on their terms. Our leading speakers must.. come to local meetings". Scotland's 
Bob Eadie called for work with regional councils of trade unions 147 . The pragmatic 
Secretary, Woolmer, noted that nothing could be done without money; there was only 
E9,500 left and the Group needed 00,000 p. a. Hattersley acknowledged the need to set 
up a Committee of CLP representatives to meet quarterly, in addition to the weekly 
Parliamentary meetings. Local groups should be created with help from MPs. There 
might also be a councillors' group and a trade union input. The Westminster weekly 
meeting could act as an Executive, subject to direction of the quarterly meetings. He 
pledged a willingness for the Group to be guided from outside but in fact it was to 
remain Westminster-driven. 
144 Chris Savage interview. 
145 All 6 June 1982 quotes from David Bean notes. 
Later to become the party's Director of Communications (prior to fellow Lambeth councillor, Peter 
Mandelson). 
147 Scottish Solidarity did not mince its words. Its newsletter included "We say to the leeches, the 
Bennites, the vulturous S. D. P. and the people of Britain, THE LABOUR PARTY IS NOT 
DEAD! I", together with a cartoon of a bed-ridden, invalid party, with Symptoms of "Militant and Benn! 'and the prescribed Cure: "Surgeryl" (Bob Eadie papers). 
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A larger crowd of Solidarity supporters gathered, under the chairmanship of John 
Smith, on 19 June. Hattersley and Shore gave major speeches, the latter savaging the 
Conservatives' disastrous record - particularly on the economy - before pointing to "the 
Great Paradox" whereby, despite Gallup showing people "overwhelmingly" hostile to 
government policies, Labour had a mere 25% support against the Conservatives' 45%. 
The Falklands was no excuse, he said. After Wembley, Labour had shed II points in a 
single month. Even at the pre-Falklands conference (October 198 1), Labour was only 
on 28%. His conclusion: "the Party is sick". That was why they had created Solidarity 
- to cure the party - though, over 12 months later, "the fever [and 
delirium] is still 
there". Blaming Labour's post-May 1979 "Cultural Revolution" and the loss of 
comradeship, Shore pointed to the current malaise: Militant. Welcoming the 
Hayward/Hughes' view that the Tendency "would not be eligible to be included on the 
proposed register", he pleaded for the party to have "frontiers" beyond which 
membership would not be appropriate. The NEC had a "duty to enforce [his emphasis] 
the constitution". It was not a witch-hunt but a duty to police those frontiers. As "a 
body of ideas.. Marxism [had] always been one of the streams that flow into the broad 
river" of the party. But Leninism, Trotskyism, with their concern for revolution and 
"the creation of a disciplined and elite, Vanguard party" was "unacceptable to 
democratic socialists". Their adherents "desl2ise [his emphasis] the democratic process" 
- witnessed in Pat Wall's call "to his 'comrades' to prepare for civil war, should Labour 
win the next election"148 . 
Hattersley identified the "Imperatives" for the party as being to: stress realistic 
manifesto commitments rather than fantasies; stop attacking the leadership - otherwise 
people would not vote for them; repudiate the 6(cuckoos in the nest" with the NEC 
acting against Militant; plus OMOV, to give the party back to the members from the 
hands of caucuses 149 . It was just 4 days later that the NEC endorsed the 
Hayward/Hughes report and agreed to establish a Register, but also endorsed Militant 
candidates (Pat Wall becoming the prospective candidate for Bradford on 28 July). 
The speeches were well covered in the media whilst the atmosphere led to successful 
collection - topped up by a percentage from sales of Susan Crosland's biography of 
"' Text of speech by Peter Shore to Solidarity Meeting, Camden Town Hall, 19 June 1982. 149 David Bean papers. 
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Tony'50. Perhaps more significant than the donation was her presence on the platform, 
illustrating its Croslandite rather than Jenkinsite genesis'51. Members asked for more 
literature and advice, increased organisation amongst unions, quarterly meetings for key 
workers and the repeated plea for supporters from around the country to feed into the 
Steering Committee "as [had been] agreed at the two previous meetings with key 
workers. If we do not fully implement this Solidarity will collapse as our key workers 
will loose faith in the committee, and its intention to be less Westminster based-152 . 
The organisation felt "too top heavy", with not enough grass-roots input 153 . 
The officers then applied to go on the "Register of Non-Affiliated Groups of Labour 
Party Members". Whilst this was created to isolate Militant, it required other 
organisations to comply. Solidarity's application showed 5,265 members/supporters, no 
full-time but 2 part-time paid staff, a full-time volunteer (Goudie) and 2 part-time 
unpaid staff. Its finance came entirely from its supporters with its modest assets 
comprising just six chairs, three desks, 2 typewriters, a filing cabinet and one table 154. it 
was, in its own words, operating "on a shoestring" 155 . 
Goudie had written to supporters outlining the recommendations of the 
Hayward/Hughes report, with a model resolution welcoming the lead given by Foot and 
56 1 57 the NEC' . She circulated the full application in September , together with copies of 
You, the Labour Party and the Militant Tendency which had been sent to MPs in July 158 
This 4-page, A5 Solidarity leaflet described Militant's history and current activities 
(undertaken by some 60 employees), detailing how the 'Editorial Board' was actually 
the organisation's Central Committee. Quotes from the Tendency's private document, 
British Perspectives and Tasks, included those foretelling how unions would be 
replaced by "worker soviets" when the revolution arrives, and plans for taking over 
constituencies to transform them on Marxist lines. 
150 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland, Jonathan Cape, 1982. 
15, John Gyford, interview, 16 November 2003. 
152 Report to Steering Committee (DRH/ 1 /2). 
153 Glen Bamham, quoted by John Gyford. 
154 Solidarity Application to be included on the Labour Party Register, submitted 21 July 1982 
(DRIi/l/17). 
155 Labour Solidarity, November 1982. 
156 26 June 1982 circular (Dianne Hayter papers. ). 157 Bob Eadie papers. 
158 DRWI/17. 
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The August newsletter focused on the Hayward/Hughes report and the importance of 
conference endorsing its conclusions'59. It included the NEC slate 160 and an article by 
Hattersley scrutinising Labour's Programme 1982 which "contains much which is both 
genuinely radical and relevant" (the sections on social policy, industry and the 
economy) though he disagreed with its proposals for withdrawal from the EEC and for 
unilateral nuclear disarmament. Given that this Programme was to give rise to what 
Kaufman later termed "the longest suicide note in history"161 , the Shadow Home 
Secretary's attitude was remarkably relaxed. 
At the September TUC in Brighton, Solidarity held a successful fringe meeting at which 
both Chairmen spoke together with NEC member Dunwoody and trade unionist Bryan 
Stanley. Labour's conference in Blackpool's (the Programme aside) was a success for 
Solidarity. Its Rally, chaired by John Smith, heard rousing speeches from Callaghan, 
Hattersley, Shore and Boothroyd, whilst a lunchtime reception for supporters offered 
mutual encouragement. The additional seats on the NEC, announced on the Tuesday 162 
were to deliver a working majority (and the key sub-committee chairmanships) on the 
NEC, whilst Solidarity's call to "BACK MICHAEL - BAN MILITANT" was gleefully 
followed the next day with "MASSIVE VOTE FOR REGISTEW'163 . Hattersley 
claimed to have witnessed members experiencing at last "the will to win"164 despite his 
doubts over the "overwhelming and unequivocal majority" in favour of unilateralism, 
lessened only by the 5: 1 majority in favour of NATO. There was no attempt to amend 
the Wembley formula. Apparently Basnett did not want any change and it seemed 
unlikely that Foot did 165 . There being no challenge to Foot or Healey on the horizon, 
the issue was kicked into touch. Meeting in Blackpool after the Militant vote and the 
NEC results, Solidarity's Steering and Organising Committees agreed that Hattersley 
and Shore should tell Foot "that we wanted a very firm line taken on expelling the eight 
parliamentary candidates, the editorial board and the shareholders and organiscrs of the 
159 Labour Solidarity, August 1982. 
160 Ashley, Hattcrsley, Barry Jones, Kaufman, Radice, Shore, John Smith (for the first and only time) 
plus Boothroyd, Anne Davis, Dunwoody and Summcrskill. 161 John Golding, op cit, 2003, p. 289. 
162 Report ofthe 1982 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 66. 163 Slogans on Solidarity Handbills. The text continued: "The Vote on the Register is not a left-right issue. The decision of the TGWU and the Mineworkers to support it make that point. Militant are in breach of the party constitution .. They want to use the party, not fight for it. Support Michael Foot and the NEC'(DRH /1/35). 
164 Sunday Times, 3 October 1982. 
165 Nick Butler, "Task Force Bulletin", 6 September 1982 (NBP). 
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Militant tendency"166 . They were to wait many years 
before achieving all of these 
demands. 
Whilst Solidarity was heartened by the NEC changes wrought by the unions, they were 
conscious of their own lack of success in the CLP section where all their candidates 
fared badly. Even the best placed, Shore, with 179,000, lagged more than 100,000 
behind the lowest-elected's 301 '000167 . Goudie suggested that the reasons were (i) the 
increased number of constituencies not affiliated or not sending delegates; (ii) the slate 
being agreed too late; (iii) insufficient contact with constituencies in surnmer (when the 
office was preoccupied with the Militant evidence and the application for registration); 
(iv) increased activity by CLPD, including regular letters to GMCs, on policy as well as 
constitutional issues 168. However, she failed to mention either the political gulf between 
Solidarity and party activists, or the absence of OMOV for determining CLPs' votes. 
She did, though, re-emphasise the need for meetings of key supporters whilst also 
"Broadening membership of [our] Committees, so as to avoid being regarded as an 
MPs' organisation". Her work on recruitment produced good results: in November, she 
reported 6,798 supporters. However, she questioned the future of Solidarity after the 
anticipated election, and whether it could attract sufficient funding to continue. Her 
paper stressed the need to "respond to the underlying wishes of our members in the 
CLPs for a more direct influence on the organisation of Solidarity. We are subject to 
great pressure to hold another key workers' meeting. Unless we respond .. some of our 
most important supporters will lose heart and interest. However, we cannot hold a 
meeting without making proposals .. for a new Solidarity constitution". The sensitive 
nature of the paper led to all copies being returned at the end of the meeting, which 
agreed OMOV and reform of the NEC as their priorities169. 
A further meeting again saw Goudie stressing that key workers had called for "an input 
.. into the Steering Committee" as agreed at two previous meetings. 
"If we do not fully implement this, Solidarity will collapse, as our key 
workers will lose faith with the Committee and its intention to be less 
Westminster based. We should be working towards the setting up of a National Advisory Council .. made up from our key workers, and 
166 Minutes of 29 September 1982 (DRIVI/1). 
167 John Smith garnered a mere 36,000; Report ofthe 1982 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, 
p. 66. 
169 Paper for Steering Committee (DRIVI/2). 
169 Steering Committee minutes, 9 November 1982 (DRIVv2). 
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nominations from our Solidarity Groups in the country.. the Steering 
Committee should.. remain the executive authority.. At least 12 people, 
none of whom are MPs, should be co-opted.. [from] the TU movement.. 
[and] local authorities .. unless we take some 
immediate steps, .. severe 170 damage will be done to.. Solidarity" 
It was therefore agreed that the January meeting become the inaugural meeting of 
Solidarity National Advisory Council (NAC). Every proposal demanded finance, so in 
addition to agreeing to the inaugural NAC, and the production of an OMOV pamphlet, 
the Steering Committee set up a Finance Group, chaired by Denis Howell. Finance was 
a constant problem for the Group, which endlessly - but largely fruitlessly - sought 
donations for their work. Well-heeled business people perhaps doubted that Labour 
would ever become electable. 
The Trade Union Group was keen for Solidarity to concentrate on OMOV. By 
December, Haines had knocked the draft pamphlet into readable shape, whilst a model 
171 OMOV resolution was circulated to the mailing list . Wider distribution was not 
always straightforward, one reprimand from a CLP Secretary complaining that 
Solidarity had sent, "unsolicited", its newsletter and the Militant leaflet to members. 
"The NEC has informed me that they are seriously concerned about the incident.. 
[and] asked me to make enquiries into how a list of my membership became available to 
you"172 . Goudie coolly replied that she had not heard from the NEC 
173 
. OMOV caused 
similar hiccups, with Stan Crowther MP demanding "When did OMOV become 
Solidarity Policy? " The response was "December 198 1, when it was adopted by both 
the Steering Committee and at a Recall Meeting of Solidarity MPs"' 74 . 
There was good and bad news for Solidarity in two by-elections in October. The good 
was Spcllar's victory in Northfield - the first Labour by-election success for II years. 
The bad was the choice of the hard-left Harriet Hannan - confirming the growing trend 
in the PLP - although in public, Solidarity could only bemoan the low turn-out in 
Peckham 175 . 1982 ended on a regretful note, with Campbell-Savours writing: 
170 Steering Committee minutes, 17 November 1982 (DRIVI/2). 
171 Steering Committee minutes, 8 December 1982 (DRIVI/2). 
172 Letter from Robin Page, South Herts Secretary to Goudie, 20 December 1982; Hughes (National 
173 
Agent) letter to Page, 24 November 1982 (DRIVI/27). 
Goudie to Page, II January 1983 (DRIVI/27). 
174 Crowther letter to Goudie, 3 December 1982; Goudie to Crowther, II January 1983 (DRI-l/l/24). 171 Labour Solidarity, November 1982. 
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"Earlier this month I .. terminate[d] my standing order to 
Solidarity. I did so 
as I feel that having seized the initiative on the issue of Militant and with an 
NEC poised to act, the party is .. better equipped to 
deal with the problems 
I have never regarded Solidarity as a permanent exponent of more liberal 
forms of party democracy. I .. support 
its aims recognising that whilst the 
party was in difficulty a clear case should be put for tolerance. I now 
perceive a.. readiness in the party to challenge intolerance. .. Solidarity 
should disappear as fast as it was given birth, claiming credit for action on 
Militant.. and re-formed only if the need were again to arise"176 . 
Woolmer thanked the MP for his "financial and moral support.. and straight talking", 
but recalled: "OMOV is still to come"177 . 
Pressure on MPs remained strong. Joe Ashton wrote "I am a 'Tribune' supporter of 
Solidarity and because of this I would like to keep a low profile and not accept any 
speaking engagements" 178 . Even Robert 
Kilroy-Silk, under strong Militant pressure, felt 
it necessary to write "You are aware, aren't you, that I'm not a member of Solidarity but 
a member of Tribune" 179 ; Dobson similarly protested "I am not a member or supporter 
of Labour Solidarity. You send me your literature, but that's up to you" 
180 despite both 
having been on the original list of 150 signatories. 
Thel6 January 1983 inaugural meeting of Solidarity's National Advisory Council, 
NAC, began with a briefing on Militant by James Goudie, Mary's lawyer husband and a 
Chambers' colleague of Derry Irvine and Tony Blair. He outlined how the party had 
chosen to deal with Militant as an organisational rather than an ideological question. 
The 1982 Conference had not actually declared Militant ineligible, following Irvine's 
advice that the NEC had to do so before proceeding to any expulsions'81. The difficult 
question was defining who were members of Militant, beyond the obvious editorial 
board and sales organisers 182 . The meeting also 
heard a hint of what later became 
evident - Golding's acceptance of Labour's Programme as the 1983 Manifesto. 
Golding would "support EEC withdrawal and unilateralism because the Party wants 
176 Letter to Woolmer, 27 December 1982. 
177 Letter of 16 January 1983 (DRWI/24). 
178 Letter to Alison Butler at Solidarity, 2 May 1983 (DRIVI/24). 
179 Letter to Goudie, 21 April 1993 (DRWI/24). When Kilroy-Silk left the Commons for television, 
causing a by-election, Austin Mitchell wrote: "Letting down those who helped him against Militant 
is inconsiderate' (New Society, 8 August 1986). 
Letter to Goudie, 5 May 1983 (DFdi/l/24). 
David Bean, together with Nick Butler and Rosaleen Hughes, had met with Underhill, who 
suggested that Solidarity should obtain legal advice to put before the NEC (Bean notes of 29 April 1982 meeting, David Bean papers). A subsequent phone call to Goudie was taken when she was at Irvine's house, which led to his involvement (Mary Goudie interview). 
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them" and "canvass for Tatchell after losing the vote on the NEC! "' 83 . The 
importance 
of control of the NEC was evident and the meeting agreed that a full slate was 
84 needed' . The 
NAC endorsed the OMOV strategy and model resolutions, subsequently 
distributed as an A5-leaflet "One Person, One Vote -True Democracy"' 
85. One 
resolution was on OMOV for the CLP section of the Electoral College, the other in the 
selection of candidates. 
The NAC having stressed the need to work closely with unions, Goudie wrote to 
friendly unions asking them to double their advertising rate in the newsletter to L300186 
Meanwhile, Solidarity in Scotland led by Dewar moved up a gear in response to 
increased Militant activity 187 . The Moderates were not just 
fighting Militant, but also 
the new "Labour Against the Witch-hunt", formed to support Benn's attempt to halt 
action against the Tendency'88. Militant was a major pre-occupation, with evidence 
continuing to arrive in Goudie's postbag'89. The party appeared more sanguine, its 
house journal, New Socialist, accepting Militant advertisements 190 , leading to protests to 
Headquarters 191 . 
Solidarity continued with fringe meetings at regional conferences, whilst the NAC met 
again on Sunday 27 March. Afterwards, Goudie reported to an absent Dunwoody that 
members were upset that the NEC had endorsed Militant candidates -a more visible 
presence of the Tendency than the Editorial Board, and thus rewarding the beneficiaries 
of infiltration. This was symptomatic of the new NEC failing to live up to Solidarity's 
92 93 
expectations' . Members also wanted to see Shadow Cabinet members at NACs' . 
A Recall Meeting of MPs organised for May was cancelled as MPs fanned out for the 
election, to campaign in the most hostile of climates. Much has been written about this 
election and its effect on the party, and will be not repeated, save to note that two 
Solidarity stalwarts, Woolmer and the recently-elected Spellar, forfeited their seats in 
I" Bean notes of 16 January 1983. 
193 ihid. 
"" Goudie report to Steering Committee (DHR/l/2). 
195 The first draft read: "One Man, One Vote - True Democracy" (DRII/l/55). 11, Goudie to Godsiff, APEX, 27 January 1983. 
1117 List of meetings, Bob Eadie papers. 
188 DRIVI/27. CLPD headed its campaign "Resist the Purge" (New Socialist, January 1983, p. 40). 189 DRWI/28. 
19, New Socialist, May 19 83, p. 2 1. 
191 Letter to Party Headquarters (DRIVI/28). 
19, Goudie letter to Dunwoody, 29 March 1993 (DRIV 1 /24). 
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Labour's tally of losses. The 1983 election was led by Foot, whose poll ratings 
continuously trailed Thatcher's. Healey remained loyal to him but few others in the 
Shadow Cabinet respected his "voter appeal". Alone amongst them, Kaufman had the 
194 
courage personally to urge Foot to step aside . But this most romantic of Leaders had 
been saved by Ossie O'Brien's by-election victory 195 over a hapless SDP candidate at 
Darlington on 24 March, at a time when national opinion polls had Labour on 32% to 
the Conservatives' 44% (and the Alliance 22%) 196 . Labour fared much worse in the 
June election - the trigger for all the policy, organisational and presentational changes 
which were to follow over the next decade. Without the Falklands, however, the crest 
of Thatcher's wave might have been lower, and it is unlikely that the SDP surge would 
have subsided so much. For the Labour Party, and for Solidarity, it was not just the 
final tally which caused despair, but the haernorrhaging of their own supposed core 
support, with trade unionists and skilled manual workers deserting in even greater 
numbers than in 1979 197 . 
After the election, Solidarity had to pick itself up - at first fearing that a further leftward 
shift in the PLP'98 would make its work harder. In fact, in the subsequent Shadow 
Cabinet elections, Solidarity won 9 of the 15 seats, Healey topping the poll (with 136 
out of 209 votes) followed by Kaufman, Shore, John Smith and Jack Cunningharn'99. In 
contrast Solidarity polled poorly in the NEC elections, where they failed to win a single 
seat in the CLP section, their top-placcd candidate (Kaufman) securing just 180,000 
votes to the 280,000 of Audrey Wise (the lowest successful candidate)200 
demonstrating the gulf between the PLP and local activists. 
Before either the NEC or Shadow Cabinet elections could take place, the party needed a 
new leadership following the resignations of Foot and Healey. From the outside, it 
appeared that: 
"Solidarity was controlled by a secret caucus behind its public faqade and 
that caucus had an intense loyalty to Roy Hattersley .. The most powerful 
19, Steering Committee minutes, 27 April 1983 (DRWI/2). 
194 Dick Clements interview. 
195 Labour: 20,544; Conservatives: 18,132; SDP: 12,735. O'Brien lost the seat in the general election. I" Sunday Times, 27 March 1982. 
197 Only 39% of trade unionists voted Labour (Frank Chapple, op cit, p. 202). 19, Predicted, for example, by the Daily Telegraph (23 May 1983) though not by Channel Four's A Week in Politics 01 June 1983). 
199 PLP papers. The other Solidarity members were Archer, Jones, Radice and Dunwoody. 21 Report ofthe 1983 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 100. Only three MPs were elected to both bodies: Dunwoody (courtesy of the unions), plus left-wingers Heffer and Meacher. 
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people who backed Solidarity did so on the clear assumption that Hattersley 
would be the next Leader.. [He] had the Right's support guaranteed', 
201. 
Though writing well after 1983, Silkin failed to notice that Solidarity did not uniformly 
plump for Hattersley. Golding had intended to, but the candidate's behaviour switched 
202 him to the Kinnock camp . Of the other 26 main Solidarity activists, 
four voted for 
Kinnock and four for Shore, Solidarity's co-Chairman, whom Howell and Hattersley 
had brought into the organisation specifically to prevent it being seen as a Hattersley 
03 
campaign2 . It was for this reason that 
Solidarity was studiously meant to avoid taking 
sideS204 although its co-ordinator booked the Old Ship Hotel for a late night party after 
the ballot, presumably for Hattersley supporters to celebrate 205 . Given the 
predominance of Solidarity MPs in the Hattersley camp, whereas Kinnock won 
overwhelmingly elsewhere in the party, this is further testimony of the distance between 
Solidarity and party (and union) activists. 
VA-iile MPs were preoccupied with the leadership contest, others were looking to the 
future. One local member stressed that "The 9 June result seems to make Labour 
Solidarity's role ever more critical if we are to rescue the Party over the next 3 to 4 
years.. There is an enormous amount to be done in the CLPs where the hard and nalive 
left groups still hold sway"206 . Others continued to press for OMOV, assisted by branch 
members' increasing demand to have a say in their CLPs' choice in the leadership poll. 
The OMOV leaflet was widely distributed and the subject chosen for the Sunday rally at 
conference. Solidarity held a fringe meeting at the TUC in Blackpool, and publicised 
its NEC slate, although the organisation "kept a low profile over the summer', 207 
because of the contest between its two leading lights. Some nevertheless entered the 
fray for the deputy leadership, Bristol's members claiming that "The election of 
201 John Silkin, op cit, p. 40. 
202 Godsiff, who had the union figures, and Golding, with the MPsI, went to Hattersicy's home to break 
the news, which the candidate took badly. Godsiff said "You have to decide whether you want to be 
Deputy to Neil Kinnock7' to which the renowned author retorted: "Why should I be Deputy to that 
Welsh windbag? I could be Deputy Editor of the Observer at L40,000 a year". The amazed 
messengers left. Golding had gone intending to tell Hattersley that he would support him regardless 
of the figures, but after that reaction went straight over to declare for Kinnock (Roger Godsiff 
interview, John Golding, op cit, 2003, pp. 320-321). 
203 Roy Hattersley interview. 
204 For example, a handwritten letter from Anne Davis to Goudie, dealing with both Solidarity and Hattersley, then says "(1 am sorry to mix Solidarity business with Roy's campaign - sorry. I know I 
shouldn'tly'; 21 September 1983 (DRIVI/33). 
205 Letter to the hotel (DRIVI/33). 
206 Peter Jones to Goudie, 14 June 1983 (DRII/l/27). 
207 Labour Solidarity, August 1983. Only two issues of the newsletter were produced in 1983. 
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Michael Meacher.. [would] be an unqualified disaster.. he represents the Hard Left- 
Zany Left combination whose antics and dogmatism lost us millions of trade union 
votes at the General Election"208 . 
In the autumn, a serious look at the future of Solidarity took place. Its finances could 
not sustain an office, so notice was given to terminate the Charles Lane lease from the 
end of December, returning the operation to Goudie's home 209 . MPs were asked for 
E20 each to keep even a skeleton structure in place 210. Significantly, the post-election 
parliamentary party finally saw the amalgamation of the three Moderate groupings - the 
Manifesto Group, Labour First and Solidarity MPs - into one: Parliamentary 
Solidarity"'. Hitherto, the "Recall" meetings appear to have been the only gathering of 
MPs, but now this body took on a life of its own, complete with bank account, standing 
orders, cheque book and Officers. The Chainnan was Brynmor John, with Vice 
Chairmen Dunwoody, David Clark (Labour First), Terry Davis (Solidarity) and Weetch 
(Manifesto Group)212 . The Secretary was the new 
MP Stuart Be11213 
. 
The merger also 
brought Manifesto Group funds into SolidaritY214. A joint grouping would not be 
without problems - Howell, for example, taking umbrage and resigning as Treasurer 
when he was not elected by Parliamentary Solidarity to be on their slate for the Shadow 
Cabinet215. 
Towards the end of 1983, a number of papers were prepared for the NAC on 14 
February 1984. One recommended a new "supporter membership" (replacing the 
mailing list), together with encouraging the adoption of "reputable" candidates for 
parliament and local government, and improved representation on regional executives. 
An EETPU paper pointed to the leftward shift in the PLP (Meacher having attracted 
more PLP votes in 1983 than Benn in 1981), a number of retired MPs having been 
replaced by hard left-wingers, taking the Campaign Group from a dozen to 30 or more, 
although the split on the Left (between the Campaign and Tribune Groups) produced 
66good" Shadow Cabinet results. Some ground had been lost on the NEC, whilst 
208 Bristol Labour Solidarity, 1983. 
209 Steering Committee minutes, 16 November 1983 (DRIVI/2). 
210 Steering Committee minutes, 14 December 1983 (DRII/l/2). 
211 Steering Committee minutes, 14 December 1983 (DRII/ 1 /2). 
212 List (DRWI/24). 
213 Notes of NAC meeting, David Bean papers.; Stuart Bell, op cit, p. 93. 214 Accounts (DRH/ 1 /3). 
1 July 1984 (DRIVI/24). This seems never have taken Cffect as the papers show his continued activity in the Group. 
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Militant were still active (their meetings advertised in Labour Weekly) and the soft-left 
dominated the Leader's office 216 . The paper concluded "our supporters 
feel isolated and 
under siege .. an occasional newsletter will not 
be enough to sustain themý', and 
therefore called for better organisation, especially in CLPs, and a renewed push on 
OMOV217. In November, a paper for the Steering Committee concluded that "among 
key supporters there is a strong desire that Solidarity should be kept" with at least a 
newsletter, model resolutions, NAC meetings and the Sunday rallies at conference but 
an end to regional fringes and the speakers' service. 
1984 opened with finther evidence of the Westminster/membcrship tension that plagued 
Solidarity. The NAC was set for mid-week, 6.30 to 9 pin "in London to facilitate the 
attendance of MPs whose absence from.. Sunday meetings may be understandable but 
is still constantly criticised"218 . The reaction was 
immediate, Spellar commenting that it 
`6yet again demonstrates the way in which ordinary party members in the regions feel 
they arc disregarded". He criticised Solidarity activities for being "stultified by national 
political events of all-consuming interest to parliamentarians, but of only relative 
interest to those in the constituencies" and predicted that a weekday meeting would 
"deprive the NAC of much needed voices from the regionS"Q 19. Barbara Hawkins 
remonstrated that the "SNAC is the best assembly for the non-Parliamentarians .. But 
mostly they do havejobs and mostly a long way from London. Teeside Solidarity urges 
a return to the week-end, whole-day, forum which can be truly representative of 
workers from the regions 420. Goudie "had already received a number of apologies and 
v221 complaints because the meeting was being held mid-week' . Nevertheless the 
meeting went ahead, Godsiff hoping "that the outcome will be that the Labour 
Solidarity Campaign will continue .. because 
it still has an important role .. to combat 
the activities of the 'illegitimate leff at constituency levelto222. 
The Valentine's Day meeting was cheered by the increased vote for Ashley and 
Kaufman in the NEC ballot, although Hattersley (appearing for the first time as Deputy 
Leader) reported difficulties in CLPs where the Left continued to organise, admitting 
116 Presumably a reference to Charles Clarke, Patricia Hewitt and Dick Clements. 
117 "Consolidating our Progress", JSA. 
211 Goudie letter to NAC members, 19 January 1984. 
219 Spcilar letter to Goudie, 24 January 1984, JSA. 
220 Letter to Goudie, 7 February 1984 (DRWI/28). 
211 Steering Committee minutes, I February 1984 (DRWI/3). 
222 Godsiff letter to Goudie, 6 February 1984 (DRIi/i/28). 
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223 
that Solidarity had "done nothing since conference" . This seems unlikely, as 9 of the 
15 elected 1983/84 Shadow Cabinet places were held by Solidarity. Nevertheless, 
given that Hattersley had joined the NEC for the first time, and with a workable (albeit 
fragile) majority, it sees strange that a coherent plan of action was not more evident. 
The February NAC established a new Steering Committee, including II representatives 
from Parliamentary Solidarity, 3 from the unions and representatives from CLPs; 
Hattersley and Shore became Vice-Presidents, and Goudie took the title of Secretary 
(Woolmer having lost his seat)224. 
At the subsequent NAC, Hattersley stressed the importance of Solidarity existing 
independently in CLPs and unions, rather than dependent on a few senior MPs, whilst 
also becoming more positive and moving into policy areas. There were mixed reports 
from around the country, Solidarity not having been very active since the election. 
Attention focused on reselection, with Bean emphasising the need to get OMOV 
through the NEC, for which "we need to be very subtle in our approach". In particular, 
unions needed to be reassured about their nomination rights under OMOV. It was 
important not to concentrate just on saving MPs but also selecting new candidates. 
CLPs wanted early re-selection which meant that work on OMOV must commence 
quickly. Up to 25 MPs were at risk so they should emphasise to the NEC "the appalling 
damage to our electoral credibility if de-selection happens causing internal rows". New 
officers were elected with Terry Davis becoming Chairmaný25. Meanwhile, from 
outside the meeting, an indication of disquiet with Solidarity appeared in the pages of 
Forward Labour with a "snippet" reading: "LSC: Where Art Thou? Where is Labour 
Solidarity Campaign: You'd think they'd be hard at it in the constituencies. In case 
Lhey don't know it, the Barmy Brigade is at it, 9226. 
The first new-style Steering Committee took place in April, with attention to the 
"drastic state of the finances". It was agreed to approach supporters in the Lords for 
funds. By May, 52 parliamentarians had signed standing orders, although the bank 
account was still fl, 000 overdrawn in jUIY227 _a situation only saved by one E5,000 
223 David Bean notes, David Bean papers. 
214 Steering Committee minutes, 29 February and 21 March 1984 (DRWI/3). See annex 6. 223 Minutes of National Advisory Council, 25 March 1984 (DRIVI/3). See annex 6. 221 ForwardLahour, April 1984. 
227 Steering Committee minutes, 29 February, 9 and 25 May, and 18 July 1984 (DRII/l/3). 
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donation raised by the new Treasurer's persuasiveneSS228. Politically, the priority was 
OMOV; the Committee agreed that Parliamentary Solidarity's Chair (John) and 
Secretary (Bell) should meet Kinnock to press for this and to express continuing 
229 
anxieties over reselection 
Discussions on the NEC slate took place in the spring, with names agreed earlier than 
previously and work with CLP contacts (which showed some support for Kaufman and 
Dunwoody but little for anyone else). The new Steering Committee immediately faced 
complaints that the MPs were failing to attend. It appears that Parliamentary Solidarity 
was fulfilling their needs, and there remained an unwillingness to engage with the wider 
grouping. Furthermore, when those present questioned what was going on in the House 
(such as on EDMs or Shadow Cabinet elections), Brymnor John slapped them down 
with the reminder "that these and other matters were the business of Parliamentary 
Solidarity" 230. The MPs' attendance continued to be variable: John and Davis both 
made 7 meetings, Robertson and Clark 5, Bell and Weetch 4 each, whilst the other MPs, 
ranged from zero to 3 231 . 
There were also complaints about the lack of visible activity. Boothroyd reported that 
members in her area had received nothing for a considerable time 232 , and Helen Eadie 
wrote about the absence of any newsletter, contrary to the NAC decision. She said that 
MPs seemed to believe that: 
"Solidarity [could] easily be re-kindled if there are pressing needs in the 
future" whereas "it is not easy to turn on the tap and come up with accurate 
records of where our support lies .. By maintaining a very weak national 
machine, the most Solidarity can realistically hope to achieve will be 
influencing slightly the NEC elections but little or no influence [over] 
reselection.. Many MPs will not be reselected and that will have been a 
high price to pay". 
She warned that the current route could see Solidarity slipping away - in which case it 
would be preferable to wind it up. Davis's reply agreed on the effect of no newsletter, 
but claimed it was finance which prevented its appearance 233 . Whilst acknowledging 
her views on reselection, he felt that Solidarity should be more than an I'Mps' protection 
228 Figure in the accounts and note from Goudie (DRH/ 1 /24 and DPjV 1 /27). 229 Steering Committee minutes, 4 April 1984 (DRWI/3). 
230 Steering Committee minutes, 5 July 1984 (DPJI/1/3). 
23 ' NAC paper, October 1984 (DRITI/3). 
232 Letter to Goudie (DRW 1 /24). 
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society" and urged Eadie to remain with i? 34 . Forward Labour's David Warburton 
wrote more openly: "The sooner LSC realises that its job is to get to work in the CLPs 
the better. Any organisation, whether LSC or the Hard Left Campaign Group, which 
relies on pearls of wisdom from sympathisers in the Palace of Westminster tolls its own 
death knell"235. 
Eadie was rather optimistic in thinking they could influence the NEC elections. They 
were "a disaster"236. In the CLP section, the lowest-elected (Wise) was nearly 100,000 
237 
votes clear of Kaufman . More ominously, there were only two names on 
Solidarity's 
slate 238 . In the union section, Golding and 
Howell were defeated 239 . However, the 
Sunday rally and two fringe meetings were successful. The NAC, in Blackpool, 
amended the Group's name to Labour Party Solidarity Campaign and introduced a El 
annual membership subscription (when this appeared as a supporter's subscription to 
the newsletter, there were complaints that yet again members would have no say over 
the organisation). Nevertheless, 137 subscribed240. 
Reviewing the conference, Spellar bemoaned the constant appearance at the rostrum of 
Militan f24 1 and "the conduct of delegates" which shocked voters. Even before former 
Prime Minister Callaghan began to speak, Heffer in the chair had to call for good 
behaviour, saying "I don't want anybody .. hissing, shouting or booing99242 . For Spellar, 
this made it essential to re-produce a "sensible" party, and to concentrate on the 
selection of candidates. Without a change, he warned of the suffering of those who 
would "bear the brunt of our failure: the old, the poor, the sick, the homeless and the ill- 
1243 housed' 
233 In fact, the next issue -a simple two-sided photocopied version - did arrive in July, largely funded 
234 
by the EETPU, her husband's employer! (JSA). 
23 
Letters of 26 June and 8 July 1984, Bob Eadie papers. 
5 ForwardLabour, October 1984. 
236 Steering Committee minutes, 24 October 1984 (DRII/l/3). 
237 330,000 to 141,000. Ashley did slightly better with 183,000; Report ofthe 1984 Annual Conference 
ofthe Labour Party, p. 69. 238 Labour Solidarity, July 1984. 
239 ibid. 
240 Steering Committee minutes, 28 November 1984 (DRIVI/3). 
241 He suggested that Liverpool's Heffer in the chair explained the selection of both Militant and scouse delegates. 
242 Report ofthe 1984 Annual Conference of the Labour Party, p. 150. Similarly when Hammond 
spoke, interruptions forced Heffer to plead "This is a Labour Party conference, not a rabble .. there is a tradition of this movement which is basic tolerance" (ibid, p. 40). By contrast, a "standing 
141 
ovation and prolonged applause and cheere' greeted Arthur Scargi 11 (ibid, p. 3 5). Undated paper, JSA. 
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Before the 1984 conference, Solidarity had seemed optimistic about the "Year of 
Progress", pointing to the party's improved fortunes following the arrival of the 
Kinnock/Hattersley leadership and the successful European elections (Labour seats near 
doubled to 32), whilst still affirming the need for increased efforts - particuI4 On 
OMOV (on which Kinnock had yet to commit) and entryism. But by November, its 
publication (reduced to A5-format) was calling for "active and efficient campaigning 
against.. those who preach intolerance and whose success would cut the Party off from 
its support in the country". It professed itself "sad" to see the new MP for 
Chesterfield 244 , Benn, sharing a platform with the outlawed Militant (though this 
probably contributed to his poor Shadow Cabinet showing). However, the Group took 
comfort from Kinnock's recent conversion to OMOV245 for selections and his 
assessment that "We won the argument but lost the vote" (by half a million votes). Its 
editorial line was that "It is not so much a question of 'if', but 'when' victory comes". 
On the other hand, the organisation was dismayed by those seeking "defiance of the 
law" in their fight with the government on local government. Solidarity feared that non- 
compliance with the law won little sympathy with the electorate and conflicted with the 
party's history and philosophy. It feared that illegality - rather the Conservative cuts - 
would become the story 246 . 
Parliamentary Solidarity meanwhile won two-thirds of the Shadow Cabinet places 
(taking 8 of the top 10 places, plus two others, as well as the PLP Chairman and Chief 
Whip 247) . The Left were unhappy: the "Shadow Cabinet elections were a disaster for 
Tribune. Solidarity stood a full slate (so much for Party unity) and was well organised. 
Ten of its members were elected (a net increase of one)". Whilst Campaign Group 
member Meacher was elected with many Tribune votes, "By not voting for the Tribune 
members, Campaign damaged the left as a whole .. preventing.. 'inside left' candidates 
such as Rooker and Straw from being elected. .. Too many left wingers stood" (there 
were 51 candidates -a quarter of the PLP - of whom 29 were from the Left)248. The 
outcome was a measure of Solidarity's discipline, tactics and underlying strength. 
2" Elected in the I March 1984 by-election. 
245 or 'One Person One Vote' as it appeared in the newsletter. 246 Labour Solidarity, November 1984. 
247 PLP papers. 
249 Clause IV, December 1984. 
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Before the year ended, a further NAC took place, with 35 present, which reiterated the 
249 importance of getting reliable candidates selected, as well as a good NEC slate . The 
threat of deselections was much in evidence prior to the 1985 round, with Field, Shore, 
Kaufman (and even left-wingers such as John Silkin) facing difficult challenges 250 9 
although the worries proved unfounded. The predicted purge of Moderates did not take 
place. Some MPs no doubt retired a little earlier than planned but elsewhere Militant 
was pushed out of contention (by Adam Ingram in East Kilbride and Steve Bassam. in 
Brighton)251. 
Despite patchy reports of local activity, some Solidarity groups were functioning, 
London's having met in the Commons, a West London group in Ealing, and others in 
Scotland, the Wirral, West Midlands and Teeside. There were regional fringe meetings, 
in Wales, Scotland and across England 252 . Student Solidarity was set up during 1985 
46as a rallying point for moderate Labour students, and to counter hard-left student 
groups within the party". It had a place on the main Steering Committee (held by 
Andrew Cook, from the EETPU) and was given E100 to get underway. Itheldatleast 
one fringe meeting and produced newsletters but did not continue for much more than a 
53 year2 . 
The Steering Committee's preoccupations in 1985, finance apart, were OMOV, 
resolutions for conference and the NEC slate. Joe Haines redrafted the OMOV leaflet, 
whilst the cause was helped by a split on the Left when the LCC gently distanced itself 
from CLPD and the hard-left. The LCC move towards OMOV was surprising given its 
role in helping defeat the 1984 amendment which would have offered constituency 
254 parties the option of allowing every individual member a direct vote . CLPD opposed 
too great an extension of the franchise, calling the "right wing proposals for one 
member one vote" an "attempt to dilute the party's policies through media influenced 
results. This is unacceptable - particularly the postal ballot". (Though CLPD did 
acknowledge that perhaps members who had attended one third of their branch 
249 NAC Minutes, 25 November 1984 (DRWI/3). 
250 Guardian, 10 December 1984. 
251 Observer, 17 March 1985. 
252 Handbills (DRH/l/26 and 27). 
213 Letters and newsletters (DRWI/26 and DRIVI/3). 254 Guardian, 20 June 1985. 
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meetings, and had at least a year's membership, might be allowed to vote 
for a 
candidate at a meeting 
255. ) 
The NEC's role in taking OMOV (and the isolation of Militant) forward was going to 
be crucial, so attempts for an attractive slate continued. However, one of the 
best 
known of Solidarity's standard-bearers was unwilling to help, John Smith writing "I 
have given some further thought to the NEC elections and I have come to the 
firm view 
that I do not wish to be a candidate , 
256 
. Despite this, a slightly 
longer list than 1984 was 
offered (Ashley, Kaufman, Radice and Robertson)257. It had no more success. 
The last- 
elected (Wise) had 317,000, with Dalyell the runner up; best-placed 
Solidarity member 
Kaufman polled 214,000 -a full 100,000 short. (The moderates 
did less well on the 
union side too, Anne Davis losing to Beckett . )258 
Parliamentary Solidarity continued its activities, with 48 MPs and 5 Lords in 
membership and re-electing its officers in January 1985. Relations between the two 
parts remained distant, Goudie having to ask to address the Parliamentary Group as "it's 
over a year since I last came formally, '259. Attendance by the MPs at the Committee 
was variable, a list for 29 February 1984 to 16 January 1985 indicating that whilst 
Brynmor John had managed 10 meetings, and Davis and Robertson 8 and 7, seven of 
the others had made either 3,2 or evenjust one meeting. The Steering Committee 
asked the "Secretary to send a stiff note with the next notice because of the bad 
attendance"260 . 
The weekend meetings were no greater attraction. Seven MPs did not attended a single 
NAC, though Chairman Davis made 3, Hattersley 4, and John, Dunwoody, Robertson, 
Clark, Shore, Dewar, Smith, Millan and Radice between I and 2. The mismatch 
between the parliamentarians and supporters was continuing. At the January 1985 
NAC, there were proposals for a restructured - and smaller - Council, presumably to 
give it more teeth, but little seems to have changed. The 35 attendees concentrated on a 
major concern. - matching reliable candidates with receptive CLPs - and on the 
traditional issues (OMOV and Militant) plus model resolutions on the economy and law 
253 Neil Rhodes, in CLPD circular. 
256 Letter to Goudie, 9 May 1985 (DRWI/26). 
211 List of names (DRW 1 /38). 
259 Report of1he 1985 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 85. 
259 Letter of 10 November 1985 (DRIVI/26). A date was set up for January. 
21 Steering Committee minutes, 20 February 1985 (DRIVI/3). 
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and order 261 . NAC meetings were arranged 
for February, June and September -a 
difficult period for the party with the miners' strike at the beginning of the year, the 
failure to re-take Brecon and Radnor, the loss of the supposedly safe Lambeth Vauxhall 
GLC seat, local government problems, and Militant activity. In parallel to Solidarity 
and St Ermins, Spellar was meanwhile engaged on the establishment of yet another 
group (Mainstream), taking Solidarity into friendly unions, some not affiliated to the 
pafty262 . There was an NAC at the end of the year, when 
22 of the 74 present were MPs 
including Hattersley, Shore, John Smith, Cunningham, Kaufman, Dewar and Radice 
from the Shadow Cabinet, plus Boothroyd and Dunwoody from the NEC263. 
Whilst 1984 had seen just two issues of Labour Solidarity (one 2-sided A4, one eight- 
page A5, both photocopied), there were three issues in 1985, albeit still photocopied 
rather than the red-bannered, typeset versions of the first two years. In January, the 
miners' strike - which caused the party so much trouble - was covered, with an attack 
on the Campaign Group for seeking a debate in the House which would have 
embarrassed Kinnock (a man "growing in stature every day")264 . Solidarity took too 
much heart from the party's performance in the May local elections, which indicated 
that Labour could "be the largest party after the next Election .. [with] every chance that 
Neil Kinnock is heading for No 10". Whilst OMOV remained centre stage, the Group 
also argued against black sections -a type of apartheid 265 . The Student newsletter 
hailed Kinnock's Bournemouth anti-Militant speech as "brilliant and courageous" and 
welcomed the enthusiastic response from delegates 266 . Solidarity's newsletter 
applauded the NEC's decision to launch an inquiry into Liverpool, and reported that 
applications to join the party had flooded in after Bournemouth, along with a surge in 
opinion poll ratings. The Group, having made the case for parliamentary socialism for 
so long, felt vindicated by Kinnock's re-assertion of "the democratic, reformist roots of 
our Party. His condemnation of impossibilism.. was a vital return to the fundamental 
principles of Labourism. The traditional pragmatic majority in the Party can now feel 
that they are on the offensive with an ideology which.. is popUlar"267. Although the 
261 National Advisory Committee notes, 20 January 1985 (DRWI/3). 
262 Labour Solidarity, May 1985. 
263 Handwritten notes (DRWI/28). 
161 Labour Solidarity, January 1985. 
263 Labour Solidarity, May 1985. 
166 Student Solidarity News, October 1985. 
267 Labour Solidarity, December 1985. 
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OMOV motion (moved by Spellar, seconded by the NLJLSC and supported by 
Robertson) had been remitted, it seemed its day would come 268 . 
Kinnock did not rest after Bournemouth, penning an "Open Letter to the people of 
Liverpool" describing how "My patience has run out on Tendency tacticians"269 . He 
then delivered a Fabian lecture in London's Friends Meeting House, where he attacked 
"Democratic centralism (which employs the most undemocratic methods).. 
Vanguardism ... [of a] self-appointed elite" and the dishonesty of those who "opt for a parasitical life inside the mass Labour movement .. [which] involves systematically abusing the open and tolerant.. Labour Party". 
Worse, their belief that "the ends .. 
justify the means, a neat and nasty tactic 
called 'revolutionary truth' provides a licence to lie about their organisation, 
their funding and their aims". Anyone committed to Militant should be "put 
out of the party.. Democracy must always defend itself and democratic 
socialists cannot permit their Party to be defaced by a secretive group whose 
whole purpose is to contradict the values, feed off the vitality of and 
disgrace" our part y 270. 
This was music to Solidarity ears and the sweeter from the left-leaning Kinnock, who 
was clearly intent on change. 
However, the divide between party activists and the PLP remained. So whilst Benn, 
Heffer, Meacher, Richardson, Skinner and Wise were all elected to the CLP seats on 
the NEC (plus Beckett and Maynard for the women's places) alone of these Meacher 
was also elected by fellow MPs to the Shadow Cabine e7l. On the Left, there was 
similarly no congruence between MPs' and activists' views, Robin Cook and Denzil 
Davies being chosen in the MPs' ballot but failing to make the NEC (for which other 
left-wing Shadow Cabinet members, such as Prescott, were not even candidates). Benn 
was more than 20 votes adrift of one of the 15 Shadow Cabinet places, in contrast to 
Kaufman's top position with 122 votes. Solidarity's slate took 9 seats (losing 
Dunwoody)272. 
1986 saw a more concerted campaign to win an NEC place - building on Kaufman's 
existing vote 273 and, it was hoped, John Smith's public profile. However, Smith would 
268 Report ofihe 1985 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, pp. 190-194. 269 Liverpool Echo, 29 October 1985. 
270 Text of Kinnock Fabian Lecture on "The Future of Socialism", 12 November 1985. 271 Report ofthe 1985 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 85, and PLP papers. 272 Stuart Bell, who organised the states, recalls that Dewar was elected by I vote when Bell got John Gilbert out from his Lisbon hotel late at night to fax through his proxy in time (Stuart Bell, op cit, 
273 
p. 99, and PLP papers). 
Bell and the EETPU having identified the 106 CLPs which supported him, JSA. 
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not commit himself, Bell writing that "Some of the senior figures, however, such as 
John Smith & Jack Cunningham would wish to reserve their position to see how well a 
national campaign can develop around their candidatures"274. This did not facilitate the 
development of such a campaign. Meanwhile, Shore was unable to get the necessary 
nomination from his CLP. By June it was clear that Smith would not stand 275 . The 
slate therefore comprised: Ashley, Bell, Kaufman, Mitchell, Radice and Robertson 276 
Whilst none were successftil, Heffer was defeated - replaced by Dalyell - with Ashley 
277 
and Kaufman as two of the three runners up . (On the women's section, the unions 
replaced Beckett with Jeuda, to the delight of the Moderates. ) At the year end, 
Solidarity was again producing slates, for the new National Constitutional 
Committee 278 , but whilst the St Ermins Group delivered both women's seats and 4 of 
the 5 union places, Solidarity made no impact on the 3 CLP places, attracting, at most, 
43 constituencies. 
Solidarity remained active in 1986, and held fringe meetings at various regional 
conferences 279. The main event was the Sunday rally at Blackpool when Hattersley's 
speech won wide publicity 280. The NAC continued to meet, with Anne Davis replacing 
husband Terry as Chairman at the January AGM. The tighter system of subscriptions 
saw 594 supporters in January (rising to 665 by September) - not enough to provide the 
necessary finance and at the beginning of the year Goudie and Hattersley had to 
guarantee a E1,000 overdraft281 . The NAC met in April and then at the October 
conference, when the subscription was doubled to E2. Its final meeting in 1986 was due 
to discuss the future of the organisation but postponed this until February while 
continuing to experience the difficulty of running activities without funding. 
Local meetings may have been declining, but Solidarity's great cause, OMOV, was 
gaining ground, with the party launching a consultation on Extending the Franchise for 
selection and re-selection as a result of the EETPU motion remitted in 1985. Haines 
revised the pamphlet into "Tbey Say It Can't be Done: One Person One Vote", 
274 Bell letter to Goudie, 6 January 1986 (DRIVI/28). 
275 Steering Committee minutes, 21 May and 4 June 1986 (DRIVI/3). 
276 Labour Solidarity, July 1986. 
277 Labour Weekly, 3 October 1986. 
2711 Steering Committee minutes, 19 November 1986 (DRIV113), 
271 Labour Solidarity, June 1986. 
290 Labour Solidarity, October 1986. 
29 ' Notes of NAC, 25 January 1986 (DMI/26); Steering Committee minutes, 22 October 1986 (DRIVI/3). 
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complete with model resolutions and rebuttal arguments against the opponents' case. 
The issue was promoted in the Students' newsletter, as "real, grass-roots democracy", 
and the Steering Group circulated another resolution on OMOV for the Electoral 
282 College . Solidarity took 
heart from the expulsion of the Militant Eight from 
Liverpool though recognised that the fight was far from over. In London, the party was 
still in trouble so a number of members launched "Londoners for Labour" at the end of 
1986, including the ever-organising Spellar and, as Secretary, Godsiff283. 
Electorally, Labour was doing better, holding every council (except Liverpool) in the 
May elections and with their overtly "family man", moderate Nick Raynsford, taking 
Fulham from the Conservatives, the first good news since the 1983 debacle 284 . 
Everything the government did heightened the desire for victory, from its abolition of 
the GLC, and allowing US planes to take off to bomb Libya, to the disregard for the 
niceties of protocol when Thatcher alone of European leaders chose not to attend Olof 
Palme's funeral. She had survived Westland and the miners' strike and helped 
marginalise the 5-year old SDP (whose third party presence in the House never allowed 
them to land a blow on the government). However, Labour's problems continued, its 
hapless far-left candidate in the Greenwich by-election, Deirdre Woods, losing 
spectacularly to the SDP's Rosie Barnes. 
This was the atmosphere in which Parliamentary Solidarity organised for the final 
Shadow Cabinet contest before the election. Benn's vote fell even further (from 62 to 
50) while Kaufman and Smith took the two top places (113 and 103 respectively), being 
joined by 8 others from their slate (as well as the Chief Whip and PLP Chairman)281. 
Solidarity clearly represented the bulk of the PLP, its leading lights seen as the 
workhorses on the opposition front-bench. There was some friction between the two 
arms of Solidarity, not least because the parliamentarians had money whereas the main 
Group did not. In parliament, paper and photocopying were free, notices of meetings 
could be distributed internally, and there were neither staff to pay nor newsletters to 
print. Despite this, some 50 parliamentarians paid LIO a year, allowing the build-up of 
a useful reserve. On one occasion, when the central organisation had difficulty 
212 Steering Committee minutes, 19 March, 21 May and 4 June 1986 (DRWI/3); Student Solidarity News, March 1986. 
233 DRIVI/3. 
2: 4 By-election 10 April 1986: Labour 16,45 1; Conservatives 12,948, SDP (Roger Liddic) 6,953. 25 PLP papers, 29 October 1986. 
209 
Chapter]] Labour Solidarity Campaign 
financing the Conference Rally, Goudie asked the MPs' treasurer, Weetch, for E300 for 
this, leading to a "cool" exchange of letters, a meeting of the respective officers, and - 
finally - the cheque 
286 
. 
In late 1986, there was more discussion on the future of Solidarity, with another Spellar 
paper which identified current work as: OMOV, Militant and Shadow Cabinet 
elections. The Group comprised: an NAC, Steering Committee, Parliamentary 
Solidarity, trade union group 287 and some regional groups. He attributed the fall-off in 
local activity to the fact "that as the NEC is dealing with Militant and that the Party is 
getting its act together". Nevertheless, he saw "the need for an organisation to 
determine the slate and to send out information". Solidarity had kept many people in 
the party who had been "disillusioned and horrified" (especially 1981 to 1983), and 
these members were now putting their effort back into the party. Spellar therefore 
289 
posed the future as concentrating on local groups or on providing information . 
With Militant having been defined as ineligible for membership, and its leading lights 
expelled, the party set up the NCC in response to a judicial ruling that the NEC should 
not be both 'prosecutor' and 'judge/jury' in cases of alleged breach of rule. The NCC 
started work early in 1987, with a healthy Solidarity/St Ermins majority. However, 
some in the Group (such as Dunwoody) remained concerned about other groups which 
could replace Militant and mused over reintroducing a 'proscribed list' as had existed 
until 1973 (members of any organisation on that list were automatically barred from 
party membership). A paper was prepared for the Steering Committee 289 , but attention 
turned to the forthcoming election and the future of Solidarity, especially in view of its 
funding problems 290 . While the future of the Parliamentary Group seemed assured (and 
possibly increasing in influence 291), without a higher profile and regular newsletter, the 
main Solidarity Campaign was not viable (although it had notably longer tentacles into 
the party than the rival Campaign Group). 
286 Letters from Goudie to Weetch, 8 November and 18 December 1986 (DRIVI/3 and DRIVI/26). 297 Actually the St Ermins Group's members. 298 JSA. 
299 JSA. 
290 Solidarity 1987 AGM papers (DRIVI/3). 
291 "If the split between the Tribune and Campaign Groups continues, the next PLP will see the broad Left majority.. whittled away from the soggy end Of the Tribune group until the Centre/Right 
absorbs enough of that to take control", Ken Livingstone, Tribune, 29 November 1986. 
210 
Chapter]] Labour Solidarity Campaign 
At the 1987 AGM, no fundamental decisions were made, although Hattersley's stress 
on the need forLhigher profile was endorsed and with it the continuation of a newsletter. 
Dunwoody replaced Anne Davis as Chair, an organiser (Andrew Cook) was added to 
the Secretary (Goudie) and a reformatted Steering Committee agreed, with 4 regional 
representatives, 4 from the parliamentary group, 2 from unions and one from Student 
Solidarity. The group dispersed, not to meet again until after the II June election. 
The election results were sorely disappointing, Labour gaining only 20 seats, leaving 
the Conservatives on 372 with Labour well behind on 229. There was not much to 
celebrate after eight hard years of opposition. The Moderates knew that further changes 
were needed within the party, not least in collaboration with the soft-left. Within a 
month, Spellar was pressing for closer discussions - even "amalgamatioif'- with 
sections of the LCC292 . The Steering Committee met as soon as the House was back, 
organising for the Shadow Cabinet. This was when disaster struck Solidarity: it lost 5 
of its 10 places 293 and was even shifted from its long-held pole-position. Bryan Gould, 
having masterminded the party's election campaign, topped the poll, with 163 of the 
220 votes, with Prescott and Meacher second and third. Solidarity managed only 4th, 
5th, 9th, II th and 14th place 294 
Thus not only was the general election worse than had been anticipated but: "We have 
a real crisis. For the first time in thirty years or more, the old, as distinct from the 
actual, Centre Right of the Party is not in control of the Shadow Cabinet,, 293. 
Throughout the Manifesto Group's history, its majority was assured, a situation 
continued under Solidarity whose slate had comfortably filled the bulk of the seats. 
Now the soft-left had eclipsed it. "On the NEC and on the Shadow Cabinet having the 
backing of Solidarity is now meaningless and both the Left and the Leadership can 
afford to ignore us" wrote a desperate Robertson. Not only had they lost 5 seats, but 
they had gone to those he characterised as "almost identikit Solidarity types - Gould, 
Brown296 , Dobson, Straw". Robertson felt the time had come to wind-up Solidarity. 
Given his key role first in the Manifesto Group and latterly Solidarity, it is worth 
quoting at length from his analysis of its successes and weaknesses. 
292 Steering Committee paper, JSA. 
293 Shore, Archer, Jones and Radice lost their seats (Healey did not stand). 294 PLP papers. 
295 George Robertson, "The Future of Solidarity", September 1987 (author's papers). 2" Gordon Brown - arriving there ahead of Tony Blair. 
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Recalling that Tribune had orchestrated the hounding of "honest, decent party 
members" when "the last Labour Government was being rewritten as worse than 
Ramsay McDonald'(sic) -, he went on: 
"Solidarity grew out of the .. revulsion in the PLP .. at the vicious, irrational, irresponsible climate in the post 1979 period. It built on the work 
of the Manifesto Group.. [and CLV and] as a defence organisation for 
beleaguered MPs, councillors and sane Party members. .. It stiffened people 
at a time of unprecedented pressure and vitriolic attack. Amid the 
defections to the SDP it kept the broad church of the Labour Party intact. 
Reselection would have been much bloodier without it, the SDP might have 
had other recruits, Benn would certainly have beaten Healey, the NEC 
would not have been regained [so] early.. and the 'dream ticket' would not 
have triumphed... Without Solidarity.. [the party] would barely have 
existed... During all that time.. the Tribune Group campaigned for 
mandatory reselection, against purging Militant, for Tony Benn (with the 
very 'bravest' voting for John Silkin), for giving the NEC the final say on 
the Manifesto, for the Electoral College and for the 40% to the 
unions ... Times have changed.. what was the soft Left, and which now 
controls the Leader, the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet,.. have assaulted 
Militant.. pushed ahead with OMOV and established [the NCC].. The real 
division.. is now between the Hard-Left and the rest... So, what is there 
left for us in Solidarity to do? With a number of our supporters slithering 
over to Tribune .. and .. espousing a line identical to ours, what is the point 
of us remaining simply as a 'Right' wing rump to prove that they are in the 
Centre?.. There is still a role and a future for our people. If Solidarity had 
not existed.. the Left would have ruined the Party. If we were to give up 
9297 then the resolution of the new image makers would soon fade' 
However, unsuccessful slates and small meetings were no response so he advocated a 
return "to the pre- 1976 298 position where there was no formal Centre-Right 
organisation", just a newsletter, links with the unions and Forward Labour and co- 
operation with some in LCC and Tribune to isolate and defeat the hard-left (particularly 
on OMOV). 
This was heady stuff but followed Spellar's suggestion of collaborating with the once- 
hated LCC. A Steering Committee was called for mid-September but, despite its 
importance, attendance was low299. Robertson's paper was leaked to the Sunday Times 
which ran it as "Labour right admits defeat"300. Brynmor John reassured members that 
the Group was "alive and well" although, 10 days later, the Steering Committee agreed 
297 George Robertson, op cit. 
298 Shorthand for the creation of the Manifesto Group, though it actually operated from 1974. 299 Steering Committee minutes, 16 September 1987 (DRIVI/3). 300 The Sunday Times, 18 October 1987. 
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to propose to that week-end's NAC that Solidarity "be dissolved .. [as] its objectives 
have been achieved", being replaced with a regular publication 301 . 
Spellar chaired what became the final NAC on Sunday I November at Swinton House 
when Goudie reported on the Steering Committee 302 . Most participants saw a 
continuing need for an organisation, Willy Bach warning "If we disbanded, we would 
be back to where we were in the 1970s". The Group represented the majority of Labour 
voters and needed to maintain contacts. There were internal elections - and reselections 
- to be organised. (There were reports that Prescott might challenge Hattersley as 
Deputy, which may have influenced people. ) Whilst some felt that, as Militant was 
receding, a looser grouping around a newsletter would suffice, others hankered after a 
machine which could organise. Former Number 10 staffer (and daughter of an MP) 
Jenny Jeger warned "If we close down the other groups will not" and stressed the need 
for a link between Westminster and what goes on outside. Spellar thought a re- 
emergent "Labour First" could encompass Solidarity and Forward Labour as a source 
of information to "our people". A lengthy debate led to agreement on: (1) a newsletter; 
(2) a skeletal national organisation meeting twice a year; (3) local groups where 
desired; (4) CLP mailings; (5) Parliamentary Solidarity for slates, and (6) Conference 
fringe meetings. A smaller Executive was agreed with representation from the unions 
(Spellar), NEC (newly re-elected Anne Davis) and PLP (Robertson) plus the newsletter 
editors and officers. 
The old Steering Committee endorsed those decisions the next day - though nothing 
more is recorded for 1987 other than the winding up of the West London Solidarity 
Group (its funds being sent to the centre). In February, the final bullet was placed in the 
barrel of the gun, with a letter from Dunwoody and Goudie to the mailing list. This 
sums up the achievements of the Group for which they had worked so hard: 
"Solidarity was born out of .. revulsion against the vicious and irresponsible 
climate.. Tolerance was under siege, moderation was under attack and the SDP was draining away support.. Solidarity stiffened the resolve of decent Party members at a time of unprecedented pressure and vitriolic attack. In 
many ways it was the decisive factor in keeping the broad church of the 303 Labour Party intact" 
301 Steering Committee minutes, 28 October 1987 (DRWI/3). 
302 NAC minutes, I November 1987 (DRIVI/3). 
303 Letter to Supporters, February 1988. 
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The letter repeated Robertson's list of achievements, adding the case for OMOV, and 
continued: Solidarity "has never been.. an alternative to the Party. Our success has 
been as a pressure point for sanity. .. Realignment .. 
is already under way and most of us 
want to be part of it". The letter invited views as to whether to continue or suggest 
ways to maintain "the pace of progress". 
The press picked up the story, quoting an unnamed member: "Our dilemma is that there 
are no battles left to fight. Kinnock is moving our way on defence, Europe and the 
economy and we've clobbered the nastieSi93O4 . Replies poured 
in, voicing the grass- 
roots' views of the organisation which was, almost to the day, celebrating its 7th 
birthday. All but 5 of 29 responses called for Solidarity to continue, some prompted by 
the Benn-Heffer challenge to Kinnock and Hattersley: 
"as there is to be a struggle for the Leadership I hope it will remain active 
Whilst I cannot envisage leaving the party, should the superannuated 
nobleman and/ or the ancien terrible have any success .. my activity may be 
confined to paying the minimum sub". 
"I would hope.. Solidarity.. continues its tolerance and moderation.. we 
have now seen the intentions of the left-handed supporters as envisaged by 
Benn and Effer (sic) ... it is imperative that Solidarity remains .. to 
counteract these". 
66although we have won some important battles the war has still got to be 
won! The leadership campaign.. emphasises the need for fresh support for 
Neil Kinnock.. against the hard left Campaign Group". 
"I was of the opinion that it would be better to wind up.. as we had won the 
battle against the 'head-bangers' but .. it would be better to keep the public informed until after the contest". 
"PLEASE KEEP GOING". 
"the threat from infiltration and Militant remains .. 'Eternal Vigilance is the 
price of Liberty' .. continue". 
"Solidarity is still useful as a pressure group for .. OMOV. (How many 
party members will feel frustrated that they have no vote in the forthcoming 
leadership/ deputy contests? ).. Will it not be necessary to support Roy 
Hattersley's candidature? " 
64carry on.. We have always to watch the " far-left' and we have to be.. 
ready to challenge them .. It would be .. a sad day" if Solidarity ceased. "Now Benn and Heffer have decided to contest the leadership.. Solidarity 
should continue.. to ensure victory for Kinnock and Hattersley". 
"Labour Solidarity is needed.. the hard-left are mobilising". 
"there is a need for more solidarity .. to rally support against the attack from Benn, Heffer and their Militant supporters. We should not sit back and 
count our successes. .. continue .. for tolerance, moderation and above all 
saniff'. 
304 Sunday Times, 21 February 1988. 
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"The NEC changed because some unions have become 'less left' .. but the 
heart of the.. Movement.. has hardly changed.. mainly 'left orientated.. 
Solidarity must be re-vitalised". 
66we can feel .. pride in what 
has been achieved in thwarting the attempts 
of those who sought to highjack our Party. It is easy to forget the threat 
which faced us in 1981 when the infiltration from Militant was very real. 
To the eternal credit of those who formed Solidarity that the threat has 
receded. However it has not been routed .. The decision of Tony Benn and 
Eric Heffer .. could give a 
boost to the extreme left. Therefore.. remain.. 
and.. support Kinnock and Hattersley". 
A CLP women's section "admired the efforts put into the Solidarity for the benefit of 
the Labour Party. It.. must.. carry on". From Liverpool, where Militant had pushed 
out members, 
"these people are still in charge.. Now we have a leader who is bringing the 
Party back to its senses and we are proud to call ourselves Labour.. We all 
want to see .. OMOV .. we see once again 
the stupid antics of the left in 
proposing Benn and Heffer .. they 
don't want.. a Labour Goveniment". 
Two long-standing party members had similar views, W. A Herbison hoping it would 
continue as "I have found the info it has provided helpful at GMC". Maýorie Durbin 
wrote "its excellent work should not yet be abandoned.. Its main objective (one 
member, one vote) has still to be attained". 
Two Steering Committee stalwarts also wrote, Anne Davis saying "I thought the AGM 
had agreed that we should continue with the newsletter and occasional meetings and 
support for local activity.. I don't think we can sit back and feel secure"; Barbara 
Hawkins wanted to: "continue .. as a broader federated structure of like minded groups 
.. the battle 
for sanity has still to be won". 
Sandwell Solidarity's view was that: 
"We must continue.. Our task is far from complete, witness the Benn, 
Heffer challenge.. The left are waiting to seize the reins of power.. The 
left must be swept aside or the possibility of becoming the Government will 
never be achieved .. The Kinnock/ Hattersley support within the N. E. C. is 
not because of a change of heart among party members.. but because some 
T Us have become less left .. the left is still .. predominant. So the need for Solidarity.. is greater". 
Four MPs favoured continuing, with defeated Shadow Cabinet member Archer, ruefully 
acknowledging that: "the Solidarity 'slate' no longer has a function in PLp elections.. 
However.. there is a need for a forum within the PLP for discussions [for] those who.. 
would not be at home in the Tribune group... Secondly.. there is still a job to do at 
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constituency level we need some mechanism by which MPs visit.. areas where 
mainstream Labour people feel isolated". Boothroyd wrote "I would like to see it 
remain.. as would other Blackcountry friends"; Bruce Millan: "I have been very 
reluctant to accept the proposition that Solidarity .. should be wound up". Finally, 
Parliamentary Solidarity Chairman Bryntnor John: I cannot accept the relatively 
benign view you have taken of the Party". Solidarity's problem was that some of its 
leading lights were more concerned about "who" rather than "what" the party was about 
and found themselves "in positions which they do not want to jeopardize and in which 
they feel perfectly cosy. That is why they feel the Party is in a much better state". He 
dismissed any idea of "realignment" especially when "the Tribunite Left, and 
particularly the leader, is constantly humiliating people in the Right and Centre .. the 
Labour Party is becoming jelly. No one knows what we believe in". The Group should 
contest the battle for ideas as "there is still a large element.. wedded to unreality". 
In addition, there were five letters in favour of winding up, two drawing different 
conclusions from the Benn/Heffer challenge. One felt that ending Solidarity would 
"put the current leadership election challenge in its proper perspective" whilst David 
Bean wrote "the time has come .. with 
dignity and honour, to call it a day. The .. 
leadership elections make this more.. urgent. If Roy is to win it can only be as the 
candidate of the whole Party, not as a factional candidate". The remaining letters read: 
"the Labour Party has overcome most of the difficulties.. [so] there seems little point in 
continuing"; "thejob has beenjust about done", and lastly "Solidarity has done a fine 
job and achieved much .. 
it should stand in abeyance with 'trustees' .. to call it together 
should the need arise"305 . 
Solidarity's luminaries gathered in Hattersley's room to review the responses. A 
paper306 summarised these as: 
We should go into "abeyance". 
There is a need for an information network so that like-minds can know 
what is going on. 
There is a need for new thinking. 
There is a reluctance to keep a high profile organisation, the objectives of 
which are not clear. 
We should team up with non-Solidarity people who now accept what we set 
out to do. 
"' All letters: March 1988 (DRII/l/4). 
306 11 May 1988 (DRIVIA). 
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Some people want to keep an organisational structure - of slates, plans - but 
are hazy about how it could operate. 
Much of what Solidarity was founded for has been achieved - although 
some think more needs to be done, especially on OMOV. 
The paper proposed: 
That Solidarity be formally wound up and this (and this alone) be 
announced. 
That in I to 2 months a newsletter would be started with (a) news and gossip 
from the party; (b) articles on stimulating issues. 
That it have a new name. 
That it have an editorial committee, with a broad membership. 
That it organise meetings at annual and regional conferences. 
That this be announced at least one month - maybe more - after the wind up 
of Solidarity. 
The work of some core activists did continue, under the banner of a new "Labour First", 
which still exists today. At this stage, the then "owner" of that title - Brynmor John - 
had , by some misunderstanding, failed to receive 
his invitation to this crucial meeting. 
It was doubly unfortunate, given his firm views, that he was therefore absent when the 
decision to wind up Solidarity was taken 307 . But taken it was, with the Secretary writing 
, 308 to the party's General Secretary for a form "to de-register Solidarity' . She and 
Dunwoody wrote to all their supporters 309 , with thanks for their responses from which 
they concluded (despite the evidence above, but presumably based on discussions vAth 
the MPs): 
"the consensus was that now was an opportune time for a change of 
approach. We were created when the Labour Party seemed very likely to 
tear itself apart. Now - despite the conduct of a small unrepresentative 
minority - the overall determination is to re-create Labour as a party of 
government and to rally round the leadership .. We have therefore decided 
to dissolve the Labour Solidarity Campaign". 
After more thanks, they asked recipients to cancel their standing orders. Some money 
remained -; C200 - which Goudie then sent to the party 310 . 
That was not quite the end of Solidarity. The parliamentary wing had long held its own 
funds, in a separate bank account, where it then lay dormant for some years, recalled 
just in the memory of its last officers. Then something rather strange happened. One 
307 John letter to Goudie, 17 May 1988 (DRWI/4). 
3"' Goudie to Whitty, 17 May 1988 (DRIVI/4). 
'" Letter of 28 June 1988. 
310 Acknowledged by the party's head of finance, 25 July 1988 (Dpl-VI/4). 
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day, Dewar asked BeI1311 whether he would mind using the residue to help fund the bust 
of Nye Bevan, as the PLP had failed to raise the required E5,000. These two, plus 
Robertson and Weetch, agreed and so they - and Blair - in addition to the traditional 
Bevanites were present for the unveiling (which made "some people - notably Dick 
Clements - very croSS,, 
312) 
. The 1885 made all the difference and the story is 
deliciously summarised. in a note from Alan Haworth, the PLP secretary: "Thus did the 
heirs of Gaitskell contribute massively to the bust of BevaW'3 13 . 
Is that the greatest achievement of "the heirs of Gaitskell" - funding the bust of the 
once-reviled Bevan? Solidarity's brief life - 1981 to 1988 - witnessed a fundamental 
turnaround in Labour's internal dynamics, not yet obvious to the electorate, but 
encompassing the underlying changes which, I suggest, were needed to create what 
became, within 10 years, an election-winning machine. Solidarity could not claim sole 
credit. It was the St Ermins Group which produced the change on the NEC, although 
both helped defeat Benn for Deputy Leader. Before ranking Solidarity's achievements 
and failures, it might be useful to summarise its strengths and weaknesses. 
Its major single strength was (until 1987) its widespread support within the PLP. 150 of 
the 251 MPs signed the post-Wembley statement, attacking its composition. Whether 
this number, the 102 who attended the launch meeting, the 80 to 90 who consistently 
voted the Solidarity slate, or the 37 who paid their f 10 to Parliamentary Solidarity, is 
the correct gauge of its strength, Solidarity was the clear voice of the bulk of Labour's 
elected representatives. Added to this, the Group had support from most of the unions, 
was led by two acknowledged parliamentary performers (Hattersley and Shore), and 
was blessed with the ever energetic, dedicated (yet unpaid) Goudie. It abstained from 
policy and could therefore encompass a wide spectrum of opinion. 
Some its strengths were also its weaknesses. Its lack of policy denied it a cutting edge 
in the hurly-burly of political debate. The rivalry of its co-chairmen for the party 
leadership in 1983, as well Shore's refusal to campaign for Healey in 1981, left it 
devoid of clear direction. Other weaknesses stemmed from its lack of finance, early 
defections to the SDP, obstruction from party staff, and the timing of the Deputy 
Leadership election: too early in its existence to have reached a settlement with the 
31, Stuart Bell, interview, 22 January 2003, and Bell, op cit, p. 100. 312 Alan Haworth, 26 February 2003, communication to the author. 
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6soft-left'. Its biggest handicaps, however, were its right-wing image and the gulf 
between its views and those of party activists. It also had an internal weakness, never 
resolved, in the split between MI's and its ordinary members which reduced its ability to 
win hearts, minds or votes locally. It was hindered by the failure of its star names - 
Smith, Shore and Hattersley - to stand for the NEC. Even where CLPs could deliver a 
Solidarity vote, there was no slate to compete with the attractions on the Left. It had no 
figurehead to compare with the charismatic Benn. 
Furthermore, some of the trade unionists, in particular, who were working so hard in the 
unions - and sometimes courting unpopularity for it - questioned the cffort made by the 
MPs. Kinnock rcflccted this: "They really didn't like way politicians, or some of the 
politicians, took stances and got attention but took no risks. That was one thing. But 
the main thing was what was common to Solidarity people other than [Giles Radice, 
George Robertson, Phillip Whitehead] and one or two others, they didn't put the work 
in. I repeatedly thought that was quite sensible, especially when I was driving to some 
meeting on a Friday night, and other people were putting their kids to bed. They didn't 
cover the ground. The other outfit [Solidarity] wouldn't do the work. No-one could 
ever accuse Giles or Phillip of not doing the work. Even if they weren't doing the GCs, 
they were writing the pamphlets and doing all the rest of it. But there were too many 
v9314 others who were dinner party and armchair - that's no bloody good to anybody 
Given these strengths and weaknesses, what were its failures and achievements? It 
failed in its initial aim - to reverse the Wembley formula. It failed to halt mandatory 
resclcction and was unable to get its candidates elected to the NEC (or NCQ - though 
Kaufman finally made it in 1991. It did not stop the NEC endorsing Militant 
candidates, nor see OMOV achieved in its lifetime. It neither won the "hearts and 
minds" of activists nor built bridges with the soft-left. 
Solidarity's achievements, however, were rightly acclaimed by Robertson and others in 
1987 and 1988, especially measured against the state of the party in 198 1. It stemmed 
the flow of defectors to the SDP, offered succour to beleaguered MPs and helped reduce 
the impact of reselection. It contributed to Healey's success in the Deputy Leadership 
contest, and to making the case for the retention of Clause V, leaving the Shadow 
313 Memo for PLP officers on "Nye Bevan Bust", September 1996. 
314 Neil Kinnock interview. 
219 
Chapter II Labour Solidarity Campaign 
Cabinet (or Cabinet) an equal say with the NEC over the manifesto. It articulated - at 
first virtually alone - the case for OMOV, and won that argument (its implementation 
coming later). Alone and against formidable opposition, it argued against Militant and 
maintained pressure for action. 
Its publications, fringe meetings - particularly its rally at conference - and regional 
activity helped keep otherwise isolated members within the party, reassured they were 
not alone. With a mailing list at one point over 6,000 (and later some 500 subscribers), 
it provided a presence on the ground, even if it could not compete with the long- 
established CLPD. Within parliament, Solidarity helped isolate Benn between 1981 and 
1983, and regularly won 9 or 10 places on the Shadow Cabinet from 1981 to 1986. By 
articulating the moderate case, it gave cover and rationale to what the unions were 
delivering on the NEC. Without continued pressure and authority from Solidarity, and 
the speeches of Hattersley and Shore, the union-created majority on the NEC would 
have struggled to push through the changes (including dealing with Militant) which 
were vital to Labour's re-emergence. 
So who is right in their quotes which open this chapter: Golding or Mitchell? The 
former ignores the role Solidarity played in keeping members in the party and the 
political cover it gave to the changes wrought by the unions, without which general 
secretaries might have found it hard to carry their executives. Mitchell is nearer the 
mark. The Manifesto Group failed to hold the PLP together, but at that stage had no "St 
Ermins" to effect the changes on the NEC - and no support from the likes of Mitchell. 
Before the SDP, it was those, like Mitchell, who refused to fight the hard-left who 
helped produce the schism which finally woke the party from its slumbers. It is clear 
whom Labour Leaders thank, as the names of today's Lords (Clark, Goudie, Graham, 
Woolmer, Radice, Robertson) testify. However, what both Mitchell and Golding omit 
is any recognition of what was happening in the constituencies, where it was the soft- 
left which was to mellow and take the reins, producing the PLP which shunned 
Solidarity for a younger, pragmatic, Kinnockite majority. Perhaps, without Solidarity, 
there might have been no party for the Kinnockites to inherit. 
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At the start of the Right's post-Wembley fightback, the only public indication of union 
activity was Forward Labour. Written, edited, produced and mailed by GMWU 
Official David Warburton', some 18,000 copies of this gestetnered, stapled 4 to 10- 
page, near-monthly newsletter were distributed over the its lifetime, to a mailing list 
growing from under 100 in 1981 to over 8002 by its final, 36th issue in January 1988. 
Despite Pearce's implication that Forward Labour was an organisation 3, in fact it was 
Warburton - albeit with a faithful group of about 20 party activists and trade unionists - 
who spread the message. 
Warburton's story is typical of many of the Right's stalwarts. As a young activist, he 
was a constituency secretary and agent, then rose to become a union national officer, 
retaining strong party links throughout his union career4. He was staunchly pro-Europe 
(and Treasurer of the "Trade Union for Europe" Group, alongside President Vic Feather 
and Secretary Grantham) and thus close to Jenkins and Williams from the 1975 
Referendum. Despite not being a general secretary, he was active in TULV (set up at 
the instigation of his own general secretary, Basnett), serving on the TUFL5 national, 
organisation and finance committees. He was thus well known to trade unionists and 
politicians, and would have been a prime catch for the fledgling SDP. 
That was not his style. Instead, as with his friends in St Ennins and Solidarity, he set 
out to help regain the party for his type of Labour. His method was the written word, 
producing a popularist newsletter to encourage members both to stay and to keep active 
in the party. He provided a mixture of information and intelligence, the listing of slates 
to be championed locally, together with large doses of humour - particularly trained on 
the "mindless left". Above all, he helped recipients of his - sometimes slightly 
scurrilous - yams know that they were not alone in their despair at the party's fortunes. 
1 
2 
Son-in-law of Frank Tomney, one of the first MPs deselected (in favour of Clive Soley). 
800 were distributed directly but recipients in unions photocopied it, bringing the circulation up to 
over 2,000, according to its editor (David Warburton, interview, 7 December 200 1; Forward 
Labour, Issue 32, March 1987). 
3 Edward Pearce, op cit, p. 557. 
4 And remains a Labour councillor today. 
5 It changed its name in 1993. 
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The intelligence comprised polling data and analysis 6, usually from David Cowling 7, 
together with what was happening in unionS8 , TULV or the TUC9, and a breakdown of 
conference voteslo. Warburton also monitored the Left's activities, revealing how 
"Labour Liaison 82" was pushing Atkinson and Wise for the NEC in an attempt to 
remove Kinnock and Lestorl 1. Individuals were singled out - such as Diane Abbott 12 
for saying "We are not interested in reforming the police, the armed services, judiciary 
and monarchy. We are about dismantling them and replacing them with our own 
13 
machinery of class rule" . Militant was well covered, with pieces on their activities, 
War Chest, record in Liverpool and the Left's "Greenwich Amendment" which sought 
to undermine the Register set up to deal with the Tendency 14 . 
Fire was also turned on the Conservatives, with campaigning material on the cost of 
unemployment, inflation, the Falklands War, the Franks Report into its origins's and 
"Big Business funding of the Tory Party" 16 . Former colleagues, now in the SDP, did 
not escape Warburton's pen 17. If his target was the government, and Labour's far-left, 
he could not resist the odd swipe at his own side. He chided Solidarity for being too 
Westminster-based and on one occasion accused the union-centred "Mainstream" of 
"paranoia"18. 
The satirical style clearly gave the author great pleasure, with snippets such as 
"Winning elections isn't all that important" (quote from a CLP delegate at Wembley), 
"Can we afford so Broad a Church? ", "Labour Councillors: Fellow Socialist or Puppets 
on a String", "The Invisible Miners" (noting that the NUM affiliated to the Yorkshire 
region of the party on 105,000 members - some 45,000 more than the number of miners 
in the Yorkshire coalfields), "Double Talk from Benn" (comparing what he said with 
6 For example in issues 3,6,9,10,13,16,19,20 and 22. 7 David Warburton interview. 
8 The AUEW in issue 2, TGWU in issue 19. 
9 Such as tipping Norman Willis to succeed Len Murray as General Secretary (issue 22). 10 Issues 12,18 and 23. 
11 Issue 10. 
12 Then a prospective parliamentary candidate. 
13 Issue 30. 
14 Issues 8,10,11,12,18,21,29 and 30. 
15 Issues 6,7,12 and 13. 
16 Issues 12,15 and 19. 
17 Issues 13 and 14. 
is Issue 26. 
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what he did), "God Bless the Sense of Wales" (the party's Welsh Conference having 
voted for an enquiry into Militant)19. 
Some was more knock-about: "Labour is OUR Party. 1982 must be the year to stop the 
Rot! There are 3 millionýo reasons why we must stop the wreckers", "Everybody's No 
I Carpetbagger - Leslie Huckster2l", "The Gospel According to St Mullins 
21)9, "Varley 
Vaults Ahead as Meacher stumbles" (the challenge for the treasurershiP), "Putting 
Teeth into Labour's Bite", "Fight Like Tigers - Against the Snakes"; "TRIB - 
ULATIONS! Yuk! Tribune Gets Worse" and "Hark the Herald" (about Ken 
D23. Livingstone's Labour Herald 
Warburton enjoyed indulging his taste in humour: "Militant is an objective voice in the 
Party. I believe that it is genuine in its support for Labour and seeks to influence views 
in the traditional style of socialism. I also believe in fairies and that the moon is made 
of cheese"; "Make Thatcher Governor of Falklands"; "I'll now ask Neil to give us a 
short address; Neil: 10 Downing Street"; "Mullin it Over"; "Twit of the Month". His 
"Small Ads Section" included offers of "The Smallest Book in the World - Democracy 
and the Militant Tendenq)ý', "Wanted: An Understandable Defence Policy. Send to 
SDP/Liberal Alliance Quickly"; "Lost: Grassroots support. Can you help the Rank and 
File Co-ordinating Tendency Factiorf' and "Rare Books - Around Europe on 60p a Day 
by Roy Jenkins and How to Win Friends and Influence People by A. Scargill 44 . It 
helped cheer up "the troops" and was surprisingly well received by local activists. 
From the start, Warburton used his journalistic contacts to best advantage, giving them 
early copies of each edition so that, retold on their pages, his ideas - and particularly the 
slates - reached a far wider audience than he could manage 
23 
- The slates in Forward 
Labour were similar to those of the St Ermins Group 26 and Solidarity - but this was the 
only outlet for the former which operated in secrecy. The slates proved vital in the 1984 
19 Issues 1,2,3 and 10. 
20 A reference to the number unemployed. 
21 A reference to Les Huckfield busily touring the country in search of a safe seat. 22 A reference to Chris Mullin, Editor of Tribune. 
23 Issues 4,6,7,10,11,13,14 and 17. 
24 Issues 2,3,5,11,13,18 and 23. 
25 David Warburton interview. See, for example, The SCotsman, September 198 1, The Times, 31 
26 
August 1982, The Guardian, 10 August 1984. 
So much so that Diana Jeuda's name, habitually mis-spelt in the St Ermins papers, similarly appears as "Jueda7' in Forward Labour. 
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battle for Treasurership, when Forward Labour was an early supporter of McCluskie 27 
(hitherto seen as a bit too left for some). Given that McCluskie's margin over the Left's 
Albert Booth was a tiny 48 '00028 (or 48 constituencies), he would not have won without 
the CLP support which Warburton helped build up. Nevertheless, only one in four 
CLPs voted for McCluskie 29 and his position remained tenuous for some years. In 
1986, Warburton styled himself "Convenor of Forward Labour Campaign for 
McCluskie" when the Treasurer faced challenges from Gavin Strang and Livingstone 30 
Even in 1987, with a near 5 million majority over Strang, the CLPs still voted for 
McCluskie's opponent by 311,000 to 272 '00031 - albeit an improvement on the 1984 
result. 
At times, Forward Labour ranged politically wider than the other moderate Groups - 
for example adding Lestor and Kinnock to its 1982 slate 32 , when the Left was trying to 
remove them for having abstained in the 1981 deputy leadership contest. In 1984, 
whilst endorsing Solidarity's Ashley and Kaufman, it suggested that Dalyell, Blunkett, 
Gould and Cook "might also be supported"33 . This was the first year Forward Labour 
had given support to Blunkett - according to Warburton, making this the first slate on 
which the future Home Secretary's name appeared 34 - However, by 1985 Blunkett was 
firmly on the slate, alongside Ashley and Kauftnan. At other times, there were bigger 
differences with Solidarity (Joan Ruddock35 appearing on Warburton's list in 1986, for 
example, in preference to Solidarity's Radice and Robertson 36). Success in NEC 
elections was widely trumpeted, though even as he celebrated Kinnock having the sort 
of majority on the NEC that Wilson, Callaghan and Foot as Leaders could only have 
dreamt of, Warburton nevertheless warned NEC members not to "rubber stamp" 
proposals emanating from Westminster 37 . 
Organisationally, Warburton played a key role in Healey's 1981 campaign, not least by 
assiduously courting the 19 small unions which had escaped the Bennites' attention, 18 
27 Issue 20. 
28 Tribune, 12 October 1984. 
29 Issue 23. 
30 Circular to Forward Labour mailing list, I August 1986, and Tribune, September 1986. 
31 Issue 35. 
32 Issue 11. 
33 Issue 23. 
34 David Warburton interview. 
35 Then Chair of CND. 
36 Issue 3 0. 
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of which voted for Healey. The Deputy Leader embarked on the campaign with 
virtually no organisation (as Radice, one of the only two other major players, confessed 
"otherwise I'd have hardly got involved. I'm an unlikely campaigner', 39 ). The Forward 
mailing list was the main source of contacts, especially as Solidarity was hesitant in 
backing Healey for most of the contest 39. Forward Labour was the only overt supporter 
for Healey - proclaiming "It's Got to Be Healey" straight after the Benn challenge 
emerged 40 . During the campaign, Warburton would meet Healey in the latter's Sloane 
Square flat every Wednesday to go through the figures, particularly adding knowledge 
from CLPs gleaned from Forward Labour contactS41 . Healey rated his organisational 
abilitieS42 , as did Kinnock for whom he also campaigned: "He was bloody good at 
organising. Pleasant bully with good left-wing background. Which he never 
relinquished. What a shame he's not got a bigger country to run - 'cos this guy is ultra 
capable""43. 
In the main, however, Forward Labour's strength was propaganda, not organisation 44 as 
it was very much a one-man-band. Its first issue, in March 1981, was sub-titled 
"Bulletin for Democratic Socialists"45. The theme of its first article was "The Road to 
Recovery", identifying its audience as the "main core" of the party who "share a 
commitment to defeating the Tories .. by, first of all, re-gaining our Party from those 
who have used it as a battleground for their own aims since May 1979". With a touch 
of self-flagellation, Warburton blamed his soul-mates as allowing the problem to 
develop by having "sought consensus whilst others relished conflict. We preached 
tolerance while others pursued intolerance. We sought rational discussion while others 
practised arrogance". The call to arms was to fellow members: "We - who represent 
the basic heart of the Labour Party - must put a stop to the nonsense which has done us 
so much harm". In a style more in common with the Mirror than the Guardian, a 2- 
inch square box simply urged: "If you think like a Socialist, Speak Out Like One! ". 
Headed "Naughty! Naughty! ", another snippet ironically chided lcft. wing MPs for 
criticising the Right for writing in "the capitalist press" whilst some of their own 
37 Issue 35. 
39 Giles Radice, interview, 26 November 2003. 
39 See chapter on Labour Solidarity. 
40 Issue 3. 
41 David Warburton interview. 
42 Denis Healey interview. 
43 Neil Kinnock interview. 
44 It never organised fringe meetings at conference, for example. 
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number were simultaneously using "such pro-socialist papers as the Times or the 
, 46 Guardian 
Forward Labour's ambition had been to reverse the Wembley formula; its launch issue 
detailed the voting pattern which led to the 40: 30: 30 outcome, which the majority of 
unions opposed, and indicated the shift needed to amend the proportions to 50% for the 
PU47 . As that objective disappeared, Militant became its prime target. This attracted 
widespread support, including from 56 MPs on its mailing lises although it was initially 
coy to name them. Nevertheless, gradually names appeared, starting with Callaghan, 
John Smith and Shore and adding Boothroyd 49, Dunwoody, Ashley, Jack Cunningham, 
Robertson, Summerskill, Golding, Varley, Woolmer, Archer5o, Hattersley, Radices' and 
52 half a dozen others, together with Gordon Adam MEP . In addition, some senior trade 
unionists were content to be named, including Duffy, Sirs and Tuffin. By the time 
Kinnock formed his first Shadow Cabinet, Forward Labour boasted that it was read by 
7 of theM53. 
Forward Labour was not slow to comment on political events, whether Warburton's 
own favoured cause of the Palestinians, or developments within the party. A central 
thrust throughout, though, was the need to win an election. Writing of the size of this 
challenge in 1985, he stressed that the party had to gain 117 seats, and increase its share 
of the vote from 28% to 40% - at a time when the opinion polls had Labour on 34- 
37%54 . Even after Kinnock's Bournemouth speech, with the Conservatives on 32%, 
Labour only managed 38%55. Following the 1987 election, when Labour won 229 
seats, the newsletter emphasised that the party had come second in just 153 and third in 
245, taking less than one third of the total vote 56 . 
Internal party issues - especially finance and publications - were regularly covered, 
with ideas for an elected Party Chair (chosen by conference) and a refonned NEC 
43 Changed to "Against Extremism" in issue 2. 
46 Issue 1. 
47 Issues I and 2. 48 Issue 5. 
49 An old family friend of Warburton, a GMWU-sponsored MP and a member of the NEC. 50 All these by issue 9. 
51 By issue 19. 
52 Issue 20. 
S3 Issue 19. 
34 Issue 28. 
55 Issue 27. 
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structure floated, and comments made on political flind ballots and the campaign 
strategy 57 . However, 
OMOV was only fully embraced after the 1987 election, and even 




Perhaps Forward Labour's most newsworthy achievement was its instigation, in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1983 election, of what became the Kinnock-Hattersley 
"dream ticket". Although this expression did not emanate from its pages, Forward 
Labour was the first to advocate that the two front-runners should stand for both Leader 
and Deputy Leader - each supporting the other for the number two position. Within 
days of the election, a new edition appeared headed "Labour needs a New Leadership" 
and balloting readers on their choice of candidate. The questionnaire polled views on 
all the likely candidates59 and offered a two-way balanced ticket of Hattersley/Kinnock 
or Kinnock/Hattersley. The 284 responses showed 232 (82%) in favour of the Unity 
Ticket option (with, on a straight choice, 43% for Kinnock, 38% for Hattersley and 13% 
for Shore - surprising for this anti-Left grouping). Of the 23 MPs responding (12% of 
the PLP), 10 went for Hattersley, 7 for Kinnock and 5 for Shore. Trade unionists voted 
42 for Kinnock, 39 for Hattersley and 8 for Shore. Forward Labour then pushed for the 
balanced-ticket, which united soft-left and moderate-right, carrying advertisements for 
both and criticising Meacher for opposing this Left-Right settlement, judging his 
election as Deputy to Kinnock would be "an unmitigated disastee16O. 
Despite the help given to Healey in 1981, and the support for Kinnock-Hattersley in 
1983, it was all to end in tears for Forward Labour and Warburton's own career in 
1988. At the end of 1987, as usual, Warburton gave an advance copy of the January 
issue to journalists. The Telegraph ran a major article on its "attack on Kinnock9s 
leadership"61 . Forward Labour's - for once signed - front-page story, "Make or Break 
Year? ", criticised Kinnock for making no major speech since the election and taking no 
initiatives, evidence of the distance between the leadership and movement which was 
"demoralising". The Leader's "low key" strategy was, the piece opined, an example of 
56 Issue 34. 
37 Issues 27,28,29 and 33. 
58 Issue 33. 
59 Hattersley, Heffer, Kinnock and Shore for Leader, plus Denzil Davies, Kaufman and Meacher for Deputy. 
60 Issues 16,17,18 and press release of 27 July 1983. 
61 Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1987. 
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either "bad advice or an excuse for lethargy"62 . Warburton's remarks attracted attention 
not simply because it was the post-Christmas quiet period, but because they emanated 
from such a Kinnock loyalist. An onslaught fell on Forward Labour's editor, well out 
of line with the mild rebukes of the offending article. It was just the excuse the new 
GMWU General Secretary, John Edmonds, needed to trim the wings of his number two 
and take political affairs out of his hands. Warburton resigned the editorship (which 
Basnett had tolerated and even encouraged) and resumed industrial, rather than political, 
responsibilities in the union. For a time after June 1988, the title continued under what 
was to become Labour First (mark two) which, based in theory at Brian Nicholson's 
address, took over the remnants of the dissolved Solidarity, continuing the numbering 
from the original and casting Warburton in the role of President. 
The original Forward Labour was never an organisation, so in some ways sits uneasily 
with the other chapters of this thesis. But it was the main communication between those 
Moderates seeking to change the party and a largish group of supporters within the 
wider movement. It helped promulgate slates, passed on intelligence, played a key role 
in the 1981 and 1983 leadership contests, added vital extra votes to those being amassed 
by the union general secretaries and "flew the flag" for party members for whom 
winning an election was central to their membership. As such, it was a tool in the 
armoury of the Moderates. 
62 Issue 36. 
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In 1979 when Labour lost the election after 5 years in power, few would have foreseen 
its internal wars and the electoral ravages that were to mark the latter years of the 20th 
century. Indications of future fissures were in view, but little to signal the dimension of 
the coming eruptions. The May 1979 election - following the Winter of Discontent - 
was portrayed in the media more as a result of a Labour Party-trade union rupture than 
as an indicator of an internal Party conflagration. Yet it was an internal re-formation 
that was occurring, with a sharp disparity between the PLP (where the moderate 
Manifesto Group held sway) and the activists (pushing a left-wing agenda) - and with 
no over-arching structure, encompassing the entire party tradition, to maintain 
equilibrium or to shape a constructive path forward. 
Earlier party splits - whether in the 1930s (over the government's response to the 
depression), in the 1960s (when CDS rode to the rescue over defence), in the 1970s 
(over Europe) - had been about policy. By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the Left 
had decided that the very nature of being in office, which caused leaders to betray the 
led, required constitutional changes to bring the government into line with party 
demands by making it accountable to the party at CLP and national level. Whilst the 
Left was not alone its is disappointment with the 1974-79 governments (about which the 
former Chairman of the Manifesto Group despaired both then and since), its recipe for 
change struck at the parliamentary/non-parliarnentary settlement within the Labour 
Party and served to fuel the self-serving and careerist tendencies of individual MPs, 
steering a number of them to choose their own future rather than the party's interests. A 
climate of fear developed which weakened the parliamentarians' response to the party's 
move away from electorally attractive policies and conduct. Whilst the constitutional 
proposals reducing the MPs' role encompassed the Electoral College and control over 
the Manifesto, it was reselection which had the greatest effect. This undermined the 
authority, job security and hence confidence of each MP. They were, in a word, 
frightened. The Manifesto Group was weakened by being right-wing, and pro-Europe; 
then the climate of fear forced it (and Labour First) to keep its membership list secret. 
This only added to the pressure on any MP identified with such a grouping. Some of 
Manifesto members even resented the creation of its CLP-based sister organisation, 
CLV, as this drew attention to the Moderates' existence. 
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After the loss of office in 1979, any semblance of party unity fell away. A downward 
spiral led to more public disagreements, further weakening the standing of the PLP. 
Then, as the trigger to the biggest split the Labour Party has ever seen, the adoption at 
Wembley of an Electoral College to select the party leadership drew the (unpopular) 
unions into a more public parliamentary role whilst downplaying the responsibility of 
elected MPs. The aftermath of Wembley is seen in the Limehouse Declaration and the 
SDP, but away from the media's gaze equally significant groupings (as far as the 
Labour Party's internal dynamics were concerned) were being created within a mile of 
the House of Commons. One was the St Ermins Group, the other Labour Solidarity 
Campaign. Both were unlike what had gone before and both have been virtually 
airbrushed out of history books. Philip Gould2 claims that it was the "modemisers" who 
saved the Labour Party3. One of those modernisers, Peter Mandelson, believed "it was 
the transformation, the rebirth of the Labour Party over the last two or three years" that 
finally clinched the victory for Blaif"4. More recently, the Fabian Society's then Chair, 
Paul Richards, whilst chastising those who date Labour Party history from 1997 (orjust 
possibly 19945) claims that "Kinnock began the long march back to electability" in 
1983 6. Neither Gould/ Mandelson nor Richards give us the full story. Gould fails to 
distinguish the party's presentation and policy modernisation from the earlier requisite 
political changes which facilitated these. Richards is nearer the truth, though Kinnock's 
modemisation owes much to the traditional Right (his opponents in his earlier 
incarnation). This thesis does not argue that the Groups studied here were the solc 
saviours of the Labour Party as an electoral machine. It does argue that they made their 
crucial - necessary if not sufficient - contribution to saving the Labour Party between 
1981 and 1987: a contribution which has hitherto been undervalued and underestimated. 
As the preceding chapters relate, the march on Militant, the changes in the composition 
of the NEC (which delivered for Kinnock the majority he required for his reforms) - 
and indeed the delivery of Kinnock over Hattersley - were all begun before 1983 and 
I Giles Radice interview. 
2 Pollster, and adviser to Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair, now Lord Gould of Brookwood. 3 Even subtitling his book "How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party" - this being code for Blair, Brown, Mandelson and, of course, himself, Philip Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, Little, Brown, 1998. 
4 Anthony Bevins, Independent, 2 May 1997, p. I. (However, in 1990 Mandelson said "We have now cffectively completed the building of the new model party.. now geared to the realities of government rather than the illusions of opposition", Guardian, 16 February 1990. ) When Blair was elected Leader. 
6 Paul Richards, "Why study Labour history" in Labour HiStory, 2003 (Autumn 2003), p. 3. 
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owe more to a band of trade unionists than to the pollsters, advisors or parliamentarians 
who subsequently closeted themselves around Kinnock, Smith and Blair. Alone 
amongst these three leaders, Smith had spoken up against the Electoral College and 
other constitutional changes and participated in "saving" the party during its darkest 
days. Even Smith played his most notable role only later when, as Leader, he oversaw 
the final introduction of OMOV. Earlier, he failed to exploit his popularity, declining to 
stand in the annual beauty parade of the NEC elections. Instead, it fell to the heirs of 
the 1900 trade union leaders, who had in their time recognised the need for power in the 
House of Commons, to re-assert the centrality of the need to win power into the party's 
thinking and to provide some leadership. Both the NEC and the parliamentarian 
leadership had failed to give this lead, the parliamentarians concentrating initially on 
being in government and subsequently on opposing Thatcher, dealing with the 
Falklands and the miners' dispute, and responding to the SDP challenge in the 
Commons. 
The major change that happened to the Labour Party - the new political make-up of the 
NEC leading, inter alia, to action on Militant - resulted from the St Ermins Group's 
work and was neither conceived of, led by or, initially, even blessed by the party 
leadership. This is in contrast to CDS in the 1960s which worked on behalf of the 
Leader, and it is at variance with some of the academic writing on party dynamics and 
change 7. The St Ermins Group's intervention stems partly from the particular roots of 
the Labour Party, secured as they are outside of Parliament, from the desire of unions to 
have an elected presence in the Commons. Thus there was an external force on the 
party willing it back to electability and, when the party machine failed to respond, 
taking action to make the necessary changes. 
The group of trade unionists who rose to the challenge in the 1980s had much in 
common with their 1900 predecessors (and indeed with Ernest Bevin who played a 
similar role in 193 1). Most left school at 14 years of age and made their way up 
through their trade and trade union, being dedicated to the well-being of their fellow 
workers. In the preceding decades, old fashioned deference, allied with the unwritten 
66rules" of the Labour Party, meant that in the main such trade unionists left high 
politics, and policy, to the politicians. That changed during the Wilson and Callaghan 
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years, when NEC-government relations worsened, as the union movement (with its own 
disappointments in those governments) ceded influence to the left-wing MPs on the 
NEC, allowing the party machinery (kept under leadership influence under Gaitskell 
and initially under Wilson) to slip away. 
Partly under pressure from radicals in their own unions, the 1970s generation of union 
leaders failed to discern within CLPD a more fundamental attack on the party structure 
and dynamics than mere expression of left-wing policy. Furthermore, from 1979, union 
leaders' attention was focused on industrial priorities as Thatcher's privatisations, 
public sector contraction and increased unemployment created a full-time agenda for 
them. However, from the late 1970s, a newer group of union leaders, who were to 
metamorphose into the St Ermins Group, were beginning to meet even before the 
cataclysmic events following the Wembley conference. Wembley was less the trigger 
for the organisational response8 than was the creation of the SDP with its electoral 
threat. This gave rise to the SDP's subsequent claim that it took their defection to bring 
the party to its senses. In fact, Foot's election as Leader in 1980 - when the moderate 
majority in the PLP failed to deliver for Healey - was the trigger for the party's 
electoral misfortunes and hence the unions' organisation. 
It is, perhaps, surprising that the PLP - which was to experience directly the electoral 
consequences of the party's troubles - was so ineffective at halting the whirlwind. The 
history of the Manifesto Group demonstrates how the Right controlled the PLP - except 
where their votes were obvious to CLP; s and where reselection meant that MPs could 
not ignore their activists' views. Ilius in the 1976 deputy leadership and 1980 
leadership ballots and in 1980/81 when the PLP gave way over the Electoral College 
(though opposed to the device, neither the PLP nor the Shadow Cabinet took on the 
arguments), the moderate majority was unable to capitalise on its advantage. Indeed, its 
success in internal elections only emphasised the disjunction between the PLP and the 
NEC, there being almost no overlap between the MPs elected by their colleagues, and 
those chosen by CLPs for the NEC. The NEC/PLP divide, which started under Wilson, 
worsened by the year. Thus from 1979, the PLP's standing in the wider party and its 
internal insecurities meant it was near neutered, whilst the unions' attention was 
For example: "political parties do not respond with changes unless their leaders order them to do so", Frank L. Wilson, op cit, p. 275. 
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elsewhere. It took some outside force - in this case the moderate unions - to have the 
courage and determination to break the impasse, as the MPs were not up to the task. 
Labour Solidarity - created after Wembley and the loss of MPs to the SDP - sought to 
make up for the shortcomings of the Manifesto Group. It was politically more broadly 
based (including Shore, Mitchell and O'Neill), had a higher public profile (spear-headed 
by Hattersley and Shore), a membership beyond parliament and a programme of events 
outside Westminster. Unlike the Manifesto Group, its public profile was evidence that 
it was fighting back, the former's few writings being more academic than polemic, 
more persuasive than rallying. 
However, Solidarity contained weaknesses: the absence of policy (a severe handicap in 
a party of policy and at a time requiring a positive agenda); a "re-tread" image as it 
lacked young spokespeople; insufficient local presence; and, above all, a political stance 
out of line with the activists in the wider party. Its inability to engage with and 
persuade party activists - key to any grouping seeking to lead a political party - 
repeated the shortcomings of the Manifesto Group and denied it any success in the CLP 
section of the party's NEC. Solidarity failed to achieve even its first objective - to 
reverse the Wembley Electoral College formula - partly because Benn's challenge saw 
it used so quickly and partly because Healey won under the very formula reviled by its 
opponents (largely thanks to those unions whose influence had been so feared but 
whom, in reality, were no Bennites). However, Solidarity largely failed in this original 
objective because there was no appetite for change. Solidarity had other weaknesses, 
such as the lack of a single, charismatic figurehead coupled with the disadvantage of 
having to promote the unpopular Healey in 198 1, and it was weakened up to 1983 by its 
two co-chairmen fighting for the ultimate crown. Its concentration on Westminster and 
Shadow Cabinet elections rather than the party in the country made its relations With the 
all-important unions difficult. As one of the key players in St Ermins, Godsiff, has 
commented "the vast majority of subscribers to the Solidarity Group were MPs who 
were fearful of their own political careers rather than actually wishing to organise the 
fightback at a local level against the Bennites and Militant or to offer an intellectual 
position to challenge the hard-left's view of the world'19. Solidarity MPs, like their 
The significance of the Electoral College, now universally accepted, was at the time much exaggerated. 
Roger Godsiff, interview, 27 November 2003. 
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colleagues in the Manifesto Group, also failed to understand the depth of hostility of 
younger party members to the old guard, whether in parliament or in the unions. The 
very strengths of trade unionists (long serving, loyal, cohesive) were seen as the 
weaknesses of "old, white, men" by the post-1960s student generation now active in 
inner city partieslo. It was a dialogue of the deaf, with old and new barely talking, much 
less understanding each other's perspective. Solidarity showed itself as unable to treat 
with these new circumstances as was the older parliamentary leadership. It was 
therefore not able to provide the dialogue so needed by the party. 
Despite these handicaps to Solidarity's success, it did have a number of achievements 
even if not quite those summarised described by some MPs' 1. It did succeed in offering 
support to Moderates and provided the only public arguments against Militant and in 
favour of OMOV (which would in due course transform the party). Unlike the 
Manifesto Group, it did attempt to take the debate outside Westminster, and it did 
furnish grassroots members with ammunition and courage to take on the Left, though it 
is possible that Forward Labour's 18,000 copies did more to raise morale than the 24 
issues (perhaps 20,000 copies) of Solidarity's slightly more staid newsletter. 
The Group of Ten 12 was not able to carry this coalition forward nor was Solidarity; it 
had to await the 1983 electoral disaster 13 for even Labour First, let alone the Tribunites, 
to join Solidarity. Even then it failed to attract new MPs to its ranks. It is notable, for 
example, that Blair and Brown joined Tribune, not Solidarity in 1983 (particularly 
surprising in Blair's case as he had been an early Solidarity supporter, was a close legal 
colleague of James Goudie and Derry Irving, a family friend of Mary Goudie and has 
not emerged since as a typical Tribunite). However, this might be explained by old 
fashion ambition and careerism. Even a serial "non-joiner", like Bryan Gould, realised 
he had to be on someone's slate to get elected to the Shadow Cabinet; so he signed up 
for Tribune 14 . He, Brown and Blair vxteall to achieve rapid success in this ambition, 
further proof of the need to hunt with the pack. 
10 Sue Goss, op cit, Matt Tee interview. 
11 see Austin Mitchell's quote at the start of the Solidarity chapter, for example. 12 See p. 36. 
13 When Labour gained the lowest level of support since 1918, with only 27.6% of the vote, giving the 
14 
Conservatives a 144-scat majority. 
Bryan Gould, interview, 16 December 2003. 
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Because Solidarity could not break the Left's hold on the party machinery, it was left to 
those outside Westminster to make the changes. We therefore return to our story of 
those trade unionists who started meeting before Wembley but, immediately afterwards, 
congregated in the St Ennins Group and decided that the priority was taking control of 
the NEC and then to fashion the party outside of the House into an election-winning 
entity. This would mean expelling Militant, changing head-off ice personnel and 
concentrating on winning back public support. Their first service to the party was not to 
defect in the aftermath of Wembley; their second had been to take control of the NEC 
by 1982; their third was to help deliver the leadership to Kinnock in whom they saw 
someone equally committed to the task of returning to government. The story told here 
shows how much effort went into this venture - at least 100 hours of business meetings 
between 1981 and 1987 - but also demonstrates the trust, discipline and organisational 
planning needed to deliver the conference votes. This was done in secret and for no 
ulterior motive. Whilst some of their number do now sit on the red benches, most of the 
names remain unfamiliar to even the Cabinet let alone the wider world. 
Whilst, as documented in the thesis, there was a phalanx of union leaders whose 
determination allied with their standing in the union movement enabled them to amass 
the necessary votes, there were two other elements which assisted the process. One was 
the undoubted arithmetic clarity and accuracy possessed by APEX researcher Roger 
Godsiff, who supplied the tactical path for his union masters to tread. The other was the 
particular role played by the EETPU. Frank Chapple (having already seen off the 
communists in his own union) and later Eric Hammond provided clear direction, as well 
as their boy Friday in the shape of John Spellar. The latter, backed by the support of his 
bosses, was able again and again to deploy the resources of the EETPU to service or 
subsidise the activities of the various groups described in these pages. Whilst the ISTC 
provided the venue for the St Ermins Group (as well as for the Solidarity National 
Advisory Council, Labour First Mark Two and Londoners for Labour), it was the 
EETPU which provided the envelopes, postage, printing and equipment for Solidarity, 
plus staff time and postage for Londoners for Labour, Labour First Mark Two, 
Mainstream and another small grouping (not covered here), Labour Defence and 
Disarmament. APEX similarly provided printing, supplies and staff time for Solidarity, 
St Ennins, Londoners for Labour and the reborn Labour First. Godsiff and Spolar 
often despaired of the politicians in Solidarity but never refused the wherewithal for 
them to do theirjob. In addition, each put, in hours of their own time to contribute to 
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Solidarity's successes. Whilst Spellar has reached high ministerial office, Godsiff has 
been ignored by the party - perhaps partly embarrassed by the role many of its current 
leading lights were playing whilst he was contributing to the saving of the Labour Party. 
The St Ermins stalwarts had another characteristic: they did not believe in taking 
prisoners. Just as one of their number, John Golding, was content to allow the party to 
fight the 1983 general election on as left-wing a manifesto as Benn wanted, so that 
blame for the ensuing defeat could be comfortably hung round the Left's neck (true 
vengeance for the 1979 defeat having been blamed by the Left on Callaghan's timid 
manifesto), so others believed that dealing with the soft-left was time wasted's. In other 
ways, they were flexible and could deal with the union Left, being willing to vote for 
even far Left candidates in NEC elections where this could produce resulting votes for 
their marginal candidates, or where such a vote would make no difference to the 
outcome. The centrality of each decision was the outcome. Having decided that control 
of the NEC was crucial, they set about amending the way the TUC General Council was 
elected (partly as a good thing in itself, but partly to free up the negotiation of votes and 
particularly to release unions' dependence on the left-wing TGWU), whilst targeting the 
NEC seats controlled by the unions: the treasurership, the women's seats and the union 
section. They would if necessary support a left-wing candidate (such as Glenys 
Thornton in London) to untie another group (in this case the Co-op) from an alternative, 
and then use traditional practices - such as support for an incumbent - to lock other 
unions into position. Occasionally they would break unwritten rules, such as when the 
AUEW supported Eric Varley against their own member, Norman Atkinson. Once, 
when one of their number "went solo" and broke another tradition by failing to support 
the Triple Alliance, he was to pay the price of his ownjob as General Secretary of the 
NUR. The fact that many years afterwards Weighell still believed he had done the right 
thing for the needs of the party, is testimony to the group's conviction that the future of 
the Labour Party was more important than any single individual. This concentration on 
the sole aim of bringing the party back to "sanity" so that it could win elections enabled 
Is Godsiff commented that the Solidarity MPs spent "interminably long! ' trying to keep O'Neill - of whom he had never heard - on board while "the whole world was crashing around our cars", a priority he failed to understand, Roger Godsiff interview. 
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the group to function as a tight knit team despite their varying views on items of policy, 
from Europe and defence, to the Middle East 16 . 
The St Ermins unions thus achieved a crucial change in the NEC composition which 
was then used, firstly, to push through action on Militant, and subsequently to support 
the leadership which it had helped deliver to Kinnock. Would the Labour Party have 
survived without the Group and its accomplishments? It is easy to forget, when the 
current government has a majority of nearly 200, how close the Labour Party- with a 
mere 200 MPs and ongoing internal feuds - was to melt down. In the words of Bryan 
Gould: "There was a moment when it was touch and go. The Labour Party was at real 
17 
risk at one point" . In 1983, 
it came within a whisker of being eclipsed electorally by 
the SDP-Liberal Alliance. The implication was serious; as one respected commentator 
wrote at the time, outside of the big cities, the party "faced something that looks 
appallingly like terminal collapse in its support in much of the rest of Britain" 
18. To get 
some perspective of what happened to the Labour Party after that 1983 defeat, it is 
useful to look at the Conservative Party which faced a similar electoral disaster in 
199719. However, without the equivalent of the trade unions to ride to its rescue and to 
insist on the party re-focusing away from its core vote and existing members, and on to 
the wider electorate, the Opposition remained more like a rabbit fixated by car 
headlights. Having made no meaningful changes by 2001, the car ran over it all over 
again. By comparison, therefore, it is possible to argue that without the unions forcing 
the Labour Party to change, it could have continued its downward path. Certainly, more 
Mps would have peeled off had Benn - as was the wish of party activists - won the 
deputy leadership in 1981, a result denied them by the St Ermins Group of unions, 
Labour Solidarity, Forward Labour, and the soft-left abstainers. That further defection 
could have fatally wounded the party's chance of subsequent electoral revival. 
in other ways, the Traditional Right was much less successful in impacting on the party. 
They failed in the period covered to alter the party's policy on withdrawal from Europe 
and defence, and they remained unable to win constituency support for their NEC 
candidates. Solidarity also failed to match CLPD's tactical skill in using resolutions to 
16 Warburton was highly involved in the Palestinian cause; Clarke and Spellar equally devoted to 
Labour Friends of Israel. 
17 Bryan Gould interview. 
is Peter Kellner, New Statesman, 17 June 1983. 
19 Withjust 31.5% of the poll. 
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force its issue (OMOV) onto the conference agenda. Both this and the policy changes 
had to await Kinnock and Smith's leaderships. However, given the short timeframe 
over which these groups operated, and lacking support from the soft-left, it is perhaps 
forgivable that they failed to undo a decade's damage to the party structure. This thesis 
does not argue that the Groups studied here were the sole saviours of the Labour Party 
as an electoral machine. It does argue that they made their crucial - necessary if not 
sufficient - contribution to saving their Labour Party between 1981 and 1987 when it 
was desperately unpopular even to say aloud the things they believed in, let alone 
embark on the tasks they set themselves. Without a majority on the NEC, Kinnock 
would probably not have made his 1985 Bournemouth speech. Without their 
determined work on Militant, the expulsions might not have taken place. And without 
their clear focus on the need to win elections, for the sake of their members and the 
good of the country, it is doubtful whether the party, within a decade of the 1987 
election, could have soared to its electoral heights. 
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David Watkins MP for Consett 
Ken Weetch MP for Ipswich MP and former PPS to Bill Rodgers 
James Wellbeloved MP for Erith and Crayford 
Phillip Whitehead MP for Derby North. Now MEP for East Midlands 
Fred Willey MP for Sunderland North 
Alan Lee Williams MP for Horrichurch 
Charles Williams Now Lord Williams of Elvel 
Shirley Williams MP for Hertford and Stevenage. Later MP for Crosby. Now 
Baroness Williams of Crosby 
Harold Wilson MP for Huyton and Labour Party Leader from 1963 to 1976. 
Prime Minister 1966-70 and 1974-76. (Later Lord Wilson of 
Rievaulx) 
Audrey Wise MP for Coventry South West (later for Preston) 
Ken Woolmer MP for Batley and Morley. Now Lord Woolmer of Leeds 
Jan Wrigglesworth MP for Teeside, Thomaby. Now Sir Ian Wrigglesworth 
Wayland Young Lord Kennet 
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Trade Unions 
Many of these unions changed their name during the period covered by the thesis, or 
subsequently. The names used in the text are those in use as at 1979. 
ACTT Association of Cinematographic, Television and Allied Technicians 
ASBSBSW Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths 
and Structural Workers (later part of GMWU) 
ASLEF Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
APEX Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff 
ASTMS Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
COHSE Confederation of Health Service Employees 
CONFED Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions 
CPSA Civil and Public Services Association 
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union 
FBU Fire Brigades' Union 
GMWU General and Municipal Workers' Union 
IRSF Inland Revenue Staffs Federation 
ISTC Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
NALGO National Association of Local Government Officers 
NGA National Graphical Association 
NUDBTW National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers (later 
merged with the TGWU) 
NUJ National Union of Journalists 
NULO National Union of Labour Organisers, 
NUPE National Union of Public Employees 
NUM National Union of Mineworkers 
NUR National Union of Railwaymen 
NUS National Union of Seamen 
NUTGW National Union of Tailor and Garment Workers 
POEU Post Office Engineering Union 
SOGAT Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 
TASS Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Staff 
TGWU Transport and General Workers' Union 
TSSA Transport Salaried Staffs' Association 
TUC Trade Union Congress 
UCW Union of Communication Workers 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
Trade Unionists 
Alf Allen General Secretary, USDAW (subsequently Lord Allen of Fallowfield) 
Cyril Ambler COHSE 
David Basnett General Secretary, GMWU 
Rodney Bickerstaffe General Secretary, NUPE 
Fred Binks UCw 
Arthur Bonner NGA 
Tom Bradley TSSA President (and MP for Leicester East) 
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General Secretary, ISTC. Now Lord Brookman 
General Secretary, ASLEF 
Research Officer, POEU 
Regional Secretary (Later Deputy General Secretary), 
GMVX. Now Lord Burlison 
General Secretary, FBU 
ASBSBSW 
General Secretary, EETPU. Now Lord Chapple 
General Secretary, IRSF 
NUM 
Deputy General Secretary, UCW, NEC member. Now 




General Secretary, USDAW. Now Lord Davies of Coity 
APEX 
NUPE 
General Secretary, NALGO 
President, AUEW 
EETPU 
GMWU. Now Member of the Scottish Parliament for 
Dunfermline East 
Moss Evans General Secretary, TGWU 
Roy Evans ISTC 
Sandy Feather ISTC 
Vic Feather General Secretary, TUC (later Lord Feather) 
Alex Ferry General Secretary, CONFED 
Alan Fisher NUPE 
Eric George NCU 
Ken Gill General Secretary, TASS 
Derek Gladwin Regional Secretary of the GMWU. Chair of the party's 
Conference Arrangements Committee (later Lord 
Gladwin of Clee) 
Roger Godsiff APEX (later MP for Birmingham Small Heath) 
John Golding POEU 
Joe Gormley NUM 
Nick Grant COHSE. Later Director of Communications at the Labour 
Party 
Roy Grantham General Secretary, APEX (formally CAWU) 
Walter Greendale TGWU 
Alan Hadden ASBSBSW, later GMWU 
Eddie Haigh N"UDBTW, later TGWU 
Eric Hammond EETPU 
Dianne Hayter GMWU, later Fabian Society, NCC and NEC. 
Neville Hough GMWU 
Douglas Hoyle ASTMS and MP for Warrington 
(Sir) Ken Jackson EETPU 
Tom Jackson General Secretary, UCW 
Clive Jenkins General Secretary of ASTMS 
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Diana Jeuda USDAW 
Jack Jones General Secretary of the TGWU, 1969- 1978 
Charles Kelly UCATT 
Bill Keys General Secretary, SOGAT 
Alex Kitson TGWU 
Jimmy Knapp General Secretary, NUR 
Gavin Laird AUEW 
David Lea Assistant General Secretary, TUC. Now Lord Lea of 
Crondall 
David Lipsey Former research assistant, GMWU (Special advisor to 
Tony Crosland MP; political advisor at 10 Downing 
Street). Now Lord Lipsey of Tooting Bec. 
John Lloyd EETPU 
Sam McCluskie General Secretary, NUS (Treasurer of the Labour Party) 
Len Murray General Secretary, TUC (later Lord Murray of Epping 
Forest) 
Ted O'Brien SOGAT 
Jenny Pardington TGWU 
Alan Quinn TGWU 
Reg Race NUPE 
Jack Rogers UCATT 
Richard Rosser General Secretary, TSSA. Now Lord Rosser 
Gerry Russell AUEW 
Tom Sawyer NUPE. Later General Secretary of the Labour Party. 
Now Lord Sawyer 
Hugh Scanlon General Secretary of the AUEW(Later Lord Scanlon) 
Arthur Scargill NUM 
William Sirs General Secretary, ISTC 
Alex Smith NUTGW 
John Spellar EETPU. Later MP for Birmingham Northfield; now MP 
for Warley West 
Bryan Stanley General Secretary, POEU 
Ken Thomas General Secretary, CPSA 
Syd Tierney USDAW, and MP for Birmingham Yardley 
Ron Todd General Secretary, TGWU 
Russell Tuck Assistant General Secretary, NUR 
Alan Tuffin General Secretary, UCW. 
Charles Turnock Assistant General Secretary, NUR 
David Warburton National Officer, GMWU 
David Ward NCU 
John Weakley AUEW 
Sid Weighell General Secretary, NUR 
William (Bill) General Secretary, USDAW 
Whatley 
Larry Whitty Former Research Officer, GMWU, former General 
Secretary of the Labour Party. Now Lord Whitty of Camberwell. 
David Williams COHSE 
Norman Willis TGWU- Subsequently, General Secretary, TUC 
Bob Wright AUEW 
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Annex3 1981 NEC Elections -Comparison between Roger Godsiff 
predictionsfor the St Ermins Group, and the actual results. 
thousands 
Godsiffprediclion Resul? Discrepancy 
Roy Evans 3,537 3,564 0.76% 
David Williams 3,462 3,433 0.84% 
Denis Howell 3,218 3,258 1.24% 
Betty Boothroyd 3,740 3,793 1.41% 
Tom Breakell 2,670 2,374 12.46% 
Gwyneth Dunwoody 3,593 3,725 3.67% 
Eric Varlcy 3,521 3,839 9.0% 
Norman Atkinson 3,454 3,252 6.2% 
Average 4.4% 
I October 1981 paper, EGA. 2 Report ofthe 1981 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party, p. 95. 
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Date Attend Location 
ance 
1981 
10 February 17 Charing Cross Hotel. 
24 March 9 St Ermins Hotel 
15 April St Ermins Hotel 
24 June St Ermins Hotel 
25 August St Ermins Hotel 
13 October 
25 November Swinton House (ISTC 
head office) 
All subsequent meetings at Swinton House, 
Grays Inn Road. 
1982 
26 January 11 
25 May 9 
6 July 8 
27 July 14 
24 August 10 
14 September n/a 
16 November 12 
1983 
11 January is 
22 February 16 
29 March n/a 
10 May n/a 
23 June 10 
26 July 14 
13 September 12 
1 November 13 
1984 
24 January 
21 February 12 
27 March 13 
9 May 11 
12 June 12 
24 July n/a 
17 September 12 
23 October 8 
18 December nfa 
1985 
22 January 10 
26 February n/a 
26 March n/a 
7 May 7 
18 June 9 
23 July 8 
10 September 10 
22 October 8 
26 November 12 
1986 
28 January 9 
25 February 8 
25 March 9 
22 April 7 
20 May 8 
22 July 11 
19 August 10 
23 September 11 
21 October 9 
25 November 7 
1987 
27 January 14 
24 February 11 
24 March 9 
28 April 10 
23 June 8 
21 July 12 
22 September 12 
27 Octobcr 8 
24 Novembcr 9 
Average attendance 10.5 
From: Minutes of Meetings, 
St Ermins Group archives. 
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Annex 5 Analysis of 1981 Deputy Leadership CLP Ballots 
60 CLPs undertook some sort of consultative balloti. 




Sutton & Chearn 70.8% 
Tonbridge & Malling 55% 
Woking 77.8% 
Average 73.04 





Average 8 8.6% 
Branch ballot 
Bromsgrove and Redditch 24% 
Carshalton 20% 
Derby North 53% 
Derby South 47% 
Durham n/a 
Pembrokeshire 30% 
Roxburgh, Selkirk & Peebles 40% 
Average 35.67% 
Branch ballot plus postal votes 
Aldershot 27.6% 
Newcastle North 50% 
Richmond (Yorks) 78.6% 
South Dorset 66% 
Average 55.55% 
From David Cowling, "One Member, One Vote: Deputy Leadership election 198 1 ", NBP. 
248 
Annex 5 Analysis of 1981 Deputy Leadership CLP Ballots 
Mass Meeting 
Altringharn & Sale 32.2% 
Cleveland & Whitby 33% 
Average 32.6% 
Mass Meeting plus postal votes 
Tiverton 45% 
Polling stations plus postal votes 
Wimbledon 39.6% 
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Manifesto Group Officers 
Chairmen: 
Dickson Mabon MP (1974 to 1986) 
John Horam MP (1976) 
Sydney Irving MP (1976 to 1977) 
John Cartwright MP (1977 to 1980) 
Giles Radice (1980 to 1983) 
Vice Chairmen: 
James Wellbeloved MP (1974 to 1976) 
Tom Urwin MP (1976 to 1983) 
John Cartwright MP (1976 to1977) 
Giles Radice (1977 to 1980) 
John Tomlinson (1978 to 1979) 
John Horam. (1979 to 198 1) 
Arthur Palmer (1981 to 1983) 
Secretaries: 
John Horam MP (1974 to 1976 
Ian Wrigglesworth MP (1976 to 1979) 
George Robertson MP (1979 to 1983) 
Treasurers: 
Neville Sandelson MP (1974 to 1980) 
Ken Weetch MP (1980 to 1983) 
(Parliamentary) Labour First Members' 
Donald Anderson MP 
Peter Archer MP 
Lord (Bill) Blease 
David Clark MP (Treasurer) 
Jack Cunningham MP 
Stanley Clinton-Davies MP 
Stan Crowther MP 
Arthur Davidson MP 
Terry Davis MP 
Bruce Douglas-Mann Mp 
Gwyneth Dunwoody MP 
Edmund Marshall interview Lord Clark of Windennere interview, David Watkins letter to author, 19 April 2004; and JGP. 
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Harry Ewing MP 
George Foulkes MP 
John Grant MP (Vice Chairman) 
Lord Gregson 
John Home-Robertson MP 
Frank Hooley MP 
Brynmor John MP (Chairman) 
Barry Jones MP 
Gerald Kaufman MP 
Tom McNally MP 
Edmund Marshall MP (Secretary) 
Austin Mitchell MP 
Alf Morris MP 
Charles Morris MP 
John Morris MP 
Martin O'Neill MP 
Barry Sheerman. MP 
Roger Thomas MP 
David Watkins MP 
Ken Woolmer MP 
Solidarity Initial Steering Committee (February 1981)2 
Roy Hattersley MP (Co-Chainnan) 
Peter Shore MP (Co Chairman) 
Ken Woolmer MP (Secretary) 
Austin Mitchell MP (Treasurer) 
Joe Ashton MP 
Stanley Clinton-Davis MP 
Arthur Davidson MP 
Donald Dewar MP 
Frank Field MP 
John Golding MP 
John Grant MP 
Denis Howell MP 
Gerald Kaufman MP 
Martin O'Neill MP 
Giles Radice MP 
Brymnor John MP. 
Added in March 1981: 
Jack Cunningham MP 
Ted Graham MP 
Barry Jones MP 
George Robertson MP 
Ann Taylor MP 
Steering Committee papers, February 1991 and 30 March 1991 (DRII/l/2). 
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Solidarity Organising Committee, February 19813 
Jack Brooks (Chairman) 
Arthur Davidson MP 
Terry Davis NIP 
Frank Field MP 
John Grant MP 
Denis Howell MP 
Austin Mitchell MP 
Giles Radice MP 
Ken Woolmer MP 
Roger Godsiff (APEX) 
John Spellar (EETPU) 
David Warburton (GMWU) 
Les Goodram 
Mary Goudie 
Solidarity Committee, March 1984 4 
Vice-Presidents 
Roy Hattersley MP 
Peter Shore MP 
PLP 
Donald Dewar MP (Newsletter Editor) 
Joe Ashton 
Stuart Bell MP (Secretary, Parliamentary Solidarity) 
David Clark MP (Vice Chairman, Parliamentary Solidarity) 
Donald Coleman MP 
Terry Davis MP, Chairman ( and Vice Chairman, Parliamentary Solidarity) 
Gwyneth Dunwoody MP (Vice Chairman, Parliamentary Solidarity) 
Brymnor John MP (Chairman, Parliamentary Solidarity) 
Barry Jones MP 
George Robertson MP 
Ken Weetch MP(Vice Chairman, Parliamentary Solidarity) 
From the regions 
Barbara Hawkins 
Paul Tinnion 
Richard Tomlinson, rice Chairman 
From the unions 
Sandy Feather 
John Golding MP 
Denis Howell MP, Treasurer 
Mary Goudie, Secretary 
3 JGP. 
4 Steering Committee minutes, 29 February and 21 March 1984 (DRII/l/3); letter from Spellar to 
Goudie, 24 January 1984 (DRII/l/28); Minutes of National Advisory Council, 25 March 1984 
(DFIVI/3). 
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Parliamentary Solidarity5 
Chairman 
Bryrunor John MP 
Vice Chairmen 
Gwyneth Dunwoody MP 
David Clark MP 
Terry Davis MP 
Ken Weetch MP (and Treasurer) 
Secretary 
Stuart Bell MP 
The "Group of log, )6 
Andrew Bennett MP 
Jack Cunningham MP 
Robert Kilroy-Silk MP 
Martin O'Neill MP 
Giles Radice MP 
Jcff Rooker MP 
Jack Straw MP 
Ann Taylor MP 
Phillip Whitehead MP 
Ken Woolmer MP 
List (DMI/24); Notes of NAC meeting, David Bean papers., Stuart Bell, op cit, p. 93. Giles Radice interview. 
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Peter Archer MP Labour First; Manifesto Group. Now Lord Archer of 
Sandwell 
David Bean Advisor to Peter Shore; Solidarity member. Now Sir David 
Bean 
ClIr Jeremy Beecham Solidarity. Leader of Newcastle City Council. Now Sir 
Jeremy Beecham 
Stuart Bell MP Secretary, Parliamentary Solidarity. Now Sir Stuart Bell 
Stephen Bird Labour Party archivist 
Arthur Bonner Londoners for Labour, TUFL 
Chris Bulford POEU 
Steve Bundred Former GLC member 
NiLk Butler Solidarity. Advisor to Peter Shore. 
Roger Carrol Former No 10 Advisor 
John Cartwright Former MP, CLV, Chairman of Manifesto Group, Member 
of NEC 
Jim Cattermole Former Labour Party Regional Organiser; CDS 
John Charlton CLV and Solidarity 
Patrick Cheney Political Advisor to Denis Howell MP 
David Clark MP Labour First Vice Chairman, and Solidarity. Now Lord 
Clark of Windermere 
Tony Clarke St Ermins Group, NEC. Now Lord Clarke of Hampstead 
Dick Clements Michael Foot's office; Neil Kinnock's office; former 
Editor of Tribune 
Gordon Colling St Ermins Group; NEC, Labour Party Chairman 
George Cunningham Former MP 
Jack Cunningham MP Solidarity; former PPS to Jim Callaghan 
Jim Daly CLV and RCDS 
Richard Faulkner Advisor to Sid Weighell; Solidarity. Now Lord Faulkner of 
Worcester 
Sandy Feather St Ennins Group 
FTz, nk Field MP OMOV; Solidarity 
Rýger de Freitas Beaujolais Group 
Derek Gladwin GMWU. Later Lord Gladwin of Clee 
Roger Godsiff APEX; St Ermins. Now Roger Godsiff MP 
Robin Gordon Walker 
Mary Goudie Labour Solidarity. Now Baroness Goudie 
Bryan Gould MP Tribune Group 
Mrs John Grant Widow of John Grant, former MP. 
Nick Grant Lambeth Solidarity; former Head of Communications at 
Labour Party 
Roy Grantham St Ermins; TULV 
John Gyford CLV, Solidarity 
Alan Hadden St Ermins, NEC, NCC 
Roy Hattersley Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, 1983-1992; Co-Chair 
of Solidarity, NEC, Manifesto Group. Now Lord 
Hattersley 
Alan Haworth PLP Secretary. Now Lord Haworth 
Denis Healey MP Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, 1980-1983. Now Lord 
Healey of Riddlesden 
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Richard Heller Advisor to Gerald Kaufman MP and to Denis Healey MP 
Joycelin Hobman Labour Defence and Disarmament Group 
John Horarn MP Manifesto Group Chairman 
Norman Howard TUPO; St Ermins Group, Solidarity 
David Hughes Former Labour Party National Agent; author 
Hayward/Hughes Report 
Chris Inman Solidarity employee 
Neil Kinnock MP Leader of the Labour Party, 1983-1992. 
John Lloyd EETPU 
Dickson Mabon MP Manifesto Group Chairman 
Edmund Marshall MP(by Secretary of Labour First 
letter and phone ) 
Tom McNally MP Now Lord McNally 
Prof Lewis Minkin 
Brian Nicholson TGWU, Londoners for Labour; Labour First 
Gerry O'Brien Former Labour Party Regional Officer, Solidarity 
Martin O'Neill MP Solidarity 
Topy Page Advisor to Gerald Kaufman MP 
Jenny Pardington TGWU, TULV 
Reg Race NUPE Official and subsequently MP for Wood Green 
Giles Radice MP Former GMWU official, subsequently MP and Manifesto 
Group Chairman; Solidarity, St Ermins Group. Now Lord 
Radice 
George Robertson MP Manifesto Group Secretary, Solidarity. Now Lord 
Robertson of Port Ellen 
Roger Robinson Labour Party staff 
Jeff Rooker MP "Group of Ten". Now Lord Rooker 
Chris Savage Solidarity employee 
Shprpas Political Advisors to the Shadow Cabinet, 1979-83: Tony 
Page [EricVarley MP], David Cowling [Peter Shore MP], 
Richard Heller [Denis Healey MP], Patrick Cheney [Denis 
Howell MP] 
Mrs Peter Shore (by Widow of Peter Shore MP 
phone) 
Bill Sirs (by letter) ISTC, St Ermins Group 
Bryan Stanley POEU, St Ermins Group 
Neil Stewart Neil Kinnock's office 
Jotin Spellar EETPU, St Ermins Group; Solidarity, Londoners for 
Labour. One time MP for Birmingham Northfield. Now 
MP for Warley West 
Matt Tee Tatchell Campaign Team, Bermondsey 
Bill Thomas National Union of Labour and Socialist Clubs 
Mike Thomas MP Manifesto Group 
Richard Tomlinson CLV, Solidarity, Co-Op Party 
Charlie Tumock St Ermins Group; NUR 
Alan Tuffin St Ermins Group; UCW 
John Wakefield Manifesto Group Research Off icer 
Peter Walker Red Wellies Club 
David Warburton Forward Labour; GMWU, TULV 
David Watkins MP Labour First 
Mike Watts Labour Party staff 
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Ken Weetch MP Manifesto Group Treasurer; Solidarity 
James Wellbeloved MP Manifesto Group 
Alan Lee Williams MP Manifesto Group 
Phillip Whitehead MP Manifesto Group. Now Member of the European 
Parliament 
Clive Wilkinson CLV Chairman; Solidarity 
Ken Woolmer MP Secretary, Solidarity. Now Lord Woolmer 
lari Wrigglesworth MP Manifesto Group Secretary; CLV. Now Sir Ian 
Wrigglesworth 
Phil Wyatt John Silkin Deputy Leadership Campaign 
Titles given in the left hand column refer to the positions held at the time of the events 
described in the thesis. 
With only one or two exceptions, the interviews were recorded and have been 
transcribed. The recordings and full transcriptions will be lodged at the Labour History 
Archive at the John Rylands Library, Manchester University. 
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CDS (1960s) Campaign for Democratic Socialism 
CLP Constituency Labour Party 
CLV Campaign for Labour Victory (1977 to 198 1) 
Clause Four Soft Left non-parliamentary grouping and newsletter 
CLPD Campaign for Labour Party Democracy 
_ EC Executive Committee (sub committee of a General Committee) 
EDM Early Dy Motion (in Parliament) 
EdA St Ermins Group Archives 
GMC/ GC The General Management Committee (later called the General 
Committee) of local Constituency Labour Parties 
IMG International Marxist Group 
IWP Sir Ian Wrigglesworth's Papers 
JGP John Grant Papers 
JSA John Spellar/ EETPU Archives 
LC Liaison Committee (of the PLP) 
LCC Labour Co-ordinating Committee 
LPA Labour Party Archive (Labour Archive Centre, Manchester University 
Library) 
LSC Labour Solidarity Campaign 
MGA Manifesto Group Archives (Labour Archive Centre, Manchester 
University Library) 
NAC (Solidarity) National Advisory Council 
NBP __ Nick Butler Papers 
NCC (Labour Party) National Constitutional Committee 
NCLC National Council of Labour Colleges 
NTEC (Labour Party) National Executive Committee (elected annually at 
Labour Party Conference) 
NEDC National Economic Development Council 
NULSC National Union of Labour and Socialist Clubs 
OMOV One Member One Vote 
PC Parliamentary Committee, or Shadow Cabinet 
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party (comprises Labour MPs) 
PPC Prospect ve Parliamentary Candidate 
PPS Parliamentary Private Secretary 
RCDS Radical Centre for Democratic Studies 
R&FMC Rank and File Mobilising Committee 
SDP Social Democratic Party 
SNAC Solidarity National Advisory Council 
SWP Socialist Workers Party 
TUFL Trade nionists for Labour 
TULV Trade Unions for a Labour Victory 




PERSONAL PAPERS and ARCHIVES 
David Bean papers (private collection). 
Nick Butler papers (NBP) (private collection). 
Lord (David) Clark of Windermere papers (private collection). 
Jim Daly papers (private collection). 
Bob Eadie papers (private collection). 
Sandy Feather papers (private collection). 
John Grant papers (JGP) (private collection). 
John Gyford papers (private collection). 
Alan Haworth papers (private collection). 
Dianne Hayter papers (private collection). 
Mike Parker papers (private collection). 
Charles Tumock papers (private collection). 
David Webster papers (private collection). 
Ian Wrigglesworth papers (IWP) (private collection). 
CLPD minutes and newsletters (personal papers). 
Labour Party Archives (LPA) in Labour History Archive, John Rylands Library, 
Manchester University. 
John Spellar/ EETPU Archives (JSA) (private collection). 
Roy Hattersley/ Labour Solidarity Archives, University of Hull. Box numbers are 
identified as DRIVI/2 etc. 
Manifesto Group Archives (MGA) in the Labour History Archive, John Rylands 
Library, Manchester University 
PLP Archives in Labour History Archive at the John Rylands Library, Manchester 
University. 
Radical Centre for Democratic Studies Archives (private collection). 
St Ermins Group Archives (EGA) (private collection). 
LABOUR PARTY REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS 
Report ofthe 1975 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report of the 1976 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Reporl of the 1977 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report ofthe 1978 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report of the 1979 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report of the 1980 Annual Conference ofthe Labour Party. 
Report of the NEC to the 1981 Labour Party Conference. 
Report of the 1981 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report ofthe 1982 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report of the 1983 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report of the 1984 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report ofthe 1985 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
Report of the 1986 Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
London Labour Party Report, March 1984. 
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